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The aim of this thesis is to critically evaluate Liberal Intergovernmentalism (LI) through the case study of the 
formulation of British defence policy (1997-2000) and the UK government's approach to European Security and 
Defence Policy (ESDP) negotiations (26 February -7 December 2000). LI has three core elements based around 
explanations of domestic policy formulation, intergovernmental bargaining and the transfer of sovereignty. Through 
the explanatory reach of these tenets, LI remains the leading explanation of European integration. Using an `as-if 
positivist methodology and extensive elite interviews with key policy makers, this thesis critically evaluates each of 
LI's three key propositions. This research argues that LI is unable to provide an accurate explanation of the 
formulation of British defence policy under-specifying where pressure for policy change comes from, the 
sequencing of policy formulation and the role and relationships between individual actors and government 
departments. However this thesis argues that LI effectively explains the negotiations at the Nice European Council. 
ESDP negotiations were as LI suggests, a rational process of governments bargaining to maximise their issue 
specific preferences. In terms of the process of negotiations, there is considerable interview evidence to indicate that 
ESDP negotiations were conducted through informal bi-lateral meetings between government negotiating teams and 
that the ESDP outcome was more than a lowest common denominator agreement as suggested by LI. Moreover LI's 
explanation of governmental motivations for the transfer of sovereignty are validated by the ESDP case study. The 
retention of governmental autonomy within ESDP made the transfer of national sovereignty easily achievable at the 
IGC negotiations. Overall the research therefore validates LI's approach, but indicates areas where its theoretical 
microfoundations need to be strengthened. 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
The aim of this thesis is to critically evaluate the leading European integration 
theory, Liberal Intergovernmentalism (LI). It does this through testing the micro- 
foundations of the theory through the case study of the European Security and 
Defence Policy (ESDP) and the UK government's approach to this policy between 
1997-2000. LI claims to offer an explanation of European integration from the 
formulation of domestic policies, the creation of national negotiating positions, the 
government's conduct during negotiations and the motivations for transferring 
sovereignty to the EU. This thesis applies LI to the Nice Treaty negotiations (from 4 
to 7 December 2000) within an examination of the UK government's approach to 
defence policy and argues that the UK government formulated domestic defence 
policy in a manner at variants with LI's prescription. 
To meet the overall aim of the thesis the following five objectives are pursued: first, 
it tests the three core foundation stones of LI, domestic policy formulation, 
international bargaining and why governments transfer sovereignty to international 
organisations through the development of UK defence policy between 1997 and 
2000. Within this first objective it then critically evaluates the theoretical micro- 
foundations that constitute the theory to assess the strength of LI through its each of 
its constituent components. 
Second, it assesses LI against its internal measures and comparatively against other 
leading European integration theories. Establishing a definitive version of LI is key 
to achieving this objective as Andrew Moravcsik has produced LI over eight 
different evolutions in various peer review journals and books over 11 years, from 
2 
1989 to 2000.1 Whilst LI was created by Moravcsik an argument advanced by this 
thesis is that its value and effectiveness is not intrinsically linked to him. The third 
core objective analyses to what extent does the concept of preference help to explain 
the formulation of UK defence policy and what implications does the UK defence 
case study have for the concept of preferences. This thesis assesses that the concept 
of preferences inherent to LI's explanation of domestic policy formulation must be 
reconsidered. Here, preferences are stable government policy paradigms that inform 
policies made in that issue area and a description of how government policies are 
formulated 2 LI argues that government policies are created by pressure from issue- 
specific domestic producer groups who exert their preferences on the government. 
Having received this domestic producer group pressure, the government aggregates 
the various policy preferences into a government policy. LI also argues that positive 
' Andrew Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to 
Maastricht Routledge / University College London Press, (London) 1998; Andrew Moravcsik, `The 
Choice for Europe - Current Commentary and Future Research' (Reply to James Caporaso, Fritz 
Scharpf, and Helen Wallace) Journal of European Public Policy, Vol. 6, No. 1,1999, pp. 157-179; 
Andrew Moravcsik, `The Choice for Europe: A Reply to Helen Field', Australasian Journal of 
European Integration, Vol. 1, No. 1,1999, p. 86-88; Andrew Moravcsik and Kalypso Nicolaidis, 
`Keynote Article: Federal Ideals and Constitutional Realities in the Treaty of Amsterdam' The 
European Union 1997: Annual Review of Activities, Special Issue of Journal of Common Market 
Studies, 1998, ppl3-38; Andrew Moravcsik and Kalypso Nicolaidis, `Explaining the Treaty of 
Amsterdam: Interests, Influences, Institutions' Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 37, No. 1, 
1999, pp. 59-85; Andrew Moravcsik, `Taking Preferences Seriously: Liberalism and International 
Relations Theory" International Organization. Vol. 54, No. 4,1997, pp. 513-553; Andrew Moravcsik, 
`Liberal Intergovernmentalism and Integration: A Rejoinder', Journal of Common Market Studies, 
Vol. 33, No. 4,1995, pp. 597-626; Andrew Moravcsik, `Preferences and Power in the European 
Community: A Liberal Intergovernmentalist Approach, ' Journal of Common Market Studies (30th 
Anniversary Edition), Vol. 31, No. 4,1993, pp. 473-524; Andrew Moravcsik, `Liberalism and 
International Relations Theory', Center for International Affairs Working Paper Series 92-6, Harvard 
University, 1992, revised 1993; Andrew Moravcsik, `Integrating International and Domestic Politics: 
A Theoretical Introduction" (Chapter One) in Peter Evans, Harold Jacobson and Robert Putnam, 
(Eds. ) Double-Edged Diplomacy: Interactive Games in International Affairs. University of California 
Press, (Berkeley), 1993; Andrew Moravcsik, `Negotiating the Single European Act: National Interests 
and Conventional Statecraft in the European Community, ' International Organization, Vol. 45, No. 1, 
1991, pp. 19-56. 
2 Andrew Moravcsik and Kalypso Nicolaidis, `Explaining the Treaty of Amsterdam' op. cit, p. 63. 
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and negative externalities impact on the formulation of government policy. 3 Each of 
these assumptions invites critical evaluation. 
Fourth, the thesis evaluates LI's effectiveness in explaining the process of 
international bargaining. LI argues that governments are the principal units in the 
international system and at international negotiations; governments who have issue- 
specific competencies and strengths dominate international bargains. Issue specific 
capabilities, finance, historical experience and institutional affiliations all contribute 
to a government becoming an influential actor in any particular set of negotiations. 
LI also holds that negotiated outcomes between governments are the result of a 
convergence of governmental interests and occur when an internationalised policy is 
more beneficial to the government than a unilateral solution. The fourth objective is 
then to test these micro-foundations against the evidence of the Anglo-French 
summit at Saint Malo (4-5 December 1998), the pre-Nice IGC negotiations and the 
negotiations at the Nice European Council to assess how convincing LI's explanation 
of international bargaining is. 
Fifth, this thesis assesses the strength of LI's explanation of governmental 
motivations for sovereignty transfer to international institutions. LI seeks to find a 
causal explanation for government behaviour in this area through a series of rational 
expectations. These expectations include the government's wish to secure credible 
international action thus solving problems associated with intergovernmental policy 
co-ordination. Furthermore, when a government faces small costs in co-ordinating 
3A policy has "external effects" when it has substantial positive or negative impacts, on people 
outside the territorial boundaries of the political system of the actor or actors pursuing the policy. LI 
argues that these effects are taken into account by policy makers during the policy formulation 
process. 
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policies in an international forum there is a greater likelihood of further EU 
integration occurring. This thesis tests LI's explanation of why governments seek to 
transfer sovereignty through the prism of UK defence policy and UK government's 
desire to co-ordinate elements of this policy within an EU framework. 
Methodological Debates 
This thesis applies an `as-if positivist framework to test LI. 4 This method is used to 
test the validity of LI through a process of falsification. 5 The premise of this 
approach is an assumption that the selected theory is valid at the time of proposal; 
falsification offers three outcomes. First, the theory is not falsified and therefore does 
help to explain an empirical event. Second, the theory is falsified; the theory fails to 
explain an empirical event. Third, that there is insufficient evidence to falsify the 
theory. The product of this third outcome is that further research needs to be 
conducted to improve the data set being used to create a falsification or validation 
analysis. 6 The basis of this approach is that there are at core discoverable truths and 
4 Michael Mann, `Authoritarian and Liberal Militarism: a contribution from comparative and 
historical sociology' in Steve Smith, Ken Booth and Marysia Zalewski, International Theory: Post- 
Positivism and Beyond, Cambridge University Press, 1996, p. 222. 
5 `We predict by reference to our present theories; we learn by refuting our present theories' William 
Bartley, `Rationality versus the Theory of Rationality' in Mario Bunge (ed), The Critical Approach to 
Science and Philosophy, The Free Press of Glencoe, (London), 1964. pp. 3-31, p. 5; And Karl Popper, 
`One can sum up all this by saying that the criterion of the scientific status of a theory is its 
falsifiability, or refutability, or testability'. Karl Popper, Conjectures and Refutations, Routledge, 
(London), 1963, pp. 33-39. 
6 Joseph M Egar, 'Hermeneutics as an Approach to Science', Science and Education, Vol. 2, No. 1, 
1993, pp. 1-29, p. 4 'Theorising in science is conjectural: Given the currently available evidence, any 
theories we put forward will always contain an element of conjecture, of being probable, of being a 
guess, of not being certain. Students should be able to state the evidence they have available and upon 
which their theorising will be based. They should be able to give reasons as to why the theory they are 
proposing is the best available given the evidence they have. Theories in science are provisional: On 
the basis of currently available evidence, when we put forward a theory in science we do so 
understanding that this theory is the best we are able to suggest. It is provisional until a better theory 
is suggested by further evidence. Theories in science are potentially falsifiable: All theories in science 
should be potentially falsifiable. That is, for any theory we should be able to indicate what 
investigation we would have to conduct to show that the theory was false. Theories in science are 
under-determined: This means that there will never be enough evidence to verify any theory in 
science. Even though we may have massive amount of evidence to support a particular theory, there is 
always the possibility that a single piece of evidence will be sufficient to falsify the theory. ' 
laws of nature but that these are difficult to discover because of the presence of 
researcher and interviewee bias. 7 As a consequence `as if positivism retains an 
aspiration to `scientificity' in social science research, a search for objective truths 
without the wholesale rejection or problems with finding verifiable facts. 8 
The other main options in testing LI against the UK government's negotiations of 
ESDP are the positivist approach, which is well suited to LI's transparent and 
testable hypotheses, and the application of empirical data against these benchmarks 
but which lacks sophistication around whether truths are `knowable'. Another 
significant approach is post-positivism. 9 This approach includes a critical analysis of 
theory building as a practice in itself. 10 James Scheurich describes the difference 
between positivism and post-positivism in the following way: 
I take positivism (which I also call the 'traditional' or 'conventional' approach) to assume that the 
individual interview context (including, for instance, the personality or gender of the interviewer) is 
not a critical consideration and that a category-based reduction of the verbal text of the interview can 
be taken as a valid representation of the interview itself and of the perceptions of the interviewee. In 
contrast to positivism, I take post-positivism, following Mischler (186), to assume that interviews are 
highly contextualised events and, thus, the representations of such events must be contextualised. But 
both positivism and post-positivism make the modernist assumption that the appropriate research 
method will yield the real or best meaning of an interview. Postmodernism, in contrast, suggests that 
there is a radical indeterminacy at the heart of the interview interaction which cannot be overcome by 
any methodology'" 
Post-positivism is more sophisticated in its construction than positivism. It 
acknowledges that individual views are informed by experiences and biases and so 
Pamela Bettis and James Gregson, `The Why of Quantative and Qualitative Research: Paradigmatic 
and Pragmatic Considerations', in Edgar Farmer and Jay Rojewski (eds), Research Pathways: Writing 
Professional Papers. Theses and Dissertations in Workforce Education, University Press of America, 
New York, 2001, p. 8. 
8 Pamela Bettis and James Gregson, `The Why of Quantative and Qualitative Research', op. cit., p. 12. 
9A leading exposition of Post-Positivism can be found in Steve Smith, `Positivism and Beyond' in 
Steve Smith, Ken Booth, and Marysia Zalewski (eds), International Theory: Post-Positivism and 
Beyond, op. cit, pp. 11-47. 
1° Andrew Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe, op. cit, pp. 77-85; Gary King, Robert Keohane and 
Sidney Verba, Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference and Qualitative Research, Princeton 
University Press, (New Jersey), 1994, p. 35-38. 
11 James Scheurich, Research Methods in the Post Modern Falmer, (London), 1997, p75. 
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`knowable truths' are difficult to observe and validate. 12 Through a process of 
triangulation, more secure evidence is sought to evaluate positions. Furthermore, 
post-positivism draws our attention to a closer analysis of the motivations and biases 
of individuals or institutions and therefore provides a more nuanced and complete 
analysis. More particularly, a post-positivist approach leads to the conclusion that 
trying to create parsimonious theories of European integration is fraught with 
intellectual problems. Indeed post-positivism suggests that facts are relative leading 
to situation specific comprehension, `This argument [... ) depends on the positivist 
assumption that a non-power-related truth game is possible. It is doubtful, however, 
at least in the social sciences, that such a power-free truth game has ever existed. ' 13 
Whilst positivism has been declared obsolete by Karl Popper and Denis Phillips 
there remains many useful aspects of this approach to theory testing; namely the 
aspiration of objectivity and a search for untainted and explicit evidence. 14 The 
approach applied here - `as if positivism - adds critical nuances to positivism 
without accepting all the constructivist aspects of post-positivism. 
In applying `as if positivism the high empirical standards demanded by Moravcsik 
are met throughout this thesis. " The three key indicators established by Moravcsik 
for research that tests and applies LI are, 
12 Michael Crotty, The Foundations of Social Research: Meaning and Perspective in the Research 
Process, Sage, (California), 1998, p. 40. 
13 James Scheurich, Research Methods in the Post Modern op. cit, p. 35. 
14 Denis Phillips, After the wake: post-positivistic educational thought, Educational Researcher 
Vol. 12, No. 5,1983, pp. 4-12; Karl Popper, Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific 
Knowledge, Routledge, 1974. 
1S Andrew Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe, op. cit, p. 10. Indeed in `The Choice for Europe' and 
associated articles Moravcsik calls for critiques of LI but only from those who are prepared to reach 
the high empirical standards he sets. Andrew Moravcsik & Kalypso Nicolaidis, `The Treaty of 
Amsterdam', op. cit, p. 58. 
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In each case, a consistent set of competing hypotheses is derived from general theories; the decision is 
aggregated to generate sufficient observations to test those hypotheses; and, wherever possible, 
potentially controversial attributions of motive or strategy are backed up by `hard' primary sources 
(direct evidence of decision making) rather than `soft' or secondary sources (public statements and 
journalistic or academic commentary in which authors have less incentive to report motivations 
accurately. ) 
16 
The research presented in this thesis follows these three prescriptions to produce a 
study that is acceptable, on these grounds, as a credible test and critique of LI. 
LI Measured Against Other Theories 
LI is the most convincing of all the theories available that attempt to explain 
European Integration. Anthony Forster contends that theorists struggle with the 
complexity of European integration and that theorising has rather unhelpfully been 
split into considerations of institutions or policymaking. '7 Anne Branch and Jorgen 
Ohrgaard take this criticism a step further by arguing that the focus of established 
European research should be on processes of governance rather than actors within 
goverment. 18 Indeed, against established research and integration theories LI fairs 
very well. 
In the so-called `Classical Debate' of neofunctionalism versus intergovernmentalism 
the focus is on the process of European integration. The main difference between 
intergovernmentalists and neofunctionalists is the focus on different actors within the 
process. Neofunctionalists believe that supranational entrepreneurs are key to 
integration, whilst intergovernmentalists believe that supranational entrepreneurs 
hinder rather than facilitate European integration and that governments are the 
16 Andrew Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe, op. cit, p. 10. 
17 Anthony Forster, `The State of the Art: Mapping the Theoretical Landscape of European 
Integration'. Journal of International Relations and Development, Vol. 2, No. 1,1999, pp. 1-19, p. 14. 
18 Anne Branch and Jorgen Ohrgaard, `Trapped in the Supranational-Intergovernmental Dichotomy: 
A Response to Stone Sweet and Sandholtz', Journal of European Public Policy, Vol. 6, No. 1,1999, 
pp. 123-143, p. 129. 
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principal actors in this process. The second key difference is that 
intergovernmentalists believe that European integration is a carefully controlled 
phenomenon with governments controlling the pace and direction of integration, 
while neofunctionalists believe that European integration has an internal momentum 
with functional effectiveness being the main drivers. The final difference concerns 
the perceived global aim of the integration process. Neofunctionalists believe that the 
aim of European integration is to create a federal state, whereas 
intergovernmentalists see European integration as being a framework through which 
national governments can be strengthened. Neofunctionalism had been, according to 
Roy Pryce, confined `to the dustbin of history' in the 1980s. '9 Many academics have 
concluded that neofunctionalism offers no predictive capability because of the 
process of central institutions gaining more powers and competencies as a 
consequence of their existing competencies though it has had fleeting resilience in 
the last decade. 
Just as LI has been subject to revised theoretical ambitions during the 1990s, 
neofunctionalism and its hybrids have been similarly revised so that it can now be 
said that there is a collection of hybrid theories that share common features. Scholars 
like Wayne Sandholtz and Paul Pierson argue that neofunctionalism convincingly 
explains the Single European Act (SEA) and the creation of the single currency 
whilst acknowledging that the theoretical aspects of neofunctionalism are subject to 
criticism. 20 Ultimately though, neofunctionalists see European integration as a means 
by which to replace national governments rather than as a framework to strengthen 
19 Roy Pryce, The Dynamics of European Union, Routledge (London), 1989, p. 2. 
20 Wayne Sandholtz, `Choosing Union: Monetary Politics and Maastricht'. International Organization, 
Vol. 47, No. 1,1993, pp. 1-40 & Paul Pierson, `The Path to European Integration: A Historical 
Institutional Analysis', Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 29, No. 2,1996, pp. 123-163, p. 158. 
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them, as LI argues. Importantly neofunctionalism is unable to explain defence and 
foreign policy integration as these are areas that are subject to high political 
considerations and thus have remained in the preserve of member governments 
rather than, as neofunctionalism suggests, increasingly under the control of the EU's 
supranational institutions. Moreover, neofunctionalism is undermined by its inability 
to suggest a timeframe for integration that can be falsified. Thus, a valid criticism 
levelled at neofunctionalism is that the EU's increasing competencies are not a 
product of spillover but are merely coincidental to neofunctionalist explanations? 
' 
Furthermore, LI does not claim to be able to predict when future expansions of EU 
competencies will occur, but central to LI's predictive claim is that it does offer 
causal explanations for why these occur, through clear and testable hypotheses. 
Some analysts have proposed a diversification of theories and processes to explain 
European integration. For example, Anand Menon proposes that a sensible resolution 
to the intergovernmental / supranational dichotomy is that LI explains the processes 
and outcomes of IGCs, while neofunctionalism explains the processes and outcomes 
of everyday policy making. 22 However, if IGCs really do codify everyday policy 
making, it is counter intuitive to suggest that neofunctionalism can be completely 
separated from LI. If IGCs codify everyday policy making, as LI argues, there is 
logically no need to analyse this dynamic. LI's explanation assumes that all the 
important elements of routine policy making are included in the outcome of the IGC, 
21 Morten Kellstrup, `European integration and political theory', in Morten Kellstrup (ed), European 
Integration and Denmark's Participation, Copenhagen Political Studies Press, (Copenhagen), 1992, 
p 13-58, p. 41. 
22 Hussein Kassim, Anand Menon, Guy Peters, The National Co-ordination of EU Policy: The 
European Level, Oxford University Press, (Oxford), January 2001. Anand Menon and Steve 
Weatherill, 'Legitimacy, Accountability and Delegation in the European Union', in Anthony Arnull 
and Daniel Wincott (Eds. ) Legitimacy in the European Union After Nice Oxford, Oxford University 
Press, (Oxford), 2002, Chapter Seven. 
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this necessarily obviates the need for neofunctionalist studies of everyday policy 
making. 
A more recent theoretical contender to LI, and a development of neofunctionalism, is 
what might be termed the supranationalist explanation. The supranationalist debate 
focuses on non-governmental supranational actors, but notably the European 
Commission, and places these at the heart of the integration project. The rationale for 
this is that the European Commission is the broker between national governments 
and central institutions. 23 Similarly, as a result of policymaking concerning highly 
specialised and technical issues, the European Commission is also perceived to hold 
dominance over the supply of information. 24 More recent supranational research has 
concentrated on the European Court of Justice (ECJ)25 The ECJ has been seen to 
extend European legal rulings through purposive legal behaviour and through adding 
additional layers to the original legislation. 26 Moreover, increasingly codified rights 
for European citizens have offered a new channel to bypass national governments 
that allow citizens to gain redress through EU legal structures. 7 The relevance of this 
stream of literature to the development of UK defence policy is tenuous at best - 
whilst the ECJ will have authority over the ESDP as it does in its overview role, it 
23 Wayne Sandholtz, High Tech Europe: The Politics of International Co-operation, University of 
California Press, 1992; Giandomenico Majone, `The European Community between Social Policy 
and Social Regulation', Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 31, No. 2,1993. pp. 224-240. 
24 Beate Kohler-Koch, `Catching up with change: the transformation of governance in the EU', 
Journal of European Public Policy. Vol. 3, No. 3,1996, pp. 359-380. 
25 Grainne de Burca, The European Court of Justice, Oxford University Press, (Oxford), 2001; Mark 
Pollack, The Engines of Integration: Delegation. Agency and Agency Setting in the European Union, 
Oxford University Press, (Oxford), 2002. 
26 Alec Stone Sweet and James Caporaso, `From Free Trade to Supranational Polity: The European 
Court and Integration'. Political Relations and Institutions Research Grout, Working Paper 2.45, 
November 1996. 
27 David Earnshaw & David Judge, `The Life and Times of the European Union's Co-operation 
procedure', Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 35, No. 4,1997, pp. 543-564, p. 560; Claudia 
Hubschmid, and Peter Moser, `The Co-operation Procedure in the EU: Why was the European 
Parliament Influential in the Decision on Car Emission Standards'. Journal of Common Market 
Studies. Vol. 35, No. 2,1997, pp. 225-242, p. 240. 
ii 
has not intervened since 2000 except for establishing principles regarding the 
freedom of access to information for member governments. 28 
Further recent theoretical contributions that attempt to supplant LI's dominance in 
this field, have sought to change the focus of EU research from explanations routed 
in governmental actors to explanations based around a political process. 
Consequently, they switch ontological focus to research questions concerning why 
and how integration occurs rather than who formulates and implements the 
policies. 29 By changing the research focus, the governance-led debate seeks to 
explain why there are varying speeds of integration across different policy areas. 
This approach partly overcomes the problems with the `classical' debate, which 
raises competing research biases of national governments versus supranational 
actors. This area of research is however, relatively new and, as yet, underdeveloped. 
By contrast to LI, the governance debate does not produce a clearly defined and 
testable set of hypotheses which makes LI an attractive framework through which to 
explore EU policy developments. 
Another strong competing theoretical debate is the comparative approach whose 
proponents include Alberta Sbragia, Simon Hix and Helen Wallace. This 
comparativist approach has created a wider debate concerning the relative 
contribution of political science and international relations approaches to European 
integration. Sbragia argues that there is no reason per se for international relations 
based theories to exclusively dominate analysis of the EU. Considerable work has 
analysed policymaking in a national context and thus Sbragia proposes that these be 
28 House of Commons Select Committee on European Scrutiny, `Twenty-Seventh Report of the Select 
Committee on European Scrutiny', The Stationery Office, (London), 21 November 2000, Part 16. 
29 Anne Branch and Jorgen r hrgaard, `Trapped in the supranational', op. cit, p. 129. 
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applied to the exploration of EU integration. 30 Hix takes Sbragia's contentions 
forward by arguing that the EU can be conceptualised as a political system and it 
should be analysed through the comparative method for systemic comparison. 31 
Likewise, Jeremy Richardson draws the conclusion that the EU has become involved 
in the distribution and allocation of resources and has therefore gone beyond the 
analytical and explanatory reach of IR theories. 32 
Forster in his article on the `state of the art' outlines four new approaches that 
constitute separate and distinct parts of the comparativist approach. 33 He identifies a 
pluralist theoretical approach that analyses the nature of decision-making at the 
European level and the extent and form of sectional interest representation in 
European institutions. Further, a comparativist rational choice approach that has 
allowed qualitative measures to be used in the study of the EU. 34 These qualitative 
measures have shown the importance of institutional culture as constraining and 
shaping policy preferences as well as the hitherto under explored area of ideology 
within European integration. Third, Forster identifies sociological approaches that 
have allowed the EU to be explored and analysed as a social system. 
35 These have 
allowed the exploration of the tension between nationalism and regulatory 
tendencies. 36 Finally, a section within the comparativist approach is a body of 
literature that focuses on `old' and `new' approaches to institutional analysis. Old 
30 Alberta Sbragia, Euro-Politics, Brookings Institution (New York), 1992, p. 291. 
31 Simon Hix, `Approaches to the Study of the European Community and the challenge to comparative 
politics, ' West European Politics, Vol. 17, No. 1,1994, pp. 1-30. 
2 Jeremy Richardson, European Union: Power and Policy Making, Routledge (London), 1996, p. 5. 
33 Anthony Forster, 'State of the Art', op. cit., p. 12. 
34 Geoffrey Garrett, `International Cooperation and Institutional Choice: The European Community's 
Internal Market', International Organization, Vol. 46, No. 2,1992, pp. 533-560; Moshe Maor, `Party 
Competition in Interlinked Political Markets: A Rational Choice Framework for Understanding Party 
Behaviour in the European and National Political Arenas' in Kevin Dowding, & Desmond King, 
Institutional Rational Choice, Oxford University Press, (Oxford), 1995. pp. 114-133. 
35 Anthony Forster, `The State of the Art', op. cit, p. 14 
36 Simon Hix, `Approaches to the Study of the European Community', op. cit, p. 17 
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approaches concentrate on formality within decision making whilst `new' 
approaches utilise more recent theories of decision making. 37 
In response to these wide-ranging debates - comparativist approaches and between 
neofunctionalism and Intergovernmentalism - Anand Menon and Andrew Hurrell 
concluded that these debates are sterile. 38 To Menon and Hurrell EU integration is 
`politics like no other' and as such cannot be analysed solely through exploring 
grand constitutional agreements or everyday policymaking. What they propose is a 
`rounded' understanding of the links between everyday policy making and the role of 
constitutional issues in the European process. 9 This is a laudable attempt at 
overcoming the problem of neither LI nor neofunctionalism providing a 
parsimonious explanation of European integration - LI fails to account for 
`everyday' policy making and neofunctionalism fails to adequately explain the 
process of intergovernmental negotiating. However, LI and neofunctionalism cannot 
be operated in series, LI establishes the grounds on which it wishes to explain 
European integration and this is to the exclusion of `everyday' policy making. 
The post-modernist approach is the last main competing theoretical approach to M. 
This approach is anti-foundationalist and raises questions over the underlying 
acceptable principles and biases of established theories through questioning what 
37 `Old' theories being epitomised by Fredrico Mancini, `The Making of a Constitution for Europe', In 
Robert Keohane and Stanley Hoffman, The New European Community: Decision Making and 
Institutional Change. 1991, Boulder Company, (New York), pp. 177-194; Whilst an example of a 
more recent approach can be seen in Simon Bulmer, `The Governance of the EU: A New 
Institutionalist Approach', Journal of Public Policy. Vol. 13, No. 4,1994, pp. 351-380. 
38 Anand Menon & Andrew Hurrell, `Politics Like No Other? Comparative Politics, International 
Relations and the Study of the EU', West European Politics, Vol. 19, No. 2,1996. pp. 386-402. 
39 Ibid, p. 387. 
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can, fundamentally, be known. 40 Through examining the extent to which any fact can 
be known postmodernists open the debate surrounding the applicability of concepts 
such as nationalism and national interests and the utility of theories that propose 
testable hypotheses based on abstract `unknowable' concepts. 1 This change in focus 
diverts the object being studied from the negotiated outcome to issues that are 
peripheral to this object. Moreover, post-modernism does not lend itself to critically 
evaluating the effectiveness of LI in explaining the UK government's defence policy 
and approach to ESDP negotiations. By adopting `as-if positivism this thesis 
necessarily rejects the utility of postmodernism in achieving its overarching aim. 
Of the main theoretical explanations of European integration LI remains the 
strongest contender in an increasingly congested field. LI's comparative advantage 
centres around the clear and explicit foundations on which it is based. These mean 
that LI clearly argues a causal process and, moreover, that it is possible to challenge 
and test LI on each of its microfoundations. This offers LI a large comparative 
advantage over competitor theories that do not have a clear microfoundational basis. 
The staging within LI, for example, the formulation of domestic policy and the 
negotiations of these policies at intergovernmental negotiations, provides an 
opportunity to critically evaluate LI at each of these stages. This makes very close 
scrutiny of LI possible, unlike the other main integration theories. The unevenness of 
LI's strengths and weaknesses and its strong rational foundations concerning 
international bargaining make LI a fascinating theoretical construct to critically 
evaluate. 
ao Ngaire Woods (eds. ), Explaining International Relations since 1945, Oxford University Press 
(London), 1996, p. 25. 
41 Asborne Sonne Norgaard, `Institutions and Post Modernity', Cooperation and Conflict, Vol. 29, 
No. 3,1994, pp. 245-287. 
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Core Arguments 
This thesis centres around four empirical and theoretical arguments. First, that LI is 
able to explain the development of UK defence policy between 1997 and 2000 and 
the UK government negotiating team's approach to defence negotiations at the Nice 
European Council, although with several important caveats. The core argument of 
this thesis is that LI is unable to accurately explain the defence policy formulation 
process, that occurred between the UK Cabinet Office, Ministry of Defence, and 
Foreign and Commonwealth Office, but correctly identifies the importance of 
domestic interest groups to this process. 42 LI suggests that pressure from domestic 
interest groups is aggregated by the government into policy. The modification to this 
element of LI's explanation of domestic policymaking concerns the effect domestic 
interest groups have on this formulation process. This thesis argues that rather than 
the preferences of domestic interest groups being aggregated by government into 
policy, the government created the change in UK defence policy and then sought 
explicit or tacit support from domestic interest groups. This theoretical corrective 
adds an important level of understanding to the relationship between the UK 
government and domestic interest groups in defence policy between 1997 and 2000. 
Moreover, it also helps to open the black box of the state to explore the internal 
dynamics of government involved in the policy making process. Furthermore, LI 
asserts that the influence of positive and negative externalities plays a large role in 
the domestic formulation of defence and security policy. 43 Both of these assertions 
are subject to the modifications set out in chapter three. Within the case study of UK 
42 Moravcsik uses the term domestic producer groups to describe groups outside of the government 
with influence on government policy. The Saint Malo process did not involve domestic producer 
groups which, in this policy area, would be the defence manufacturers but instead involved interest 
groups like the armed forces, research institutes and think-tanks. 
43 Correspondence with Andrew Moravcsik, `Question LI', 12 July 2003. 
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defence policy (1997 to 2000) the influence of positive and negative externalities are 
underplayed by LI. The motivation for change in UK defence policy was mostly 
driven by the influence of positive externalities. A key concern was to ensure that the 
EU had credible capabilities with which to intervene in humanitarian crises like 
those in the Balkans, and similarly to encourage European governments to re-shape 
their armed forces as the UK armed forces had done following the Strategic Defence 
Review (SDR) of 1998. 
The second major theoretical modification this thesis offers concerns LI's 
explanation of international bargaining. LI argues that international negotiations are 
dominated by major governments and the outcome of the Nice European Council is a 
lowest common denominator agreement. 4 Chapter four advances revisions to both 
these contentions. The definition of what constitutes a `major' government also 
requires further clarification. LI suggests that a major government can exert 
considerable influence on an international negotiation through intrinsic factors, such 
as financial strength, population, and geographical location. In general terms France, 
Germany and the UK are considered the `major' governments in the EU. However, 
to this list is added issue specific factors, which are preference intensity, membership 
of relevant international organisations and the effect their unilateral action has on the 
international system. 45 LI suggests that preference intensity and influence of 
unilateral action are the key aspects of the issue-specific factors and that these factors 
result in dominance of the UK, France and Germany in the ESDP negotiations. The 
clarification this thesis proposes is the extent to which other EU member 
governments with a particular interest in defence and security are able to add roles 
44 Andrew Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe, op. cit, p. 482. 45 Andrew Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe, op. cit., pp. 476-478. 
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and operational remits to the ESDP outcomes, but without threatening the entire 
negotiations. 
LI's explanation of domestic policy formulation centres on a concept of preferences, 
which are historically stable government policy paradigms that inform policies, the 
everyday decisions, made in that issue area. 46 The development of UK defence 
policy to include the pro-European dimension of the Saint Malo Initiative is said to 
threaten the sanctity of the NATO Alliance by some commentators and political 
opponents of the Labour Government. 47 However, chapter three argues that the 
government pursued this policy shift within the transatlantic preference. It did so in 
order to strengthen the Alliance by creating European based capabilities that could 
be used with or in the absence of US / NATO capabilities, and/or when the US did 
not wish to be involved. LI's concept of preferences is therefore theoretically and 
empirically useful in explaining the development of UK defence policy and the 
continuity of the NATO paradigm. However, the concept of preferences can be 
unhelpful in as much as analysts were able to argue that the Saint Malo process was 
either a fundamental shift in preferences or a tactical shift in policy that remained 
within the transatlantic paradigm. The concept of preferences in this case study 
remains contestable, but the overwhelming weight of evidence points towards the 
Saint Malo process being an innovative policy solution within the transatlantic 
framework. 
This thesis further argues that LI is highly effective in explaining ESDP negotiations 
at the 2000 Nice IGC. The IGC and its outcomes demonstrate that governments are 
46 Andrew Moravcsik & Kalypso Nicolaidis, `Explaining the Treaty of Amsterdam', op. cit, p59. 
47 For example, see chapter three, p. 106-7. 
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the principal units in EU negotiations. The supranational component in the 
negotiations was largely absent as a consequence of the closed intergovernmental 
nature of this bargaining with governments excluding participation from the 
European Parliament's observers. Moreover, through a self-denying ordinance the 
European Commission declined involvement in a subject it viewed as being the 
preserve of member governments. Chapter four argues that LI's conceptualisation 
concerning the lowest common denominator of respective individual government 
positions is a simplistic view of international negotiating. A more accurate view is to 
challenge a `one-model fits all' approach and to compare those governments with 
intensive preferences who do reach lowest common denominator agreements, with 
those governments with less-intensive policy preferences and who do not need to 
reach lowest common denominator positions. The key factors in shaping the 
intensity of preferences are the need to ensure domestic support for negotiated 
positions, the level of capabilities the government holds in the particular issue and 
the ability of the government to create coalitions in support of a particular policy 
area. 
The fourth core argument of this thesis is that LI's explanation of why governments 
seek to transfer domestic sovereignty to international institutions is validated by an 
analysis of the UK defence policy case study. LI argues that the motivations for a 
transfer of domestic sovereignty are based on the ambition to secure credible 
international action on a particular policy area. 48 Within this general aim of securing 
credibility the more specific objectives are to solve the problems associated with the 
international co-ordination of policy and governments. The result of this objective is 
48 Andrew Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe, op. cit, p. 473. 
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to make the costs of co-ordination small and the benefits from joint working large. 
On a meta-level LI argues that the EU is an opportunity structure to achieve national 
government policies. 49 
This thesis suggests that the UK government viewed the Saint Malo initiative and the 
resultant ESDP as a means to achieve three defence related objectives: to co-ordinate 
national defence and security policies within the EU, across a limited range of 
peacekeeping and peace-building issues; and to improve EU member states' 
autonomous defence and security capabilities; and to strengthen the EU's role within 
NATO. Moreover, the UK Ministry of Defence were hopeful that a move towards a 
common EU policy on defence and security would result in military reforms across 
the EU to reflect the changes made by the British military after the Strategic Defence 
Review (SDR). The UK government's desire to transfer sovereignty on the issue of 
the ESDP is best conceptualised as being based on a rational aggregation of UK 
national interests - the benefits of sovereignty transfer outweigh the potential costs to 
the UK because of the desire to create a framework for domestic policy co-ordination 
at the international level. These core and secondary empirical and theoretical 
arguments are advanced throughout this thesis. 
Sources 
Moravcsik suggests a process of rigorous empirical testing of LI, but he is not 
prescriptive in exactly how this might be undertaken. The `as-if positivist 
conceptualisation is that `facts' are constructed through the biases and experiences of 
49 Ibid, p. 473. Moravcsik notes that the principal motivation is domestic commercial interests. He 
goes further to suggest, in correspondence that commercial interests are a primary motivator in 
defence integration with geopolitical issues also having an importance. Correspondence from Andrew 
Moravcsik, `Question LI', 12 July 2003. 
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individuals. 50 It therefore suggests that a complex process of multiple measures and 
observations should be undertaken. Whilst acknowledging that each possess their 
own errors this thesis adopts triangulation to achieve a greater level of accuracy. 
`As-if positivism presents key methodological challenges concerning the 
contemporaneous nature of the subject material. The proximity between the events 
being explained and the production of this thesis poses problems for several key 
stakeholder groups. Civil service officials from the Ministry of Defence, Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office and Cabinet Office are still engaged in the formulation and 
implementation of the ESDP and the UK's approach to it. As a result, they might be 
unwilling to reveal the true nature of the policy negotiations or their role within 
them. The politicians involved might similarly be conscious that the ESDP is a `live' 
political issue and as such a research publication exploring this policy in-depth might 
become subject to interest from the media and, by extension, electoral interest. The 
secondary accounts available about the UK approach to ESDP and the policy itself 
have been weak because of the lack of in-depth research on these areas. In using 
interview evidence this thesis aims to provide robust levels of corroborative evidence 
and also to conform to the professional standards on how researchers should 
approach collecting interview evidence established by both the Institute for 
sl Contemporary British History and the British Sociological Association. 
50 Steve Smith, `Postivism and Beyond', in Steve Smith, Ken Booth and Marysia Zalewski, 
International Theory, op. cit, p. 35. 
s' The Institute for Contemporary British History have produced a set of guidelines for Officials 
participating in scholarly interviews and witness seminars. The Principles this document sets out for 
participation in interviews and seminars are first, compliance with the law - both Official Secrets Act 
and related obligations; and privacy and defamation considerations; second, compliance with the duty 
of confidentiality, including any employment contract terms; third, respect for the loyalty owed by 
officials in close working relationships with Ministers; fourth, primacy of the truth. The general 
guidelines set down are that first, there is a balance to be struck between discretion and the need for 
accuracy and balance; second, that contemporary history carries some remaining potential for political 
controversy. This should not be regarded as an automatic bar on taking part but it requires careful 
judgement as regards the auspices of the interview, the track record of the institution and the standing 
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The common problem of bias encountered when attempting to gain contemporary 
views of government positions from ministers or senior officials is overcome by the 
use of anonymous quotable sources. 52 Verification of UK government's negotiating 
position is based on extensive triangulation of primary and secondary evidence. 
Primary evidence was obtained from those involved in negotiations on the security 
and European desks at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the Ministry of 
Defence. 53 Evidence was also sought from government officials from EU member 
governments notably France and Sweden. In addition to these sources, interviews 
of the interview; third, closeness in time to the particular event. Events which still concern the 
government of the day will for the most part make it difficult for former officials to participate; 
fourth, where the subject matter has attracted a high security classification, or is of lasting live 
political controversy, it may still be possible for officials to participate to some extent, although 
exercising discretion. `Guidelines for Former Officials at Scholarly Interviews and Witness 
Seminars', Institute for Contemporary British History, 9 December 2002. Similarly the British 
Sociological Association have produced a `Statement of Ethical Practice for the British Sociological 
Association' which deals with how social researchers should use interview evidence. The relevant 
sections for this study are: Section 16 - As far as possible participation in sociological research should 
be based on the freely given informed consent of those studied. This implies a responsibility on the 
interviewer to explain in appropriate detail, and in terms meaningful to participants, what the research 
is about, who is undertaking and financing it, why it is being taken, and how it is to be disseminated 
and used. Section 17- Research participants should be made aware of their right to refuse participation 
whenever and for whatever reason they wish. Section 18 - Research participants should understand 
how far they will be afforded anonymity and confidentiality and should be able to reject the use of 
data-gathering devices such as tape recorders and video cameras. Section 19- Sociologists should be 
careful, on the one hand, not to give unrealistic guarantees of confidentiality and, on the other, not to 
permit communication of research films and records to audiences other than those to which the 
participants have agreed. Section 22- Interviewers should clarify whether, and if so, the extent to 
which research participants are allowed to see transcripts of interviews and field notes and to alter the 
content, withdraw statements, to provide additional information and to add glosses on interpretations. 
`Statement of Ethical Practice for the British Sociological Association', The British Sociological 
Association, (London) March 2002. 
52 This thesis quotes the sources in full. The published version will render these quotes anonymous in 
line with `Chatham House Rule'. According to the Royal Institute of International Affairs `... the new 
amendment means that participants are free to use the information received and can now also state 
that it was received at a Chatham House meeting. This provides clarity for participants and will allow 
summaries of meetings to be prepared. The Chatham House Rule reads as follows: `When a meeting, 
or part thereof, is held under the Chatham House Rule, participants are free to use the information 
received, but neither the identity nor the affiliation of the speaker(s), nor that of any other participant, 
may be revealed'. http: //www. riia. org/index. php? id=14 
53 The term `desks' is often based on two or more officials and is used to describe a narrow but deep 
understanding of a particular issue area within the Departments. For example, within the MoD there 
are desks for every country in the world and each of these desks can provide detailed intelligence, 
information and analysis on their country of expertise. In this thesis the crucial `desks' were the 
Security Policy desks in the MoD and FCO as well as the European policy desks in both institutions. 
Notionally a Grade 5 civil servant is in charge of that particular brief and is responsible to the policy 
director of the department and ultimately the Permanent Under Secretary. 
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with officials from NATO, the CFSP secretariat (part of the Council's Secretariat), 
and the European Commission are used to cross-reference the UK government's 
position in the negotiations. The process of triangulation and cross-referencing 
ensures that interview evidence is verified against information that can be gained 
from quality sources within the news media such as `Agence France Presse', 
`Bulletin Quiotidien', `The International Herald Tribune', `The Guardian', `The 
Daily Telegraph', and `The Financial Times' as well as UK government reports and 
press releases. 54 Thus, a varied and extensive collection of primary sources are 
provided to triangulate and cross-reference the main contentions within this thesis. 
55 
Nonetheless it is acknowledged that this thesis provides a provisional account of the 
government's approach to the Saint Malo process and the formulation of ESDP 
pending the opening of the archives under the 30-year rule in 2028 and 2030 
respectively. 
The development of UK defence policy between 1997 and 2000 occurred through 
four distinct phases and the selection of interviewees reflects this. First, between 
May 1997 and February 1998 the initial pledge of the Labour government to place 
the UK at the heart of EU politics and the transformation of this declaration into a set 
54 For example, Bulletin Quotidien Europe Number 7855, `Council approves report on ESDP for 
Summit, 5&6 December 2000; Michael Clark, `How the MoD came to rewrite our foreign policy', 
The Independent, (London), 8 July 1998; Peter Cole, `Britain and Europe: PM goes to war over Euro- 
army', The Guardian, (Manchester), 25 November 2000, p. 8; Editor, `Euro-corps to command 
peacekeepers in Kosovo', International Herald Tribune, (New York), 29 January 2000; Douglas 
Hamilton, 'US to Turkey, don't let EU-NATO deal collapse', Reuters, (Paris), 15 December 2000. 
55 Triangulation is a research method used to establish the trustworthiness of both qualitative and 
quantitative data. The aim of triangulation is to `examine a single social phenomenon from more than 
one vantage point' Thomas Schwandt. Qualitative Inquiry: A Dictionary of Terms, Sage Publications, 
(California), 1997. The triangulation approach argues that collecting data from different perspectives 
adds weight to the credibility of the analysis based on an foundation principle that no single source 
which is influenced by bias, priorities, and experiences can provide an accurate account of a situations 
but that by triangulating multiple sources contentions can be verified to a closer degree of accuracy. 
William Neuman, Social research methods. Qualitative and quantitative approaches (Fourth edition). 
Allyn and Bacon, (Boston), 2000. 
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of precise policy actions and suggestions. The second phase involved a number of 
officials from the Cabinet Office, the MoD and the FCO at a Policy Director level 
(Civil Service grade 3). In this phase MoD officials conducted an internal scoping 
exercise concerning possible European policy initiatives and wrote the outline of a 
detailed set of policy objectives and consulted widely with their respective opposite 
numbers in the FCO. The third phase placed the policy initiatives developed within 
the Cabinet Office, MoD and FCO into an international framework culminating in 
the Saint Malo negotiations and Accords in December 1998.56 Fourth, the 
development of the negotiated output of Saint Malo, the Accords and the Letter of 
Intent, an expression of support for European solutions, into the negotiated outcome 
of the Nice European Council including the pre-IGC negotiations. 
Informed by the different level of officials involved in each phase and the various 
political and bureaucratic affiliations of the officials participating in these phases 
determined where the interview evidence for this thesis should arise. Interviewee 
selection drew on politicians and officials in the Prime Minister's office, the Cabinet 
Office, the MoD, the FCO, the Armed Forces, the UK's Permanent Representation in 
Brussels and various European and defence think tanks, research institutions and 
parliaments. Interviewees were also selected from various levels of seniority within 
their institutional frameworks. The selection provided a breadth of experience from 
different institutional perspectives and insights into how each department viewed the 
issues under debate and external perspectives from different levels of seniority 
within the relevant departments. 
56 See Annex B and Annex C 
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At the very centre of the UK decision-making framework on the issue of 
`Europeanising' UK defence were key civil service and political appointments. 
Within the Downing Street Policy Unit, Roger Liddle the Prime Minister's personal 
political advisor on European affairs, Philip Budden, a Cabinet Office official with 
responsibilities for European policy issues, and Sir Stephen Wall, the Prime 
Minister's advisor on European issues, whose roles are substantially analysed. 57 
Budden and Wall were civil service appointments and thus had a duty of 
confidentiality to the government and the Prime Minister. Liddle was a political 
appointment and whilst paid by the civil service a Labour party spokesperson in 
close day-to-day proximity to the Prime Minister. His interview evidence was 
inevitably informed by a desire to position his employer and party in a positive 
light. 58 Liddle's position within the Downing Street Policy Unit overlaps in terms of 
scope and responsibilities with the role of Wall. 59 In answers given to the Lobby 
Briefing in June 2001 the Prime Minister's official spokesman accepted that the two 
roles appeared close, but also stated that Wall and Liddle had slightly different roles 
in advising the Prime Minister about European issues and that Wall retained 
seniority over Liddle. 60 The selection of both Wall and Liddle as interviewees was 
based on a need to analyse evidence from those who most closely advised the Prime 
Minister and who were directly involved in inter-departmental debates between the 
Cabinet Office and the MoD and FCO. 
57 `New Head of Cabinet Office European Secretariat', Number 10 Downing Street Press Briefing, 5 
June 2000; Michael White, 'Blair will tour site of atrocity after talks with Bush', The Guardian , (Manchester), 18 September 2001. 
58 Nyta Mann, `Roger Liddle, Centre Stage Once More'. BBC Online News, 26 October 2001. 
Ambrose Evans-Pritchard, `2003 target vote on Euro', The Daily Telegraph, (London), 25 October 
2001. 
59 From 2002 called the Strategy and Innovation Unit. 
60 `Improving Public Services / Changes at the Centre', Number 10 Downing Street Lobby Briefing, 
22 June 2001. 
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Cabinet Office interviewees, who played key roles in co-ordinating a set of UK 
government positions to be negotiated around at Saint Malo, centred around the 
European Secretariat of the Cabinet Office, notably Philip Budden, with 
responsibilities for EU public diplomacy and EU institutions and Stephen Wall the 
Head of the European Secretariat and the Prime Minister's advisor on Europe. 61 
The interview strategy for this thesis was based on involvement and proximity of 
sources to the key debates surrounding the development of UK defence policy 1997- 
2000. Particularly important was the interviewee's involvement in negotiating the 
policy objectives with other European governments both bilaterally and in the 
multilateral negotiations at the Nice IGC. These included: Sir Emyr Jones-Parry, 
Political Director of the FCO between July 1998 and August 2001 and subsequently 
the UK's Ambassador to NATO and the UN, who participated in the negotiations at 
Saint Malo, Paul Johnston, Director of Security Policy at the FCO who led 
negotiations with the French government, having formerly worked in the British 
Embassy in Paris, between 1997-2000. From the Ministry of Defence, Richard 
Hatfield Policy Director of the Ministry of Defence and the official who initially 
proposed the policy that led to the Saint Malo Accords and the ESDP Presidency 
Conclusions in the Nice IGC. 62 Hatfield was the lead UK negotiator at the bilateral 
61 `The main functions of the European Secretariat, which is headed by the Prime Minister's policy 
advisor on EU matters, are to drive forward the Prime Minister's European agenda, and to ensure that 
the Government's policy on EU issues is co-ordinated across Departments. In doing this, the 
Secretariat provides the Prime Minister, his officials and other Ministers with advice on the substance 
and presentation of EU issues, and supports the Foreign Secretary in his role as Chairman of the 
Ministerial Committee dealing with EU matters. A feature of the Secretariat's co-ordination work is a 
weekly meeting held with the UK's Permanent Representative to the EU and senior officials in 
Whitehall Departments, to discuss the tactics and handling of key issues coming forward for 
discussion in the Council of Ministers and elsewhere in the week ahead and beyond. ' `An 
Introduction to the Cabinet Office', The Cabinet Office, The Stationery Office, (London), November 
2002. 
62 Nice European Council: Presidency Conclusions, IV Common European Security and Defence 
Policy, Paragraphs 13 and 14 & Annex VI, 10 March 2001. See Annex C, pp. 274-314. 
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French-UK summit and was instrumental in the development of UK defence policy 
in the 1997-2000 period. In some key aspects of the development of UK policy, this 
thesis has also used interview data from officials present at important meetings 
providing a rich empirical base to critically evaluate the extent to which LI can be 
said to explain the development and negotiation of UK defence policy preferences. 
Thesis Structure 
The structure of this study mirrors in a substantial way the structure of LI. Chapter 
two, introduces a detailed analysis of LI that includes establishing a working version 
of LI. This task is particularly pertinent to Moravcsik's theoretical work as he has 
written 8 different evolutions of LI in various peer review journals and books over 
11 years, from 1989 to 2000. The leading critiques and defences of LI are presented 
in order to demonstrate the main strengths and weaknesses of the theory, before 
introducing the empirical data associated with the Europeanisation of UK Defence 
Policy and the Nice IGC. Similarly, a full account of both strengths and weaknesses 
as well as critiques and defences and a detailed textual analysis of LI allow 
hypotheses to be derived from the framework that are subsequently tested against the 
UK government's approach and the negotiations at the Nice European Council. 
Chapter three explores the first element of LI namely the proposition of `what 
explains national preferences'. 63 LI argues that the formulation of government 
policies are achieved through a process of aggregating the policy positions and 
preferences of individual interest groups. LI's account of the domestic policy 
63 Andrew Moravcsik & Kalypso Nicolaidis, `Explaining the Treaty of Amsterdam', op. cit, p. 63. 
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formulation process has been argued by commentators to be its weakest element. 64 
Chapter three uses elite interviews, contemporary open source material, academic 
literature and quality news media reports, through a framework of hypotheses 
derived from LI, to argue that UK defence policy formulation is not created in 
accordance with the explanation advanced by LI. 
According to LI, UK defence policy formulation occurs as the result of pressure 
from domestic interest groups that are aggregated by the core executive into 
government policy. 65 Chapter three demonstrates that the case study of the 
formulation of UK defence policy 1997-2000 does not validate LI's explanation and 
indeed that an alternative explanation can be advanced. This explanation effectively 
reverses LI's conception. Rather than government policies being the product of 
pressure from domestic interest groups chapter three argues that UK defence policy 
was determined by the core executive and then officials tested the support for this 
policy amongst domestic interest groups and political supporters. 
Chapter four explores how convincing LI's explanation is of the intergovernmental 
bargaining at the Nice IGC. Relative power in international negotiations is the 
second element of the LI framework. This chapter uses the seven theoretical 
propositions of LI in relation to international bargaining. 66 In the liberal 
intergovernmentalist conception of treaty negotiations, the British government 
64 Helen Wallace, `Piecing the integration jigsaw together', Journal of European Public Policy, Vol. 6, 
No. 1, pp. 155-179; Daniel Wincott, `Institutional Interaction and European Integration: Towards an 
Everyday Critique of Liberal Intergovernmentalism', Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 33, 
No. 4,1995, pp. 597-609. 
65 The core executive being `all those organisation and procedures which coordinate central 
government policies and act as final arbiters of conflict between different parts of the government 
machine. ' In Rod Rhodes and Patrick Dunleavy, Prime Minister. Cabinet and Core Executive, St 
Martin's Press, (New York), 1995, p. 2. 
66 Andrew Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe, op. cit, p. 8. 
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should be able to achieve more of its key aims within the negotiations as a 
consequence of its relative strength in voting rights, economic strength and perceived 
elevated status in foreign and military affairs. Chapter four uses hypotheses 
generated from LI to argue that the relative bargaining strengths of the British, 
French and German governments represented the strongest preferences within the 
negotiations. Close contextual analysis of the negotiations showed that the three 
strongest governments dominated the proceedings through alliance building and link- 
issue trade-offs to achieve the majority of their negotiating aims. This research also 
suggests that Moravcsik can be accused of having a reductive view of 
intergovernmental bargaining. Whilst on its own terms LI captures the process of 
issue convergence across the fifteen EU member governments it does not adequately 
reflect the rich context of informal negotiating and positioning that occurs before 
European Council meetings. Moreover, chapter four advances the argument that 
during the negotiations the European Commission opted not to exercise its influence 
over the direction of ESDP, and that as result the foundational elements of LI that 
suggest that governments drive the integration process is validated by this case study. 
Chapter five explores the third element of LI, the outcome of IGC negotiations and 
the decision to transfer national sovereignty. The empirical and analytical elements 
of this chapter are the most straightforward of those tackled in this thesis. The reason 
for this is equally straightforward - analysis of treaty outcomes is a key test of how 
closely outcomes match initial policy preferences. In the context of this thesis, 
governmental preferences are discussed in the light of open sources, newspaper 
reports, government documents, and elite interviews. Chapter five argues that the 
outcomes of the Nice IGC matched UK government's preferences very closely. It 
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also shows that ESDP negotiations were not linked in any tangible way to other 
policy areas and therefore the UK government was not asked to absorb bargaining 
`losses' in other policy areas in exchange for bargaining `successes' in the defence 
sphere. 
Furthermore, chapter five focuses on institutional decisions to distribute sovereignty. 
This deals retrospectively with the decision of national governments to pool or 
delegate their sovereignty into supranational organisations. The rationality of LI 
points towards all decisions to pool sovereignty based on the maximisation of 
economic or issue-specific benefits. 67 On the basis of the information and data 
available this thesis contends that the decision to pool and delegate minor amounts of 
sovereignty and decision making apparatus to the ESDP was taken on the basis of 
global strategic ambitions, inter-European political ambitions and as a part of a 
recalibration of domestic economic and political necessity. The hypotheses of LI 
were used to produce a framework for presenting the development of ESDP and to 
present a critical evaluation of LI. 
The concluding chapter deals with the three core concerns of this thesis; first, a 
critical evaluation of the effectiveness of LI in explaining the UK government's 
involvement in the formulation and negotiation of ESDP; second, an analysis of 
domestic British defence policy making; and third, an analysis of the development of 
the common European Security and Defence Policy. The concluding chapter also 
sets out the relative strengths of the six key arguments presented in this thesis. 
67 The concept of weak rationality in LI was coined by Anthony Forster, `Britain and the Maastricht 
Treaty: A Critical Analysis of Liberal Intergovernmentalism', Journal of Common Market Studies, 





First seen in the 1990 book `The New European Community', LI was a 
groundbreaking rebuttal to the received theoretical wisdom of neofunctionalism. 1 LI 
argues that governments are rational actors and bargain to maximise their national 
interest 2 Moreover, LI suggests that governments aggregate the policy preferences 
of domestic interest groups into governmental policy. 3 Government policy is shaped 
by the value of benefits to be gained from co-operation with other governments, the 
certainty of these costs and benefits and the relative influence of the producer groups 
on certain areas of policy formulation. 4 Thus, co-operation only occurs when 
national interests converge. LI contends that the separate policy areas are not 
connected and that individual areas impose individual constraints on the policies of 
governments ultimately producing identifiable patterns of bargaining. 5 
LI is the leading explanation of EU integration for two distinct reasons. First, LI 
offers a level of sophistication in its initial formulation and hypotheses that make it 
superior to the other main integration theories. Second, the empirical reach achieved 
through analysing the critical choices in EU integration history, is more extensive 
than other competing accounts. However, LI attracts considerable criticism on 
empirical, theoretical and methodological grounds. This chapter argues that whilst 
most of these criticisms have been unjustified, Moravcsik's approach to defending LI 
1 Andrew Moravcsik, `Negotiating the Single European Act', in Robert Keohane and Stanley 
Hoffman, The New European Community, Boulder Community Press (New York), 1990, pp. 41-84. 
Moreover, Daniel Wincott, Simon Bulmer and James Caparosa contend that LI springs from 
Moravcsik's critique of neofunctionalism. Daniel Wincott, `A Critique of Liberal 
Intergovernmentalism', op. cit, pp. 597-609; Simon Bulmer, `The Governance of the EU: A New 
Institutionalist Approach', in Niall Nugent (ed), The European Union (Volume 11), Dartmouth Press, 
(Aldershot), 1997, pp. 49-78; Helen Wallace, James Caporaso, Fritz Scharpf and Andrew Moravcsik, 
`Symposium on The Choice for Europe', Journal of European Public Policy, Vol. 6, No. 1,1999, 
pp. 155-179. 
Andrew Moravcsik, `Preferences and Power in the European Community', op. cit, p. 480. 
3 Ibid, p. 481. 
4 Ibid. 
5 Ibid, p. 488. 
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has nonetheless undermined the ability of LI to evolve in the face of compelling 
empirically informed theoretical criticisms. In particular, Moravcsik fails to 
acknowledge that some of the criticisms levelled against him are justified, and has 
missed opportunities to strengthen LI by engaging with the criticisms and in replying 
to them in somewhat intemperate terms. 
This chapter explores LI through its foundational constructs, the methodology 
proposed to test it and the applicability of LI to scenarios outside of the European 
Union and is divided into two sections. The first section is based around the five 
rules of theory building suggested by Gary King, Robert Keohane and Sidney 
Verba.? These five rules suggest that theories should be constructed so that they can, 
if appropriate, be quickly and transparently falsified. In other words, theories should 
not be designed in a way that makes falsification difficult to achieve. Theories 
should therefore be clearly expressed so that the rationale and microfoundations of 
the theory are explicit and testable. Theories should also be written in such a way 
that they are internally consistent, to ensure that the explanations the theory advances 
are both logical and testable. Moreover, theories should contain dependent and 
independent variables that are carefully selected and pertinent to the phenomena 
being studied. LI's dependent variable is the negotiated outcome whilst its 
independent variables are power and preferences. Furthermore, King, Keohane and 
Verba stress the importance of theory writers maximising precision within theories. 
This relates to being explicit about foundational assumptions, the microfoundations 
and dependent and independent variables. Without precision, they argue, theories 
6 In email correspondence Moravcsik acknowledged that some criticisms of LI were justified but that 
most were not. He has not, however, conceded this in any of his published comments. 
Correspondence with Andrew Moravcsik, 'PhD research concerning Liberal Intergovernmentalism', 
29 November 2000. 
Gary King, Robert Keohane, Sidney Verba, Designing Social Inguiry. op. cit, pp. 99-114. 
33 
become difficult to falsify and therefore limited in their ability to explain social 
science phenomena. Lastly, King, Keohane and Verba argue that theories should be 
stated in an encompassing way. Theories should seek to explain general rather than 
specific phenomena and should be explicit about what they seek to explain. This 
chapter explores the extent to which LI conforms to each of the requirements of 
theory creation. It argues that LI meets four of the five rules proposed by King, 
Keohane and Verba. Indeed this chapter argues that on balance LI is a compelling 
theoretical approach that, has only been undermined at the margins. 
The second section of this chapter examines the question of whether LI is a theory 
or, as Forster argues, a pre-theory -a question crucial to the contextualisation of LI 
within the theoretical literature. 8 The test of whether LI constitutes a theory or pre- 
theory is informed by the analysis of King, Keohane and Verba. In particular they 
argue, 
Causal theories are designed to show the causes of a phenomenon or a set of phenomena. Whether 
originally conceived as a deductive or inductive, any theory includes an interrelated set of causal of 
hypotheses. Each hypothesis specifies a posited relationship between variables that creates observable 
implications if the specified explanatory variables take on certain values; other specified values are 
predicted for the dependent variables. Testing or evaluating any causal hypotheses requires causal 
inference. The overall theory of which the hypotheses are part should be internally consistent or else 
hypotheses can be generated that contradict one another. 9 
The Five Rules of Theory Building 
King, Keohane and Verba argue that theories should be designed so that they can be 
quickly falsified, `The emphasis on falsifiable theories forces us to keep the right 
8 Anthony Forster, `Britain and the Negotiation of the Maastricht Treaty, op. cit, p. 367. Daniel Wincott 
goes further by asserting that LI is merely an approach as opposed to a pre-theory. Daniel Wincott, 'A 
Critique of Liberal Intergovernmentalism', op. cit, p. 598. 
9 Gary King, Robert Keohane, Sidney Verba, Designing Social Inquiry, op. cit, p. 99 
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perspective on uncertainty and guarantees that we treat theories as tentative and not 
let them become dogma. '° 
The design of LI is such that it cannot be comprehensively falsified. At its 
microfoundational level LI, has been described by Helen Wallace as being `vague' 
and by Daniel Wincott as `ambiguous'. 11 To counter these critiques three factors are 
important. First, Moravcsik claims to have developed a single theory that meets an 
exact prescription of `explicit hypotheses, disaggregated cases, primary sources. 12 
Yet in practice, LI contains common core elements throughout all its incarnations, 
but takes on subtly different forms in each, to give the impression that the theory fits 
the empirical evidence. 
The changes in LI across its evolutions have been typified by Forster as being 
sufficiently ambiguous to allow a wide theoretical interpretation to fit the data set. 
Forster goes on to argue that the consequence of weak microfoundations and 
hypotheses reduces LI to a pre-theory in terms of its construction, analytical reach 
and level of ambition. 13 Meanwhile Menon argues that LI is sufficiently vague to 
allow a wide interpretation and, therefore, the appearance of parsimony. 14 These two 
views are subtly different, Menon's claim of vagueness gives Moravcsik the benefit 
of the doubt in respect of whether he deliberately altered the microfoundations of the 
theory to fit empirical data. However, the result of both of these contentions is the 
'o Gary King, Robert Keohane and Sidney Verba, Designing Social Inquiry, op. cit, p. 100 11 Helen Wallace, `Liberal Intergovernmentalism; Review Symposium, Journal of European Public 
Policy, op. cit, pp. 155-179; Daniel Wincott, `Towards an Everyday Explanation of Liberal 
Intergovernmentalism', op. cit, pp. 597-609. 
'2 Andrew Moravcsik, `Does the European Union Represent an n of 1? ' ECSA Review. Vol. X, No. 3, 
1997, pp. 1-5, p. 3. 
13 Anthony Forster, `Britain and the Negotiation of the Maastricht Treaty', op. cit, p. 366. 
14 Paper given by Anand Menon at Department of Nottingham Invitational Speaker Series, May 2000. 
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same, namely, that LI is not a single stable theory but a single theory that is adapted 
to meet the requirements of independent case studies - giving the impression of 
parsimony. Importantly, this thesis argues that because LI does not establish an 
accurate pattern of government behaviour it does not provide a full explanation of 
the formulation of UK defence policy (1997-2000) even though it provides a 
convincing explanation of the ESDP negotiations. 
On a presentational level, it is difficult to falsify LI because of a rapid transformation 
of LI between the 1991 SEA Article, and the publication of `The Choice for Europe' 
in 1998. The renaming of the theory, which finally settled at `Liberal 
Intergovernmentalism' in 1998 adds to the difficulty in tracking its changes and 
analytical reach. Whilst it is unfair to overplay the relevance of labelling to a critical 
evaluation of LI, it is indicative of the way Moravcsik seeks to defend LI in shifting 
the description of foundational aspects of LI to avoid some of the criticisms that are 
made. 
The first version of LI published in journal form in 1991 concerned the negotiation 
of the Single European Act (SEA) and was called `Liberal Institutionalism'. 15 By 
1997, LI's name had transformed into a `Liberal Theory of International Politics'. 16 
The label 'Liberal Intergovernmentalism' arose in 1998, which again changed, to 
`the liberal intergovernmentalist approach' in the article concerning the Treaty of 
Amsterdam in 1999.17 The subtle variations in LI's labelling are significant, in as 
's Also seen in the 1990 book `New European Community', Andrew Moravcsik, `Negotiating the 
Single European Act', op. cit, pp. 19-56. 
16 Andrew Moravcsik, `Taking Preferences Seriously' op. cit, pp. 513.553. 
"Andrew Moravcsik & Kalypso Nicolaidis, `Explaining the Treaty of Amsterdam', op. cit,. pp. 59-85. 
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much as they run in parallel to important variations of the nature and more 
particularly the scope of LI. 
The change in nomenclature is linked to changing levels of ambition in terms of 
what LI seeks or can explain. In his 1991 article, Moravcsik seeks to explain the 
negotiation and the agreement of the SEA in 1986 and provides causal explanations 
for state preferences that gave rise to the intergovernmental bargaining outcome 
agreed at the Luxembourg European Council in 1986.18 In particular, LI aims to 
explain negotiated outcomes by arguing that the predominantly economic 
negotiations and treaty provisions are based around individual governments 
attempting to maximise economic interests. 19 
`The Choice for Europe' (1998) was more ambitious in attempting a historical and 
theoretical revision of European integration. It focuses on major treaty negotiations 
concentrating on the relative bargaining power of governments, and government 
endeavour to maximise economic and financial interests. 20 In many respects the 
expectations established in `The Choice For Europe' are somewhat higher than in 
the 1991 SEA Article, where only one set of negotiations was explained. However, 
`The Choice for Europe' was concerned with explaining five sets of negotiations and 
thus necessarily had to adopt an enhanced level of explanation across diverse policy 
areas as coal and steel policy, community law and social policy. Following the 
publication of `The Choice for Europe' LI faced a raft of criticism from James 
Caparosa, Anthony Forster, Gary Marks, Fritz Scharpf, Helen Wallace and Daniel 
18 Andrew Moravcsik, 'Negotiating the Single European Act', op. cit, pp. 19-56. 
19 Ibid, p. 19. 
20 Andrew Moravcsik, 'The Choice for Europe', op. cit., p. 6-8. 
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Wincott. 21 In the face of this criticism, the level of ambition placed on LI by 
Moravcsik has been markedly reduced so that it no longer aims to provide a 
comprehensive theory of integration. What LI now claims to offer is, `(A) solution to 
the narrow puzzle of why states reach agreements in Intergovernmental 
Conferences'. 22 
Figure 1: The Chronology of LI: Moravcsik's editions and Academic Criticism. 
Moravcsik Writes Commentaries Written 
1991 Andrew Moravcsik, 
`Negotiating the Single 
European Act: National 
Interests and Conventional 
Statecraft in the European 
Community', International 
Organization, Vol. 45, No. 1, 
1991, . 19-56. 1992 Andrew Moravcsik, `Liberalism Wayne Sandholtz, High Tech 
and International Relations Europe: The Politics of 
Theory', Center for International Co-operation, The 
International Affairs, Working University of California Press, 
Paper Series, 92-6. Harvard 1992. 
University, 1992. (Revised 
1993) 
1993 Andrew Moravcsik, `Preference Janne Haaland Matarly, 
and Power in the European `Beyond Intergovernmentalism: 
Community: A Liberal The Quest for a comprehensive 
Intergovernmentalist Approach, ' framework for the study of 
Journal of Common Market integration', Co-operation and 
Studies, (30`x' Anniversary Conflict, Vol. 28, No. 2,1993, 
Edition), Vol. 31, No. 4,1993, pp. 181-210. 
pp. 473-524. 
1994 Andrew Moravcsik, Simon Bulmer, `The 
`International cooperation and Governance of the European 
domestic politics', Working Union: A New Institutional 
Paper Series No. 52. Harvard Approach', Journal of Public 
University, 1994. Policy, Vol. 13, No. 3,1994, 
pp. 351-380. 
Paul Pierson, `A Historical 
Institutionalist Account'. 
Working Paper 5.2, Harvard 
Center for European Studies, 
1994. Updated in `The Path to 
European Union: A Historical 
Institutionalist Account', 
21 Gary Marks, Liesbet Hooghe and Kermit Blank, 'European Integration since the 1980s. State- 
centric Versus Multi-Level Governance', Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 34, No. 3,1996, 
pp. 343-78; Daniel Wincott, 'Towards an Everyday Critique of Liberal Intergovernmentalism', op. cit, 
pp. 597-610; Helen Wallace, James Caporaso, Fritz Scharpf and Andrew Moravcsik (1999) `Review 
Section Symposium: The Choice for Europe', op. cit, pp. 155-179. Anthony Forster, 'Britain and the 
Negotiation of the Maastricht Treaty', op. cit, pp. 347-368 
22 Andrew Moravcsik, `The Choice for Europe - Current Commentary and Future Research: A Response to James Caparosa, Fritz Sharpf and Helen Wallace, op. cit, pp. 168-179. 
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Comparative Political Studies, 
Vol. 29, No. 2,2000, pp. 123-164. 
Alexander Wendt, `Collective 
Identity Formation and the 
International State', American 
Political Science Review, 
Vol. 88, No. 2,1994, June 
pp. 384-396. 
1995 Andrew Moravcsik, `Liberal Daniel Wincott, `Institutional 
Intergovernmentalism and Interaction and European 
Integration: A Rejoinder', Integration', Journal of 
Journal of Common Market Common Market Studies, 
Studies, Vol. 33, No. 4,1995, pp. Vol. 33, No. 4, pp. 597-610. 
597-626. 
1996 
1997 Andrew Moravcsik, `Taking Alec Stone-Sweet and Wayne 
Preferences Seriously: Sandholtz, `European 
Liberalism and International Integration and Supranational 
Relations Theory', International Governance', Journal of 
Organization, Vol. 54, No. 4, European Public Policy, Vol. 4, 
1997, pp. 513-553. No. 3,1997, pp. 297-317. 
Karl-Orfeo Fioretos, `The 
Anatomy of Autonomy: 
Interdependence, domestic 
balances of power and European 
integration', Review of 
International Studies, Vol. 23, 
No. 2,1997, . 293-320. 
1998 Andrew Moravcsik, The Choice Anthony Forster, `Britain and 
for Europe: Social Purpose and the Maastricht Treaty: A 
State Power from Messina to Critique of Liberal 
Maastricht, University College Intergovernmentalism', Journal 
London Press, (London), 1998. of Common Market Studies, 
Vol. 36, No. 3,1998, pp. 347-368. 
Andrew Moravcsik and Kalypso 
Nicolaidis, `Keynote Article: 
Federal Ideas and Constitutional 
Realities in the Treaty of 
Amsterdam', The European 
Union 1997: Annual Review of 
Activities, Special Issue of 
Journal of Common Market 
Studies, October 1998, . 13-38 
1999 Helen Wallace, James Thomas Diez, `Riding the AM 
Caporaso, Fritz Scharpf and Track through Europe, or: The 
Andrew Moravcsik, Pitfalls of a rationalist journey 
`Symposium on The Choice for through European integration', 
Europe', Journal of European Millennium: Journal of 
Public Policy, Vol. 6, No. 1, International Studies, Vol. 28, 
1999, pp. 155-179. No. 2,1999, pp. 355-369. 
Anthony Forster, `The State of 
Andrew Moravcsik, `Explaining the Art: Mapping the 
the Treaty of Amsterdam: Theoretical Landscape of 
Interests, Influences, European Integration', Journal 
Institutions, Journal of Common of International Relations and 
Market Studies, Vol. 37, No. 1, Development, Vol. 2, No. 1, 
1999, pp. 59-85. 1999, pp. 1-19. 
Helen Wallace, James 
Andrew Moravcsik, `The Caporaso, Fritz Scharpf and 
Andrew Moravcsik, 
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Choice for Europe: A Reply to `Symposium on The Choice for 
Helen Field', Australasian Europe', Journal of European 
Journal of European Integration, Public Policy. Vol. 6, No. 1, 
Vol. 1, No. 1,1999,86-88. 1999, . 155-179. 
2000 Craig Parsons, `Domestic 
interests, ideas and integration: 
lessons from the French case', 
Journal of Common Market 
Studies, Vol. 8, No. 1,2000, 
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The criticism levelled by Caparosa that Moravcsik seeks and fails to provide a 
parsimonious explanation of European Integration was rebutted with a slightly 
intemperate description of Caparosa as being "naive" and by Moravcsik stating, `I 
believe the search for such a theory to be futile, even counter productive. '23 
Moravcsik reinforces this view in his Amsterdam article, written with Kalyspo 
Nicolaidis, where he states that the Liberal Intergovernmentalist approach, `.. [it] 
should be noted, does not constitute a general theory of European integration. 
Neither one of us believes such a theory exists, any more than there exists a theory of 
American Politics'. 24 What LI does provide, according to Moravcsik and Nicolaidis 
is a theoretical explanation of how governments formulate domestic policies, how 
governments negotiate these domestic policies and international negotiations and 
why governments seek to transfer their sovereignty to international organisations. 25 
23 Andrew Moravcsik, `The Choice for Europe - Current Commentary and Future Research: A 
Response to James Caparosa, Fritz Sharpf and Helen Wallace', op. cit, p. 174 
24 Andrew Moravcsik and Kalypso Nicolaidis, `Explaining the Treaty of Amsterdam' op. cit, p. 60. 
2 Andrew Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe, op. cit, p. 473. 
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LI's early ambition for parsimony is said to be unachievable because of the 
complexity of the EU. 26 This opinion has gained weight amongst EU scholars 
notably Robert Geyer who commented, 
The pursuit of parsimonious order allows the observer to see only some parts of the holistic reality 
and not necessarily the most important parts. Second, since the EU and international systems are 
composed of different phenomena, then one must accept methodological pluralism.. there is no 
universal hierarchy of phenomenon and hence no hierarchy of method. 27 
The 1999 `Treaty of Amsterdam' article dramatically reduces LI's ambitions for 
theoretical reach compared with the SEA article and `The Choice for Europe' from 
`parsimony' to an `explanation' of aspects of integration. This is important as it 
markedly affects the benchmark of effectiveness that can be applied to test LI. Under 
the terms set out in the 1991 SEA article, LI should be tested against a benchmark of 
parsimony, whereas the benchmark used for `The Choice for Europe' is one of 
finding convincing possible causes, which is the version used by this thesis. 28 
The tension between formal theorising and historical work is encapsulated by 
Thomas Diez who wrote, 
His [Moravcsik's] own standard is the scientific ideal of parsimonious, falsifiable, and explanatory 
theories constituted in the three steps and tested against competing hypotheses. First, national 
preferences need to be formed. This is done not according to `geopolitical ideas' but by encapsulating 
`economic interests; derived mostly from domestic interest groups. Second, governments need to 
bargain to ensure that as many of their preferences can be realised. Here, the role of the supranational 
actors is negligible if not counterproductive; if there is a bargaining solution, member state 
governments are effective enough on their own to produce it and do not need a facilitator to agree. 
Third, the bargain needs to be enshrined in institutions. In designing these institutions, neither 
federalist ideology not the conviction that technocratic management is needed to govern increasingly 
complex, technical spheres is of any prime relevance. With a few exceptions, institutional choice is 
about binding other governments - both those of other states and future domestic ones - to the 
agreement and prevent cheating and later policy reversal. 29 
26 Andrew Moravcsik and Kalypso Nicolaidis, 'Explaining the Treaty of Amsterdam' op. cit, p. 60. 
They argue that there are too many complexities within the EU to produce a parsimonious explanation 
for its integration history. 
27 Robert Geyer, `European Integration, Complexity and the Revision of Theory', Journal of Common 
Market Studies, Vol. 41, No. 1,2003, pp. 15-35, p. 30-1. 
28 The problem of finding a definitive version of LI is conceptually problematic and is tackled later in 
this chapter. 
29 The importance of career development and departmental politics on a researcher's intellectual 
progress and publication record might be overstated but similarly might be one explanation why 
Moravcsik vigorously defends LI in journals whilst adding to information on exogenous influences on 
academics that is an emerging area of interest. Thomas Diez, `Riding the AM Track through Europe', 
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The lack of clarity in the published theoretical ambition, the transformation of LI 
from case study to case study and the change in nomenclature means that LI, 
arguably, falls short of being easy to falsify. However, the argument here is that if LI 
is closely analysed a consistent set of testable hypotheses and microfoundations are 
present from the SEA Article in 1991 to `The Choice for Europe' in 1998 which 
allows falsification to occur. This consistent set of testable hypotheses should be 
treated separately from the commentary provided by Moravcsik and others 
concerning the theoretical reach and name of LI and further supports the argument 
that LI should be seen as distinct from Moravcsik. 
Wincott argues that in failing to state the standard of theory building, Moravcsik fails 
to create a theory. 30 However, Wincott concludes that LI does instead provides, 
(A) methodologically sophisticated approach to the study of European integration, not a theory of 
integration. A theory of integration would set out circumstances in which it would be empirically 
refuted but would be immune from more generalised empirical criticism. 31 
If however, Wincott's view is given credence his subsequent point that the internal 
biases present in LI, especially those that exclude consideration of supranational 
institutions are difficult to justify. This point is central to the empirical testing of LI. 
If Wincott's argument that LI is merely a methodologically sophisticated approach to 
EU integration is accepted, then an exploration of the influence of supranational 
actors and informal integrations processes should be explored. LI claims that formal 
negotiations and treaties incorporate informal agreements and whilst supranational 
actors do not dominate, they have some relevance. LI also offers causal mechanisms 
op. cit, p. 356; These issues are addressed by Oliver Daddow, The Historiography of European 
Integration, PhD Thesis, University of Nottingham, 2000. 
30 Daniel Wincott, ` Towards an Everyday Critique of Liberal Intergovernmentalism', op. cit, p. 599 31 Ibid, p. 598 
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that account for domestic policy formulation, intergovernmental bargaining, and 
facilitates the production of testable hypotheses that are internally consistent. As a 
consequence LI can be validly tested on its own terms. 
The empirical dimension of Moravcsik's work takes on an added importance because 
of the prominence he places on empirical validity. Moravcsik argues, 
A historical revision is only as plausible as the evidence and method employed to evaluate it. This 
book is based on methods which, while far from ideal, generate more rigorous, transparent, objective 
and replicable tests of competing theoretical claims about European integration than have heretofore 
been conducted. 32 
Crucially, Moravcsik sets himself a very high empirical standard of validation to 
confirm his theoretical premises and, a similarly high standard to falsify them. This 
method is described as, 
(W)herever possible, potentially controversial attributions of motive or strategy are backed by `hard' 
primary sources (direct evidence of decision making) rather than `soft' or secondary sources (public 
statements and journalistic or academic commentary) in which authors have less incentives to report 
motivations accurately. 3 
Many criticisms of the empirical dimension of LI focus on Moravcsik's emphasis on 
intergovernmental conferences. Commentators most notably Simon Bulmer, Daniel 
Wincott and Helen Wallace have suggested that LI is weak because it fails to take 
account of `everyday' policy making. 4 These criticisms do not significantly 
undermine LI. Moravcsik states very clearly that the focus of his research centres on 
IGCs. The rationale for this is that IGCs codify the informal integration that occurs 
in `every-day' policy making, which amounts to one of the critical points where 
European governments have a choice about whether to codify relationships between 
32 Andrew Moravcsik, The Choice For Europe, op. cit., p. 10. 
33 Andrew Moravcsik, The Choice For Europe, op. cit., p. 10. 
" Simon Bulmer, `The Governance of the EU: A New Institutionalist Approach', op. cit, pp. 351-380; 
Daniel Wincott, `Towards an Everyday Critique of Liberal Intergovernmentalism', op. cit, pp. 597-609. 
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governments on various policies, hence the title `The Choice for Europe'. 3S In 
contrast, Forster describes the emphasis on IGCs as, `... offer(ing) a very incomplete 
picture of European integration'. 6 However, LI can provide adequate coverage to 
the formulation of domestic defence policy, including the approach to the Saint Malo 
negotiations, 4-6 December 1998. 
The inclusion of the Saint Malo preparations is important because this meeting also 
serves as an example of the informal negotiations and `everyday' policy making 
critics like Wincott and Forster say LI excludes. Moreover, whilst the vast majority 
of ESDP negotiations were conducted outside of formal IGC frameworks LI's 
explanations of the dynamics and processes of IGC negotiating are accurate, as this 
thesis will demonstrate. However, Colin Elman argues that the debate should still be 
firmly rooted in terms of whether neorealist theories, including LI, are capable of 
being used to explain interstate relations. Elman contends that the internal logic of 
neorealist theories fail to produce a single determinist prediction, that unit level 
influences will interfere to make systematically derived behavioural predictions 
inaccurate, that neorealist models rely on an evolutionary selection mechanism and 
thus cannot be used predictively and that variables in neorealist theories are poorly 
conceptualised or their dependent variables are substantively too general for making 
behavioural predictions. 37 Thus, the debate concerning LI should still be based 
primarily on whether it is a valid approach to interstate bargaining. As a concluding 
note, Elman is confident that neorealist approaches can be used to make predictive 
35 Daniel Wincott, `Towards an Everyday Critique of Liberal Intergovernmentalism', op. cit, p. 607 36 Anthony Forster, `The State of the Art', op. cit, p. 19. 
37 Colin Elman, `Horses for Courses: Why Not Neorealist Theories of Foreign Policy? ', Securi 
Studies, Vol. 6, No. 1,1996, pp. 7-53, p. 47. 
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statements once neorealist practitioners properly address his analysis; even though 
Moravcsik makes no claim to prediction. 38 
The failure to entertain the possibility that European institutions created by national 
governments, are able to thwart the policy preferences and distribution of benefits to 
governments in everyday policy integration, is a significant oversight in LI. Wincott 
notes there is the anomaly of expanding roles and responsibilities for the ECJ and the 
absence of analysis around the interaction between supranational institutions and 
governments. 39 Thus, a significant part of the distribution of information within the 
bargaining process is unaccounted for and balances of power within the EU 
neglected. 4° Moreover, in terms of accounting for the results of the negotiations, 
Moravcsik's research does not fully account for some elements of the bargains struck 
through a failure to understand the complexity of IGC's. This lack of appreciation 
expresses itself in the small amount of research focussed on the affect of procedural 
negotiations and the post-IGC legal ramifications on governments of these 
negotiations. 41 If this was a conscious decision to exclude the procedural elements of 
IGCs it would have been more effective for Moravcsik to state this explicitly. 
However, LI does not explicitly exclude these procedural elements of IGCs and 
whilst arguing that supranational institutions hinder integration, does not preclude 
the inclusion of these in any test of LI 42 
38 Ibid, p. 22. 
39 Daniel Wincott, `Towards an Everyday Critique of Liberal Intergovernmentalism', op. cit., p. 607. 
40 Ibid, p. 607. 
41 Philip Budden, The United Kingdom and the European Community. 1979-1986, Unpublished 
DPhil thesis, University of Oxford, 1994. 
42 Andrew Moravcsik, `Preferences and Power', op. cit., p. 513; Hussein Kassim and Anand Menon, 
European Integration since the 1990s: Member States and the European Commission, Paper prepared 
for ARENA Seminar, University of Oslo, 11 February 2003, p. 3 
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This thesis applies the concepts first developed by Robert Putnam to describe the 
process of international bargaining. 43 Moravcsik draws on Putnam's concepts in 
advancing a theoretical explanation of intergovernmental bargaining in `The Choice 
for Europe'. 44 The `two-level' game metaphor is used by Putnam to describe how 
negotiators at international negotiations are constrained by the need to ratify the 
negotiated outcome at the domestic political level. 45 The domestic political level is 
labelled as level two in Putnam's analysis whilst international negotiations are 
described as the level one bargaining table. 46 Putnam argues that negotiators at the 
level one bargaining table negotiate to create `win-sets' (agreements that are ratified 
at the level two domestic political level. )47 Negotiators are therefore part of a 
complex series of interactions between the international level negotiations, domestic 
producer groups and electoral cleavages. Moravcsik argues that the strongest 
motivation for agreement at the IGC is the threat of failing to agree and also the need 
to avoid agreeing to international bargains which they are unable to ratify 
domestically. 48 To avoid the latter outcome negotiators are able to employ a range of 
negotiating strategies to reach an agreed bargaining output that meets domestic `win- 
sets' and thus avoids voluntary or involuntary defection from an agreement. It is 
similarly possible within Putnam's analysis for negotiators to link multiple issues 
within a single negotiation to produce an overall negotiated `win-set' rather than 
simply negotiating and achieving domestic support on a single issue. This makes the 
interaction between government negotiators conducting negotiations and domestic 
°S Robert Putnam, `Appendix - Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two Level Games', 
Peter Evans, Harold Jacobson and Robert Putnam (Eds), International Bargaining and Domestic 
Politics - Double Edged Diplomacy, University of California Press, London, 1993, pp. 431-69. as Andrew Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe, op. cit, p. 62. 
45 Robert Putnam, `Two Level Games', op. cit, p. 436. 
46 Ibid, p. 436-7 
47 Ibid, p. 436-7 
48 Andrew Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe, op. cit, p. 441. 
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`win-set' providers a complex set of interactions and relationships that are fluid 
during the negotiations and subject to continual analysis by both negotiators and by 
the validating cleavages. 49 
In summary, when examining the extent to which LI can be falsified it is argued that 
LI offers clear and explicit testable issue-specific hypotheses. As a result LI can be 
applied to each new policy area that arises within the EU, but as important, it can 
also be falsified. Having demonstrated this, Moravcsik's response to criticisms has 
been to reject them outright, thus raising doubts about whether LI can be falsified. 
Moreover, the chronology of the evolution of LI and the parallel chronology of 
responses to LI, with noticeable changes to content and ambition suggest that 
Moravcsik has amended the theoretical reach of LI in response to criticisms rather 
than using these criticisms to strengthen the theoretical microfoundations. 
However, this review of LI has advanced three contentions. First, Moravcsik, should 
not be elided with LI. As a `free-standing' theory LI offers strong explanations for 
European integration, the processes by which this integration occurs and does so in a 
more convincing way than any of the other leading contenders. This is particularly so 
in the sequencing of the policy process, with governments aggregating domestic 
interest group preferences into government policy then taking this policy forward to 
IGC negotiations and negotiating rationally during this bargaining. Second, through 
the change in nomenclature the core tenets of LI have been reasonably consistent, 
particularly in the rational underpinnings of domestic policy aggregation and 
governmental bargaining behaviour. Third, many of the critiques of LI are based on 
49 For example, see chapter four page 185. 
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acts of omission such as exclusion of everyday policymaking and the similar 
exclusion of supranational institutions from bargaining. 
Consequently, although LI is not constructed in a formal manner, it has a rational 
basis and thus should be open to the possibility of being formally constructed so 
Formal construction demands that all the elements of the theory have to be explicit 
and internally consistent. The choice of explanatory and dependent variables are 
therefore crucial. Wincott concludes that LI does not meet the high standards of 
internal consistency to map a formal political science theory. 51 Yet, in the 1991 SEA 
article the explanatory variable is clearly economic preferences, with the dependent 
variables being power and preferences which does lend itself to formal construction, 
despite Wincott's reservations. 52 This clarity is reduced through consecutive articles 
with the inclusion of caveats to try and expand LI to cover all the bargaining 
circumstances and outcomes, finally presented in `The Choice for Europe'. For 
example, Moravcsik concedes that in foreign policy, geopolitical considerations 
override economic considerations in providing an explanation for the CFSP. 53 If LI is 
to have its foundation in rationality then it should be open to formal modelling even 
though its current definition is insufficiently precise to allow this. But, the original 
1991 SEA article is constructed in a way that is conducive to formal modelling and 
the essential elements of this article are present through all the articles concerning LI 
so Formal construction refers to a trend most prevalent in American political science which seeks to 
create mathematical models of political science. Based on regressions American political scientists 
attempt to create `formal' theories of government and political activity. Peter Ordeshook, Game 
Theory and Political Theory. Cambridge University Press, (New York) 1986; Marcartan Humphreys, 
Bargaining in the presence of strategic ratifiers, Harvard Working Paper Series, January 2003, p. 1-3. 
s' Daniel Wincott, `Towards an Everyday Critique of Liberal Intergovernmentalism', op. cit, p. 607. 
52Andrew Moravcsik, `Negotiating the Single European Act', op. cit, pp. 19-56. 
s' Andrew Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe, op. cit, p. 50. 
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between 1991-1999.5; The difference is the way that the theory is described and the 
associated commentary around the theory that Moravcsik uses to deflect the 
criticisms it has received. 55 In essence, LI has an internal logic and consistency that 
provides its explanatory strength in the formal negotiations at the Nice IGC. 
Moreover, this internal consistency means that each microfoundation can be 
examined individually to access the utility of each one. 
The third rule of King, Keohane and Verba is that dependent variables need to be 
carefully selected. They pose the question whether, in LI, Moravesik has limited the 
number of possible dependent variables. In LI, the dependent variables are 
bargaining outcomes which are endogenous within LI's analysis whilst the 
independent variables within LI are power and preferences because these factors are 
exogenous to the process. 56 However, it is quite difficult to extrapolate these 
variables from the five articles and book concerning LI. Elman argues that neorealist 
theories in general suffer because `The variables in neorealist theories are poorly 
conceptualised or their dependent variables are substantively too general for making 
behavioural predictions'. 7 Whilst this is untrue for the SEA article where the 
dependent variable is the bargaining outcome and the independent variables are 
54 These factors are: aggregation of domestic producer / interest groups preferences, establishment of 
a governmental position and rational bargaining to achieve a maximisation of the government's 
position during negotiations. 
See Figure One for Chronology of LI's evolution, page 38. 
56 Endogenous variables `are factors in a causal model or system whose value is determined by the 
states of other variables in the system. Exogenous variables are factors in a causal model which are 
entirely outside of the system. ' In the case of the EU the influence of the United States might be 
considered to be an exogenous influence. However, some might argue that the uniquely close 
relationship between the UK government and the US Presidency means that this factor is a blend of 
endogenous and exogenous issues. Daniel Little, `Endogenous Variables', in Michael Lewis Beck, 
Alan Bryman (Eds), Encyclopaedia of Social Science Research Methods Volume I Sage Publishing, 
(New York), 2003, p. 490. 
57 Colin Elman, 'Horses for Courses: Why Not Neorealist Theories of Foreign Policy? ', op. cit, p. 22. 
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power and preferences, the ambiguity within the five subsequent variants of LI offers 
some validity to Elman's critique. 
However, in response the following points can be raised. That in analysing any IGC 
negotiations the outcome is the dependent variable regardless of whether this comes 
under Elman's critique of being `substantively too general'. Indeed the outcome as 
the dependent variable does open up analytical lines to cover the respective roles of 
preferences and power in negotiations. The selection of dependent and independent 
variables in LI captures the essence of IGC bargaining and therefore provides a very 
robust explanatory framework through which to analyse the UK government's 
approach to and negotiation of ESDP (1997-2000). In summary, in analysing the 
extent to which LI is constructed as an internally consistent theory it is the 
contention of this thesis that LI is constructed in a logical manner that captures the 
key aspects of the integration process in general and IGC negotiating in particular. 
King, Keohane and Verba's fourth rule is to, as they state, `maximise precision' 
which they argue means that theorists should `... choose observable rather than 
unobservable concepts. Unobservable concepts might include utility, culture, 
intentions, motivation, identification, intelligence, and national interest. Use of these 
concepts hinders the empirical evaluation of theories'. " King, Keohane and Verba 
counsel that theory created with imprecise parameters may produce tautologous 
results, `An act of an individual or a nation may be explained as resulting from a 
desire to maximise utility, to fulfil intentions, or to achieve the national interest. But 
the evidence that the act maximises utility or fulfilled intentions or achieved the 
58 Gary King, Robert Keohane and SidneyVerba, Designing Social Inquiry, op. cit, p. 110. 
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national interest is the fact that the actor or the nation engaged in it. '59 In short, the 
theory needs to be explicit about it being observed. Furthermore, if the concepts the 
theory is to observe are abstract the less likely it is that the theory can be falsified. 
Moreover, the concept of precision relates to how the theory is described. According 
to King, Keohane and Verba there should not be the need to engage in extended 
debates about what theory posits nor what is seeking to observe, `The vaguer our 
language the less chance we will be wrong but the less chance our work will be at all 
useful. It is better to be wrong than vague. '60 
A serious criticism that can be levelled at Moravcsik is that he attempts to observe 
the unobservable concepts of national interests, intentions and motivations. The 
difficulty with LI's attempt to observe these abstract concepts is that it makes the 
falsification of LI problematic, although these are the foundational elements of IGC 
bargaining. The choice of these concepts is curious because of the scientific 
explanatory intentions Moravcsik states in his publications. 61 The question what is an 
acceptable measurement to validate or falsify the hypotheses generated by LI is key. 
Moravcsik contends that source material must be gathered from primary sources and 
referenced against secondary sources. This makes testing LI a highly empirical 
endeavour. Using this rationale the researcher who presents the most comprehensive 
survey of triangulated primary evidence would have the greatest claim to validation 
or falsification of the theory. 
59 Ibid, p. 110 
60 Ibid, p. 112. 
61 Andrew Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe, op. cit, p. 6 
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Moravcsik's position is somewhat weakened by having both proposed and tested 
LI. 62 Other scholars like Paul Pierson and Theda Skockpol's work on historical 
institutionalism, have tested the theory with supportive outcomes. 63 Paradoxically, 
Moravcsik notes that theories should not be based on the empirical data that the 
theory aims to explain, `Theories should be derived independently of the matter 
being studied'. 64 Sadly, Moravcsik does not follow this aspiration with LI as it is 
deductively formulated from a history of European integration and inductively 
applied to the same data set. However this does not automatically invalidate LI and 
indeed provides further reason for LI to be tested against new policy areas and one 
that can be overcome with adequate testing. Moravcsik stridently defends his record 
and endeavours to answer his critics. He robustly states that he will only debate the 
validity of LI with academics who have conducted research as rigorously as that 
presented in `The Choice for Europe '. 65 
In summary, Moravcsik unnecessarily proposes and tests LI using the same data set. 
In doing so he has left himself open to the legitimate criticism that he has created a 
tautologous theory. However, LI is able to deflect this criticism because it has 
subsequently been tested by other scholars and the EU continues to evolve through 
successive IGCs and because LI can be tested by fresh case studies. Criticisms have 
also revolved around the concept of national interests - namely that the concept of 
62 Popper contends that once a theory is proposed it is accepted into the literature. A theory is no 
longer part of the literature when someone conclusively falsifies the hypotheses emanating from it. 
Thus, there is no need to go to great lengths to prove the theory as it stands anyway. The implication 
for LI is that Moravcsik could have proposed the theory in 1991 and not sought to defend it so 
vigorously. The criticisms produced by scholars would then in turn have been tested by other scholars. 
Karl Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery, Penguin Books, 1968, p. 468. 
63 Paul Pierson & Theda Skocpol, Historical Institutionalism in Contemporary Political Science, 
Harvard University Working Paper Series, 2004, p. 22. 
64 Andrew Moravcsik, `Preferences and Power', op. cit, p. 477. 
65 Andrew Moravcsik, `The Choice for Europe - Current Commentary and Future Research', op. cit., 
p. 170. 
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national interests is too vague to be relevant to a study of European integration. 
Chapter three argues that national interests are a valid analytical tool and can be 
found through interviews with government officials and politicians. Elman's 
criticism that LI has weaknesses in its ability to offer predictions is therefore only 
partly valid. LI makes explanatory rather than predictive claim regarding the case 
study of UK defence policy and ESDP negotiations. This thesis seeks to test the 
strength of LI's explanatory reach. Furthermore, it concludes that LI is a valid 
approach to interstate bargaining as it captures the core elements of the IGC process 
and does so with relatively transparent assumptions. 
The fifth rule asserted by King, Keohane and Verba is that rules should be stated in 
as an encompassing way as is feasible. In other words, theories should aim to explain 
general phenomena rather than very narrow occurrences. In applying LI to the grand 
bargains in the EU's history, Moravcsik is accused of three main lapses: first, the 
failure to take adequate account of extraneous factors in negotiations, for example, 
the geopolitical and ideological debates. 66 Second, that in weakening the precision in 
which LI is stated, the theory can be written to meet the necessary emphases required 
to explain each respective case study. These factors are excluded by Moravcsik 
under the rationale that power and preferences are the key determinants of the IGC 
outcome - the role of ideology and personalities are interesting but not an essential 
part of the policy making process. One of the arguments advanced in thesis is that 
these factors were present in the ESDP negotiations and the UK government's 
approach to ESDP. It also contends that there is no bar within LI to exploring such 
factors and that an exploration of these factors leads to a stronger examination of 
LI's core microfoundations. In other words while Moravcsik claims to have one 
66 Anthony Forster, `Britain and the Negotiation of the Maastricht Treaty', op. cit, pp. 347-368. 
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theory that is applied to an exact prescription of `explicit hypotheses, disaggregated 
cases, primary sources' in practice there are certain core elements present throughout 
all the case studies, but each takes on an amended form to fit theory to data. 
Third, is the failure to understand the nature and processes of government. Forster 
argues, 
Its core assumptions are undermined by a failure to disaggregate the concept of the state and more 
particularly the concept of `the government' in inter-governmental negotiations. As a consequence of 
this, LI's understanding of how governments pick and choose between various policy options is 
weakened by the fact that this is premised on the belief that governmental preferences are essentially 
the articulation of the economic interests. 7 
Furthermore, Moravcsik's interpretation of LI assumes that governments are 
homogenous and united entities whose purpose, within the EU framework, is to 
rationally negotiate in IGCs to maximise their policy preferences. Yet this thesis 
argues that the domestic policy formulation process in the approach to ESDP 
featured four main parts of the UK government, the MoD, the FCO, the Cabinet 
Office and the Prime Minister and his immediate circle of officials and advisors. Not 
only did this feature four Whitehall Departments who negotiated the detail of the 
policy internally before being able to take the policy forward into bilateral 
negotiations with the French government and then into the IGC frameworks. 
Moreover, during ESDP negotiations at Nice officials from difference department 
acted on behalf of the UK government bringing different institutional perspectives to 
elements of the negotiations and allowing the analysis of this thesis to explore LI's 
explanatory strength in greater depth. 
67 Anthony Forster, `The State of the Art', op. cit, p. 20. 
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These three criticisms go to the heart of the testability of LI. The first criticism is one 
of bias. The relevance and testability of LI bias has been questioned because of the 
failure to include exogenous factors such as geopolitical and ideological tendencies 
within governments that can become part of negotiating strategies and processes. 
The affect of geopolitical factors and concepts of nationhood are important to the 
discussion of defence policy because of the historical link between core national 
sovereignty and defence policy. 68 The political-economic basis of LI means that 
intuitively it should have less explanatory reach over foreign, defence and security 
policy integration as these policy areas are determined by other exogenous factors. 
However, LI makes an explanatory claim in this policy area because it pays regard to 
issue specific factors which brings positive and negative externalities to the fore in 
analysing security and defence policy integration. LI can act as a bridge between 
what a political-economic theory should be able to explain and what LI claims to be 
able to explain through stating the importance of geopolitical factors, and the 
relevance of positive and negative externalities in foreign and defence policy. The 
thesis argues that, notwithstanding several major correctives, LI does act as a conduit 
between the economic and geopolitical. 
Undoubtedly LI is a contested approach and as a consequence testing it is 
problematic. The definition of LI taken by this thesis is the one that features in the 
book `The Choice for Europe' which is the most detailed and thoroughly researched 
version of the theory. There are exact prescriptions and hypotheses through LI that 
are applicably to UK defence policy and the negotiation of the ESDP that are 
68 Tim Garden and John Roper, `Time for European Defence', Centre for European Reform, 11 
November 1999; David Milliband in answer to questions in the House of Commons also refers to 
defence as being `central to national sovereignty'. David Miliband, European Communities 
(Amendment) Bill, Col. 1255,17 October 2001; Nicole Gnesotto, ESDP: A European View, prepared 
for the IISS/CEPS European Security Forum, Brussels, 8 July 2001. 
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testable. The other evolutions and revisions of LI are considered as context in the 
analysis presented throughout this thesis. 
Whilst LI has very clear and precise microfoundations this thesis argues, particularly 
in chapter three, that LI fails to adequately account for the formulation of domestic 
policies. Although LI is based around the interaction of government preferences it 
fails to adequately explain the workings of the UK government. Thus, LI shows 
considerable weakness in an area where it should demonstrate a great deal of analytic 
strength. The growing body of bureaucratic politics literature strongly suggests that 
LI's omission of this dynamic is a serious one. Within the broad range of politics 
incorporated within the `black box of the state' LI fails to take account of what 
Rhodes and Dunleavy term the politics of the core executive. 9 In the case study of 
UK defence policy 1997-2000 the relevant actors that constitute the core executive 
were the Prime Minister and his immediate personal political advisors, the European 
Secretariat in the Cabinet Office, the Secretaries of State for Defence and Foreign 
and Commonwealth Affairs, their Policy Directors and Security Policy Directors and 
the Chiefs of Defence Staff. In chapter three this thesis argues that the interaction 
between the respective elements of the core executive was crucial in the 
development of a European defence initiative. The Prime Minister's role was to 
approve and direct the strategic direction of the policy entrusting officials within the 
Cabinet Office, MoD and FCO to implement this policy within acceptable 
parameters. 
69 Rod Rhodes and Patrick Dunleavy, Prime Minister. Cabinet & Core Executive, op. cit, p. 4. 
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LI is also weak in its analysis of how a governmental view pursued at an IGC 
develops. For instance, the government model, advocated by Bertjan Verbeek, is 
heavily influenced by a pluralist conception of power. This approach highlights the 
power inequalities that affect perception and preference formulation and suggest the 
importance of `ideas' to policy choices. 70 This is particularly pertinent to the UK 
defence policy case study where the importance of key concepts, transatlanticism 
and ideology played very significant roles in the policies creation within the UK 
MoD and subsequent adoption by the Prime Minister and the Cabinet. 
Moravcsik has attempted to state LI in as encompassing a way as possible by trying 
to apply LI to world governance and the negotiations of international treaties outside 
of the EU. 71 This was a bold attempt to widen the theory's scope and to create a 
theory that explains a general political science phenomena of international 
negotiations. The clear hypotheses and microfoundations of LI means that it can be 
applied to non-EU intergovernmental bargains, whether these involve trade 
agreements or security agreements where political-economic or geopolitical / 
exogenous motivations apply. However, it is not clear why Moravcsik did not 
continue to expand LI into these global agreements when the microfoundations of 
the theory are robust enough to sustain such an expansion. 
Moravcsik and Nicolaidis state that they believe that LI is an alternative to traditional 
grand theories, 
70 Bertjan Verbeek, `Whither the Study of Governmental Politics in Foreign Policy Making', Marshon 
International Studies Review. 1998, Vol. 4 1, No. 2, pp. 205-255. 
71 Andrew Moravcsik, `Taking Preferences Seriously', op. cit, pp. 513-553. 
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Unlike traditional grand theories of integration, the explanation we have provided is not grounded in a 
realist ideal-type in which states are always opposed to surrenders of sovereignty (or a 
neofunctionalist teleology of ever-expanding integration. )72 
The general patterns of government behaviour that LI identifies and the explanation 
for why governments seek to transfer issue specific sovereignty to international 
institutions has an applicability that falls wider than the EU. 
Only the critique concerning the need to state rules in an encompassing way is 
supported by this thesis. The failure to adequately explain the workings of the UK 
government is the major sustained criticism of LI, that is subject to revision and 
correctives in chapter three. The balance of evidence presented in this thesis makes it 
clear that the relationship between the key actors in the core executive played an 
important role in the development of UK defence policy. 
73 Indeed much of the 
explanation of the European defence policy initiative can be found in the relationship 
between for example, the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State for Defence, 
George Robertson and between the MoD and FCO's Policy and Political Directors, 
respectively, Richard Hatfield and Emyr Jones-Parry. 
The other two critiques made of LI are that it fails to take adequate account of the 
role of geopolitical and exogenous factors and that LI effectively changes to meet the 
needs of the case study. LI takes account of the geopolitical and exogenous factors 
but does not stress them in previous case studies involving trade and social policies. 
That these factors feature in the theory allows them to be examined by this thesis and 
provide a great deal of the analysis surrounding the motivation for this policy. The so 
called amorphous nature of LI is due more to Moravcsik's application of the theory 
72 Andrew Moravcsik and Kalypso Nicolaidis, `Explaining the Treaty of Amsterdam', op. cit, p. 82. 
73 For example, see chapter three, page 84. 
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in the articles he has written, largely in response to criticisms. However, this thesis 
contends this is distinct from the theory itself. Rather than the theory being subject to 
continual change, the fundamental tenets of LI have remained consistent throughout. 
LI is therefore stated in an encompassing manner and so meets the criteria of this 
rule. 
This is only one element of a critical evaluation of LI, the other is how the theory 
compares to its internal expectations. Compared to alternative theories of European 
integration LI fares well. This thesis argues that the internal elements of LI are 
compelling, albeit with two significant qualifications. Moravcsik proposes a 
theoretical approach that generates testable hypotheses and specifies why and how 
European integration occurs. The negotiated bargains codify the everyday 
policymaking that occurs between governments which enables an IGC-centric view 
of European integration, an approach that significantly narrows the focus of 
European integration research. 
To reach its analytical conclusions LI argues that European integration occurs in a 
three-stage process. National government preference formulation forms the first 
stage which then leads to governments taking their preferences to international 
negotiations. The last stage is the decision to pool and delegate sovereignty. 74 LI falls 
short of meeting two of these internal ambitions. LI fails to adequately explain the 
formation of national preferences, using a rigid description of how domestic interest 
groups influence government policy. The evidence from UK defence policy (1997- 
2000) casts serious doubt on this account of policy formulation. Similarly, LI argues 
74 Andrew Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe, op. cit, p. 9. 
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that international bargains are conducted on the basis of lowest common 
denominator agreements, whereas the evidence presented within this thesis, in 
chapter four, is that this understates the complexity of international negotiations. 
Tested against the five rules of theory writing suggested by King, Keohane and 
Verba LI provides a robust account of itself. LI is written in a way that allows it to be 
quickly falsified through appropriate research. As with the other rules suggested by 
King, Keohane and Verba doubts that have been cast on LI in this regard have 
actually been criticism of Moravcsik's application of LI rather than the theory itself. 
LI has been constructed in an internally consistent way that allows it to be seen as a 
quasi-scientific theory. Moreover, the dependent and independent variables within LI 
are appropriate in number and in selection by type. King, Keohane and Verba's 
fourth rule is that theories should be written precisely. It is here that criticisms can be 
made of LI, namely, that whilst retaining clear fundamental elements it has been 
written and revised in such a way as to disguise some of this clarity. This includes 
how the object of the research is described, what LI aims to explain (the outcome of 
negotiations). Finally, LI has been written in an encompassing manner. This chapter 
has argued that Moravcsik was ill-advised to drop his attempts to apply LI to non-EU 
intergovernmental bargains, an area in which its core elements are well suited. In 
summary, four out of the five rules are easily met by LI and the fourth rule of 
maximising precision is not completely met by LI, in part due to the nature of the 
phenomena being observed but also because of the way Moravcsik has sought to 
respond to his critics. 
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Conclusion 
LI provides a convincing and elegant explanation of European integration. The 
extent to which LI appears to explain every major EU bargain even when in areas 
where a political-economy based theory perhaps should not be relevant is a cause for 
concern. The concern is that LI explains too much without offering the potential to 
be falsified. 
King, Keohane and Verba and Karl Popper's work makes clear that the burden of 
proof is on those who seek to falsify theories. However, as the author of LI 
Moravcsik decided to respond to these criticisms. In doing do so he attempted to 
shift the theoretical ambitions of LI, to deflect the criticisms rather than using these 
critiques to strengthen LI's microfoundations, and overall has done much to 
undermine LI by wish to retain exclusive control over LI's development. 
Moravcsik's personal ownership of LI is indicated by his decision to both propose 
and test his theory and to deduce a theory from a data set and then test this risking a 
tautology and Moravcsik continued to feel obliged to continually defend and validate 
LI. As a consequence, LI has been opened up to being so all encompassing that it 
appears to explain every bargaining outcome. However, Moravcsik's interventions 
should not detract from the extensive explanatory reach LI has. At its core LI has 
very clear and pertinent microfoundations and assumptions that are relevant to EU 
intergovernmental negotiations. The inherent robustness and explanatory reach 
makes it the most compelling of the leading integration theories. 
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LI convincingly demonstrates several causes of European integration and EU 
expansion into further policy competencies meeting the first rule that causal theories 
are designed to show the causes of a single or set of phenomena. Criticisms of LI that 
suggest that it provides a closed account of European integration and fails to take 
account of exogenous factors are inaccurate accounts of LI. LI does make provisions 
for geopolitical and exogenous factors. The second rule - that a theory offers an 
interrelated set of causal hypotheses - is an area of weakness for LI. Its conception 
of how preferences are formed, the role of bureaucratic politics and the interaction of 
governments are imprecisely defined. However this thesis will outline (chapters 3-5) 
that these causal links can be strongly tied to each other even though the strength of 
LI has not been hitherto adequately demonstrated in this respect. The third and fourth 
rules - that each hypothesis specifies relationships between variables - is again a 
little uncertain. However, at the core of LI the theory is clear. It is merely that the 
established literature that is vague. Some criticisms of Moravcsik have been unfair - 
the relationship between power and preferences are crucial - but he has missed the 
dynamics and fluidity within the core executive of the UK government, a point this 
thesis seeks to address. There have also been questions raised about the 
methodological efficacy of Moravcsik deriving LI from empirical evidence and then 
testing LI using the same material. Whilst this is not an ideal situation it makes 
further empirical evaluation more timely so that the integration literature benefits 
from its insights. 
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Chapter Three - Domestic Policy Formulation. 
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This chapter critically evaluates LI's explanation of domestic policy formulation 
through the case study of UK defence policy between 1997-2000, in particular the 
government's approach to the development of ESDP. 
This chapter advances six central arguments. First, that the Saint Malo initiative 
reflected a tactical shift of UK defence policy within fixed government preferences 
concerning the transatlantic security guarantee. Second, that the PM centralised the 
defence policy decision making process within a core executive that comprised the 
PM and his senior political advisors, the European Secretariat of the Cabinet Office, 
the Secretaries of State for Defence and Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, and 
their respective Policy and Political Directors, Richard Hatfield and Emyr Jones- 
V 
Parry. Third, that the Prime Minister was central to the development of the pro- 
European British defence policy but did not tightly control the detail of the policy. 
Importantly, the PM give his support to the direction of the policy and left officials, 
on trust to negotiate the detail of the policy within the parameters he was prepared to 
support. The PM was motivated both by the geopolitical and exogenous factors of 
the external security situation in Kosovo and by the desire to place Britain `at the 
heart of Europe'. 
Fourth, that the pro-European defence policy was created through a process that can 
be typified as a series of `successive limited comparisons. " Fifthly, that the 
1 This refers to the work of Charles Lindblom and is expanded on page 93 of this chapter. In essence 
Lindblom argued that decisions made within bureaucracies are a series of limited comparisons in 
which officials acting as negotiators make iterative judgements about what will be acceptable to their 
officials and the others negotiator's officials. From this judgement they then work towards a fixed 
endpoint making further judgments about how to reach that point. 
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presentation of the pro-European defence policy to the domestic electorate, other 
European governments, the US President, Defense Department and the US State 
Department was conducted by advocating the elements of the policy that appealed to 
the lowest common denominators between all the parties. Finally, that whilst LI 
provides an effective analytical framework through which to explore the formulation 
of domestic policy, LI's precise hypotheses regarding policy formulation are not 
supported by the evidence of this case study. Instead this chapter argues that the 
Prime Minister determined the direction of the policy and then allowed his officials 
to seek a coalition of agreement amongst domestic interest groups challenging one of 
LI's key assumptions concerning preference formation. 
This chapter examines the formulation of British defence policy through LI's 
concepts of `preferences', `process' and `presentation'. Preferences are LI's 
conceptual device that underpins governmental policy-making. This chapter analyses 
whether the UK government's preference for the transatlantic status-quo remained 
stable between 1997 and 2000.2 This includes an analysis of whether the Saint Malo 
process represents a radical change in governmental preferences or merely a tactical 
shift of policy to achieve other European policy goals. Interview evidence is used to 
describe how the British government developed the Saint Malo initiative that led to 
the ESDP. This evidence convincingly shows that the UK government stayed within 
2 Jolyon Howarth, `Why ESDP is Necessary and Beneficial for the Alliance', International Relations 
and Security Network, 2002, p. 1. 
3 The `Saint Malo Process' describes the bilateral negotiations between the British and French 
governments between July and December 1998 that resulted in a joint `Letter of Intent' declaring that 
both governments would work towards improving European military capabilities. The `Saint Malo 
process' also includes negotiations between governments up to and including the Nice 
Intergovernmental Conference (IGC). The book by Maartje Rutten shows a clear chronology from the 
informal summit at PSrtschach to the Nice IGC. Maartje Rutten, From Saint Malo to Nice. European 
Defence: Core Documents. Institute for Security Studies, (Paris) 2001. Moreover, Lord Robertson, 
Secretary of State for Defence (May 1997-August 1999 - replaced by Geoff Hoon) argued that once 
the Saint Malo Accords (see Annex A, p. 268) were signed they locked both the UK and France into 
formalising the development of ESDP. Interview with Lord Robertson, 11 March 2004. 
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established preferences and sought instead to find an innovative policy solution to 
meet its ideological, strategic and geopolitical ambitions. 
The concepts of process and presentation analyse the mechanics of policy making: 
how the political decision to adopt a pro-EU defence policy was taken and then 
translated into government action. This examination reveals how the government 
made progress towards a contested policy goal but did so with clear aims. Similarly, 
this analysis shows how the British government secured French and American 
government agreement for the British policy. 
The chapter is divided into four sections. The first section outlines LI's explanation 
of domestic policy formulation. The second section explores the contention that the 
Saint Malo process was a shift in core governmental preferences and argues that 
there is insufficient evidence to make this a compelling case. The third section 
explores the empirically strong contention that the Saint Malo process was a tactical 
shift of policy to meet the government's short-term strategic EU and long-term 
defence goals. The concluding section explores the applicability of LI to domestic 
policy formulation arguing that the theory does not fully capture UK defence policy 
formulation within its explanatory framework. Furthermore, this chapter offers an 
alternative explanation that is based around the Prime Minister establishing the 
strategic direction of the policy, on receipt of the specific MoD plan, generated by 
Richard Hatfield and his colleagues, to be promote a collaborative EU based 
defence. 
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LI's Explanation of Domestic Policy Formulation 
LI argues that governments aggregate domestic pressures into governmental policy 
and preferences. 4 LI draws a subtle difference between the concepts of governmental 
`preferences' and governmental `policy'. 5 Preferences are the stable positions held 
by governments, traceable over a large number of years, regardless of the political 
hue of the government. Policies, however, are the issue specific positions of 
governments that, in LI's view of European integration, are rationally pursued at 
IGCs. 6 The formulation of policies rather than preferences are dealt with in this 
chapter. 
A potentially important absence in LI's explanation of domestic policy making is the 
failure to account for `every-day' policy making. Whilst Moravcsik does not claim to 
want to explore `every-day' policy making, citing the five key moments in European 
integration as the treaty forming and amending intergovernmental conferences, the 
failure to examine informal integration neglects a significant element of the 
integration process. 7 This omission, which is explored later in this chapter, may have 
led to LI under-specifying the distribution of information and balance of power 
within the EU. 8 
4 Andrew Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe, op. cit, p. 3. 
s Ibid, p. 3-9 
6 Ibid, p. 3 
Ibid, p. 2. Philip Budden, `Observations on the Single European Act and `launch of Europe': A less 
`intergovernmental' reading of the 1985 Intergovernmental Conference', Journal of European Public 
Policy, Vol. 9, No. 1,2002, pp. 76-97, p. 94-5. Anthony Forster, `Britain and the negotiation of the 
Maastricht Treaty', op, cit, p. 357-9. 
8 Daniel Wincott, `Towards an Everyday Critique of Liberal Intergovernmentalism', op. cit, p. 607. 
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LI also argues that governments are rational actors who bargain to maximise their 
national interest. 9 Moreover, LI suggests that governments aggregate the policy 
preferences of domestic interest groups into their national policy. 10 Government 
policies are thus shaped by the value of the benefits to be gained from co-operation 
with other governments, the certainty of these costs and benefits and the relative 
influence of the interest groups on areas of policy formulation. " Thus, co-operation 
at the EU level only occurs when governmental interests converge. 12 Furthermore, LI 
rejects the argument that negotiations concerning EU policy areas are linked. 13 LI 
states that individual policy areas impose individual constraints on the policies of 
governments and ultimately produce identifiable patterns of bargaining. '4 
Critics of LI, like Fritz Scharpf and Daniel Wincott argue that LI provides an 
inadequate and incomplete picture of domestic policy formulation, preferring instead 
to rely on a series of assumptions that work back from a start point that there was a 
negotiated outcome between governments. 15 However, by contrast this chapter 
argues that LI is a very useful way of examining domestic policy formulation. In this 
9 Andrew Moravcsik, `Preferences and Power in the European Community', op. cit, p. 480. 
'o Ibid, p. 481. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Andrew Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe, op. cit., p. 74. 
13 Johan Olsen, `Garbage can, new institutionalism and the study of politics', American Political 
Science Review. Vol. 95, No. 1,2000, pp. 191-198; Jeremy Richardson, `Policy Making in the EU: 
Interests, Ideas and Garbage Cans of Primevil Soup' in European Union: Power and Policy Making. 
Routledge, (London), 1996, pp. 3-23. An example of policy linkage is the argument that the reticence 
of the UK government to join the single European currency informed the pro-European defence 
agenda. Interview with Robert Key MP, 10 January 2003; Correspondence with John Redwood MP, 
10 December 2002. 
14 Andrew Moravcsik, `Preferences and Powers in the European Community', op. cit, p. 488. 
15 Fritz Scharpf, `The Choice for Europe: Selecting cases and testing hypotheses', Journal of European 
Public Policy. Vol. 6, No. 1,1998, pp. 164-168, p. 165; Daniel Wincott, `Towards an everyday critique 
of Liberal Intergovernmentalism', op. cit, p. 601. The term `next stage up formulation' is the work of 
this author. Starting from the lead point that there was a negotiated outcome and then saying there 
must have been a rational negotiation between governments and before that governments will have 
formulated their policies and preferences and thus will have been on the basis of an aggregation of 
interest group pressure. Thus this process can be described as `next-stage-up' validation or perhaps 
`reverse engineering'. 
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particular case study the dynamics and relationships between key officials within the 
core executive plays an important part in the formulation of UK defence policy 
between 1997-2000. Nonetheless this research finds that LI does not adequately 
account for this dynamic. 
Preferences 
LI argues that preferences are the fundamental pre-cursors that underscore the 
making of policy and are stable over extended periods of time16 To discover that core 
UK government preferences changed during the Saint Malo process would be 
significant in the context of LI's analysis. The importance would be in suggesting 
that the Saint Malo process was a radical departure from the fifty year history of the 
transatlantic paradigm. This thesis strongly argues, however, that the Blair 
government did not shift UK government preferences with the Saint Malo Accords 
but changed policy to reflect the strategic and political needs of the government. 
A key preference is the UK government's view of Europe's place in the world -a 
positive and engaged role in global affairs - is consistent with the policies pursued by 
the Labour government, particularly in seeking to take up a `... destiny to be leading 
16 Andrew Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe, op. cit, p. 5-6. Policy is used extensively in the news 
media as a way of describing both the ideology behind actions of government and the implementation 
of that action. The working definition of policy advocated by Andrew Dorman incorporates the 
production of ideas, a consultation process over the appropriateness of those ideas, the resultant 
implementation and reaction to the implementation. Andrew Dorman, An Examination of the 
Formulation and Implementation of British Defence Policy 1978-1989. Unpublished PhD Thesis, 
University of Birmingham, 1998, p. 13-15. William Wallace argues that policy is `a stable set of 
attitudes, an implicit or explicit plan or some general guiding principles or attitudes determining or 
influencing decisions. cf Brian Hogwood & Lewis Gunn, Policy Analysis for the Real World. Oxford 
University Press, (Oxford) 1984, p. 19. Sarah Hogg and Jonathan Hill bring the experience of working 
in Downing Street to bring an autobiographical see to the concept of policy which they describe as 
being a process interdepartmental and personality conflict which to leads to governmental policy. 
Sarah Hogg & Jonathan Hill, Too Close to Call, Little, Brown and Company, (London) 1995, p. 98. 
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at the heart of Europe'. 17 Moreover, it holds the view that if the US is increasingly 
reluctant to engage in military interventions in Europe's near abroad then the EU 
should attempt to fill this void. 18 Alyson Baffles discusses the UK government's 
security preferences, or in her words 'characteristics'. 19 First, `Britain can never 
regard European security as a purely self-serving process but is constantly aware of 
the role Europe is expected to play, and ought to be able to play, in the greater 
enterprise of world order and global security cooperation. ' 20 
Second, 
[A].. characteristic of the British view might be described as worldly-wise but not world-weary. British 
thinking takes full account of realities and power relationships. It accepts the use of military force as 
legitimate, and sometimes necessary, part of the spectrum of options for the defence of national and 
collective interests and for various phases of conflict management. At the same time, the British sense 
of fair play and balance, and experience of the costs and limits of military intervention, leads the UK 
to a preference for seeing power exercised within the rules, and a dislike for ill-considered, especially 
unilateralist action. 21 
This preference can be summarised as being the UK's continued role as a medium 
sized military actor which seeks to play an active role in humanitarian interventions, 
even when these interventions do not directly benefit the UK national interest. The 
development of the Saint Malo process can be strongly argued to be part of this 
tradition as well as part of the general desire to share the security burden for 
continental Europe with the US. 
"Anne McElvoy, `Goodbye Party, hello people. First New Labour now New Britain. After watching 
the Prime Minister in action at Brighton last week Anne McElvoy believes she has discovered his real 
political aims', The Sunday Telegraph (London), October 5 1997, p. 27; Colin McInnes, `Labour's 
Strategic Defence Review'. International Affairs, Vol. 74, No. 4,1998, pp. 823-848, p. 828; Tony Blair, 
1945 Anniversary Lecture to the Fabian Society, 1995. Peter Mandelson, Speech to the European 
University Institute, Florence, 30 January 1998. 
18 Interview with Lord Robertson, op. cit; Former Secretary of State for Defence Lord Robertson 
suggested that the Saint Malo process was a response to the realisation that the US was increasingly 
reluctant to act in Europe's near abroad and also that European moves towards an autonomous 
defence identity were set in train before 1998 with initiatives like NATO's ESDI but that the Labour 
government was keen to advance this initiative to ensure that the UK's interests were secured. 
19 Alyson Bailes, `European defence and security: The Role of NATO, WEU, and EU', SecuriDialogue 
. Vol. 27, No. 1, (1996), p. 55-64. 20 Ibid, p. 55. 
21 Ibid. p. 55-56. 
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Third, `A British analysis of the role of institutions in European security will always 
begin with a survey of demands they have to meet. And despite all the novel features 
of the post-Cold War environment, the first of these must remain collectivity in 
defence for the most closely like-minded powers, including a continued US strategic 
commitment'. 22 This preference, a security guarantee underwritten by the 
transatlantic Alliance is, according to mainly Conservative party politicians, strained 
by the `Saint Malo Process'. Former Secretary of State for Wales, and two time 
Conservative party leadership candidate, John Redwood argues that the Saint Malo 
process has the potential to fatally undermine NATO, unleashing the French 
government's preference, as he views it, for decoupling from the transatlantic 
Alliance. 23 Former Secretary of State for Defence Malcolm Rifkind (1992-1995 and 
1995-1997 Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs) reinforces this 
view, but sees it as a failure to consider the most likely implication of the Saint Malo 
process rather than a deliberate act, as Redwood suggests. 4 
The announcements at Pörtschach and Saint Malo created the possibility of a 
credible European collaborative defence structure being created and this, if managed 
badly, from a British perspective, could have had the consequence of undermining 
NATO and the broader relationship between the US and the EU. 25 One of the 
22 Ibid, p. 56. 
23 Correspondence with John Redwood MP, op. cit. Joylon Howarth, The European Security 
Conundrum: Prospects for ESDP after September 11 2001. Policy Paper Number One, Notre Europe, 
Paris, March 2002; Robert E. Hunter, After Helsinki: Getting the NATO-EU Relationship Right, 
RAND (New York), 2002, p. 73; Michael White, `Thatcher decries European Army', The Guardian, 8 
December 1999. 
24 Interview with Sir Malcolm Rifkind, 13 January 2004. 
25 Richard Hatfield, `The Consequences of Saint Malo', Lecture given to the Paris Institut Francais 
des Relations Internationales, 28 April 2000. Kori Schake, `EU Should Duplicate NATO Assets', 
Centre for European Reform, Bulletin, Issue 18, June / July 2001. Joylon Howarth, `Why ESDP is 
necessary and beneficial for the Alliance', op. cit., p. 15; Julian Lindley-French, Terms of Engagement. 
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arguments advanced in this chapter is that officials within the core executive 
managed the pre-negotiation and IGC negotiations very effectively, ensuring that 
ESDP reflected core UK government interests. 
The assessment of whether the Saint Malo initiative amounts to a radical shift of 
preferences is contested along two lines. The first being that core UK government 
preferences were shifted by the Saint Maio Accords and the second being that this 
was a tactical shift in policy with preferences remaining unaffected. The balance of 
available evidence strongly points towards a conclusion that the Saint Malo process 
constituted a tactical shift in policy within the stable preference of the transatlantic 
security guarantee. 
Contention One: The Saint Mato Initiative Amounts to a shift of Preferences. 
There is circumstantial evidence that points towards the Saint Malo initiative being a 
fundamental shift in governmental preferences. Defence policy is traditionally a slow 
evolving and developing policy area. Policy initiatives are rigorously analysed for 
their strategic and economic implications before being brought before Parliament 
and implemented. 26 The Prime Minister, by contrast, announced the Saint Malo 
The Paradox of American Power and the Trans-Atlantic Dilemma post-I 1`h September. Chaillot Paper 
52, Paris, 2002, p. 67; Interview with Bruce George MP, 7 January 2003, Interview with Robert Key 
MP, op. cit; Also see, Annex A and Annex C. 
26 Both William Hopkinson and Malcolm Rifkind argue that the Saint Malo initiative represent a rapid 
change in defence policy. Hopkinson thought that such a change would only be able to occur in a very 
permissive political environment whilst Rifkind argued that such a rapid change cannot have been 
`properly thought out'. Moreover, Rifkind cast doubt on the effectiveness of the Secretary of State for 
Defence which, of course, be a political point. Interview with William Hopkinson, 17 January 2003; 
Interview with Sir Malcolm Rifkind, op. cit. 
72 
initiative, at the Pörtschach press conference on 25 October 1998 at a time when the 
debate between the MoD and FCO concerning the policy remained unresolved. 27 
The initiative alluded to at Pörtschach was formally announced at Saint Malo with a 
similar perception of haste. This was partly because it ran contrary to published 
Labour party policy before and immediately after the 1997 general election. 28 These 
two factors suggest that the initiative was not under active consideration until the 
spring of 1998.29 Furthermore, previous major changes in defence policy have had 
their origins in the government's desire to reduce or maintain the defence budget. 30 
Indeed many, including former Chief of Defence Staff Charles Guthrie argue that the 
primary motivation for defence reviews are the desire to reduce defence budget 
spending within a framework of changing strategic considerations. 31 In the context 
of the historically identifiable imperative of budgetary considerations - particularly 
equipment and manpower budgets - it would be reasonable to assume that these 
factors would play a significant role in the development of British defence policy in 
1998. 
27 Interview A said that the announcement was made as a way of allowing the Foreign Office an 
elegant withdrawal from this debate. Lord Robertson, however, stated that this was a way of ending 
the debate between the departments. Interview with Lord Robertson, op. cit; Interview A, 26 March 
2002. 
28 Road to the Manifesto: A Fresh Start for Britain - Labour's strategy for Britain in the modem 
world. Labour Party, (London), 1996, p. 11-15. 
29 David Clark, Labour's Defence and Security Policy, UK Defence Forum 
(www. ukdf. org. uk/cp5. html), (London), 11 March 1997. David Clark was Robin Cook's special 
advisor on foreign affairs between 1997-2000. Defence was not a key tenet of the European plank of 
the Labour Party election manifesto which did give considerable space to defence issues stating the 
need for the Strategic Defence Review. Interview B, 6 March 2002, Interview C, 21 January 2003. 
30 Andrew Dorman, 'Reconciling Britain to Europe in the next Millennium: The Evolution of British 
Defense Policy in the Post-Cold War Era', Defense Analysis, Vol. 17, No. 2,2001, pp. 187-202, p. 192. 
31 This view was reinforced by Sir Tim Garden who stated that in the case of the SDR, and indeed the 
Saint Malo initiatives, the motivations he felt were primarily strategic. Interview with Sir Tim Garden, 
7 January 2003; Interview with Lord Charles Guthrie, 21 January 2003. 
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Investment 
The Labour party's approach to defence policy leading up to the 1997 election was 
to place a great emphasis on the economic benefits that could be derived from a 
revised defence policy. 32 These benefits were to be realised through an improvement 
of the defence and high technology industrial bases that they argued the 
Conservative government had neglected. 33 To commentators, notably Stefano 
Silvestri and Matthew Uttley, the continued success of the defence industrial base is 
the key to the `Europeanisation' of the defence sphere. 34 They advance the argument 
that the UK, French and Italian governments have guarded their defence industries 
and as a result failed to produce a pan-European defence industrial base to rival the 
dominance of the American military industrial complex 35 
The recent mergers of BAe Systems and Marconi, to form British Aerospace 
Industries, and Aerospatiale-Matra, Dasa and Casa to create EADS (European 
Aeronautic and Space Company) signals some consolidation towards a more 
integrated defence base. 36 Keith Hartley estimates that the progressive unification of 
the national defence industries into a pan-European defence industrial base will 
produce equipment cost savings of 10-12%. 37 To draw a link between the pressure 
from domestic producer groups and the development of the Saint Malo Initiative 
32 The Labour Party, Road to the Manifesto: A Fresh Start for Britain, op. cit, p. 11-15. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Stefano Silvestri, `Atlantic and European Defence after Kosovo', The International Spectator, 
Vol. XXXIV, No. 3,1999, pp. 11-20, p20. Matthew Uttley, 'Defence Procurement and Industrial 
Policies', in Stuart Croft, Andrew Dorman, Wyn Rees & Matthew Uttley, Britain and Defence 1945- 
2000. A Policy Re-evaluation, Pearson /Longman, (London), 2001, pp. 115-134, p. 126-7. 
35 Stefano Silvestri, `Atlantic and European Defence', op. cit, p. 19; Matthew Uttley, `Defence 
Procurement and Industrial Policies', op. cit, p. 126-7. 
36 David Gow, 'BAe targets US monopoly', The Guardian, (London & Manchester), 2 January 1999. 
" Keith Hartley, `Evidence to the House of Lords Select Committee on the European Union'. Sub- 
Committee C- The Common European Security and Defence Policy. 2nd March 2000, The Stationary 
Office, London, 2000, p. 38. 
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would certainly support LI's account of domestic policy formulation. The history of 
previous defence reviews by previous governments indicates that budgetary 
considerations should have been a significant factor in the development of British 
defence policy between 1997 and 2000. 
The budgetary imperative led the government to tackle the problem of equipment 
projects being over-budget and overtime. 38 To counter problematic equipment 
projects the government introduced the `smart procurement' initiative which aimed 
to reduce costs and shorten lead-in times for major equipment projects. Crucially 39 
`smart procurement' was meant to simplify the procurement procedures, facilitate a 
greater level of co-operation amongst allies, increase the use of commercial 
technology and retain competitive tendering as a means to keep costs low. 40 
The cost cutting impetus of the Labour government, of maintaining budget levels but 
increasing efficiency, has led some academic commentators to argue that the 
motivations for the Europeanisation of defence policy are founded in the need to 
achieve budgetary savings, whilst retaining operational effectiveness. Michael 
Alexander and Timothy Garden argue that, 
Unless European governments can find a way to get a significantly better return for each unit of 
defence expenditure, starting relatively soon, their ability, separately or collectively, to take 
substantive military action in defence of their interests is going to evaporate. Even before the reality 
of military ineffectiveness becomes established, the perception of it will mean European governments 
38 Essays 10-1, The Strategic Defence Review. The Stationery Office, (London), 1998; Laura 
Trevelyan, 'UK Defence Projects Over Budget', BBC News Online, 30 June 1999; Mark Milner, 
'BAe Makes Ministry Peace', The Guardian, (Manchester), 20 February 2003. 
39 MoD Press Release 096/97, `Strategic Defence Review seeks `Smart Procurement', The Minister of 
Defence, (London), 30 July 1997. 
40 Essays 10-2, `The Strategic Defence Review', op. cit. 
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losing whatever influence they have over US defence and security policy, as well as the support of 
their electorates for whatever levels of defence expenditure they obtain' 41 
Alexander and Garden further contend that the erosion of military capabilities 
resulting from declining budgets will produce a point `beyond which the 
maintenance of a military capability for anything other the most local defence 
requirements will become impossible. '42 This analysis is reinforced by former Vice- 
President of the European Commission Lord Brittan, Interview C and Pol de Witte 
from NATO, who argue that greater European defence co-operation might lead to a 
more cost-effective provision of defence across the EU. 43 
Examining the lines of capital investment in the British defence budget strengthens 
the economic rationale for the pro-European defence policy. In the 1999/2000 
Financial Year personnel costs accounted for 37.5%, equipment costs 44.2% and 
maintenance costs 18.3% of the British defence budget. 44 The inflationary pressures 
on the maintenance costs are broadly in line with those in the general economy as 
they comprise such aspects as food, accommodation, and fuel that are readily 
sourced from the private market. Inflationary pressures on manpower costs run ahead 
of those in the civilian economy because of the extra dangers and anti-social aspects 
involved with working in the forces. Inflationary pressures on manpower costs are 
increased during periods of national prosperity as a consequence of the added 
competition from private employers but still run ahead of pay increases in the 
41 Michael Alexander & Timothy Garden, `The Arithmetic of Defence Policy', International Affairs 
Vol. 77, No. 3,2001, pp. 509-529, p. 510. 
42 Ibid, p. 513. 
43 Interview C argued that this would lead to other member governments aside from UK and France 
improving their defence capabilities in line with their collective responsibilities whilst Lord Brittan 
thought this would provide a streamlining of defence budgets, `a smarter use of the defence budget'. 
Interview with Lord Leon Brittan, 9 January 2003; Interview C, op. cit; Interview with Pol de Witte, 
20 April 2004. 
44 Ministry of Defence Performance Report, Cm 5000, Ministry of Defence, (London), December 
2000, p. 43. 
76 
economy as a whole in times of economic recession. 45 Inflationary pressures on the 
cost of military equipment are far greater than on personnel costs and are well 
documented. 46 Equipment costs escalate because of the need to match and exceed the 
military capabilities of potential enemies and from the desire to remain at the `cutting 
edge' of defence technology. 47 Alexander and Garden estimate that technology 
prices rise at approximately 5% above inflation year on year, with the caveat that in 
some areas the inflationary pressures on cutting edge technologies are much 
greater. 48 The increasing costs involved in maintaining British defence while the 
defence budget is kept at constant or diminishing levels has forced manpower to be 
cut year on year for the last thirty years. 49 Projections show that if British GDP 
grows at 3% for the next 15 to 20 years and defence spending is maintained at 
current levels, the defence budget as a share of GDP will have decreased from 2.4% 
in 2000 to 1.3% by 2015.50 
With a continuing emphasis on budgetary cuts and maximising efficiency in the 
armed forces it would have been arguably expedient to pursue the Europeanisation of 
British defence policy between 1997-2000 in this context. Within the EU level the 
as Michael Alexander & Timothy Garden, `The Arithmetic of Defence Policy', op. cit, p. 515. 
46 For example, see Timothy Garden's comparison of the cost of airborne bombing capability between 
1945 and 1980. Garden calculated that for like for like roles this type of aircraft cost Britain 20 to 30 
times more (including mid-service updates) than in 1945. (Timothy Garden, The Technology Trap, 
Brasseys, (London), 1989, pp. 38-39. ) Similarly, a study by David Kirkpatrick and Philip Pugh has 
borne out the escalating costs of defence equipment. (David Kirkpatrick & Philip Pugh, Towards the 
Starship Enterprise - are the Current Trends in Defence Unit Cost Inexorable, Aerospace, (London), 
1983, pp. 16-23; Todd Sandler and Keith Hartley, The Economics of Defence, Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge, 1995, p. 185-7; J. B. Bourn, `Securing value for money in defence procurement', 
Whitehall Paper Number 25, Royal United Services Institute, (London), 1994; Trevor Taylor, `Smart 
Procurement and Partnerships with Industry', The Journal of the Royal United Services Institute, 
Vo1.143, No. 2,1998, p. 41. 
47 David Kirkpatrick, `The Rising Unit Cost of Defence Equipment - the Reasons and Results', 
Defence and Peace Economics, Vol. 6, No. 4,1995, pp. 263-288. 
48 Michael Alexander & Timothy Garden, `The Arithmetic of Defence Policy', op. cit, p. 516. 49 Indeed 30% of defence manpower was cut by Defence Secretary Tom King in 1991, Britain's Army 
for the 90s, Ministry of Defence, (London), July 1991, Foreword. 
50 Michael Alexander & Timothy Garden, `The Arithmetic of Defence Policy', op. cit, p. 520. 
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collective 1998 defence spending levels were $173.4bn a year whilst America spent 
$271.3bn, both have GDPs of approximately $8.2 trillion. 51 An additional investment 
of some $95bn over a 25-year period would, according to the RAND Corporation, 
fail to bring EU capabilities to the level that America enjoys. 52 Whilst not providing 
a long-term fix to the gap between European and American capabilities, the 
`Europeanisation' of British defence policy might delay the erosion of domestic 
defence capabilities and would produce a greater level of capabilities for comparable 
funding. Achieving budgetary savings on defence would also have allowed Labour 
to focus spending on electorally significant issues notably the National Health 
Service, education and pensions. 53 Indeed, according to a MORI poll published in the 
`Economist', defence was the fourteenth out of seventeen most important issues for 
voters in the 2001 general election. 54 With voter concern on defence so low, securing 
financial savings from the defence budget would have been rational and expedient. 
However, there is very little evidence that budgetary considerations played a 
significant or even minor role in the formulation of UK defence policy between 1997 
and 2000. This conclusion forms part of the evidence that the Saint Malo process 
was not a fundamental shift in core government preferences. 
S' According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies the defence budgets of the EU 
collectively was, in 2000, $129,349m compared to the US Department of Defense, $281,000. The UK 
had a defence budget of $33890m, France $26538m, Germany $22871m and Sweden $4405m. The 
Military Balance 2001/2002, IISS, (London), 2003. Eurostat estimates that in the FYI 2002 that the 
GDP for the United States was $10.4tr whilst the combined GDP of the EU was $8.59tr. 
ýhttp: //www. eia. doe. gov/emeu/cabs/euro. html) 
2 Mark Berman & Grace Carter, The Independent European Force: Costs of Independence, RAND 
Corporation, (New York) 1993, p. 41. 
53 David Denver, Elections and Voters in Britain, Palgrave, (Basingstoke), 2003, p. 100. 
54 Philip Cowley and Stuart Quayle, `The Conservatives running on the spot', in Andrew Geddes and 
Jonathan Tonge, Labour's Second Landslide - The British General Election 2001. Manchester 
University Press, (Manchester) 2002, p. 58. 
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Lobbying 
The potential profits involved in British defence manufacturing industry makes 
effective lobbying for defence contracts worthwhile and might affect the 
government's strategic direction a lucrative activity. The perceived need to maintain 
interoperability with the US military feeds into the process of allocating contracts for 
research and development. 55 Michael Rush notes that there have been increasing 
levels of political expertise amongst industrial lobbyists to take commercial 
advantage of opportunities within the parliamentary system. 56 Increasing numbers of 
ex-civil servants have been employed by the industry to `best access' the machinery 
of government and thereby improve the profitability of industry. 57 Ex-civil servants 
have provided an increased amount of access to key officials for industrial lobbyists, 
as Wyn Grant notes, 
.. 
(being able to) talk their (Civil Service) language; that it knows how to present a case, and how to 
bargain and accept the outcome of the bargaining process. The language of the British civil service is 
a language of veiled understatement and it is characteristic of politically unsophisticated outsider 
groups that their demands are often presented in strident and uncompromising terms s$ 
Through retaining civil service contracts lobbyists have similarly maintained access 
to regular consultations and meetings to gauge opinion on policy proposals and 
implementation. 59 Grant Jordan and Jeremy Richardson argue that membership of 
advisory committees which are maintained by government departments is a key way 
of influencing policy, as these committees allow, `regularized participation in these 
ss Interview with Robert Key MP, op. cit; Interview C, op. cit; Interview with Sir Tim Garden, op. cit; 
Interview with William Hopkinson, op. cit; All of these interviewees referred to the need to retain 
interoperability - the ability to engage in joint operations with the US largely to retain influence over 
the US and to maintain the UK's position as the leading military actor in the EU. 
56 Michael Rush (ed), Parliament and Pressure Politics, Clarendon Press, (London), p. 272. S' William Coxall, Pressure Groups in British Politics, Pearson, (London) 2001, p. 78. 
58 Wyn Grant, Pressure Groups and British Politics, MacMillan, (London), 2000, p. 20. 59 William Maloney, Grant Jordan, and Andrew McLaughlin, `Interest Groups and Public Policy: the 
Insider / Outsider Model Revisited', Journal of Public Policy, Vol. 14, No 1,1994, pp. 17-38, p. 23 
79 
structures, groups are able to shape the definition and perception of problems, 
influence the political agenda in those policy area of direct concern to them, and 
influence the perception and emergence of `practicable' solutions'. 60 
Malcolm Chalmers similarly argues that access to key MoD staff and procurement 
processes are invaluable to defence manufacturers and has produced efficiency 
savings for business and government because of a greater compatibility between 
equipment and industrial objectives. 61 The development of defence industrial policy 
is conducted through a regularised and controlled system of formal and informal 
contacts with industry along with the sustained aim of government to reduce defence 
budgets and improve capabilities. These meetings, contacts, and economic aims have 
put pressure on government to reduce costs and restructure the forces away from 
their Cold War structures to a post-Cold War structure in line with the Petersburg 
tasks. 62 This pressure can be seen as part of an evolution rather than a radical 
departure from existing British policy. 63 This assertion strengthens LI's account of 
domestic policy formulation which highlights a system of government departments 
aggregating domestic producer group policy pressure into policy positions. 
Interview evidence from key officials involved in the development of defence policy 
points towards an absence of attention on budgetary issues particularly in the 
formulation of the Saint Malo initiative. 64 These interviewees argue that motivations 
60 Grant Jordan and Jeremy Richardson, Government and Pressure Groups in Britain, Oxford 
University Press, (London) 1987, p. 185. 
61 Malcolm Chalmers, `Military spending and the British economy', reprinted in David Coates and J 
Hillard (eds), UK Economic Decline, Harvester Wheatsheaf, (London), 1995, pp. 287-9 1. 
62 See Annex C, page 275 for a definition of the Petersburg Tasks. 
63 William Hopkinson, The Making of British Defence Policy, The Stationary Office, (London) 2000, 
77-8. Interview with Robert Key MP, op. cit; Interview with Lord William Wallace, 23 May 2003. 
Interview B, op. cit; Interview M, 21 March 2002; Interview I, 26 March 2002. 
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for the Saint Malo process were not founded in the desire to make efficiency savings 
in the UK nor `EU' defence budget. 65 Indeed, it was commented that in hindsight 
this might appear negligent but that the development of the policy was devised to 
achieve international political objectives rather than economies of scale and 
efficiency savings. 66 
The Role of the Prime Minister 
This section argues that Tony Blair was central to the development of UK European 
defence policy between 1997-2000. Evidence of this begins with the PM rather than 
the Secretary of State for Defence, George Robertson announcing the Saint Malo 
initiative. Interviewees from the FCO and Cabinet Office argue that this 
demonstrates the centrality of the PM and Cabinet Office in the process and the 
temporary marginalisation of the MoD and FCO in the launching of the Saint Malo 
initiative. 67 At the summit press conference on 4 December 1998 Blair stated, 
A common foreign and security policy for the European Union is necessary, it is overdue, it is needed 
and it is high time we got on with trying to engage with formulating it and I think that people were 
pleased that Britain came to this with an open mind and was willing to participate in the debate and I 
think it is important that we do that 68 
65 Interview B, op. cit; Interview M, op. cit; Interview I, op. cit; Interview A, op. cit. 
66 It should be noted that the economic part of the equation was examined after the announcements at 
PSrtschach and Saint Malo. Interview M said he was not aware, and had not been party to discussions 
that had included budgetary considerations at any stage of the discussions within Whitehall about the 
Saint Malo initiative. This further reinforces the view that the Saint Malo initiative was a shift in 
policy rather than a shift in preferences. Interview M, op. cit. 
Perhaps, unsurprisingly, Interview M and Interview A argue that the Cabinet Office was crucial in 
this process as they were, at the time, Cabinet Office officials. They do, however, point towards a 
trend that the former FCO official Interview B reinforces which is that the European Secretariat of the. 
Cabinet Office became Blair's personal advisory unit on this issue and therefore gained a more central 
role. Interview B, op. cit. Interview M, op. cit. Interview A, op. cit. 
68 `Austrian Presidency Informal Summit Press Conference', 25 October 1998, Reproduced in Maartje 
Rutten, From Saint Malo to Nice, op. cit, p. 1-3. 
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The Prime Minister's role in this instance, is indicative of the extent to which this 
policy was a crucial element of the government's programme. Moreover, by 
remaining so closely involved and associated with the initiative Tony Blair invested 
a great deal of his most valuable asset, his personal credibility, in a policy with very 
easily measurable successes and failures. By pursuing this policy, Blair also took a 
number of political risks. The first of these was with the transatlantic alliance itself. 
If the policy had been perceived by the US State Department or key NATO allies in 
a negative way there is a possibility that ESDP could have fatally undermined 
NATO. From one perspective, namely, the Conservative opposition and sections of 
the Parliamentary Labour Party, the Labour government seemed to be reversing a 
long history of British defence preferences being vested exclusively in the NATO 
transatlantic alliance. 69 Indeed previous Conservative governments had believed that 
NATO was more than a military organisation also containing a political dimension, 
through `Partnership for Peace' that would help defence transformation in the ex- 
communist states in Central and Eastern Europe. In contrast the Labour party 
position under Blair seems to have provided a division of labour between security 
matters being vested in NATO and political competencies concentrated in the EU. 70 
Whilst in opposition the Labour party criticised the government's defence policy as 
lacking strategic focus and dictated by the Treasury's desire to make piecemeal cuts 
69 Lawrence Freedman, The Politics of British Defence 1979-1998, Palgrave, (Basingstoke) 1999, p. ii. 
This view is particularly true of John Redwood and Robert Key who were senior figures within the 
Conservative party and Bruce George who is the Labour chairman of the House of Commons Select 
Committee on Defence. Counterbalancing views are provided by Lord Robertson and senior officials 
involved in the process like Richard Hatfield and Emyr Jones-Parry who state categorically that this 
was not the case. Correspondence with John Redwood, op. cit; Interview with Lord Robertson, op. cit; 
Interview with Robert Key MP, op. cit; Interview D, 6 January 2003 
70 Michael Portillo, `A British View', in The Framework of United Kingdom Defence Policy, The 
Stationery Office, (London), 1996, p. 3. 
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to the defence budget. 7' Labour signalled their early desire to take a positive stance 
on defence with a greater sense of an external purpose for defence policy - this can 
be seen through the Labour party's desire to be `a force for good' in the world rather 
than preserving established balances of power. 72 In addition to the Labour party's 
ideological verve and strategic approach on defence policy reform there were 
secondary motivations including, the desire to generate general defence and 
Whitehall budgetary efficiencies that could be spent on priority government areas 
and, moreover, to maintain the capabilities gap with the United States and to produce 
a more effective UK and EU military. 73 In advocating the Saint Malo initiative and 
ESDP the Labour government took serious steps to address the issues of burden 
sharing and to not let the issue of interoperability with the US degrade any further. 
Had the Saint Malo process been seen unfavourably by the US and EU governments 
there was considerable risk of disruption to the legislative and IGC programme 
within the European Union. Blair therefore risked a great deal of personal and 
strategic credibility on a defence initiative for which he did not have a great deal of 
personal experience or expertise. Tony Blair's European ideology is a strong 
motivation for him and has become the hallmark of his premiership. 74 Blair may 
have provided the political motivation and impetus for the Saint Malo initiative but 
71 Colin McInnes, `Labour's Strategic Defence Review', op. cit, p. 828. 
72 Ibid, p. 824. 
73 Interview D argued that interoperability and not allowing the capabilities gap with the US to grow 
were the main concerns whilst Interview G and Interview B viewed this enthusiasm as part of a 
foreign policy strategy adopted by the government. Interestingly, the defence policy output achieved 
by the Labour government are far more positive than those achieved by the Conservative government 
between 1992-1997 who prioritised defence policy. Interview D, op. cit; Interview G, 20 December 
2002; Interview B, op. cit. 
74 Nick Palmer MP argued that Blair is an ideologically driven politician, much in the mould of Mrs 
Thatcher. Others, like Alan Simpson MP were less charitable describing Blair as having a `messianic 
zeal'. Interview with Dr Nicholas Palmer MP, 30 November 2002; Correspondence with Alan 
Simpson MP, `ESDP', 8 May 2003. 
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he did not involve himself with resolving the fine detail of the policy. 75 According to 
William Hague this is in keeping with the Blair style of government, 
He focuses a great deal on overall strategy and does not let the details get in the way.. Travelling with 
him to Northern Ireland in 1998 to make a joint appeal for a yes vote in the referendum, I was struck 
by how his preparation was almost entirely focussed on his top line message and the generation of an 
emotional appeal to the voters, without remembering the finer points of the Good Friday Agreement. 76 
After the 1997 election Tony Blair employed a number of pro-European policy 
advisors within Number 10 and the Cabinet Office. 77 George Robertson, a leading 
advocate of engagement with EU in the party was appointed Secretary of State for 
Defence which was viewed positively by the Armed Forces because of his record as 
a serious commentator on military issues. 78 Sir Stephen Wall, a key negotiator at 
Maastricht in 1991 was moved from Head of COREPER in Brussels, to Head of the 
European Secretariat in the Cabinet Office. At the same time, Wall's office was 
physically moved from the Cabinet Office into Number 10 in order to give the PM 
closer access to his senior European advisor allowing him more easily to draw on 
Wall's experience of European negotiations. 79 Similarly, in terms of party political 
advisors, the publicly pro-European pairing of Peter Mandelson, the Minister without 
Portfolio and Roger Liddle, personal political advisor to Tony Blair, bolstered the 
'S Interview M arguing that the Prime Minister simply did not have the time to engage himself with 
the fine detail of a complex policy whilst Interview D, perhaps understandably, given his position felt 
that the Prime Minister was happy to let the fine detail be resolved by Whitehall experts. Interivew M, 
oo. cit; Interview D, op. cit. 
' William Hague, `What I learned about Tony - The Hard Way', The Guardian. (London & 
Manchester) 26 April 2002, G2 Section, p. 3. 
77 The key example of this being the employment of Roger Liddle the ex-SDP advisor who in an 
interview for this theses said to he was happy to be described as `ardently' pro-European. 78 In an interview for this thesis he said he was happy to be described as pro-European and an 
Atlanticist. Robertson moved in pro-European circles counting amongst his friendships Lord Wallace 
of Saltaire the pro-EU academic and Liberal Democrat peer and was considered a leading figure in the 
pro-EU section of the Labour party. He was also a member of the Royal Institute of International 
Affairs, a Labour Party spokesman on Defence and Foreign Affairs, 1982-93 and a founder of the 
British Atlantic Committee 1979-90. Interview with Lord Robertson, op. cit. 
79 Toby Helms, `Major's Lieutenant could continue EU battle under Blair', The Daily Telegraph 
(London) 7 April 1997, p. 12; Kamal Ahmed & Gary Hinscliff, `Blair appoints Euro `enforcer' to 
crack whip', The Observer (London) 4 June 2000, p. 4; Brian Groom, 'President Blair beefs up 
Downing Street: The Prime Minister is strengthening his office to ensure policy ideas are turned into 
action', Financial Times (London) 9 July 2001, p. 23. 
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staff, with a willingness to engage with the EU, amongst Blair's immediate circle. 80 
The Prime Minister's use of his power of patronage was contextually significant to 
the extent that European policy expertise was predominantly in favour of further 
European integration and likely to drive this agenda focussed through Labour's first 
term of office. 
In summary, there is some circumstantial evidence that suggests the Saint Malo 
initiative did constitute a shift in core UK defence preferences. Factors such as the 
speed at which the policy was adopted certainly mark out an exceptionalism to this 
policy but is not strong evidence of a shift in preferences. Furthermore, the close 
involvement of the Prime Minister marks this policy out as a significant initiative in 
the first term of the Blair government but does not mark it out as being unusual. 
Even within the first four years of the Labour government the Good Friday 
Agreement, and public private finance initiative schemes (PFI) are further examples 
of where the Prime Minister has got closely involved with driving a policy through. 8' 
The two most significant pieces of circumstantial evidence pointing towards a 
preference shift are the absence of budgetary motivations for this policy and the 
potential for this proposal to disrupt intergoverrunental relations within the EU and 
between the EU and the United States. 
The Labour government were clearly wedded to the idea of defence review and 
policy innovation based on strategic need - the smart procurement initiative 
so Mandelson and Liddle can be seen as a pairing in this context due to their exceptionally close 
personal and professional relationship that resulted in the book Roger Liddle and Peter Mandelson, 
The Blair Revolution: Can New Labour Delivery?. Faber & Faber, (London), 1996. 
81 Forster and Blair explain how the ESDP initiative cut across the remits of both the FCO and the 
MoD, was the subject of discussion in the Cabinet and as with all issues that hold an interest across 
departments was subject to the interest of the Cabinet Office. Anthony Forster and Alasdair Blair, The 
Making of Britain's European Foreign Policy, Longman Press, (London), 2002, pp. 68-69. 
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obviously had economic implications - but this was not a central plank of Labour's 
strategic defence policy. It would therefore be analogous to suggest that an absence 
of budgetary considerations was highly significant in this case. Similarly, the 
evidence presented later in this chapter along with that presented in chapter four 
strongly suggests that UK officials, through extensive bilateral consultations and 
negotiations managed the Saint Malo process effectively and as a result prevented 
the initiative from causing serious diplomatic unrest. Indeed great effort was made to 
ensure that the French and US governments (particularly the US State Department) 
were consulted and were in agreement at every stage, such was their importance to 
the success of the initiative. 82 In short, there was the potential for Saint Malo to cause 
diplomatic tensions but this risk was vitiated by the efforts of UK officials, 
principally in the MoD and FCO. 
Contention Two: Tactical Policy Shift with Preference Status Quo. 
This thesis advances the argument, through the second contention, that the Saint 
Malo initiative was a tactical policy shift within core governmental preferences that 
allowed short-term European policy goals to be met and prevented a European 
defence capability to be created that did not reflect core UK preferences. Contention 
two is supported by the weight of interview evidence and by government 
announcements regarding the pre-eminence of the transatlantic Alliance. 83 The 
primacy of NATO was made clear when the Prime Minister said, 
92 For example, see chapter four, p. 172. 83 Peter Cole, `Britain and Europe: PM goes to war over Euro Army', op. cit, p. 8; Ian Traynor and 
Michael White, `Angry Blair lambasts anti-EU `nonsense', The Guardian (London & Manchester), 22 
November 2000, p. 1; John Lichfield, 'Anglo-French summit: France and the UK blaze trail on 
defence', The Independent (London) 5 December 1998. 
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We need to get the institutional mechanism right, we need to make sure that the institutional 
mechanism in no way undermines NATO but rather is complementary to it, we need to recognise that 
that will mean changes in our defence capability and we also need the political will to back it up 
whatever we do. 84 
The main policy issue facing the EU in 1997 was the creation of the single currency. 
As a pro-EU party Labour had been keen to show principled support for the project 
but had added important caveats about not joining until the economic circumstances 
were right for the UK. 85 This position had its foundations in Treasury concerns 
surrounding convergence criteria and public disaffection with Europe and the single 
currency project. 86 This meant that, in the leading European policy area being 
considered by EU governments in 1997, the Labour government was unable to 
demonstrate their pro-European credentials. This led to the consideration of 
alternative policy areas in which the UK government could demonstrate European 
policy entrepreneurship. 87 In this respect the Saint Malo initiative can be viewed as 
using disparate means to reach a single endpoint of demonstrating the government's 
pro-European agenda. The pro-European defence initiative should, therefore, be seen 
as part of the government's broad European policy rather than a solely defence based 
84 `Austrian Presidency Informal Summit Press Conference', 25th October 1998, in Maartje Rutten, 
From Saint Malo to Nice, op. cit, p. 1-3 
85 Hugo Young, `Blair is a European. He must speak now', The Guardian , (London and Manchester), 27 July 1999. 
16 Guardian Special Report, `What Blair Didn't Say', The Guardian, (London & Manchester) 15 
October 1999). Mark Milner, `Single Currency: Work in Progress', The Guardian, (London & 
Manchester) 16 September 2002). 
87 House of Lords, Minutes of Evidence Taken Before The Select Committee on the European Union 
(Sub-Committee C), lain Duncan-Smith MP, The Stationery Office, (London), 26 April 2001, p. 3-4. 
Correspondence with John Redwood MP, op. cit; who stated that in his opinion this was a clear 
tradeoff between a policy the Labour government could not engage with and ESDP in which they felt 
they could lead. However, a very different angle is provided by officials involved in Britain's 
European policy at the time. Interview B, Interview M and Interview D all remembered receiving a 
memorandum from Number 10 asking for policy areas in which they government could be more 
engaged on the EU stage or that the government could bring to the EU stage. The important rider to 
this was that policies would benefit from being Europeanised. In short, the government was seeking to 
show its pro-EU credentials whilst also bringing real benefits to the policy areas it was seeking to 
Europeanise - it was not, from a government perspective, a crude tradeoff between the single 
currency and ESDP. Interview M, op. cit; Interview A, op. cit; Interview D, op. cit. 
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initiative, although one in which the government believed that real benefits to 
collective European defence and security capabilities could be accrued. 
Strategic Influences 
Strategic considerations formed a large part of the UK government's, and 
particularly the PM's willingness to support the Saint Malo initiative. Not only did 
the policy demonstrate the government's willingness to engage positively with the 
EU and its member governments but also to build up real capabilities that could be 
used to intervene in humanitarian crises such as those experienced in the Balkans. 
The escalation of Serbian hostility towards the ethnic Albanian population in Kosovo 
population in 1997 caused the British government to contemplate possible actions 
against the Yugoslavian government in Belgrade in December 1997.88 A realisation 
within the FCO of President Clinton's unwillingness to engage in Yugoslavia, and 
that onerous conditions would be placed on military engagement, led British policy 
makers to consider alternatives. 89 Such conditions included an effective ban on early 
deployment of ground troops as either part of an expeditionary force or to enforce 
the peace / secure the safety of Albanians -a strategy that the UK and French 
governments had been particularly keen to pursue. 90 
The US policy planners' preference was to try and control the situation on the 
ground through exploiting their air superiority. The Clinton administration, 
88 Interview I argued that this was the only reason for wanting to act positively on ESDP. Wallace, 
Garden and Interview C argued that the experience in the Balkans and the realisation that the French 
were a very able military partner with similar views on troop deployment led to a see-change opinion 
in the UK military establishment. Interview I, op. cit; Interview with Sir Timothy Garden, op. cit; 
Interview C, op. cit; Interview with Lord William Wallace, op. cit. 
89 Interview E, 7 January 2003. This initially on a practical level. 
90 Interview with Lord Wallace, op. cit; Interview with Lord Robertson, op. cit. 
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chastened by events in Somalia between 1992 and 1995 were not keen to deploy a 
high profile ground force. As a result the PM along with his Secretaries of State for 
Defence and Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs had reached a conclusion that the 
EU needed to address its inability to act effectively in its near abroad. George 
Robertson argues that the Saint Malo initiative aimed to improve EU capabilities, 
and thus the European section of NATO, without creating an alternative to NATO. 
Nonetheless, he also argues that UK preferences would remain within the 
transatlantic Alliance and that the PM supported this view. 9' In confronting 
frustrations over Kosovo the Prime Minister came to the informal EU meeting at 
Pörtschach on 25 October 1998 with what appeared to be a revolutionary message 
that he claimed would strengthen European defence and the transatlantic Alliance. 92 
Thus, in the context of the situation in the Balkans, the Saint Malo initiative was a 
reaction to strategic stimuli and not a radical departure from the stable governmental 
preferences founded in the transatlantic alliance. 
Process and Presentation 
The debates concerning UK defence policy formulation are matched by a similarly 
contested account of the presentation of the Saint Malo process. The two main 
arguments concerning the policy-making process revolve around whether the 
initiative was part of the `standard policy formulation' contention or whether it 
represents part of a `centralisation' of policy making. 
91 Amongst government officials and informed commentators this position seemed clear. Publicly to 
the PLP and more widely to the media the emphasis was on improving EU capabilities. In private and 
in bilateral meetings with the French government and US State Department this position remained the 
same, to improve EU capabilities and in doing so improve the transatlantic alliance. Interview with Sir 
Timothy Garden, op. cit; Interview with William Hopkinson, op. cit; Interview E, op. cit; Interview G, 
op. cit. 
9 Blair having apparently realised that America could not always be relied upon to intervene in 
military crises. Stefano Silvestri, `Atlantic and European Defence after Kosovo', op. cit, p. 14. 
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The first argument, which holds that the Saint Malo initiative formed part of a 
`standard policy making' process highlights the routine aspects of the defence policy 
making process, which includes a careful consideration of strategic, economic and 
pressure group factors. The second `centralisation' argument places greater emphasis 
on the role of the Prime Minister and core executive in initiating and leading the 
Europeanisation of British defence policy. 93 These competing accounts are compared 
in turn to analyse their relative strengths and weaknesses through three key factors. 
First, the party political framework, second, pressure groups activity and third, 
departmental interaction including the politics of Number 10 and the Cabinet Office. 
Party Political Framework 
The party political context of the Saint Malo initiative plays an interesting role in the 
nature/form of the policy adopted by the UK government. The modernisation of the 
Labour party from 1993 onwards had an important impact on electoral politics in 
1997. In the 1983,1987, and 1992 general elections defence policy had proved to be 
politically disastrous for the Labour party. 94 The so-called unilateralist policies of the 
party during the early and mid-1980s had on served to undermine its credibility on 
defence and as potential governing party. Indeed, the 1983 Labour party manifesto, 
in which unilateralist policies were expounded, was described by Gerald Kaufman as 
`the longest suicide note in history'. 5 
93 See page 64 for the definition of the core executive. 
94 James Allan, The British Labour Party in Opposition 1979-1997. Structure. Agency and Party 
Change, Unpublished Thesis, University of Connecticut, 1998, p. 64. 
95 Denis Healey, The Time of My Life, Michael Joseph, (London), 1989, p. 218. 
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The Labour party's success in 1997 was, in part, based on removing defence as a 
major area of debate during the election campaign. 96 This may have been surprising 
as the Armed Services were in quite poor shape after seventeen years of the 
Conservative government. They were suffering from severe overstretch, an inability 
to recruit and a similar inability to re-equip due to major equipment programmes 
being both late and over-budget. 97 The incoming Labour government signalled an 
early desire to be positive on defence with appointment of George Robertson to the 
post of Secretary of State for Defence and a reversal of the long held Labour position 
of reducing the defence budget. 98 As Michael Clarke noted in 1998 `... although New 
Labour is determined to divert more cash to health and education, major shifts in 
resources will not come from the Ministry of Defence - not this time anyway. '99 
Moreover, the electoral imperative was to ensure the armed services were bolstered 
rather than denigrated as Lawrence Freedman notes, `We need to make the spending 
review work for defence. Big cuts and you can forget any hope of winning back 
ground on `standing up for Britain'. 100 The origins of the Saint Malo initiative within 
a party political context can be tentatively traced to the Labour party in opposition 
but more importantly to the first post-election party conference in 1997. During this 
conference, the PM in his headline speech argued that Britain should fulfil its 
historic legacy `... to lead at the heart of Europe'. '°' This statement of intent 
96 Interview I argued that the government had not focussed on defence because it was determined to 
fight the election on strong Labour issues such as education and health whilst Interview M felt that the 
Labour party, stung by the history of defence being a trying issues sought to steer clear of it through a 
lack of confidence. Interview M, op. cit; Interview I, op. cit. 
97 Colin McInnes, `Labour's Strategic Defence Review', op. cit, p. 829. 
98 See Footnote 78 for George Robertson's previous connection with defence issues. 
99 Michael Clark, `How the MoD came to rewrite our foreign policy', op. cit. The MoD's resource 
budgets in Financial Years 99-03 are: 1999-00; £31,967,459,000; 2000-01; £32,949,615,000; 2001- 
02; £34,299,438,000; 2002-03; £34,257,993,000. The Government's Expenditure Plans 2002-3 to 
2003-4, The Ministry of Defence, The Stationery Office, (London), 2003 
100 Lawrence Freedman, `Chapter 14 -Defence', in Anthony Seldon (Ed), The Blair Effect, Little, 
Brown and Company (London) 2001, pp. 289-305. 
101 Anne McElvoy, `Goodbye Party, hello people. First New Labour now New Britain', op. cit, p. 27. 
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presented an opportunity for astute civil servants, like Richard Hatfield, to bring their 
department to the forefront of the domestic policy agenda and also to please their 
new political masters early in the new term of government. 
Iain Duncan Smith (Shadow Secretary of State for Defence 1999-2001) argues that 
the Labour party were opposed to the Europeanisation of defence policy in 
opposition and indeed during the first months of government. In testimony to the 
House of Lords Select Committee on the European Union (Sub-Committee C) 
Duncan Smith notes, 
It was absolutely clear to me that the government on the record and I think off the record were 
opposed to this very process... On 12 March 1996, Mr Cook said to the then Foreign Secretary, 
Malcolm Rifkind, in the House of Commons in the course of debate about the European Union, would 
he, Mr Rifkind, accept that `he will have our full support in resisting any defence competence for the 
European Union. 102 
Moreover, Duncan Smith argues that the `Saint Malo' process was motivated by the 
need to appear pro-EU in the light of a conservative attitude towards the single 
currency, 
I sense really the main driver behind this was political and that the government, feeling themselves on 
the edge of being isolated from the euro which was due to start the following month, simply decided 
the biggest card they could play in the EU discussions, in the councils of power over in the EU, was 
the card that we were easily pre-eminent in, which is defence. I think that they played that and they 
played it to get some influence and to show that they were still very positive in all of those discussions 
with regards to the future direction of the European Union. 103 
Duncan Smith's analysis implies that the Labour government became quickly 
disjointed from its pro-further EU integration agenda once elected. '°4 Having found 
the single currency project politically untenable in the short term the Prime Minister 
needed to meet the objective of demonstrating clear pro-EU credentials within 
102 House of Lords, Minutes of Evidence Taken Before The Select Committee on the European Union 
(Sub-Committee C). lain Duncan Smith MP, op. cit, p. 3-4. 
'o3lbid, p. 6. 
104 This view is also reinforced by Robert Key MP and Alan Simpson MP who are broadly `euro- 
sceptic' and Nick Palmer MP, who is pro-European. Interview with Robert Key MP, op. cit; 
Correspondence with Alan Simpson MP, op. cit; Interview with Nicholas Palmer MP, op. cit. 
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alternative policy areas. 105 This view is partly supported by interview evidence from 
key government officials but with a crucial qualification that the government wanted 
to progress policies that were beneficial to the UK's national interest not just as a 
trade-off to the single currency. Furthermore, the PM and the Secretaries of State for 
Defence and Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs felt that the UK should lead on 
ESDP before this policy came on the general EU agenda from another government. 
This implies that the UK government had an anxiety about what an ESDP not 
initiated by the UK might include, the logical conclusion being that it might not be 
consistent with the British national interest. 
The process by which the UK government made EU defence related policy conforms 
quite closely to Charles Lindblom's policy-making framework `The Science of 
Muddling Through' which offers an alternative approach to LI. 106 Lindblom's thesis 
was a reaction to the growth of studies offering rational explanations of policy- 
making. Lindblom highlights the flaws with rational accounts: that policy makers are 
very rarely faced with neat problems described by rational theories, they do not have 
all the necessary information to make a rational choice, they do not necessarily have 
the time or resources to consider all the possible policy options, nor might they be 
sufficiently objective to make a rational decision. 107 Moreover, once a policy has 
been made, rational choice theories do not allow for the possibility that the policy 
might fail or might need amendment. Thus, Lindblom argues that an alternative 
105 Both interviewees identified were present at high-level discussions between Cabinet level 
politicians and between the Policy Directors and Permanent Under Secretary level official on how to 
progress a pro-EU policy agenda. Interview B, op. cit; Interview G, op. cit. Interview A, op. cit; 
Interview D, op. cit 
106 Charles Lindblom, `The Science of Muddling Through', Public Administration Review, Vol, 19 
No. 1,1959, pp. 76-88, p. 76-8 
107 Charles Lindblom, `The Science of Muddling Through', op. cit, p. 76-8 
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approach might consider policy making as a process of successive limited 
comparisons - that is the development of policy through successive trial and error. 108 
The development of UK European defence policy is arguably a process of 
`successive limited comparisons'. Short term politically expedient goals were met 
with pragmatism and efforts to find alternative policy areas to the single currency 
were pursued and in which the government could positively engage with Europe 
followed by the development of a pro-European defence policy to meet this overall 
aim. 
The successive limited comparisons thesis is strengthened by Margarita 
Mathiopoulos and Istven Gyarmati who contend that the development and 
introduction of the single currency spurred the ESDP, 
The launching of the euro marked the beginning of a European integration of unprecedented 
proportions, one that encompasses far more than just the use of a common currency... the economies 
of euro-zone members will become increasingly similar, creating the kind of economic entity that 
cannot exist without a common foreign policy to address the shared interests of its members. An 
effective foreign policy is unimaginable without a common security policy. And a common foreign 
and security policy cannot be credible without a common defence policy. '09 
However, this analysis is explicitly rejected by the PM's political advisor Roger 
Liddle who denied that the development of ESDP had been linked to other policy 
areas. Other interviewees did not adopt such absolute positions. Robertson, for 
example, argued that the Saint Malo initiative was worthy of being followed in its 
own right but that the unwillingness to join the single currency had made the 
108 Charles Lindblom, 'The Science of Muddling Through', op. cit, p. 79. 109 Margarita Mathiopoulos and Istvan Gyramati, `Toward European Defence', The Washington 
uarterl , 
Vol. 22, No. 4,1999, pp. 65-76, p. 68. 
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political atmosphere more permissive and therefore more conducive for such 
suggestions. 10 
Whilst the development of a European defence policy can arguably be seen in terms 
of Lindblom's `successive limited comparisons', the presentation of the pro-EU 
defence policy is slightly different in nature. The presentation of this policy to the 
Clinton and Bush Administrations, the US State Department, the Department of 
Defense, the French government, and the domestic British audience was more akin 
to finding lowest common denominator positions. The presentation of the Saint Malo 
initiative aimed to appeal to the lowest acceptable outcomes of all interested 
institutions and parties. For example, the policy was presented to the US State 
Department, at desk officer level as strengthening NATO, to the French President as 
a genuine advance towards a more closely integrated EU and to the domestic 
audience as a policy that did not provide for a loss of core national sovereignty nor 
one that would see UK armed personnel being forced into a European army 
controlled by a supranational EU organisation. 111 The process of attaining lowest 
common denominator agreement allowed the headline goal of the policy - the 
improvement of EU co-operation on defence issues - was to be advanced whilst not 
resolving the minutiae of policy detail. Indeed, it is notable that the minority of the 
policy detail was entrusted to the two Policy Directors of the MoD and FCO, Richard 
Hatfield and Emyr Jones-Parry, to negotiate with European governments within the 
110 Interview with Lord Robertson, op. cit; Interview I, op. cit. 
111 Neil Tweedie, `Beware of the Euro-Army, says Major', The Daily Telegraph. (London) 18 May 
2002, p. 2. Paul Eastham, `Nato could be `detroyed' by Euro Army says US envoy', Daily Mail. 
(London), 30 March 2000, p. l. Paul Johnston, Philip Budden, Richard Hatfield and Emyr Jones- 
Parry, were directly involved in the presentation of the Saint Malo intiative to the French and US 
authorities on a day-to-day basis. Budden and Hatfield particularly noted that their role was to 
reassure their opposite numbers that the initiative did not represent a radical departure for established 
policy. Interview E, op. cit; Interview A, op. cit. Pol de Witte argued that a key factor of the process 
was the transparency between EU governments and NATO on this policy that meant in his views that 
the policy would remain modest in its aims. Interview with Pol de Witte, op. cit. 
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confines of a framework established by the Prime Minister and his Secretaries of 
State. 112 
The Conservative opposition brought the issue of defence integration to the fore of 
British politics with meetings in Washington between Iain Duncan Smith and the 
Bush Administration in January 2001. These meetings highlighted the Conservative 
view that the Labour government was undermining the transatlantic Alliance. 113 
Duncan Smith and other Conservative party spokespeople were caught in a 
transatlantic framework in which they were unable to entertain the possibility that 
this policy aimed to strengthen NATO. The PM and his core executive intended to 
enhance NATO through improved European military capabilities and by ensuring 
that the US would remain engaged in European security. Moreover, the Labour 
government saw the Saint Malo initiative as away of improving UK force projection 
through building up effective and capable coalitions of the willing to engage in a 
range of operations covered by the Petersburg Tasks. "4 This presents an interesting 
paradox for the Conservative party with intensive preferences on defence attempting 
to undermine measures from the Labour party, with less intensive defence 
preferences, who were trying to strengthen and improve the UK's ability to intervene 
militarily. 
Viewed from Washington, Mathiopoulos and Gyarmati note that 
112 Interview D and Interview G tactfully noted that it would be difficult for a PM to devote enough 
time to the minutiae of defence policy negotiations. Interview E said that the technical expertise rested 
with the officials who are able to convey the progress of negotiations to politicians effectively. 
Interview E, op. cit; Interview G, op. cit; Interview D, op. cit. 
113 Stephen Glover, `Lies? No, a dangerous self delusion as the grim reality of a Euro-Army becomes 
apparent'. Daily Mail. (London) 7 December 2000, p. 12. 
14 Lord Robertson and Interview C were notably keen on this. Interview C with the emphasis on 
sharing the financial burden whilst Robertson emphasised the political and military joint action. 
Interview with Lord Robertson, op. cit; Interview C, op. cit. 
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London finalized its formal defence review and adopted a more constructive role toward Europe than 
its predecessors. The new regime in London espoused the notion that in the twenty first century, there 
is no need to make a definite choice between being European and at the same time being the closest 
ally of the Americans. On the contrary, the best ally of the United States can only be a genuine 
European. 115 
George Robertson, appointed to the post of NATO Secretary General in 1999, 
suggested something similar when discussing the inviolability of the twin 
progression of the EU and NATO. He proposed that European defence integration 
should follow the `... three I's: indivisibility of the Alliance, improved European 
capabilities and inclusiveness of all partners. ' 116 This was a view that was held and 
repeated by the UK government in the approach to and during the Nice IGC to 
Parliamentarians and the wider public. 117 
In summary, party political frameworks clearly informed the development of ESDP 
in the following ways. The historical legacy of Labour party unilateralism and the 
electoral difficulties this caused in 1983 meant that the incoming Labour government 
tried, successfully, to keep defence as a low-visibility subject in the 1997 general 
election. This produced a public and Parliamentary perception that the government 
was happy to maintain a policy status quo with the outgoing Conservative 
government. However, the Labour government was keen to conduct a wide-ranging 
review of British defence and strategic direction through the SDR and the Saint Malo 
initiative that prioritised geopolitical over budgetary considerations. The 
Conservative opposition, through their Shadow Secretary of State for Defence lain 
Duncan Smith, coloured the political debate over the Saint Malo initiative by 
115 Margarita Mathipoulos and Istvan Gyarmati, `Saint Mato and Beyond: Toward European Defense', 
op. cit, p. 67. 
116 George Robertson, `NATO in the new Millennium', NATO Review, Vol 47, No. 4,1999, p. 6. 117 Interview with Bruce George MP, op. cit; Interview with Nick Palmer MP, op. cit; Two PLP 
members from different ends of the debate - Bruce George is a very publicly and, being Chairman of 
the Select Committee on Defence and an influential advocate of transatlanticism. Whilst Nick Palmer 
is a frequent public speaker for the interest group `Federal Union. Both confirm this government 
statement of intent. 
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reverting to a very narrow interpretation of transatlanticism that seemed to fail to 
recognise the critique that Labour were trying to retain US involvement in European 
security - however misguided they felt this approach was. 
Furthermore, in the presentation of the Saint Malo initiative to the domestic political 
audience, to the French government (particularly President Chirac, and the French 
Foreign and Defence Ministries) and the American President, Department of Defense 
and State Department UK government officials adopted a strategy of trying to meet 
lowest common denominator factors. The message delivered to each of these key 
audiences gave reassurances to their core concerns and made the progression of the 
Saint Malo initiative smoother. This process was likened to Lindblom's model of 
bureaucratic politics and thus provides a minor revision that LI fails to capture the 
micro-detail of negotiations within domestic bureaucracies. 
Pressure / Interest Groups 
LI specifies that domestic interest groups exert pressure on government to pursue 
certain policies that are advantageous to their interests. Within this broad set of 
groups, are pressure and sectional interest groups who are significant because of their 
electoral leverage. According to the Political Participation Study, involvement in 
pressure groups is the most likely form of political involvement outside of voting. "8 
"$ 14.6% of respondents had attended a protest meeting, 13.8% had engaged in informal protest 
activities and 11.2% in a formally arranged group. This is in contrast to the 8.6% who had attended 
party political meetings and 3.5% who had actively canvassed for a political party. The 1992 British 
Political Participation Study reported that a much larger proportion of the population were involved in 
pressure group activities than were actively involved in party politics. (Gerraint Parry, George Moyser 
& Neil Day, Political Participation and Democracy in Britain. Cambridge University Press, (London) 
1992, p. 44. ) Pressure groups are seen, by those who participate in them, as the most effective way of 
influencing government policy. (Wyn Grant, Pressure Groups and British Politics, op. cit, p. 5) 
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Pressure groups, are defined by Wyn Grant as 
An organization which seeks as one of its functions to influence the formulation and implementation 
of public policy, public policy representing a set of authoritative decisions taken by the executive, the 
legislature and the judiciary and by local government and the European Union. 119 
Such groups have fed into the defence policy formulation process with varying 
degrees of success. Groups who have influenced the policy formulation process or 
who are considered to have done so by informed commentators, have been very 
closely linked with the Labour party. This is particularly true of the Centre for 
European Reform and The Foreign Policy Centre who, despite being officially 
apolitical are given regular access to high level officials and politicians and are 
routinely included in Cabinet Office policy committees. 120 
Diane Stone argues that the `... impact of even the best-known think tanks on policy 
is modest. Policy making is mainly driven by interests, not by ideas. ' 121 This point is 
arguable in the example of the Labour government who have supported and liased 
with a great number of think-tanks and research organisations. Indeed Joanna Spear 
argued that the Centre for European Reform headed by Charles Grant had initially 
suggested the pro-European defence policy. 122 Charles Grant puts his role more 
modestly as having given external validation to a policy already under 
consideration. 123 
119 Wyn Grant, Pressure Groups and British Politics, op. cit, p. 14. 
120 Interview A was responsible for creating several Cabinet Office committees exploring EU issues. 
These committees included think-tank officials like Charles Grant and Heather Grabbe and 
academics, for example, Anand Menon, Director of the European Research Institute, University of 
Birmingham. Interview with Charles Grant, op. cit; and Interview A, op. cit. 
121 Diane Stone. Capturing the Political Imagination: Think Tanks and the Policy Process. Frank Cass 
(London), 1996, p. 106. & William Hopkinson, The Makin; of British Defence Policy, The Stationery 
Office, (London), 2000, p. 78. 
122 Interview with Dr Joanna Spear, King's College London, 27 March 2001. 
123 Interview with Charles Grant, op. cit. 
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Other pressure groups and think-tanks involved in monitoring, lobbying and 
commenting on the Saint Malo process and European integration included the 
Western European Union Institute (now the European Union Institute for Security 
Studies) who held seminar groups with key European opinion formers and officials 
to discuss the development of ESDP. A May 1999 seminar on `The Problem of 
European Co-ordination' concluded that greater emphasis should be placed on 
achieving political co-ordination between the governments. 124 Similarly, the Royal 
Institute of International Affairs (RIIA) held a conference to discuss the development 
of the Saint Malo initiative and the impact this would have on NATO. The 
conference report suggests that the majority of speakers and attendees did not view 
the Saint Malo initiative as a threat to NATO and strongly argued that an EU based 
capability would not be able to challenge NATO for operational supremacy. 125 The 
Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) enjoys significant engagement with 
government officials and politicians and as such provides an opportunity for 
academics and commentators to engage with each other. RUSI seminars during the 
Saint Malo process focussed on the `Lessons of Kosovo', `Smart Procurement' and 
UK Procurement in relation to the Saint Malo initiative. 126 The role of these think- 
tanks and research institutes is to provide the government with a means to consult 
widely on defence issues. The effect these seminars have on policy making is 
difficult to discern but what is clear is that they all followed on rather than preceded 
the Saint Malo decision. Moreover, whilst officials attending these seminars can test 
whether certain policy initiatives are acceptable to key domestic producer groups no 
'24 Timothy Garden, The Problem of European Co-ordination. WEU Institute, Paris, 28 May 1999. 
125 Royal Institute for International Affairs Conference on NATO, 8 October 1999. 
126 Royal United Services Institute, Calendar of Events (http: //www. rusi. org/cgi- 
bin/public/view. cgi? template=layouts/template. tpll&disj, g=event list ) 
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officials interviewed were able to quantify how much influence these events have on 
UK government policy making. 127 
As part of the aggregation of domestic interest group preferences the armed forces 
played an important role. 128 The accepted position of the Armed Forces is one of 
reluctance to engage in permanent collaborative defence structures, with the 
exception of NATO. 129 The forces became, therefore, a key interest group that had to 
be persuaded of the wisdom of this policy. This was partly because of their position 
as the object of the policy, partly because of the position the forces are held within 
British public opinion (the implication being that if the armed forces had made 
public objections to the Saint Malo initiative it would have been more difficult for 
the government to proceed. ) Furthermore, the Chief of the Defence Staff has an 
influential position within government that allows him to advise the PM directly - it 
would be similarly politically difficult for the PM to proceed in the face of 
vociferous opposition from the Chief of the Defence Staff. 
It was with these factors in mind that throughout the SDR process in 1998, some 
seven thousand service personnel were consulted to gauge their views on force 
structure and future military roles. 130 In addition to a widespread consultation of 
service personnel, academics and interest group representatives were similarly 
127 Interview M and Interview E argued that it was useful to test ideas on groups of informed 
commentators but that decisions were not made by a committee of the knowledgeable. Interview D 
argued that informal discussions held under the `Chatham House rule' often produced the most 
fruitful results in terms of policy ideas. Interview M, op. cit; Interview G, op. cit; Interview D, op. cit. 
128 Both Garden and Interview C argued that the armed forces, as a collective entity, are pragmatists 
and therefore could support the pro-EU defence plans. The Services themselves are part of an 
institutional interest group infrastructure. Interview C, op. cit; Interview with Sir Timothy Garden, 
op. cit. 
'Z9 Evidence from Anand Menon, House of Lords Committee on the European Union (Sub-Committee 
C), (London), The Stationary Office, 25 July 2000, Question 441, p. 139. Interview with Sir Timothy 
Garden, op. cit; Interview with Lord Charles Guthrie, op. cit. 
130 Michael Clark, `How the MoD came to rewrite our foreign policy', op. cit. 
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consulted. This consultation was well received amongst the Services, and Civil 
Service, despite initial scepticism, although leading commentators like Malcolm 
Chalmers and William Wallace do not believe that these groups had a pivotal role in 
affecting the review or subsequent defence policy. '31 
As a key part of the MoD the armed forces, through the Service Heads and the 
Chiefs of Staffs Committee, are able to pass on critical information and through the 
articulation of this advice mould debates and policy Outputs. 132 The Chief of Defence 
Staff (CDS) has the further power to liase directly with the Cabinet and the Prime 
Minister which gives the Services an high level of influence. 133 In the opening 
phases of the Saint Malo process between October-December 1998 the Prime 
Minister was in close contact with the CDS, Lord Guthrie concerning the initiative. 
Guthrie felt that it was in the best interests of the Services to be engaged in this 
process, so long as NATO was not undermined, in order that they could help shape 
the policy to best reflect the Services interests. 134 Guthrie gave his support to the 
Saint Malo process having come to the opinion that a restructuring of the British 
armed forces was necessary to better reflect the operational capability of Britain and 
in securing better value defence forces across Europe. 135 Guthrie's decision also 
shows his connection with the political-military debate in that he agreed that Saint 
131 Indeed both Chalmers and Wallace argued that this was a presentational move to make the defence 
review feel more inclusive. Guthrie and Garden were more positive saying that this was a genuinely 
positive step but that the results had been similar to holding a consultative event at RUSI and that 
nothing exceptional had come out of the consultation. Interview C, op. cit; Correspondence from 
Malcolm Chalmers, op. cit; Interview with Lord Wallace, op. cit; Interview with Sir Timothy Garden, 
op. cit. 
132 Andrew Dorman, `British Defence Policy', op. cit, p. 31-3. 
133 John Baylis, `Defence Decision-making in Britain and the Determinants of Defence Policy', 
Journal of the Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies, (March 1975), pp. 42-48, p. 44. 134 Interview C, op. cit; Interview A, op. cit; who noted that if the Chief of Defence Staff had strongly 
advised against the Saint Malo process it is unlikely that the British government would have 
continued to have pushed a pro-Europeanisation agenda. 
135 This was Interview C's account. It is reinforced by Interview D and by Interview I who had the 
perspective of a Number 10 official. Interview I, op. cit; Interview C, op. cit; Interview D, op. cit. 
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Malo could potentially secure greater efficiencies and capabilities for the UK 
military. This shows the level of support across the elements of government that 
were concerned with defence matters. Moreover, the Saint Malo initiative attracted 
support from interest groups who, prima facie, might have been expected to have 
reservations about the policy. In summary, this lends weight to the argument 
advanced in this thesis that the core executive determined the direction of the Saint 
Malo initiative and then left officials to define the precise details of the policy and to 
seek support from important interest groups for this policy. 136 
The direct effect of interest group pressure on the defence policy formulation process 
was limited then to a validating role. There is little evidence that pressure and 
interest groups shaped the Saint Malo initiative, but they did help shape the public 
debate via having facilitated interchanges between government officials and 
informed commentators. Such conclusions affect the degree to which LI can be said 
to explain the domestic policy making process. There were interactions between 
interest groups and government officials and between actors in the core executive -a 
dynamic that LI does not adequately reflect. 
136 Interview C's account of these meetings is somewhat colourful. In parenthesis he took a pragmatic 
decision to support the initiative in the hope that this would put the armed forces in a favourable 
position when staffing and equipment negotiations recommenced. Interview C, op. cit. 
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Parliament 
This section argues that Parliament did not play an advanced role in the formulation 
of the Saint Malo initiative, nor did it, with the exception of the Parliamentary Select 
Committees on Defence and European affairs, extensively scrutinise this initiative. 
This is because of public and political focus resting more on EU tax harmonisation 
and other public service debates. In short, Saint Malo simply was not as politically 
significant as public service reforms in 1998, although this situation changed in 
2000. Furthermore, the opposition from PLP and Conservative party members was 
subdued because of the `honeymoon' period the PLP were contented to allow the 
government to proceed on trust whilst the Conservative opposition were attempting 
to regroup following their very heavy electoral loss in 1997. 
Parliament, insofar as it can be seen as an interest group, scrutinised defence policy, 
through Parliamentary debates, the routine scrutiny of the SDR legislation and the 
Reports of both the House of Commons and House of Lords Defence Select 
Committees. Bruce George, a long-standing member and Chair of the Defence Select 
Committee argues that the Prime Minister and his close colleagues were pre-eminent 
in the development of defence policy. 137 George argues that Parliament is unable to 
effectively scrutinise defence policy because the PM and his core executive retain 
control over the defence and security policy. Moreover, party discipline, the general 
inability of Parliament to hold the Executive to account and the executive's 
137 Bruce George, `Focus - The Higher Management of Defence: Parliament and National Security', 
Journal of the Royal United Services Institute, (June 1998), p. 24-28; Also an interview with Bruce 
George who felt that the Prime Minister had been steered into this initiative by his close advisors and 
that it was not an MoD initiative. The Prime Minister's role was also highlighted by Interview C and 
Interview M whilst Lord Robertson and Interview D, perhaps for understandable reasons felt that 
Whitehall departments played a large role in this process. Interview C, op. cit; Interview M, op. cit; 
Interview with Lord Robertson, op. cit; Interview D, op. cit. 
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dominance of the supply of information make it difficult for Parliament to exert 
influence on defence policy formulation. 138 The well-briefed Commons Defence 
Select Committee, whilst not possessing the same level of influence as the American 
Congressional Defence Committee, has been able to scrutinise British defence policy 
through the production of detailed reports since 1979.139 This `friendly but critical' 
relationship between the Select Committee and government has been achieved 
through pursuing similar goals namely to `.. strive to get the best defence at an 
affordable cost. ' 14o Occasionally the relationship between the MoD and the Defence 
Select Committee has been strained principally concerning the release of 
information, 
The Defence Committee's experience has not been so much major confrontations with the Ministry of 
Defence over specific documents but frequent skirmishes over the release of information and its 
classification. It is not usually a case of information being refused as of questions not being answered 
fully. The absence of a full answer is usually not apparent at the time. If and when the full information 
emerges, it is often too late to make an issue of it. '4' 
Parliament and the Select Committees have contributed to the Europeanisation 
debate through seventeen reports between 1998 and 2001. The House of Commons 
Defence Select Committee has a majority membership of transatlanticists and is, 
therefore, deeply sceptical of the development of a European defence independent of 
the NATO structures. 142 In particular, the `Report on the ESDP' by the House of 
138 Bruce George, `Parliament and National Security', op. cit, p. 24- 
139 For example, House of Commons Defence Select Committee, Third Special Report, The Future of 
NATO: The Washington Summit. The Stationery Office, (London), 21st May 1999. House of 
Commons Defence Select Committee, Second Special Report, Lessons of Kosovo: Government 
Observations on the Fourteenth Report from the Defence Committee of Session 1999-2000, The 
Stationary Office, (London), February 2001. House of Lords Committee on the European Union, 
Select Committee C, The European Union's Policy on Security and Defence. The Stationery Office, 
July 2001. 
140 Bruce George, `Parliament and National Security', op. cit, p. 25. 
141 Michael Colvin, in Bruce George, `Parliament and National Security', op. cit, p. 25. 
142 Interview with Bruce George MP, op. cit; Interview with John Gearson, Special Advisor to the 
House of Commons Select Committee on Defence, 7 January 2003. Both of these interviewees said 
that the Committee had not taken the government's reassurances regarding the preference for 
transatlantic security solutions nor that this initiative aimed to strengthen NATO at face value. 
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Lords Committee on the European Union demonstrated the depth and reach of 
Parliamentary scrutiny on the emerging European security and defence policy. 143 The 
leverage the Committees did have on the Prime Minister and the core executive 
during the development of defence policy between 1997 and 2000 was in terms of 
the media coverage reports and interviews could generate. 144 The extent of this 
leverage is shaped by the size of the government's Parliamentary majority. Bruce 
George suggests that the large Parliamentary majority enjoyed by the Labour 
government between 1997-2001 meant that the Select Committee's leverage was 
reduced along with it the Committee's ability to exert pressure on the government. 145 
Indeed, the evidence from the Saint Malo initiative is that the core executive was 
able to effectively bypass Parliament through use of several consultation meetings 
targeted at government backbenchers with the aim of countering fears of the PLP 
that Saint Malo would undermine NATO. A meeting held on 2 December 1998 of 
the PLP was hosted by the PM and the Secretaries of State for Defence and Foreign 
and Commonwealth Affairs to launch the initiative and to tell the PLP, what they 
proposed to try and negotiate with the French government. 146 
In summary, Parliament had neither a significant effect on holding the government to 
account on this initiative nor did it play a significant role in the formation of the 
Through taking oral and written evidence the Committee attempted to closely scrutinise each 
development in the Saint Malo process. 
143 House of Lords, Select Committee on the European Union, Session 1999-2000,15th Report, The 
Common European Policy on Security and Defence. The Stationery Office, (London) 2000. 
144 From the Defence Select Committee's perspective they aimed to exert media, public and political 
pressure through the production of reports. Interview with Bruce George MP, op. cit; Interview with 
Dr John Gearson, op. cit; Former Defence Secretary Riflcind said that the Committee has influence to a 
limited degree. Questioning by the Committee could be awkward but would never be enough to 
dissuade the adoption of any particular policy. Interview with Malcolm Rifkind, op. cit; 
14$ Interview with Bruce George MP, op. cit. 
'46 Interview with Dr Nicholas Palmer MP, op. cit; and Interview with Bruce George, MP, op. cit. Both 
interviewees stated that the Prime Minister and Secretaries of State took as many questions as there 
were from the PLP members who were given reassurances that this did not undermine NATO. 
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policy. Indeed, the House of Commons merely served to validate the initiative 
largely because of the government's `honeymoon' period in the eyes of PLP 
members and because the Conservative opposition were regrouping following their 
election defeat in 1997 and as a consequence were not putting up sustained 
opposition to government measures. Furthermore, the Defence and European Select 
Committees were able to exert leverage over the government through publishing 
reports and the associated publicity that came with publication of the reports. 
The Departmental Debate 
The state of MoD and FCO interdepartmental relations are a key area of contested 
opinion within the history of the Saint Malo initiative. The `centralising' argument 
argues that the Saint Malo process was driven by Downing Street and the Cabinet 
Office officials within these institutions finalised the policy and then sought 
agreement amongst domestic interest groups which was eased by the fortunate 
positioning of Richard Hatfield and Emyr Jones-Parry as Policy Directors of the 
MoD and FCO whose close working relationship aided the smooth development and 
negotiation of the ESDP provisions into the Nice Treaty. 147 The `standard 
formulation' argument looks at routine elements of policy making. Under this view 
the stimulation for the Saint Malo initiative should have come from within the MoD. 
Moreover, that the MoD should have come to a position of agreement with the FCO 
147 This relationship was highlighted by Charles Grant as being crucial to the development of the Saint 
Malo initiative. The two men themselves played down the relevance of their relationship to the policy 
- although Hatfield did note that the fact they understood each other this assisted in the Saint Malo 
negotiations, 4-6 December 1998. Lord Robertson noted that Hatfield and Jones-Parry were on very 
good professional terms, but drew a general lesson that personal relationships are key to the workings 
of government and crucially so in negotiations. Interview with Charles Grant, op. cit; Interview D, 
op. cit; Interview G, op. cit; and Interview with Lord Robertson, op. cit. 
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towards a joint approach in policy making in recognition of the FCOs pre-eminent 
role in European in European policy negotiation. 
The centralisation argument is reinforced by a history of defence policy analysis that 
examine the central role of the PM and Defence Secretary. The governing style of 
the Blair Labour government and what Anthony Seldon describes as `the Blair 
effect', has had a dramatic impact on British defence policy since 1997.148 More 
generally Peter Hennessy has commented on Blair's approach as 
Tony Blair and his inner group of advisers seemed determined to operate inside Number 10, once they 
get there as they had within the Labour Party driving policy and presentation from the centre around a 
core of delivery musts, and brooking no serious resistance either from Ministerial colleagues or from 
cumbersome traditional government mechanics. '49 
The `Presidential' or `Napoleonic' style of government has produced a heavily laden 
top-down approach to policy making. 150 The use of small cabinet sub-committees 
and informal meetings between cabinet ministers, senior civil servants (Grade 3 and 
above) and special advisors routinely take favoured subjects out of the sphere of 
normal civil service decision-making processes and into small centralised policy 
making fora. 151 This centralised style of government is particularly pertinent to 
148 Anthony Seldon (Ed. ), The Blair Effect - The Blair Government 1997-2001. Little, Brown and 
Company, (London), 2001, p. vii-viii. 
149 Peter Hennessy, The Prime Minister: The Office and Its Holders since 1945, Penguin Press, 
(London), 2000, p. 477. iso Roger Liddle & Peter Mandelson, The Blair Revolution: Can New Labour Delivery?. op. cit, 
Chapter 9. Journalist Michael White recounted a conversation he had with Downing Street official 
Jonathan Powell where he and Peter Hennessy was told that the old system of bureaucracy and 
government was inefficient. Blair's government would adopt a system of `Napoleonic' government to 
overcome this. This is the Prime Minister and the core executive would take control of the policy and 
dictate to the respective department how the policy should develop. Interview with Michael White, 18 
December 2003; Correspondence with Peter Hennessy, `The Presidential Prime Minister', 4 April 
2003. 
151 Interview M argued that this was a way of bringing the PM's influence most effectively to bear on 
a particular policy. Both Sir Timothy Garden and Lord William Wallace had been included on such 
committees and both argued that whatever the constitutional debate surrounding these committees 
they are an effective way of bringing experts together to make effective policy. Interview M, op. cit; 
Interview with Sir Timothy Garden, op. cit; Interview with Lord Wallace, op. cit. 
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defence policy formulation. As Anthony Eden commented more than four decades 
ago; 
Defence is very much a Prime Minister's special subject. He presides over the meetings of the 
Defence Committee which are attended by the Chiefs of Staff. He may on occasion, hold informal 
meetings with the Minister of Defence and the Chief of Staff, or with these and the Service Ministers 
as well. The Prime Minister is ultimately responsible for all important decisions on defence. 152 
Indeed the Prime Minister's political advisor Roger Liddle argues that the centrality 
of the Prime Minister's role within the Saint Malo process cannot be understated 
`.. this process (Saint Malo) would not have occurred without Tony (Blair) being at 
the helm. ' 153 However, it would have been striking if the Prime Minister's personal 
political advisor had not espoused this view. Interviewees such as Nicholas Palmer, 
Bruce George, Interview M and Interview D, however, concurred with this view that 
the PM was crucial to the process, with all attributing great strength to Blair's 
personal political standing. 154 
Following Blair's `Heart of Europe' speech at the 1997 Labour Party conference 
there was a meeting of key Cabinet Ministers and senior civil servants engaged in 
co-ordinating EU policy within the Cabinet and Foreign Office. 155 At this meeting 
Tony Blair asked the assembled Permanent Under Secretaries to implement a change 
in operating rationale. 156 Blair's instructions centred on finding policy areas in which 
Britain could be more co-operative or, indeed, lead in the EU. 157 Interview B said 
this process aimed to put `water into the policy wine', that is to say, to take a bold 
152 Sir Anthony Eden, Full Circle. Cassell, (London), 1960, p. 367. 
153 Interview I, op. cit. 
154 Interview with Dr Nicholas Palmer, op. cit; Interview with Bruce George, op. cit; Interview M, 
o5p. cit; Interview D, op. cit. 
1s Interview A, op. cit; Interview B, op. cit; Interview B noted that this was in response to a call for 
ideas coming from Number 10 in memorandum form. 
156 Interview B, op. cit; Interview 1, op. cit; Interview with Lord Robertson, op. cit; Robertson argued 
that this was more a clarification of the governments determination to show pro-EU intentions 
whereas Budd seemed to indicate this was a step change in government processes. 
's' Interview B, op. cit; Interview with Michael White, Michael White said this was made clear to him 
on a lobby journalist basis, the Downing Street equivalent of `Chatham House rules'. 
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statement of pro-Europeanism from the PM and to use this to seek possible ideas 
from senior civil servants that would lead to European initiatives without 
compromising core British interests. 158 
This process was managed through a version of the (E)DOP Committee whose remit 
was to review the approach of each government department to the EU. 159 This 
committee agreed with the view of George Robertson who had identified defence as 
being an area in which Britain could usefully lead to reduce the pressure on the 
government from European colleagues about their reticence both on the issue of the 
single currency and on defence integration. 160 The Committee reviewing British EU 
policy had received a clear view from the Treasury that Britain could not join the 
single currency in the first term of the government for three reasons. First, that the 
Labour party had not expected to be elected with as big a majority as they succeeded 
in achieving. 161 Second, that despite achieving a landslide majority in Parliament the 
referendum on Welsh devolution turned on a small margin leaving the government 
reluctant to rely on the solidity of their majority. 162 Third, that the Treasury was 
genuinely concerned about single currency convergence levels and hence the 
possibility of detrimental effects on the British economy. 163 The civil service 
officials interviewed, like Interview M, Interview B, Interview D and Interview G, 
158 Interview B, op. cit. 
159 The best information this thesis could find on the membership of (E)DOP was as follows. The 
Membership of this Committee was the Prime Minister, the Foreign Secretary, Peter Mandelson, 
Colin Budd, Brian Bender, and Stephen Wall from The Permanent Representation to the EU. It should 
be noted that interviewees were not keen to reveal the membership of such committee, because of 
their professional obligations. 
160 Interview B, op. cit; Interview M, op. cit. Both of these interviewees outlined these as conclusions 
of this committee. 
161 Interview with Michael White, op. cit; Interview with Ian Black, 16 December 2003. 
162 Interview M, op. cit; and interview with Michael White, op. cit who said that this lack of belief in 
their political strength left the government reluctant to act positively on reforming issues. 
163 Interview M, op. cit; Interview with Charles Grant, op. cit; and Interview with Michael White, 
op. cit. 
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argued that there was no link between the decision to adopt a conservative approach 
to the single currency and the decision to act positively on defence policy. 164 The 
principle reason for the isolation of defence as an area in which Britain could play a 
leading role was a result of the MoD being the only Department to answer the call 
for areas of policy that could be `Europeanised'. 165 
The second debate highlights what might be termed `routine policy' making when 
Whitehall Departments dominate sectoral decision making, in this instance the MoD 
and the FCO in formulating and leading policy initiatives. Early in its term in office 
the Labour government showed a desire to build a policy consensus in Whitehall that 
would lead to long-term stability in British defence. 166 To this end the MoD and FCO 
worked more closely together initially through the SDR process which was 
committed to taking soundings and opinions from all interested parties. 167 There was 
initial opposition to this openness from the armed forces and sections of the MoD 
who were sceptical about what could be gained from including the FCO in the 
review George Robertson had proposed. 168 A contrary view is provided by Malcolm 
Chalmers who was involved, in an advisory role, in the SDR process, 
For officials, a key consideration was probably whether there was political pressure for them to listen 
to outsiders - and I think, there genuinely was on, for example, the nuclear arms control front and on 
the development of the NGO interface - where significant changes in approach did take place... Post 
SDR though I think many of us would perceive a lessening of openness. The change of Secretary of 
State may also have played a role here. ' 9 
'64 Interview B, op. cit; Interview M, op. cit; Interview D, op. cit; Interview G, op. cit. 16s Interview I, op. cit; Interview A, op. cit. 
166 David Clark, Labour's Defence and Security Policy, op. cit. 167 `We actively sought ideas and suggestions from all sources. The aim was an open, inclusive 
Review which would encourage a better informed debate on defence issues and help build a wide 
consensus on defence policy. ' The Strategic Defence Review, Essays 1-5, op. cit, 1998. Furthermore, 
Interview C and Interview E confirmed that this happened in practice, not just in theory. Interview C, 
oj. cit; Interview E, op. cit. 
168 Colin McInnes, `Labour's Strategic Defence Review', op. cit, p. 830. Interview C argues that taking 
advice from external actors like academics did little to advance the review as the MoD considers as 
many options as it can in reviews. Interview C, op. cit. 
169 Correspondence from Malcolm Chalmers, op. cit. 
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The SDR process was largely driven by the FCO. Indeed the Secretary of State for 
Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs attended the various seminars arranged to hear 
the opinions of academics and think tank experts which showing a considerable 
commitment to the process. 170 
Defence ministers were keen to emphasise that no options would be ruled out of the 
SDR process. 171 In reality, though, some defence projects like the nuclear deterrent 
and the `Eurofighter' project were ring-fenced from exposure to radical conclusions 
in the SDR. '72 Moreover, Britain remained wedded to European defence solutions 
but that a common European defence policy would remain an untenable 
aspiration. 173 
The MoD and Cabinet Office view is that the SDR was a stand-alone process 
disconnected from the Saint Malo process - the timing of the restructuring of the 
British military and the Saint Malo process was purely coincidental. 174 Lord Guthrie 
also argues that the process was separate, based on the Labour Party's manifesto 
pledge to conduct a defence review, but that the results of the SDR effectively 
informed the ability of the Prime Minister to make the Pörtschach declaration. 175 
10 Peter Hennessy, Whitehall, The Free Press (New York), 1989, p. 494 
171 Both Robertson and Interview C stated that this was a comprehensive review with all policy 
options being open to debate. However, they both were clear that this was a review that was primarily 
going to codify the strategic changes that had become obvious - namely the switch to smaller, quicker 
forces. Interview with Lord Robertson, op. cit; Interview C, op. cit. 
172 Essays 1-3, The Strategic Defence Review, The Stationery Office, (London), 1998; Jack Straw, 
Mission Statement- Foreign and Commonwealth Office, HMSO, September 2001. 
13 Malcolm Chalmers, `The Strategic Defence Review - British policy options', Journal of the Royal 
United Services Institute, Vol. 142, No. 4,1997, p. 37 and Colin McInnes, `Labour's Strategic Defence 
Review', op. cit, p. 835. 
174 Both Interview D and Interview C argue that Saint Malo was distinct from the SDR. C departed 
from this view slightly when he argued that by the closing weeks of the SDR it was obvious that the 
Saint Malo recommendations or a derivative thereof would be forthcoming. Lord Robertson pre-dates 
this realisation to the Amsterdam IGC negotiations when it become clear to him that the debate would 
move to an EU based system shortly. Interview C, op. cit; Interview D, op. cit. 
175 Interview A, op. cit; Interview C, op. cit. 
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In summary, this section has argued that the Departmental debate between the MoD 
and FCO was ended by the PM's announcement at Pörtschach. The way this debate 
was handled was akin to the `Napoleonic' style of government that Michael White 
and Peter Hennessy claim that Blair adopted having won the 1997 general election. 
The `Napoleonic' system meant that the Prime Minister and the core executive 
steered the strategic direction of the policy and then officials resolved the details of 
this policy. The policy process gave MoD Policy Director Richard Hatfield a great 
deal of influence over the direction of the policy - once the Secretary of State for 
Defence George Robertson had persuaded Tony Blair of the wisdom of the policy it 
took on an enhanced credibility. The policy formulation process outlined by LI does 
not deal with the level of detail provided by this research. As a result it misses 
crucial elements of the interaction between influential government officials. 
Furthermore, the resolution of an interdepartmental debate by the PM and the core 
executive is not exceptional, particularly in the context of Blair's government. This 
adds further weight to the argument that the Saint Malo initiative was not a shift in 
preferences but was a tactical shift in defence policy. 
Jolyon Howarth's contentions along with interview evidence from Lord Wallace and 
William Hopkinson reinforce the view that the Saint Malo intiative was motivated by 
strategic considerations. 176 Howarth contends that the origins of the Saint-Malo 
176 Lord Wallace was particularly well placed to make these observations as he was a member of the 
Cabinet Liaison Committee exploring these issues and Hopkinson was well connected through the 
MoD and RUSI to observe the formulation process. Interview I, op. cit; Interview with Lord Wallace, 
op. cit; Interview with William Hopkinson, op. cit. 
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process were founded in the Prime Minister's frustration at being unable to formulate 
a coherent and effective policy on the Balkans. '77 
Evidence from Lord Wallace and Interview C suggests that the UK government was 
wary of the gap between expectations and the EU's ability to deploy in the Kosovo 
theatre. 178 The Kosovo crisis was not the only circumstance in which the British 
government had been pressured to act positively on European defence. Following the 
establishment of French-German Eurocorps and CFSP, to improve the defence 
capabilities of the EU in 1991 the British government had been pressed to drop its 
opposition to collaborative EU defence proposals. 179 The Conservative government 
decided that such moves should be resisted because of the fear of jeopardising the 
transatlantic Alliance. 180 The constant communication between UK officials and 
their counterparts in the US State Department had ensured that key officials in the 
US administration were kept fully informed of the debates and negotiations in the 
EU. 18' Throughout the 1990s and the Saint Malo process elite American opinion (in 
the US State Department and Department of Defense) was firmly in favour of the 
moves to strengthen European defence efforts so that the EU had a fail-safe position 
could act if America chose not to. 182 
177 Joylon Howarth, `Britain, France and the European Defence Initiative', Survival, Vol. 42, No. 2, 
2000, pp. 33-55, p. 33 
178 Interview C, op. cit; and Interview with Lord Wallace, op. cit. 
179 Interview M was in COREPER at the time and was one of the UK government's leading 
negotiators at Maastricht. Lord Robertson also argued that pressure for EU defence structures began 
much earlier than Saint Malo and his fear was that the UK would be ambushed into a disadvantageous 
European defence structure. Interview with Lord Robertson, op. cit. Interview M, op. cit. 
iso Interview with Robert Key MP, op. cit. Interview with Sir Timothy Garden, op. cit. Interview with 
William Hopkinson, op. cit. 
181 Interview with Sir Timothy Garden, op. cit; Interview with William Hopkinson, op. cit; Interview 
with Charles Grant, op. cit. 
182 Interview M outlined the highly strategic position of the PM on this issues. Interview E similarly 
highlighted the concerns within his Security Policy Directorate of the FCO. Interview M, op. cit; 
Interview E, op. cit. 
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In summary, strategic influences clearly impacted on the formulation of UK defence 
policy. The experience of the Balkans led the government to feel a sense of 
helplessness in not being able to intervene as they would have liked. This also 
produced the two further realisation that the French government and armed forces 
were positive partners in military interventions in the near-abroad and that the US 
President and State Department were increasingly reticent to intervene militarily 
where US interests were not directly affected. This research suggests that the 
strategic influence of the Balkans and US isolationism provided some important 
political context to the Saint Malo initiative. Rather than the Saint Malo initiative 
being mono-causal, the need for the UK government to demonstrate its pro-EU 
credentials and also avoid other EU governments suggested the policy dovetailed to 
create a permissive environment in which this initiative was devised. This type of 
policy formulation kept UK defence policy within its established transatlantic 
preferences and also helps support the validation of LI and its hypothesis of positive 
and negative externalities impacting on domestic policy making. 
Pörtschach 
An examination of the chronology of the 25 `h October 1998, at the informal 
conference at Pörtschach, which was a precursor to the Saint Malo Accords, adds 
some important detail to Blair's public announcement. The Prime Minister's aircraft 
was late in departing for Pörtschach, reducing the time available to discuss strategy 
for the informal meeting with key officials, whilst the debate between the MoD and 
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FCO was unresolved. 183 Underlying this meeting was the Prime Minister's desire to 
make a pro-EU statement at Pörtschach to signal the difference between his and the 
previous Conservative government but on the single policy area identified for 
entrepreneurship, defence, he appeared to be hampered by a prolonged debate 
between the MoD and FCO. On the advice of Stephen Wall, and from a 
presentational perspective, the Prime Minister's communications advisor Alistair 
Campbell, the PM decided to override the interdepartmental debate and make an 
announcement signalling the UK's decision to be positive on EU defence 
capabilities! 84 This set in train a change of policy without seeking full agreement 
between the two departments. 185 Indeed, Blair's announcement at Pörtschach was 
deliberately underplayed to the UK media by the Prime Minister's communications 
officers a strategy that ensured that the subtle change in the official emphasis in UK 
defence policy was not subject to a wider debate in the UK media and thus potential 
revisions through pressure. 
The `routine' policy making argument highlights the historical continuation of 
certain practices to emphasise the lack of radicalism in UK defence policy 
formulation. Defence policy is an area where decisions are made by a small number 
of individuals, often in the light of incomplete information. As such decisions are 
made more by accretion than by selection. The mechanism by which the Defence 
Secretary establishes policy has varied greatly. For example, Duncan Sandys drove 
183 Interview C, op. cit; and Lord Robertson, op. cit, who argues that this declaration was designed to 
show UK intentions on this policy and to end the Departmental debate. 
184 George Robertson also argues that the Pörtschach announcement was designed to end this debate. 
Interview A, op. cit; Interview with Lord Robertson, op. cit. 
185 Interview with Lord Robertson, op. cit. 
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policy from the front asking the pertinent questions and offering policy solutions. '86 
Denis Healey, on the other hand, would hold a great number of informal meetings 
with key advisors and conduct policy within a small informal, but powerful policy 
network. 187 The Healey approach was quite closely followed, albeit tacitly, 
throughout the Saint Malo process. The evidence suggests informal policy networks 
and personal relationships between the leading individuals at the heart of this process 
were important. The UK European defence policy was pursued from the core 
executive with its leading advocates being Tony Blair, George Robertson (and 
subsequently Geoffrey Hoon who became Secretary of State for Defence on 11 
October 1999) and their respective political and Civil Service advisors. 188 
Following the Pörtschach declaration the debate between the FCO and MoD ended 
with both adopting the Saint Malo initiatives. 189 After UK defence policy was 
changed the personal relationship between Emyr Parry-Jones and Richard Hatfield 
was very important. 190 The collaborative work of these two senior officials focussed 
on crucial issues and negotiating strategies. Where one might normally expect there 
to be institutional roadblocks erected to halt or divert proposals, the personal 
relationship between Jones-Parry and Hatfield ensured that the departments worked 
to a relatively unified agenda. 191 This key inter-departmental relationship helped to 
186 Philip Darby, British Defence Policy East of Suez 1947-68, Oxford University Press, (Oxford), 
1973, p. 108. 
187 Michael Howard, The Central Organization of Defence, Royal United Services Institute, (London), 
1970, p. 39. 
188 Interview M, op. cit; Interview D. op. cit. 
189 Interview A, op. cit, and Interview with Lord Robertson, op. cit. Robertson argued that that 
Pörtschach ended the debate between the Departments. Budden noted that it was important the 
adoption of the Saint Malo initiative by the FCO was not seen as a defeat for the FCO and efforts 
were made to ensure that this was the case. 
190 Interview M, op. cit; Interview D, op. cit; Interview G, op. cit. 
191 Both Interview M and Interview A argued that close personal relationship serviced to remove 
institutional bars to the policy. Interview M, op. cit; Interview A, op. cit. 
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inform a bureaucratic context determined by civil servants `... collecting, collating, 
interpreting and distributing the information. ' 192 
Whilst the pro-EU UK defence policy arose partly in the absence of alternatives to 
meet the UK government's short-term EU strategy and longer term UK defence 
ambitions in 1999 and 2000 the government invested a great deal of effort in 
ensuring that the integration of defence policy was a success. 193 These efforts 
concentrated on securing agreement on operational and institutional arrangements 
and similarly ensuring that the smaller countries within the EU were fully involved 
in the development of ESDP in the lead up to the Nice IGC. 194 Gaining agreement on 
the Berlin Plus provisions and ensuring that smaller member governments remain 
actively involved in the process was described by Interview M, as being the only 
measure of success or failure the UK government holds for the Saint Malo 
initiatives. 195 Interview M argues the importance for the UK government was that 
once the Berlin Plus provisions were signed the ESDP became operationally 
credible. 196 
The evidence that the `Saint Malo' process begun in Pörtschach and was led by the 
Prime Minister and the core executive has important implications for LI's approach 
192 John Baylis, 'Defence Decision-making in Britain and the Determinants of Defence Policy', op. cit, 
43. %4 
3 Interview G and Interview D noted the effort invested by UK officials in almost continually 
negotiating with EU partners on ESDP provisions. Interview E reinforces this view adding that this 
effort did not stop with bilateral meetings with the French, German and Italian governments but also 
with the `minor military powers' which include many of the other EU member states. Interview G, 
oc. cit; Interview D, op. cit; Interview E, op. cit. 
'4 Interview A, op. cit; Interview E, op. cit; Interview with Pal Jonson, Swedish Defence Ministry 
Official, 25 March 2003 who contends that the bilateral meetings between UK officials and less 
influential government officials like Swedish foreign ministry officials allowed the Swedish 
government to gain additions to the policy like, for example, a greater emphasis on the policy and so- 
called `soft' security roles. 
195 Interview M, op. cit; Interview A, op. cit. 
196 Interview M, op. cit; Interview A, op. cit. 
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to domestic policy formulation. In this instance the aggregation of domestic policy 
pressures was completed by the Prime Minister and his close advisors on the basis of 
a desire to make a positive statement of intent at Pörtschach. The formulation of 
defence policy in this period was completed on a narrow definition of national 
interests as defined by this small group of decision makers who were attempting to 
achieve a particular aim. LI does not highlight this process as part of its analysis of 
domestic policy formulation. Moreover, the aggregation of interest group preferences 
did not strictly occur in this case study. The policy was driven by the PM and his 
core executive, and the relationship between officials was key to this process. The 
example of Pörtschach is informative of a `Napoleonic' style of decision where key 
policy areas are steered by the Prime Minister directly. 
In conclusion, this chapter has argued that the Saint Malo initiative amounts to a 
tactical shift of policy within established core UK preferences. This tactical shift 
aimed to meet a series of short-term EU policy goals, the need to become engaged in 
European integration and to maximise budgetary efficiencies within UK defence 
policy to focus finance on core government preferences. Furthermore, these 
initiatives aimed to meet long term defence policy goals of improving UK and EU 
capabilities to meet military crises in the near abroad like the Balkans, but also to 
confront the long term problem of keeping the United States involved in EU security 
whilst bearing the brunt of the burden of European security. 
In terms of process this chapter has highlighted the extent to which the domestic 
formulation of the Saint Mato process is similar to the `success limited comparisons' 
model suggested by Charles Lindblom that provides a corrective to LI's policy 
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formulation hypotheses. The `routine' policy formulation processes were bypassed 
by the Prime Minister to expedite the development of a Europeanised defence policy. 
Blair's adoption, explicitly, of the `Napoleonic' style of government meant that the 
policy was directed by the PM and the core executive rather than being managed by 
the respective Whitehall departments. Similarly, the PM ended the debate within 
Whitehall, between the MoD and FCO with the announcement at Pörtschach, 
demonstrating the influence of the PM on this particular policy. The detail of the 
policy and managing negotiations with other EU governments were entrusted to key 
officials particularly the Policy Directors of the FCO and MoD, the Security Policy 
Directors of the FCO and MoD and Cabinet Office officials. 
The Saint Malo process is also an example of the presentation-focussed politics that 
the Blair government is accused of pursuing. 197 Whilst Alastair Campbell was central 
in co-ordinating the presentation of the Saint Malo initiative to the media at 
Pörtschach and Saint Malo, he was not key to the development of the policy itself. 
The presentation of the European UK defence policy to the MoD/FCO post- 
Pörtschach, to the French government and US President, State Department and 
Department of Defense, all focussed on lowest common denominator aspects of the 
policy that would result in widespread agreement. The UK government's use of 
lowest common denomination presentation techniques aimed to advance the 
Europeanisation of defence to a near finished stage where differences of policy 
objectives could be managed within the confines of new institutional structures 
197 Richard Allen, `Labour spins every 4 minutes', Evening Standard, (London), 1 May 2002, p. 6.; 
Graeme Wilson, `How Labour trebled the spending on spin to £136m', Daily Mail. (London), 30 
March 2002, p. 38; Robert Shrivesley, `How Labour's wizards spun themselves to a standstill: 
Government efforts to evade the truth have deepened crisis', Financial Times. (London), 27 February 
2002, p. 20. 
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Interview evidence showed that important impacts of the Saint Malo initiative were 
not considered by the Prime Minister and Cabinet Office officials, before 
announcing the policy shift at Pörtschach. The strong manpower, equipment and 
budgetary efficiency arguments that could be made to justify the Europeanisation of 
UK defence policy were not considered by UK policy makers before the Pörtschach 
announcement. Such an omission highlights several weaknesses in LI's explanation 
of domestic policy making. The first of these weaknesses was that the decision to 
adopt a pro-European defence policy was principally taken by the PM in the absence 
of domestic interest group pressure. Moreover, domestic interest groups merely 
provided support for this policy after the decision had been taken. Second, LI does 
not attribute priorities to influencing factors like budgetary efficiencies versus 
international positive or negative externalities. Yet, the balance of evidence in this 
case study is that positive externalities were the principal motivations for a tactical 
change in policy. 
LI provides a specific explanation of domestic policy formulation that is based upon 
the aggregation of interest group preferences by the government. To validate LI this 
case study would have needed to show that the MoD and Parliament had aggregated 
interest group pressure into the Saint Malo initiatives. The strength of available 
evidence is that the MoD responded to a call from the PM to look for policy areas 
that the government could be effective with on the European stage. The PM's desire 
was based on ideological motivation and the influence of positive and negative 
externalities whilst the MoD's motivations were geopolitical. Thus, while LI 
provides a useful framework to explore domestic policy formulation - it highlights 
the value of interest groups and the role of governments in aggregating these 
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interests - what this chapter has revealed is that LI provides an 
inaccurate 
explanation of domestic policy formulation in this case study. 
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Chapter Four: Intergovernmental Bargaining 
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This chapter critically evaluates LI's explanation of intergovernmental bargaining 
through the case study of ESDP negotiations at the Nice IGC 7-11 December 2000. 
The chapter progresses through the seven hypotheses of LI in this regard which are: 
governments are the principal units in the international system; negotiations are 
dominated by governments who have intense issue-specific preferences and 
capabilities; effective international bargaining is only viable if there is preference 
convergence; geopolitical and exogenous factors were significant in the negotiations; 
governments act as `gate-keepers' between domestic electorates and international 
negotiators; the negotiated outcome is a lowest common denominator agreement; and 
the EU is an international regime for the co-ordination of national policies. Each one 
is taken in turn and tested through the intergovernmental ESDP negotiations at Nice. 
The principal argument advanced by this chapter is that LI provides a strong 
explanation of the ESDP negotiations at the Nice IGC. Within the overall argument 
this chapter also contends that national governments were the principal actors in the 
negotiations to the exclusion of the EU's supranational institutions. Furthermore, a 
number of governments who held strong issue-specific preferences and capabilities 
dominated the negotiations and the final outcome reflected a convergence of these 
governments' preferences. This chapter also argues that negotiators retain a 
`gatekeeper' role between domestic public and political audiences and other member 
government negotiators. Furthermore, this chapter argues that the EU's primary 
function is to serve as a co-ordinating forum for national policies. 
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LI and International Bargaining. 
LI advances the following assumptions concerning international bargaining. First, that 
pressure from domestic interest groups create pressures on the government to change 
domestic policy. LI then argues that if governments decide that a collaborative EU 
policy is in the national interest it then tries to coordinate the policy through 
international negotiations. Moreover, governments enter international negotiations 
with the aim of achieving a more favourable outcome than if they had continued to 
pursue an independent policy. International negotiations provide a supply side 
solution to member governments' demands for international policy solutions. LI also 
assumes that negotiations pose practical challenges in the need to `create' and `claim' 
value. 1 
Figure 2- Pareto bargaining curve 2 
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LI makes no claim to be able to predict where on the Pareto-frontier the negotiated 
outcome will fall. Being able to pinpoint the settlement area is an important aspect of 
' David Lax and Joseph Sebenius, `The Manager as Negotiator: The Negotiator's Dilemma: Creatin 
and Claiming Value' in Stephen Goldberg, Frank Sander and Nancy Rogers, Dispute Resolution, 2' 
Edition, Little, Brown and Company, Boston, 1992, pp. 49-62, p. 50. 
2 Ibid. 
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creating a formal theory of European integration. LI successfully argues, however, 
that IGCs, resulting in treaty amendments, produce a positive sum outcome to the 
negotiations. To `create value' negotiators must reach a mutually beneficial consensus 
most commonly expressed through a Pareto-frontier graph. 3 The output might not 
conclude at the optimal point for the government because of strategic decisions taken 
during negotiations to concede issues or to change policy proposals. To `claim value' 
negotiators settle on a point between A and B and thus conclude the negotiations. 
The distributional outcomes of the negotiations are the principal focus of negotiators 
when they attempt to `claim value'. LI's assumption that the political costs of failing 
to agree an outcome outweigh the distributional costs of agreeing a disadvantageous 
agreement, means that LI's focus is on the problem of claiming value. However, on 
issues of `high' politics where governments hold intense preferences, LI suggests 
there may be the demand for compromise but governments might resist when they 
perceive that a negative sum game exists. So, LI proposes a general theory of where 
negotiators will try to claim value, but with the substantial caveats that only if the 
negotiated issue falls within the intense preferences of a negotiating goverment. 
LI further assumes that IGC negotiations are non-coercive, therefore negotiators can 
veto agreements or `opt-out' and are not forced to comply. 4 Moreover, IGC 
negotiators are aided by an information-rich system. The negotiators are aware of the 
preferences and constraints of other negotiators and are also aware of the technical 
implications of enforcing any particular outcome. The free flow of information 
3 See page 125. 4 Alasdair Blair and Anthony Forster The Making of Britain's European Foreign Policy, op. cit, p. 108. 
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between negotiators is further assisted by the Permanent Representations (COREPER) 
and European Council that bring negotiators within close everyday working proximity 
of each other. 5 LI disregards the value that might be created by the interaction 
between the Permanent Representatives, the Commission and the European Council 
as it argues that the process of intergovernmental bargaining codifies the salient 
element of informal integration that occurs on an everyday basis. 6 
LI argues that the transaction costs within intergovernmental bargaining are relatively 
low because of the IGC infrastructure that facilitates the flow of information between 
negotiating parties. 7 Transaction costs are also reduced by lengthy negotiations. The 
Nice IGC lasted ten months (19 February to 11 December 2000), during which 
negotiators were able to table numerous proposals and counter-proposals with few 
attached costs. Indeed, this chapter argues that a great deal of ESDP negotiations were 
conducted outside of the formal IGC frameworks. Conversely proposals made in the 
last four days of the IGC, 7-11 December 2000, regarding institutional reform 
imposed costs on negotiating time and entailed opportunity costs, in terms of there 
being finite time to analyse and response to these proposals. Side-payments and issue 
linkages are similarly tools used by negotiators to facilitate agreement during IGC 
bargaining, although there is little evidence that these tools were used in the ESDP 
s COREPER (Comite des Reprdsentants Permanents) is based on Article 207 of the Treaty of Rome. 
Every Member State has a Permanent Representative in the EU with the rank of ambassador. The 
fifteen Permanent Representatives together form the Committee of Permanent Representatives, better 
known as COREPER. When the ambassadors meet, this happens in COREPER II. COREPER I 
consists of fifteen deputy Permanent Representatives. Under COREPER, there are numerous functional 
working groups with officials who prepare the subjects in the various policy fields. The Permanent 
Representatives prepare the activities of the Council and carry out the assignments given by the 
Council (Article 207). COREPER makes its decisions on the basis of the findings of the functional 
working groups. In these matters, the Permanent Representatives have a certain margin of negotiation 
granted them by their governments, with which they also continually hold consultation in the course of 
the negotiations. Pieter Jan Boon (information specialist, European Documentation Centre based at the 
Tilburg University Library) 
6 Andrew Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe, op. cit., p. 490. 
7 Ibid, p. 479. 
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negotiations. The importance of being the first negotiator to move, sequencing, 
strategic misinterpretation, the use of coercive threats, and unilateral commitments are 
negated as important factors by the assumptions LI makes. 8 
These assumptions limit the negotiating permutations on the Pareto-frontier. 
According to LI's reading of international bargaining the cost of not ratifying an 
agreement should be the focus for predicting negotiations. Moravcsik notes this 
pressure as `... the simple but credible threat of non-agreement provides rational 
governments with their most fundamental form of bargaining power. '9 This can be 
reduced to a cost-benefit analysis of whether advantage lies in co-ordinating national 
policies into EU policy or retaining national policies. Domestic pressures and the size 
of potential domestic `win-sets' informs the judgement about whether to pursue a co- 
ordinated EU policy or an independent policy. 10 Moreover, international bargains can 
influence the views of domestic interest groups. Domestic interest groups can change 
their preferences in the light of international negotiations to create a greater 
opportunity to effective ratification of the negotiated output. " Thus the process of 
bargaining is not a static process of international negotiations followed by a process 
of seeking a domestic win-set, but is conceptualised as a process of reactions to 
negotiations that have effects at the domestic level which in turn re-informs the 
8 Side payments are payments or benefits in kind to achieve a mutually acceptable balancing of benefits 
between negotiators. Side payments are used by those governments with intense preferences to 
overcome the objections or reservations the reluctant negotiating party might have about the particular 
issue under negotiation. Issue linkage is the connection of multiple issues within a negotiation to 
broaden the bargaining so that a greater range of issues and, therefore, a higher percentage of the total 
bargain. By broadening negotiations to incorporate multiple issues, the negotiating parties find it more 
problematic to reject a linked negotiation over multiple issues than on a single-issue basis. 
Andrew Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe, op. cit, p. 65. 
10 See chapter two, page 46 for a definition of the concept of `win-sets'. 
11 Robert Putnam, 'Two-Level Games' op. cit, p. 457-8. 
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government's negotiators as to whether they can secure domestic support for the 
negotiated outcome. 
12 
LI advances the argument that rational governments will not accept collective EU 
policies which they perceive to be inferior to autonomous national policies. Collective 
policies that are subject to negotiation are already deemed to be to the advantage of 
those EU governments willing to negotiate subject to the output meeting the win-sets 
of all negotiators. 13 Thus, the outcome of IGC negotiating must reach unanimous 
support in the IGC. IGC outcomes can be driven beyond the lowest common 
denominator through the construction of coalitions, the use of `opt-outs' and the threat 
of exclusion from the bargain. 
LI concludes that IGCs are the turning points of EU history. This rationale leads to the 
conclusion that integration is intergovernmental, and negotiations are liberal to the 
extent that governments have no uniform national interests. 14 LI argues that 
governments act as a conduit through which domestic actors influence domestic 
government policy rather than directly influencing international bargaining. The 
separation of domestic producer groups from international bargaining is crucial to an 
understanding of international bargaining that retains the primacy of governments in 
formulating European policy responses. Thus, governments are the principal 
bargaining units in the international system driven by aggregated domestic pressures. 
Aggregated domestic interests and a cost-benefit analysis of the merits of formulating 
an international response leads to a governmental desire to engage in international 
negotiations allowing the negotiators to pursue these national interests. The secondary 
12 Ibid. 
13 Andrew Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe, op. cit, p. 492. 
14 Andrew Moravcsik, `Preferences and Power in the European Community', op. cit, p. 480. 
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purpose of aggregating domestic producer groups is to separate the domestic from the 
intergovernmental and to this extent governments perform a gate-keeping role 
between domestic politics, producer group pressure and international bargaining. 
LI argues that international bargains are the product of a convergence of member 
governments' interests and often the lowest common denominator position between 
governments. The complexity of international negotiations and the subtle cost-benefit 
calculations throughout negotiations can lead to the concession of core positions to 
achieve benefits in other linked negotiations or issue areas. This links back to the 
previous discussion concerning the Pareto-frontier equation. In particular, LI suggests 
that the output of negotiations will generally be positive but does not suggest where 
the final output will fall. Finally, LI asserts that the EU is an international regime that 
facilitates the co-ordination of national policies, rather than providing a political 
system -a higher level of government. 
States are the principal units in the international system. 
LI argues that governments are the principal units in the international system, 
international negotiations and specifically the EU. In short, the EU and its institutions 
derive their legitimacy from the member governments. Moreover, significant 
developments to institutions and constitutional treaties are determined by the member 
governments. The superiority of member governments in the EU is contested because 
of the developing role of supranational institutions. 15 These institutions add a layer of 
13 For Moravcsik's rejection of this see Andrew Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe, op. cit, p. 491; An 
exponent of the increasing influence of supranational please see, for example, Christine Arnold, `How 
Two-Level Entrepreneurship Works: The Influence of the Commission on the Europe Wide 
Employment Strategy', Paper given to the American Political Science Association, 29 August -1 
September 2002. (http: //apsaproceedings. cup. org/Site/papers/014/014006ArnoldChri. pdf) 
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decision-making and authority that some, including Jeremy Richardson, argue 
undermine the primacy of member governments. 16 However, as LI contends, 
governments are the principal actors in treaty negotiations, giving them significant 
influence over the EU and EU integration. 
The EU is founded on international treaty bargains in which the member governments 
are the principal actors and sole signatories. IGCs are conducted in a political system 
in which governments are able to veto the entire package of deals being negotiated. '7 
Indeed vetoing a single element of the package has the effect of vetoing the entire 
package unless provision is made for a government to `opt out' as the UK government 
did at Maastricht with the social chapter provisions. " This offers a substantial 
challenge to LI as opt-outs effectively insulate negotiators from the major factor 
compelling them to seek agreement which are the consequences of failing to agree. 
Thus, the main consideration for discontented governments is a cost benefit analysis 
of vetoing the entire package, versus the cost of accepting a disadvantageous policy. 
The ESDP negotiations were almost the sole preserve of governments. The 
negotiations were dominated by the member governments from the Saint Malo 
Accords, through the Cologne and Helsinki Councils in 3-4 June and 10-11 December 
1999 and then through to the Nice IGC, 7-11 December 2000. The European 
16 Jeremy Richardson, European Union: Power and Policy Making, op. cit, p. 5. 
17 Robert Putnam, `Two Level Games', op. cit., p. 457. The term IGC is `used to describe negotiations 
between the Member States' governments with a view to amending the Treaties. Intergovernmental 
conferences play a major part in European integration, since institutional changes must always be the 
outcome of such negotiations. These conferences are convened, at the initiative of a Member State or 
the Commission, by the Council of Ministers acting by a simple majority (after consulting the 
European Parliament and, if appropriate, the Commission). The preparatory work is entrusted to a 
group consisting of a representative of each of the Member States' governments and, as a matter of 
custom, a representative of the Commission. The European Parliament is closely involved throughout 
by means of observers and discussions with the President of the Parliament. This group regularly 
reports to the General Affairs Council. The final decisions are taken by the heads of state and 
government at a European Council. EU Glossary of Terms, 
(http: //europa. eu. int/scadplus/leg/en/cig/g4000. htm) 
18 Anthony Forster, `Britain and the Negotiation of the Maastricht Treaty', op. cit, pp. 351-2 
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Parliament and WEU through debates, research and public pronouncements tried to 
exert pressure and influence on the member governments between the Saint Malo 
Accords and the IGC. 19 
MEPs find themselves unable to strongly influence the British government's policies 
and preferences through institutional exclusion from domestic politics. The links 
between UK MEPs and their domestic political parties are not as close as UK MPs 
with their party political machineries. MEPs do not have a right of access to the 
Houses of Parliament or their research facilities and are not included in the 
consultation processes of the three major UK political parties. 20 The EP was restricted 
to a lobbying role between Saint Malo and the final stages of the Nice IGC, 7-11 
December 2000. The EP lobbied extensively with government negotiators to enhance 
the communautaire elements of ESDP, and to give a greater role to the EP in initiating 
foreign policies that might necessitate a military element. 21 
The EP was, as an institution, excluded from the negotiations at Nice, sending instead 
two official observers, Elmar Brock and Dmitris Tsatos. At previous IGCs EP 
observers had no formal voting powers, but were consulted by negotiators. 22 The 
unwritten understanding of this arrangement is that whilst the EP cannot formally 
negotiate, if the observers express a very strong disagreement on an issue this will 
" For example, European Parliament legislative resolution on the proposal for a Council regulation 
creating the Rapid Reaction Facility (COM(2000) 119 - C5-0272/2000 - 2000/0081(CNS)) to meet 
international crises; European Parliament recommendation on the establishment of a European Civil 
Peace Corps, Minutes of 10/02/1999, based on Document No. A4-0047/99 - Final Edition; Resolution 
on the gradual establishment of a common defence policy for the European Union, Minutes of 
14/05/1998, based on Document No. A4-0171/98 - Final Edition 20 Interview with Bill Newton-Dunn, op. cit; Interview with Nick Clegg, op. cit; and Interview with 
Michael White, op. cit. 
21 Interview with Nick Clegg op. cit; Interview with Bill Newton-Dunn op. cit. 22 Both Interview M and Bill Newton-Dunn have previously been closely involved with IGC 
negotiations. 
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have a bearing on the negotiations. 23 The EP has to ratify new treaties and as a result 
retains some generalised leverage over the integration process, although the 
consequences of an EP veto would have far reaching consequences for the EU. 24 
Agence Europe reported that the EP observers at the Nice IGC, particularly Elmar 
Brock, were `upset' at the lack of consultation but with little practical effect 25 
The European Commission voluntarily played a limited role in the negotiations of the 
ESDP. Former Vice-President of the Commission Lord Brittan noted that there was 
an institutional taboo surrounding the Commission discussing or promoting greater 
integration in the security or defence spheres as this is a policy area in which 
governments have exclusive control26 According to Lord Brittan the Commissioners 
are conscious of their supplicant position to governments because the Commission 
derives its legitimacy, role and function from treaties agreed between member 
governments?? 
Between 1998 and 2000 the Commission was sceptical about whether the EU member 
governments would provide a credible security and defence policy with associated 
23 Interview M and Interview H argued that relevant objections by the EP would be positively 
considered. However, Interview D and Interview G argued that ESDP was too central to the 
government's EU programme to entertain EP input. Interview M, op. cit; Interview H, 26 March 2003; 
Interview D, op. cit; and Interview G, op. cit 
2° Ambrose Evans-Pritchard and George Jones, `Blair pledges to maintain Britain's veto', The Daily 
Telegraph (London), 13th December 2000. 
25 Bulletin Ouotidien Number 7863, `Next March Parliament will give its detailed opinion on Nice 
Treaty. In meantime Constitutional Committee's analysis is very severe and very concerned', 
December 14,2000. 
26 Interview with Lord Brittan, op. cit. 
27 Interview with Lord Brittan, op. cit; see also Michelle Cini, The European Commission. Manchester 
University Press, (Manchester), 1996 p. 20-1 & p. 224; Thomas Christiansen, `Reform of the European 
Commission: Whither informal networks? ', paper presented at the ECPR Joint Sessions of Workshops, 
Copenhagen, April 2000, particularly page 11 where the effect of Commission reform to the reciprocal 
informal influence held by member governments and the Commission is explored. 
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capabilities. 28 During the IGC Agence Europe reported that the Commission publicly 
expressed preferences concerning ESDP. 29 Further evidence from negotiators 
Interview E and Interview F suggests that the ESDP was negotiated and shaped 
through ministerial meetings in addition to regular meetings between Foreign and 
Defence ministries, not as a response to European Commission pronouncements. 30 
Evidence suggests that governments are the principal actors in the ESDP negotiations 
with the supranational institutions like the EP and the Commission playing a 
peripheral role to the intergovernmental bargaining. However, the EP and European 
Commission did play a role in forming the wider, informed debate on the subject. 
Interviewees like Lord Robertson and Lord Brittan argued from different positions 
that these institutions had raised the profile of the ESDP debate. 31 
One of LI's observations is that the supranational institutions do not help in advancing 
European integration in areas that they intervene in. This section has argued that the 
EP and European Commission did not effectively intervene in the negotiations 
because the EP was excluded from ESDP negotiations and the European Commission 
had voluntarily withheld its influence over the negotiations. However, this section has 
also argued that the two institutions did play a role in shaping an informed debate 
28 Interview with Lord Brittan, op. cit; Interview with Sir Timothy Garden, op. cit. Both Lord Brittan 
and Sir Timothy Garden argue that there was clearly no overriding motivation amongst the member 
g9overnments to invest the money required to create a credible autonomous defence capability. 
Bulletin Ouotidien Europe Number 7865, `Draft text to be subject of legal and linguistic review next 
week - Commission considers it was not able to fully play its role as mediator in Nice and that working 
of EU Council must be improved', December 16,2000 
30 Interview E came to this view from the perspective of having worked on the Saint Malo initiative and 
the bilateral negotiations with the French and other EU governments from 1998. He viewed this more 
in terms of a routine exchange of policy ideas. Interview F was particularly involved in the IGC 
negotiations and thus was able to point to the relative exceptionalism of conducting an entire policy 
negotiation outside of the formal IGC framework. Interview E, op. cit; Interview F, 17 June 2003. 
" Lord Robertson said they had raised the profile of the debate but were often wide of the mark in 
addressing key issues whilst Lord Brittan felt that they brought positive contributions to the debates. 
Interview with Lord Robertson, op. cit; Interview with Lord Brittan, op. cit. 
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amongst the policy community about ESDP and European integration. Key UK 
officials argue that this did not have significant effects on the direction and outcome 
of their negotiations with other EU governments. This section has also shown that 
LI's hypothesis that governments were the principal actors in the ESDP negotiations 
is highly persuasive. Furthermore, whilst LI under-specifies the extent to which the 
flow of information between supranational institutions and negotiators impacts on 
bargaining. This section has found that the discourse between the European 
Commission and EP and the bargaining governments had a very limited impact on 
ESDP negotiations. 
The international system is dominated by the maior states. 
LI contends that governments are the principal actors in ESDP negotiations and 
furthermore that the `major states' dominate the international system. This thesis 
refines these hypotheses to the ESDP case study by adding that negotiations were 
dominated by governments with intense issue-specific preferences and capabilities, a 
more accurate definition of the same concept. This section critically evaluates the 
extent to which governments with intense issue specific preferences and capabilities 
dominated ESDP negotiations. 
The main driver for the codification of ESDP provisions in the Nice Treaty came from 
the Anglo-French meeting on 4-6 December 1998 that produced the Saint Malo 
Accords. 32 UK and French government officials were also heavily involved in the 
conferences that followed on from Saint Malo and further clarified and extended the 
principles established at Cologne (3-4 June 1999), Helsinki (10-11 December 1999) 
32 See Annex A, p. 267-271. 
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and Sintra (28 February 2000), and where for example capabilities were prioritised as 
an area of focus for negotiations 33 
EU defence co-operation had been suggested as far back as 1954 but had become a 
lower priority for European integration following the creation of NATO. The 
Maastricht negotiations had reignited the issue of a common defence policy but it was 
the UK government in 1998 at Pörtschach and Saint Malo that provided the political 
impetus to this initiative. A considerable number of bilateral meetings were held 
between the UK and French MoD and Foreign Office officials between 25 October 
and 4 December 1998 to ensure that the two governments were able to find a common 
policy that met win-sets in both countries domestic political systems. 34 
The Policy Directors of the MoD and FCO, Richard Hatfield and Emyr Jones-Parry 
were the lead negotiators of the Saint Malo Accords. Hatfield and Jones-Parry 
simultaneously negotiated with the French Foreign Office negotiator, mindful of what 
might be acceptable to him whilst also being mindful of the need to secure agreement 
in the domestic constituencies of the FCO, MoD and Cabinet Office. 35 Hatfield and 
Jones-Parry were given a great deal of freedom to negotiate the detail of the policy 
with French government negotiators, within a broad framework of `red-lines' 
33 Interview E and Lord Robertson revealed that the UK negotiators had written the `toolbox paper' 
document that had been adopted at the meeting in Sintra. Pal Jonson also reports that the UK 
government's role in creating this paper had caused some friction between the UK government and the 
Finnish government who felt that they had been prevented from making the level of contribution they 
should have been making as hosts. Interview with Lord Robertson, op. cit; Interview E, op. cit; 
Interview with Pal Jonson, op. cit. 
34 See page 46, chapter two for an extended definition of negotiating terminology. Many of these 
meetings were routine meetings between EU governments on defence and foreign policy issues. 
However, because of the public announcement of the Saint Malo Accords greater credence was given 
to the detail of the Accords and how these might develop. Interview G, op. cit; Interview D, op. cit. 
35 Interview G made it clear that he and D had been given clear instructions of where the UK 
government's red-lines existed. Interview D argued that he and Interview G were very well aware of 
these red-lines having been so closely involved in the development of the initiative. Interview G, op. cit; 
Interview D, op. cit. 
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established by the PM, and the Secretaries of State for Foreign and Commonwealth 
Affairs and Defence, Robin Cook and George Robertson. They told Hatfield and 
Jones-Parry that negotiations should not conclude at a point where the EU would seek 
to replicate or undermine NATO's role in European security nor seek to decouple the 
EU from NATO. 36 George Robertson and Richard Hatfield both noted that the 
negotiated agreements at Saint Malo and the Nice Treaty output on ESDP were 
remarkably similar. 37 Indeed Hatfield argued that the Saint Malo Accords were not 
substantively changed between 6 December 1998 and the final signatures on the Nice 
Treaty on 11 December 2000: the language had been refined whilst the concepts had 
remained stable. 38 
The Saint Malo Accords gave ESDP a significant momentum because of the 
perception that the UK and French governments had diametrically opposed views on 
European security. This meant that agreement between these two on closer defence 
ties within Europe was highly significant. 9 Similarly, the Saint Malo Accords 
provided the scope and a framework for the further negotiations at Sintra, Cologne, 
and Helsinki culminating in ESDP provisions being included in the Nice Treaty. 440 
36 The `red-lines' system establishes constraints on negotiators. The red-lines are placed at the point of 
the last acceptable policy outcome and should not be breached by British negotiators. Negotiators can 
strike a deal anywhere within these `red-lines'. At complex negotiations where multiple issues are 
being negotiated the `red-lines' system offers a unique opportunity for British negotiators to move 
within several policy areas to give ground to foreign negotiators on certain issues to ensure the largest 
win-set possible on an area of particular interest or importance to the British government. Interview D, 
o,. cit; and Interview with Lord Robertson, op. cit. 
3 Interview D, op. cit, and Interview with Lord Robertson, op. cit. 
38 Interview with Richard Hatfield, op. cit. 
39 William Hopkinson, Timothy Garden and Charles Grant all argued that once the British and French 
collective view became clear to the other EU governments only the French and British governments 
could have practically stopped the initiative from going to intergovernmental negotiations. William 
Wallace was more circumspect, putting the significance of the collaboration as being `helpful' to the 
development of an EU based defence identity. Interview with William Wallace, op. cit; Interview with 
William Hopkinson, op. cit; Interview with Sir Timothy Garden op. cit. Interview with Charles Grant, 
4' 
p. cit. 
Hatfield, perhaps unsurprisingly, as the author of the original Saint Malo initiative felt that the text 
provided the framework for all the subsequent meetings and negotiations on ESDP. Moreover, he 
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The UK and French governments were perceived to hold intense and opposing 
preferences on security and defence. As a consequence UK officials felt that gaining 
French government agreement for European defence would ensure that a critical mass 
of military capabilities in the EU were in support of this cooperation and as a result 
this initiative would be difficult for less influential governments to oppose 41 
Moreover, the agreement between UK and French governments on issues of 
principles and substance before putting security and defence proposals to the other EU 
governments was key to ensuring that ESDP would remain within UK and French 
red-lines. 42 
Furthermore, there were practical advantages for UK officials in negotiating with 
French officials before the Nice IGC (7-11 December 2000). These advantages lay in 
ensuring that French government preferences were stable and secured before the IGC 
negotiating took place so that the French government would not seek to use its 
political leverage over the policy against the UK government's interests 43 The close 
working relationship between UK and French officials continued throughout the 
preparation for and during the Nice IGC with close coordination between UK and 
argued that the fundamentals of the Saint Maio Accords remained throughout the entire process 
including the negotiations up to the European Council at Nice, December 2000. Interview H comes 
from the opposite angle. As a UK government negotiator at the European Council he argued in support 
of Hatfield that the Saint Malo Accords had provided the basis on which he had conducted his 
negotiations. Interview with Richard Hatfield, op. cit; and Interview H, op. cit. 
41 Both Interview M and Interview H felt this was true from a purely practical negotiating position, 
based upon their collective wealth of experience at the Maastricht, Amsterdam and Nice European 
Councils. Interview M, op. cit; and Interview H, op. cit. 
42 Again, the positions of Interview M and Interview E came from a practical perspective. Interview M 
, op. cit; and Interview 
E, op. cit. 
43 Interview E and Interview H note that the French government tabled amendments to the ESDP 
provisions on the evening of 3 December 2000 that were rebuffed by the UK government as being 
outside of their red-lines and would provide a justification for UK government to not sign the Nice 
Treaty. Interview E, op. cit; Interview M, op. cit; 
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French foreign and defence ministries by COREPER. 44 The British and French 
negotiators also coordinated the responses to the UK / French government view in the 
negotiations, enabling challenges to this view to be managed. 
In summary, this section has argued that governments were the principal actors in 
ESDP negotiations to the exclusion of the supranational institutions of the EU. 
Furthermore, it has argued that ESDP negotiations were dominated by the UK and 
French governments who held intense issue specific preferences and capabilities. The 
Saint Malo Accords were important to the development and negotiation of ESDP as 
they established an agreed framework through which the UK and French officials 
could develop the policy with other EU partners, and ultimately in IGC negotiations. 
This case study reinforces LI's hypothesis that `major states dominate the 
international system' but places a question over LI's exclusion of non-IGC 
negotiations as evidence strongly suggested that the Saint Malo Accords provided the 
basis for ESDP and where the `real' negotiations took place. Thus, this thesis argues 
that Moravcsik's view of bargaining whilst being validated on its own terms is 
reductive and under-specifies a key part of the process. 
International Co-operation is feasible and viable only if there is convergence of 
national interests. 
LI advances the argument that rational governments only pursue common policies if 
these initiatives secure greater opportunities than independent approaches. 5 Defence 
is a paradoxical policy area in this respect. Defence strikes at the heart of the 
44 As a COREPER official one might assume that Interview F would advance this view - however he 
was supported by Interview M, former UK Permanent Representative within COREPER. Moreover 
Interview A, who also worked in the European Secretariat commented on the co-ordinating function 
played by UKREP during negotiations. Interview M, op. cit; Interview A, op. cit; and Interview F, 
o?. cit. 
4 Andrew Moravcsik, The Choice for Eurore, op. cit, p. 3 & p. 8. 
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autonomy of a government because of sensitivities to territorial defence and 
committing national human resources and national identity. However, defence is also 
an area of international cooperation where the Article 5 provisions of the Washington 
Treaty that established NATO confers responsibilities on signatory governments 46 
Defence and security policy is long established as an intergovernmental area in which 
policy is ultimately guided by autonomous governments but subject to co-ordination 
to achieve agreed ends. The convergence of EU governments' defence interests to 
form ESDP was ultimately codified at the Nice IGC but can also be seen to have 
emerged through a series of political and military developments from the 1990 
Maastricht negotiations. This bargaining reactivated the issue of defence as a reaction 
to the EU's inability to react to the conflict in the Balkans and the increasing 
insularity of the United States government which led to demand for an EU defence 
and security policy. 47 
The first meeting where there was a convergence of views between the French and 
German governments occurred at Potsdam (1 December 1998). At this meeting the 
French and German governments announced they were working together to try and 
define the CFSP more closely and to include a defence dimension. 48 The French 
President and German Chancellor also stated their belief that the WEU should be 
integrated into the EU and emphasised the importance of capabilities in driving EU 
external relations policy. 49 EU capabilities should be developed using existing EU 
46 Washington Declaration, NATO, 4 April 1949. (http: //www. nato. int/docu/basictxt/treaty. htm) 
47 Andrew Duff, The Treaty of Amsterdam: Text and Commentary, Sweet & Maxwell, (London), 
1997, p. 125. 
4e Final Declaration, Franco-German Summit, Potsdam. I°t December 1998, reproduced in Maartje 
Rutten op. cit, pp4-6. 
49 Ibid. 
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capabilities or by calling on pre-existing NATO capabilities identified for this use 50 
The Potsdam declaration states that both countries believe that the EU's conflict 
prevention measures ought to be improved. " The Potsdam meeting was significant in 
establishing common positions between two of the three major EU states and 
progressed the Pörtschach declaration by beginning the process of interest 
convergence between EU governments that would lead to the codification of the 
ESDP at Nice. 
The second event that saw a publicly announced convergence of government interests 
was the Saint Malo Accords (3-4 December 1998) that added credible agreement to 
the PM's Pörtschach announcement. 52 The convergence of interests announced at 
Saint Malo had been extensively negotiated by British and French officials. The 
British delegation consisted of the Prime Minister, Richard Hatfield (Policy Director, 
MoD), Emyr Jones-Parry (Policy Director, FCO), Paul Johnston (Director of the FCO 
Political-Security Department) and the Prime Minister's communications advisor 
Alastair Campbell who met with their French equivalents. Richard Hatfield brought 
several texts to Saint Malo, one of which he knew would not find support amongst 
French officials. The document proposed dividing NATO into two sections, the first 
section would transform the EU into the political wing of NATO and the second 
section would form the military wing extended to incorporate tasks from the 
Petersburg list. 53 This document was not put to the French officials partly because 
they felt it would politically untenable for the French President, who was concerned 
50 Ibid. 
51 Ibid. 
52 For Interview M this was the next logical stage for the initiative, a phased integration of more details 
gaining momentum across EU governments. Lord Robertson viewed Pörtschach as being a means to 
end a debate concerning EU defence between the FCO and MoD whilst Saint Malo was the public 
announcement of an Anglo-French initiative. Interview with Interview M, op. cit; Interview with Lord 
Robertson, op. cit. 
53 This document is not currently in the public domain. Interview D, op. cit; Interview 0, op. cit. 
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about `Anglo-Saxon' dominance of NATO, and also because negotiators quickly 
agreed that there was too little common ground between governments to try and 
revise proposals leading them to negotiate from first principles. 54 French proposals 
included greater levels of military autonomy for the EU. 55 This proposal was not 
accepted by the UK government because the fear of US withdrawal and the potential 
damage to NATO were overriding priorities for the UK government. 56 
The gap between the negotiating positions of the UK and French governments left 
Hatfield and Jones-Parry with tighter constraints on `claiming value'. The UK PM 
and the core executive were committed to a more positive stance on European 
defence. They had invested a great deal of time convincing the French government 
that an initiative to be launched at Saint Malo was credible and worthwhile. 57 The 
Saint Mato meeting represented the last politically viable chance for either the UK or 
French governments to withdraw from negotiations of collaborative defence 
initiatives. A statement had been prepared by the European Secretariat of the Cabinet 
Office in recognition of the prospect that the negotiations might fail. 58 
Instead of announcing failure officials agreed a final attempt to draft the agreement 
from fresh throughout the evening having withdrawn from the formalities of the 
54 Interview D, op. cit. 
55 As with the UK government's positioning papers brought to Saint Malo the French government's 
papers are not in the public domain either. The only evidence for their existence or content comes from 
the principal negotiators. Interview D, op. cit; Interview G, op. cit. 56 Rebecca Johnson, `Missile Defence Debate Remains Intense as US Conducts Reviews', 
Disarmament Diplomacy, No. 56, April 2001. Also interview with Lord Robertson, who was firm that 
no deal was possible at Saint Malo without it being clear that NATO was to be enshrined as the 
military forum of choice in Europe. 
" These were mostly routinely scheduled meetings in which the Saint Malo initiative took a prominent 
position on the agenda. Interview D, op. cit; Interview G, op. cit; Interview E, op. cit. 
According to both Interview M and Interview D this is standard and good practice, particularly in the 
light of the government being wedded to the idea that the Saint Malo initiative had to be in their 
interests first and foremost. Interview D, op. cit. Interview M, op. cit. 
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summit dinner on 3 December. 59 The dynamics of the negotiations between Policy 
Directors was particularly important. The lead UK negotiator Richard Hatfield asked 
Emyr Jones-Parry to assist him with the UK side of negotiations whereas the French 
MoD negotiator barred the French Foreign Office Policy Director from the 
negotiations, underlining the difference between British and French policy making 
styles and bureaucratic interaction. 60 The absence of planning for the negotiations that 
did occur meant that the negotiators had to provide their own secretarial skills and 
computer to type the agreed text 61 
The authority for these negotiations was tenuous; neither the MoD nor the FCO had 
authorised them nor had they planned or discussed any supplementary positions. 
62 
The authority for the negotiations came from the Prime Minister, but there was a 
considerable risk to Hatfield and Jones-Parry if they strayed too far from the 
originally agreed red-line positions of their departments. Cabinet Office officials 
periodically observed the proceedings and were able to report to the Prime Minister 
how the negotiations were progressing and officials from the French President's 
Office did likewise. 63 The final document was produced at around 3am on the 
morning of 4 December and was `written in a strange Franglais' that allowed an 
acceptable agreement to be struck on broad principles whilst carefully side-stepping 
the problematic issues of human resources and procurement, the detail of which could 
59 The evidence from the direct negotiations at Saint Malo can only come from Interview D and 
Interview G who were associated with the lead officials. Interview D, op. cit; and Interview G, op. cit. 
60 Interview D, op. cit; Interview G, op. cit; 
61 Interview D, op. cit; Interview G, op. cit. 
62 The personal risks inherent in proceeding from this standpoint were obvious but both Interview D 
and Interview G believed that they knew their respective Departmental views well enough to be able to 
continue without referring back. Moreover, the Prime Minister was providing the authority for these 
negotiations, further insulating them. Interview D, op. cit; Interview G, op. cit. 
63 Interview D, op. cit; Interview G, op. cit. 
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not be resolved in one evening's negotiations. 64 The first principles of collaborative 
EU security and defence were potentially the most problematic area for UK and 
French officials to reach agreement. In doing so this represented a significant 
advance. 
The UK and French government negotiators then slipped the single sheet of A4 paper 
that contained the proposed Joint Declaration under the doors of the UK Prime 
Minister, Foreign Secretary, Defence Secretary and French President, who had only a 
very short time in the morning to agree or reject its content. 65 As Interview D put it 
Very considerable risks were taken by both the British Prime Minister and French President in 
accepting a document that went to the heart of national sovereignty with only five or ten minutes 
consideration. No doubt there were many moments over the next two years when they wondered 
whether they'd done the right thing that morning. 66 
Despite the different interpretations placed on key phrases by the UK and French 
governments the text agreed at Saint Malo was fully understood in terms of its scope 
and its implications by the negotiators who had drafted it on 3 December. 67 The 
different interpretations placed on the text by the two governments were motivated by 
political positioning by both governments appealing to domestic audiences. 68 The 
agreed document was, between Saint Malo and Nice, continually used to bring both 
the UK and French governments back to the agreed line when their individual 
64 Interview D, op. cit; 
65 Interview D argued that this was not a satisfactory situation but that there was a positive atmosphere 
to try and get a positive result from the summit, which is why such circumstances were permitted. 
Interview D, op. cit; Interview G, op. cit. 
66 Interview D, op. cit. 
67 This argument was advanced by Interview D, who was keen to defend the deal struck at Saint Malo 
and also to highlight the role of politics in interpreting the agreement. Liddle and Grant were keen to 
support the view that the nature of the agreement was very clearly understood at time of signing and 
any variations from this view occurred after the summit rather than as a product of it. Interview D, 
op. cit; Interview with Roger Liddle, op. cit; Interview with Charles Grant, op. cit; 
6 Lord Robertson and Charles Grant said that the British government understood the French 
governments domestic political need to emphasise the federalist aspects of this agreement - it did not 
affect the essence of the agreement, however. Interview with Lord Robertson, op. cit; Interview with 
Charles Grant, op. cit. 
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interpretations threatened to take the debate beyond the agreed boundaries. 69 Overall 
the Saint Malo declaration was made in order to ensure that the EU could `.. take 
decisions and approve military action where the Alliance as a whole is not engaged'. 70 
LI is not concerned with the outputs of negotiations, which forms the theory's 
dependent variable, but rather, the process by which these negotiations and 
agreements are formed. The focus on the process rather than outputs misses a crucial 
element of the bargaining process; namely where negotiators have `claimed value' 
and what this reveals about the international bargaining process. 
The outcome of the Saint Malo negotiation is significant because of the absence of 
detail in the Accords establishing the ESDP process. 71 Finding common interests 
between the UK and French governments on European defence policy was not as 
problematic as some have asserted but it was challenging. 72 The French government 
had a long history of support for the notion of creating a European defence capability 
and were also motivated by the need to address the perception of imbalances in the 
leadership of NATO. 73 The reform and then break up of the Soviet Union gave further 
impetus to analysts who had envisaged a distinct European military capability. 
However, discussing an autonomous EU defence capability was still taboo, which 
provided for renewed focus on the Anglo-Saxon dominance of NATO. 74 The majority 
of EU governments prefer to ensure European security through NATO largely 
69 Interview D, op. cit. 70 British-French Summit Saint Malo. 3-4 December 1998, in Maartje Rutten, op. cit., pp. 8-9, p. 8 
71 See Annex A for the full text, p. 267-71. 
72 Martin Walker, `Europe takes first steps to common defence policy', The Guardian . 
(London), 3 
June 1999. 
" Jolyon Howarth, `France and European Security 1944-95 `Re-Reading the Gaullist `consensus' in 
Brian Jenkins and Tony Chafer (eds), France from the Cold War to the New World Order, MacMillan 
(London), 1995, pp. 17-40. 
74 Ronald Asmus et al, `Can NATO Survive? ', The Washington Ouarterjy, Vol. 19, No. 2,1996, pp. 79- 
101. 
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because such reliance is financially and operationally expedient for many EU 
governments. 75 The EU governments' reluctance to improve military capabilities was 
institutionally evident from the Maastricht and Amsterdam negotiations where foreign 
and security outcomes were `exceedingly modest'. 76 The Maastricht and Amsterdam 
negotiations created a pressure on the UK government to become entrepreneurial on 
EU defence. This is a pressure that the Major government resisted but that George 
Robertson maintained was an important one for the Labour government to respond to 
avoid other EU governments taking a lead on this issue. 77 
The French government's continued desire to rebalance NATO away from control by 
the UK and American governments was clear in the June 1999 Cologne Council and 
the December 1999 Helsinki Council Annex I which implied a rebalancing towards 
control of NATO by European member governments 78 Richard Hatfield argued that 
the removal of the UK veto on defence and security within the EU had `let the genie 
out of the bottle' and automatically prompted discussions on more ambitious plans for 
EU defence structures. 79 For agreement to be reached between the French and UK 
governments on defence policy, convergence was needed between the UK's 
preference for NATO's security guarantee and the French government's preference 
'S Indeed the interviewees spoke in very strong terms on this issue. Interview C was adamant that 
Germany has neglected its role as a large political and military actor in Europe because of its 
problematic military history. Tim Garden was equally certain that the majority of EU governments 
prefer to remain within NATO structures because it allows them to effectively `free-ride' on US 
military expenditure. Hopkinson agreed with this position but added the caveat that there were only 
certain European governments the UK government would be pleased to see taking an advanced role in 
European security. Interview with Sir Timothy Garden, op. cit; Interview with William Hopkinson, 
ojcit; Interview C, op. cit. 
Francois Heisburg, European Defence: Making it work, Chaillot Papers 42, Institute for Security 
Studies of the WEU, September 2000, Paris, p. 5. 
" Interview with Lord Robertson, op. cit; Robert Key and Interview M highlighted the pressure from 
EU governments from the Maastrict European Council onwards to be entrepreneurial on European 
defence. Both stated that the Conservative government were not prepared to entertain such requests. 
Interview with Robert Key, op. cit; Interview M, op. cit. 
711 Presidency Conclusions. European Council. Helsinki, 10-11 December 1999, in Maartje Rutten, 
oý. cit, p. 82. 
7 Richard Hatfield, `The Consequences of Saint-Malo', op. cit 
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for greater EU autonomy. The compromise reached at Saint Malo of greater EU 
capabilities but within a NATO context was, according to Lord Robertson and 
Malcolm Rifkind, an attempt to satisfy both governments. 80 
The extent to which the French government is keen on pursuing policies that might 
lead to an autonomous EU defence and security structure as a replacement for NATO 
was disputed amongst interviewees. 81 Two key UK government negotiators at the 
Nice IGC, Interview H and Interview D, strongly argue that the French MoD and 
Foreign Office, were in full agreement with a process that reinforces rather than 
undermines NATO. 82 The presentational focus on autonomy was purely a device to 
appeal to a Gaullist domestic audience. 83 Other commentators are more sceptical 
about French intentions. Bruce George MP, longstanding Chairman of the House of 
Commons Defence Select Committee and Robert Key MP, former Shadow Defence 
Minister, and Malcolm Rifkind, former Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs and 
Defence Secretary believe that the French government is actively seeking in the 
medium term to create an autonomous EU force that undermines NATO. 84 Lord 
Brittan, former Vice-President of the Commission, and Sir Timothy Garden offer 
some support to this view by arguing that it was the absence of support across the EU 
80 Interview with Lord Robertson, op. cit; Interview with Malcolm Rifkind, op. cit. 
81 This was again a subject that drew very strongly worded responses from interviewees for this thesis. 
For example, Bruce George MP and Sir Malcolm Rifkind stated that there was no debate to be had on 
this issue - the French government clearly supported the Saint Malo initiatives as a means by which to 
advance a decoupling agenda from NATO. More moderate views came from Interview C and Sir Tim 
Garden who argued that the French government did hold such preferences but were constrained by the 
realities of the pre-eminence of NATO and limited European defence budgets. Officials like Interview 
M and Interview D argued that the French government was broadly supportive of the transatlantic 
Alliance but were unable to overtly support it because of domestic political considerations. Interview 
with Bruce George MP, op. cit; Interview with Sir Malcolm Rifkind, op. cit; Interview C, op. cit; 
Interview with Sir Tim Garden, op. cit; Interview M, op. cit; Interview D, op. cit. 
82 Interview D, op. cit; Interview H, op. cit. 
83 Interview E, op. cit and Interview H, op. cit. Also see, Footnote 80 
84 Interview with Bruce George, op. cit. Interview with Robert Key, op. cit; Interview with Malcolm 
Rifkind, op. cit. Also see, Footnote 80. 
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for such a move prevented the French government pursuing this policy seriously. 85 
The Saint Malo accords provided a compromise where both positions were 
acknowledged and put to one side for the sake of efficient policy making and to 
improve EU defence capabilities. 86 
The UK and French governments' divergent views concerning defence policy 
highlight the dynamics of issue convergence within the EU. The two governments 
showed common interests in preserving the NATO security guarantee, independent 
defence policies and improved capabilities for EU external relations policy sphere. 87 
The election of the Labour party in 1997 on a manifesto that encouraged European 
integration provided an important catalyst to the UK government becoming 
entrepreneurial on EU policy making. In particular, the Labour government wanted to 
position the UK at the `heart of Europe' and in doing so sought to improve European 
capabilities outside of strictly NATO frameworks, unthinkable under the previous 
Conservative government. 88 
LI advances the argument that rational governments only agree to collaborative 
policies when these offer tangible benefits to the national interest over and above 
independent policies. This and the previous chapter have outlined the budgetary, 
capabilities and strategic reasons why ESDP would be more beneficial to the UK than 
an autonomous policy. The task for government negotiators was to claim value in 
finalising a collective policy, whilst retaining national independence and the 
$s Interview with Lord Brittan, op. cit. 
86 This was firmly the view of Interview D who had been one of the main negotiators of this policy and 
also Interview M who directly advised the Prime Minister on this initiative and its subsequent 
development. Interview D, op. cit; Interview M, op. cit. 
87 Jean-Pierre Froehly, `The French Perspective: France's position towards ESDI and ESDP', German 
Council on Foreign Relations, June 2000. 
88 Interview with Robert Key, op. cit; Interview with Malcolm Rifkind, op. cit. 
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transatlantic security guarantee. The Saint Malo Accords achieved a win-set in both 
countries and therefore produced a convergence of national interests. 
In summary, this section has argued that the Saint Malo Accords produced a 
convergence of preferences between the UK and French governments. Furthermore, 
this section advanced the argument that convergence was necessary for ESDP to be 
advanced, more particularly preference convergence between governments with 
intense issues specific preferences and capabilities. Thus LI's hypotheses on 
preference convergence were validated by the case study of ESDP. However, this 
section also concluded that the Saint Malo negotiations were critical to the 
development of ESDP, as they provided political momentum and much of the detail 
of the final policy. Moreover, as the negotiations were conducted outside of IGC 
frameworks they fall outside of LI's explanation of European integration. Thus, LI 
misses a crucial part of the ESDP negotiations whilst, in general, adequately 
explaining intergovernmental negotiations. 
International structural factors do not shape national interests. National 
interests and preferences are shaped through the domestic policy process. 
LI specifies that governments are the leading actors in the international system. This 
leads to the conclusion that domestic political processes rather than international 
systemic pressures drive national interests. This section explores the domestic and 
international pressures on the British government to pursue a European defence 
policy. There are three arguments concerning the domestic pressure on the UK 
government to pursue a pro-European defence policy. The pre-determinist argument 
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is that the Labour party's 1997 manifesto informed its desire to show leadership in a 
European policy area. 89 John Redwood is a leading advocate of this argument: 
My view, in general, is that the Government wrongly offered defence an area where it thought it could 
lead, and divert attention away from its failure to join the Euro, as part of its posturing over EU 
policy. 90 
This position is supported by lain Duncan Smith in testimony to the House of Lords 
Select Committee on European Issues Sub-Committee concerning Defence. 91 In 
addition to these politically motivated opponents who are naturally keen to be critical 
of government policy there was also media commentary claiming that the Saint Malo 
initiative was linked to the government's reticence to be positive on the single 
currency. 92 The pre-determinist view is not only held by members of the Conservative 
and Liberal Democrat parties, but also some members of the PLP who were a quiet 
and acquiescent minority to the PM and the core executive. These MPs believe that 
the government pursued the policy as an end in its own right but that this also saved 
the government from having to take a politically dangerous decision regarding the 
single currency. 93 The government's plans for European defence cooperation did not 
89 Robert Key contended that the Government was determined to demonstrate pro-European credentials 
and chose defence on the basis that this was an area in which Britain was uniquely placed to lead. 
Interview with Robert Key, op. cit. 
90 Email correspondence with John Redwood MP, `Re: PhD Thesis Research Request - re; the ESDP 
and British Defence Policy 1998-2000, op. cit. 91 Catriona Gourlay, `The Spanish Presidency's agenda for conflict prevention and civilian crisis 
management, European Security Review', International Security Information Service, (Brussels) 
January 2002, p. 1-2; House of Lords Select Committee on the European Union, The Common 
European Security and Defence Policy, July 2000, op. cit. This contention is also reinforced by Bruce 
George MP, Chairman of the House of Commons Select Committee on Defence and Robert Key MP, 
former shadow defence minister. 
92 Ken Livingstone, `Charm is not enough- now Blair must take on Murdoch', The Independent 
(London), 17 December 1998; Editor, `The Voice of America', The Daily Telegraph (London). 28 
December 2000. 
93 For example, these members include Bruce George MP and Nicholas Palmer MP. Moreover 
interview evidence from 'The Guardian' newspaper's Political Editor Michael White, similarly 
supported this view. Interview with Bruce George MP, op. cit; Interview with Dr Nicholas Palmer MP, 
op. cit. 
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face substantial opposition within the PLP beyond a desire to secure guarantees that 
the Saint Malo initiative would not undermine NATO. 94 
The scepticism about how reliable the United States' commitment to European 
security is, informs a great deal of the policy analysis within the UK FCO. This 
discourse states that to retain America's involvement in European security Britain has 
to persuade European allies to bolster their military capabilities to `share the burden' 
of European security. 95 The concern over US Presidential and State Department's 
attitudes towards the EU ran parallel to the UK government arguing for military 
action in Kosovo. 96 The Prime Minister was convinced by George Robertson and 
Stephen Wall that the government could act to bolster the transatlantic Alliance and 
also fulfil the Labour party's election manifesto pledge to become a `force for good' 
in the world. 97 Saint Malo was a timely initiative as it extended the Anglo-French co- 
94 See page 106-7, chapter three for further details. 
95 Editor, `The Voice of America', The Daily Telegraph. op. cit; Michael White, `Bombing of Iraq a 
triumph of an old foreign policy', The Guardian (Manchester and London), 22 December 1998; Paul 
Eastham, `Cook flies into US storm over Euro army', The Daily Telegraph, (London) 7 February 2000, 
p. 2; Donald Macintyre, `A Bush victory could trouble the Tories as well as Labour', The Independent. 
(London), p. 3; Commentary, `A look at... America's role; new isolationists, old fallacies; the speech', 
The Washington Post, (Washington), 31 October 1999, p. b. 03; Samuel Berger, `Why isolation is not an 
option for American in the years to come', International Herald Tribune, (Neuilly Sur Seine), 27 
October 1999, p. 8. 
96 George Parker, `Blair to set out bottom line on new EU Treaty', Financial Times (London), 19 May 
2003, p. 3; Quentin Peel, `The failure of Blair's European Policy', Financial Times (London), 6 May 
2003, p. 21; Benedict Brogan, `Sniper fire over army that dare not speak its name', The Daily 
Telegraph, (London), 23 November 2000, p. 14. 
" The majority of evidence suggests that Hatfield and his Policy Unit created drew up the Saint Malo 
initiative and potential impacts and presented it to George Robertson. Hatfield convinced Robertson of 
the merits of the policy who then brought it forward to the Prime Minister. Robertson's divergence 
from this view comes from his account that he instructed Hatfield to produce this policy. It is not clear 
from the evidence which of these views is the strongest. Interview with Lord Robertson, op. cit; 
Interview with Bruce George MP, op. cit; Interview M, op. cit. 
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operation that had operated in Kosovo. 98 Military collaboration provided the context 
in which the UK MoD felt confident in promoting closer EU defence integration. 99 
Charles Grant, Director of the Centre for European Reform, spent a great deal of time 
discussing these issues with FCO, MoD and Cabinet Office officials, particularly with 
the Policy Units of the MoD and FCO and the European Secretariat of the Cabinet 
Office as well as with Tony Blair's political advisor Roger Liddle. loo The evidence is 
that Liddle was impressed by Grant's case for European defence integration and 
similarly that Liddle conveyed these arguments to the Prime Minister. The fact that 
the policy was taken forward is a key indication that Blair found the arguments 
persuasive. 101 Grant supported the idea of EU based defence as a means to strengthen 
the NATO alliance whilst promoting a serious French defence contribution in the eyes 
of the Alliance through the Saint Malo initiative. 102 Grant's role is perceived to be a 
strong external validating influence on Blair's opinions on this policy. '03 
Those who view Saint Malo as a `unique opportunity' argue that negotiations took 
place in the context of converging disparate motivations that culminated in the Saint 
98 Both Interview C and Lord Wallace drew very close links between the military action in Kosovo and 
the development of this initiative. Moreover, none of the other interviewees dissented from the view 
that Kosovo had played a role in the formulation of this policy, but differed in the importance attributed 
to it. Interview with Lord Wallace, op. cit; Interview C, op. cit. 
99 Gilles Andreani, Christophe Bertram and Charles Grant, Europe's Military Revolution, Centre for 
European Reform (London), March 2001, pp. 8-11; Charles Grant, `Can Britain Lead? '. Centre for 
European Reform (London), 1998; Interview I, op. cit. ioo Interview with Charles Grant, op. cit. 
101 This point is linked to a broader issue about how Tony Blair has conducted his Premiership. Lord 
Wallace and Interview M argued that Blair was keen to seek views outside of the confines of Whitehall 
but with the caveat that these views came from `trusted' sources - hence the relative importance of 
Roger Liddle and Charles Grant who are informed European commentators with the confidence of the 
PM. Interview with Lord Wallace, op. cit; Interview M, op. cit; Interview I, op. cit. 
102 Karl Schake, Amaya Block-Laine, Charles Grant, `Building a European Defence Capability', 
Survival, Vol. 41, No. 1, Spring 1999, pp. 20-40. 
103 Michael White described Grant as being part of Blair's inner circle and confirmed that rumours 
around Westminster at the time were that Saint Malo had been inspired by him. Ian Black also 
supported this view. Interview with Michael White, op. cit; Interview with Ian Black, op. cit. 
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Malo Accords. 104 These converging motivations were that the pro-European 
preferences of the Labour government resulted in government departments 
developing policy areas that could be `europeanised' and that pro-EU defence policies 
were linked to UK government intransigence on the single currency. The linkage of 
these two motivations implies the co-ordination of domestic policies within a 
European framework that all EU member governments engage in. 105 
The unique opportunity argument also suggests that the Labour government made a 
step-change in thinking from previous governments in deciding there were tangible 
benefits in leading on a policy issue from inception rather than joining once the 
framework of the policy had been established. 106 Furthermore, the development of 
NATO, coupled with the increasing reticence of the United States to intervene in so- 
called `out-of-area' operations and the reluctance of America to intervene in the case 
of the Kosovo Albanians contributed to the `unique opportunity' of Saint Malo. '07 
Richard Hatfield convened a working group within the MoD from December 1997 to 
June 1998, to develop policy proposals around EU based solutions for European 
security and defence issues. Detail of the membership of the working group is 
104 Nicole Gnesotto, `ESDP: The Way Forward', Military Technology, December 2002, pp. 17-20, p. 17. 
Interview with Lord Wallace, op. cit; Interview with Sir Timothy Garden, op. cit. 105 Although this concept was expressly rejected by the Prime Minister's personal political advisor 
Roger Liddle who maintained that each policy area was taken and negotiated on its own merits to the 
exclusion of any potential linkages, this is a minority view of the 23 relevant interviewees in this thesis. 
Interview with Lord Leon Brittan, op. cit. Interview with Lord Wallace, op. cit. 
106 Wall, Hatfield and Jones-Parry worked under the previous Conservative government where they all 
argued that a European defence initiative was not open for consideration. The first 12 months of the 
Labour government provided a more permissive environment in which these issues could be explored. 
Interview M, op. cit; Interview D, op. cit; Interview G, op. cit; Matthew Sowemimo, `Evaluating the 
success of the Labour Government's European Policy', Journal of European Integration- Vol. 2, pp. 343- 
68, p. 349. 
107 David Dunn, `European Security and Defence Policy Debate: Counter-balancing America or Re- 
balancing NATO', Defense Studies, Vol. ], No. 1, Spring 2001, pp. 146-55, p. 151; Michael Clarke and 
Paul Cornish, `The European Defence Project and the Prague Summit', International Affairs, Vol. 78, 
No. 4,2002, pp. 777-88, p. 777-8. 
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restricted information. 108 This working group concluded that European security and 
defence could be strengthened to the benefit of the UK and NATO. 109 The rationale 
for this conclusion was that the US were more likely to want to act in conjunction 
with a militarily strengthened EU. "° ESDP militarily strengthens the EU because it 
provides the Union with a framework through to which to engage in a multilateral 
way in defence cooperation and military operations and to share the US' burden of 
European security. " This line of thinking was successfully promoted by Richard 
Hatfield to both George Robertson, the Secretary of State for Defence and then onto 
the Prime Minister, core executive and the Cabinet. ' 12 
The policy work completed by Richard Hatfield's working group was exceptional in 
its range and scope, taking in possible outcomes and scenarios as a response to the 
Prime Minister's request for departments to find areas in which the UK government 
could be pro-active on the EU stage. The exceptionalism comes from the extent to 
which Hatfield drove this work forward and was able to present the Secretary of State 
with a very well developed set of proposals. 113 William Hopkinson (former Assistant 
Under Secretary of State MoD (Policy) argues that it is not necessarily exceptional to 
have working parties examining areas of policy, but it is exceptional for that working 
party to devise a marketing strategy for the policy as well as scoping all possible 
`08 The author was refused information as to the membership of this working party. 
109 Interview B provided confirmation of Hatfield creating this working group and the nature of the 
work it conducted. Interview D, op. cit; Interview B, op. cit. 
"o Interview C, Sir Tim Garden and Charles Grant all argued that strengthening the EU's military 
capabilities was key to retaining the interest of the US in European affairs - an interest that had been on 
the wane since the collapse of the Soviet bloc. Interview C op. cit; Interview with Tim Garden, op. cit; 
Interview with Charles Grant, op. cit. 
111 David Dunn, `European Security and Defence Policy in the American Security Policy Debate', 
op. cit, p. 146. 
12 See Footnote 96. 
113 Hopkinson and Garden as former senior MoD officials argued that the prominence of a single 
individual in this process was unusual. A more usual route would be that the consideration of the policy 
be widened to a greater number of MoD officials. Interview with William Hopkinson, op. cit; Interview 
with Sir Timothy Garden, op. cit. 
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counter proposals and obstacles that might be made by negotiating parties and the 
United States. 114 Hopkinson argues that the particularly enthusiastic work of the 
Hatfield working party was because of Hatfield's personal view that EU solutions 
should be sought. 115 This MoD working group was also one part of a federation of 
competing bureaucratic interests that were distilled by the Prime Minister and his 
close advisers -a position close to LI's explanation of domestic policy formulation. 
Lord Guthrie argues that towards June and July of 1998 senior military officials, 
including himself, viewed the SDR as facilitating closer collaboration with other EU 
governments by gearing the British armed forces to the `small and flexible' roles of 
peace enforcement and humanitarian missions which are part of the ESDP. 116 
Moreover, the SDR made clear that the British government was taking the potential of 
the EU's CFSP seriously as a useful tool of foreign policy. 117 The SDR established a 
change in UK strategic preferences that would allow a more effective use of the 
defence budget. '18 Moreover, despite hostility towards policies that might undermine 
the transatlantic Alliance, senior military officials were broadly in favour of policies 
that would encourage European allies to increase their domestic defence spending and 
114 Interview with William Hopkinson, op. cit; 
115 It is likely that Hatfield would not want to confirm a description of himself as being `pro-European'. 
His view is likely to be that he was merely assisting in developing existing UK government European 
policy. However, other interviewees like Sir Timothy Garden and Interview C similarly described his 
preferences as being `pro-European' but not anti-NATO. Interview D, op. cit. Interview with Sir 
Timothy Garden, op. cit; Interview C, op. cit; Interview with William Hopkinson, op. cit; 
116 Appendix to Annex II to Annex VI, Number I Guiding Principles, Report of the Presidency on the 
European Security and Defence Policy; Annex VI, of the Conclusions of the French Presidency of the 
European Council, 9 December 2000 in Nice, in Maartje Rutten, op. cit, p. 169. See also Annex C. 
117 Paragraph 64, The European Security and Defence Identity, Select Committee on Defence, 3'a 
Report, 3 March 1999, The Stationary Office (London) 
"a Interview D, op. cit; Interview G, op. cit. MoD Announcement, `Gordon Brown announces billions 
extra for defence', SR2002/MOD, HM Treasury, 15 July 2002; Paul Rogers, `New Grand, Old 
Assumptions: Analytical Limitations in the SDR', Disarmament Diplomacy, Issue Number 28; Michael 
Clarke, `How strategic was the review? ', Disarmament Diplomacy, Issue Number 28, July 1998; Select 
Committee on Defence, Examination of witnesses (Question 2960-2979) Thursday 23 July 1998, 
Question 2961, George Robertson, Eighth Report. Defence Select Committee, The Stationary Office, 
(London), 3 September 1998 
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improve capabilities. ' 19 Indeed, Interview C believes that the Petersburg tasks and 
ESDP provides a more realistic range of tasks for the British military in the twenty 
first century. 120 Despite reticence towards a policy that might undermine NATO the 
Chief of the Defence Staff steered the Services into a position of constructive 
engagement with the government offering conditional win-sets. 121 Thus, evidence 
suggests that the national interests that guided Britain's approach to EU defence 
negotiations were derived from domestic pressures as LI suggests. There are several 
notable counter-factual arguments that can be deployed against LI's view. 
Howarth suggests three key exogenous factors that shaped the development of ESDP: 
the degree of political will generated from the Saint Malo conference in December 
1998; the emergence of a military industrial base; transatlantic consensus on NATO 
and the British commitment to the ESDP project. 122 Elizabeth Pond argues that the 
EU's impotence in the Kosovo crisis was the key driver in the ESDP negotiations. 123 
The UK government's position on the Saint Malo initiatives and ESDP can be 
attributed to exogenous factors and the belief that ESDP strengthens transatlantic 
relations. 124 
119 Interview C, op. cit; Interview with William Hopkinson, op. cit. 
120 Interview C described Britain as being `a medium sized actor with large actor roles'. He also 
thought Britain should realise its size and moderate its aspirations down accordingly. Interview C, 
o2p. cit. 
1' This move is particularly praised as being evidence of Guthrie's political acumen (he did not attest 
to this himself) and his pragmatism, which he was prepared to suggest. Interview D, op. cit; Interview 
C, op. cit; Interview with Sir Timothy Garden, op. cit. 
122 Joylon Howarth, European Integration and Defence: the ultimate challenge?. Chaillot Papers 
Number 43, Institute for Security Studies, November 2000, p. 93. 
123 Elizabeth Pond, `Kosovo: Catalyst for Europe', The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 22, No. 4, pp. 77-92, 
p. 77. 
124 This was the position of the government before, during and after the Saint Mato negotiations and 
indeed this thesis argues was an innovative response to the problem of retaining NATO and US interest 
in European security. Interview D, op. cit; Interview G, op. cit; Interview with Lord Robertson, op. cit. 
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A further intergovernmental negotiation that assisted the development of ESDP was a 
parallel development in NATO. The NATO framework document of 24 April 1999 
produced a new defence role for the European members of NATO. The 
announcement produced a formal link between EU military initiatives and internal 
NATO restructuring. 125 This link aimed to modernise the Alliances military forces for 
`out of area' and `peace enforcement' tasks but was a modest and unsuccessful 
endeavour. 126 At the NATO summit, the British government representatives praised 
`... the determination of both EU members and other European allies to make the 
necessary steps to strengthen their defence capabilities. "27 
The NATO summit, 23 and 24 April 1999, produced agreement amongst the Heads of 
State and government on NATO conducting `out of area' operations. 128 American 
officials were keen that NATO could conduct out of area operations without the need 
for a United Nations mandate. Despite military operations in Kosovo having a formal 
UN Security Council resolution mandate European governments refused to agree to 
the new Strategic Concept practice of conducting `peace-enforcement' operations 
without UN approval. 129 NATO members acknowledged ESDP developments and 
particularly the EU government's enthusiasm for being able to conduct autonomous 
actions. 130 The EU negotiators, principally the UK and German government 
125 North Atlantic Council Summit Washington DC. 24"' April 1999, reproduced in Maartje Rutten, 
pp. 20-39, p. 29. 
6 The Alliance's Stategic Concept. Approved by the Heads of State and Government participatinin 
the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Washington DC on 23`d and 24`h April 1999. Reprinted in 
Maartje Rutten, op. cit, p. 29. Strobe Talbott, `America's Stake in a Strong Europe', Reprinted in 
Maartje Rutten, op. cit., pp. 54-59. 
127 NATO Summit, reproduced in Maartje Rutten, op. cit., p. 26 
128 Ibid. Out of area operations are those which occur outside or on the periphery of Alliance Territory. 
Myron Hura, Gary McLeod, Eric Larsen, James Schneider, Daniel Gonzales, Daniel Norton, Jody 
Jacobs, Kevin O'Connell, William Little, Richard Mesic, Interoperability: A Continuing Challenge in 
Coalition Air Operations, RAND Corporation, (New York), 2000, p. 1. 
129 NATO Summit, reproduced in Maartje Rutten, op. cit., p. 24-5 
130 Ibid, Paragraph 9, p. 22 
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negotiators, secured agreement from America on access to NATO capabilities, based 
on the following principles: 
a) assured EU access to NATO planning capabilities able to contribute to military planning for EU- 
led operations. 
b) The presumption of the availability to the EU of pre-identified NATO capabilities and common 
assets for use in EU-led operations 
c) Identification of a range of European command options for EU-led operations, further developing 
the role of DSACEUR in order for him to assume fully and effectively his European 
responsibilities, 
d) The further adaptation of Nato's defence planning system to incorporate more comprehensively 
the availability of forces for EU-led operations. 131 
Pressure for the UK government's initiative on European defence might at least in 
part have stemmed from the reform in NATO. 132 If this is the case it leaves interest 
formulation in a conceptually problematic position as it would suggest that 
developments within international institutions can drive domestic policy formulation. 
However, the evidence suggests that UK government preferences within NATO and 
the EU were determined by the pressure exerted by groups aggregated and negotiated 
by governments at intergovernmental bargaining conferences as LI argues. 
In summary, this section has argued that the UK government's policies towards the 
EU and NATO were determined by pressures exerted and aggregated from the 
domestic political system. Furthermore, it argued that whilst the experience of 
Kosovo and the concerns surrounding the commitment of the US President and State 
Department to European security provided strong context to the Saint Malo initiative 
greater credence was given to domestic factors. These include an ideological desire to 
be `better Europeans' and also to develop a collaborative European defence identity 
131 Ibid, Paragraph 10, p. 22-3 
132 Charles Grant and George Robertson both argued that the discussions in NATO about ESDI and the 
following reforms had provided an additional motivation for the Saint Malo initiative. Malcolm 
Rifkind countered this with his opinion that greater efforts should have been sought to keep 
Europeanised defence within a strictly NATO framework. Interview with Charles Grant, op. cit; 
Interview with George Robertson, op. cit; Interview with Malcolm Rifkind, op. cit. 
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before other EU governments decided to bring forward a proposal to the EU, thus 
jeopardising the UK's core defence preferences. 
Governments act as a `gate-keener' between the domestic and international 
bargaining tables. 
LI advances the argument that governments act as `gate-keepers' between the 
domestic political system and the international bargaining table. 133 The gatekeeper 
metaphor used by LI is drawn from Putnam's conceptualisation of bargaining 
behaviour that is cited in `The Choice for Europe'. 134 Both Moravcsik and Putnam 
agree that domestic interest groups lobby governments in pursuit of their own 
interests. 135 They also agree that political parties seek electoral victories through 
constructing coalitions between interest groups and foster continued interest group 
support through meeting these groups' expectations once in government. 136 
LI argues that governments then take these aggregated preferences forward to 
international negotiations. Putnam asserts that the government's negotiators must seek 
to maximise the satisfaction of domestic interest groups whilst minimising the adverse 
consequences that might result from the absence of negotiated output between 
governments. 137 The tension between Putnam's work and LI arises from Putnam's 
belief that government negotiators are conscious of domestic developments and of 
attaining agreements that meet a `win-set', or agreeable form within the domestic 
system. 138 LI advances the argument that once the domestic pressures have been 
aggregated into government policy and preferences, the `win-set' has already been 
133 Heather Mbaye, 'Why national states comply with supranational law: Explaining implementation 
infringements in the European Union 1972-1993', European Union Politics, Vol. 2, No. 3, pp. 259-281, 
261. 134 
Andrew Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe, op. cit., p. 65. 
135Ibid, p. 473; Robert Putnam, `Two Level Games', op. cit, 436-7 
16 Robert Putnam, `Two Level Game', op. cit., p. 434 
137 Ibid., p. 457 
138 Ibid, p. 456-7 
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established. Government negotiators must remain within this `win-set' without 
reference back to the domestic interest groups for ratification. 139 This tension is 
further borne out by the process by which international agreements are ratified. Each 
government's negotiating officials brings the agreed bargain back to the domestic 
political system to seek ratification; in the case of the UK government the Treaty of 
Nice was ratified by both Houses of Parliament. 140 Not all governments will requite 
votes in their respective Parliaments to gain ratification, although the method of 
ratification affects the size of the potential available `win-set'. For instance, a 
requirement for a two-thirds Parliamentary majority for ratification necessarily 
require a broader agreement than if a simple majority is required. 
Putnam argues that the ability of the negotiators to achieve domestic ratification 
determines the extent to which the negotiator can manoeuvre to `claim value'. 
Negotiator's judgments are not captured at one moment in time but are subject to a 
continual iterative process of review during the negotiations. Negotiators therefore 
have to make judgments during the entire negotiations about whether an individual 
measure will be ratified by the UK Parliament and accepted by key domestic groups. 
An inability to secure approval from key groups in the domestic political system, and 
a resultant inability to guarantee ratification gives negotiators some freedom to try and 
secure concessions from the other negotiating teams. 141 In this respect international 
negotiations are iterative rather than sequential and whilst ultimately treaty 
negotiations are ratified post-facto, the negotiators have to be aware of the effect 
139Ibid, p. 450-1 
140 European Communities Amendment Act was passed in the House of Commons on 18 July 2001. A 
treaty can be made law by Crown prerogative and therefore does not need a vote in Parliament unless it 
changes domestic law, as was the case with the Nice Treaty, though not the defence clauses. 
141 For example, the German government's negotiations on the single currency. Andrew Moravcsik, 
The Choice for Europe, op. cit, p. 441-6 
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various negotiated permutations have on the ability to secure both Parliamentary 
ratification and domestic acceptance. For example, in the case of the Treaty on 
European Union, in 1992, the UK Conservative Government had a majority of 
seventeen in the House of Commons and nine MPs who were willing to vote against 
the Government on ratifying the Treaty and who went on to lose the Government 
whip in 1994 because of continued rebellious behaviour. 142 Prime Minister John 
Major could legitimately claim at the IGC negotiations that he was constrained by the 
size of the possible `win-set' in Parliament. '43 If Prime Minister Major and his 
officials did not negotiate a treaty at Maastricht acceptable to the majority of his MPs 
and Peers then the treaty would not have been ratified in the UK Parliament. In 
practice, John Major was reliant on the work of his officials to negotiate within agreed 
red-lines and he provided the authority within which they were able to do this. The 
Prime Minister argued strongly with his negotiating partners that the UK government 
would be unable to ratify the treaty without several key concessions from them 
including social chapter opt-outs. 144 This reinforces LI's view that one of the key 
motivators for bargaining officials is the fear of not reaching a positive negotiated 
outcome. Moreover, it demonstrates the leverage governments, whose ability to ratify 
the agreement in their domestic system is debatable, have over negotiations, thus 
jeopardising the entire treaty. 
EU governments act as gate-keepers between the domestic political system and 
international negotiators during bargaining. The government's negotiating team is the 
only group empowered to make offers and counter offers at the intergovernmental 
142 The relevant MPs were: Sir Richard Body, Theresa Gorman, lain Duncan Smith, Richard Shepherd, 
Sir Trevor Sheet, Toby Jessel, Christopher Gill, Ann Winterton, Sir Teddy Taylor. Philip Cowley and 
Philip Norton, `Rebels and Rebellions: Conservative MPs in the 1992 Parliament', British Journal of 
Politics and International Relations, Vol. 1, No. 1, April 1999, pp. 84-105, pp. 88-9 '43 The Conservative government's majority in 1992 was 21. Ibid. 144 Anthony Forster, The Negotiation of the Maastricht Treaty', op. cit, p. 352. 
161 
bargaining table, and government ministers are the only actors that can agree to 
proposals they feel that the government will get ratified in parliament. The gate- 
keeper role is further entrenched by the absence of supranational negotiators at the 
international level. This role allows negotiators to assess domestic win-sets without 
the domestic audience being affected by international influences and also to extract 
concessions from other government negotiators. In ESDP negotiations the Labour 
government had a large potential win-set, through its Parliamentary majority, but 
maintained self-imposed constraints - managed through careful coordination by 
COREPER, the European Secretariat of the Cabinet Office and the FCO. This element 
of LI is, therefore validated by the ESDP case study. 
The policy outcomes of international bargaining are often the lowest common 
denomination of interests. 
LI advances the argument that rational governments negotiate collaborative European 
policies when these policies produce a distinct advantage over pursuing independent 
national policies. 145 To reach agreement across fifteen autonomous governments all of 
whom wield a veto over the whole package of negotiated agreements requires the 
agreement to meet the win-set of the most reluctant negotiator. LI argues that the 
number of negotiations, the political system and the consequences of non-agreement 
lend themselves to the production of lowest common denominator policies. 146 This 
section explores the substance of negotiations to assess the extent to which the 
Presidency conclusions at the Nice IGC were merely the lowest common denominator 
policies or whether the Anglo-French coalition, log-rolling, side payments or threats 
of exclusion took the ESDP beyond this point. '47 
145 EU agreements are `Pareto-efficient'. Andrew Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe, op. cit, p. 482. 
'46 Andrew Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe, op. cit, p. 482-3. 
147 Bargaining seldom involves a single issue at a time. Politicians, diplomats and the like are forced to 
balance their preferences on some issues against their preferences on others, given that they probably 
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Between December 1998 and December 2000 the UK, French and German 
governments attempted to advance ESDP negotiations with independent policy 
initiatives. The German government used its Presidency of the EU (January to July 
1999) to try and advance the ESDP agenda in accordance with its own preferences. 
The German government initiative became a formal EU process embodied by the 
Cologne Council June 1999.148 The German government's EU Presidency produced a 
set of guiding principles for the Council that incorporated a desire for CFSP and 
ESDP to be credible policies, and for the EU not just to have military capabilities, but 
also a decision making structure to authorise actions across the full range of conflict 
prevention, crisis management tasks and the Petersburg tasks as defined in the Treaty 
of European Union. '49 Moreover, the NATO Council Communique 24-25 April 1999, 
stated that the Alliance supported the development of ESDP and shared the 
aspirations of the UK and French governments that ESDP should provide the EU with 
the capability to act autonomously when the Alliance as a whole is not engaged. It 
also stated that there should be a formulation of EU rights to NATO planning 
facilities and that the availability of pre-identified NATO assets for use in EU led 
operations should be similarly codified. 150 
won't get their way on all of them. A concession may be made to another party on a less important 
topic in exchange for that other party's support on a more vital issue. This process is known as log 
rolling. Sidepayments can be typified as distributing the benefit of a policy to all partners, whilst threat 
of exclusion is effectively a promise to be excluded from the benefits of any negotiation. 
148 Declaration of the European Council on strengthening the Common European Policy on Security 
and Defence. European Council, Cologne, 3-4 June 1999, in Maartje Rutten, op. cit, p. 41 
149 German Presidency Paper. Informal Reflection at WEU on Europe's Security and Defence, Bonn, 
24th February 1999, reproduced in Maartje Rutten, op. cit, pp. 14-16. Informal Meeting of EU Foreign 
Ministers Eltville. 13-14`h March 1999. German Proposal. Reproduced In Maartje Rutten, op. cit., 
pp. 17-19; Declaration of the European Council on strengthening the common European policy on 
security and defence, European Council, Cologne, 3-4 June 1999, Paragraph 1; Petersburg 
Declaration. 19 June 1992. which are `humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks, tasks of 
combat forces in crisis management including peacekeeping. ' 
150 Final Communique. North Atlantic Council Summit. Washington DC. 24 April 1999, Paragraphs 
8,9,10, reproduced in Maartje Rutten, op. cit, p. 20 
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The Cologne Council 3-4 June 1999 occurred in the context of the Kosovo crisis. The 
effect of the crisis on ESDP negotiations is a keenly contested issue. Alyson Baffles, 
former Political Director at the WEU and former Deputy Head of the Policy Planning 
Unit in the FCO (1984-1986) and career diplomat, claims that the Kosovo conflict 
played a leading role in galvanising EU Member governments to support the measures 
outlined at the Cologne Council. 151 Baffles contends that the Kosovo conflict brought 
the French and UK governments together in agreeing that they should be active in 
persuading the EU into a more effective foreign and defence policy and similarly that 
the EU should be endowed with greater military capabilities. 152 This view is 
supported by NATO publications concerning Kosovo, and the work of informed 
security commentators who have argued strongly in favour of the catalysing role 
played by Kosovo. 153 The literature also suggests that Kosovo played a motivating 
role in the creation of ESDP and also fed into a debate about how enhanced 
capabilities would have been used by the UK in the Kosovo theatre. '54 While Kosovo 
polarised the debates about autonomous EU defence capabilities and whether 
collaborative policies were more advantageous than unilateral actions, it did not 
resolve the debates concerning how this military role should be developed. 155 The 
division of opinion concerning the approach towards Kosovo is that on the one hand 
the French and Italian governments viewed the military action in Kosovo as an 
Anglo-American venture that was saved from disaster by extensive diplomatic efforts 
251 Alyson Baffles, Under a European Flag,, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Unpublished Paper, 
2000. 
152 Ibid. 
ts' NATO Factsheet, Strengthening European Security and Defence Capabilities, Brussels, 2000; 
Natalie Roth, `The New European Security and Defence Policy (Panel Summary)', for `The Future of 
Europe Conference of the European Union Centers, 9/10 February 2000, The German House, New 
York. 
154 Alyson Bailes, Under a European Flag, op. cit; Christopher Coker, Twilight of the West, Boulder 
Press, (Westview), 1998; Jim Hoogland, `Stone by stone, NATO builds a new Kosovo', International 
Herald Tribune, (Paris), 19 April 2001, p. 7. 
iss Alexander Moens, 'NATO's dilemma and the elusive European defence identity'. Security 
Dialogue. Vol. 29, No. 4, December 1998, pp. 463-75. 
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made during the bombing raids. 156 On the other hand the US President made the 
bombing strategy a condition of the US military's involvement to minimise casualties 
and to try and avoid a ground campaign completely. '57 
The development of planning capabilities and assets was advanced by the French and 
German governments in consultation with NATO. 158 In Toulouse on 29 March 1999 
the French and German governments agreed to reform the `Eurocorps' into a rapid 
reaction force capable of `out-of-area' operations and with headquarters capable of 
being used for international peacekeeping and peace support operations (PSO). 159 
Parallel to this Spain, Belgium and Luxembourg also agreed to restructure their 
military forces to make them more mobile and rapidly deployable too. 160 The 
Cologne meeting (3-4 June 1999) was dominated by efforts to define ESDP more 
closely. The summit reaffirmed that the EU should be given the capacity for 
autonomous action, backed by credible military forces and established a precise 
timetable for action. 161 This timetable consisted of the heads of government deciding 
that by the end of 2000 the WEU would have completed its function and would be 
subsumed into the EU. They also agreed that governments should have regular and ad 
hoc meetings of the General Affairs Council which would incorporate Defence 
Ministers, to create a permanent EU Political and Security Committee (PSC), and that 
156 Bulletin Ouiotidien, 24th April 1999, 'Italian Minister Climbs Down from Condemning TV 
bombing', op. cit. 
ls' Agence France Presse, 250' April 1999, `Balkan states around Yugoslavia are to be offered a multi- 
million dollar political and economic aid package to bolster wavering support for NATO action over 
Kosovo, British newspapers reported on Sunday'; Robert Fisk, `NATO used the same old trick', The 
Independent, London, 4 October 2002; Owen Harries, `Three rules for a superpower to lie by', New 
York Times, (New York), 23 August 1999, p. A19; Flora Lewis, `Like it or fear it, a united Europe is on 
its way', International Herald Tribune, (Neuille sur ville), 30 June 2000, p. 8. 
158 Franco-German Defence and Security Council, Toulouse, 29th May 1999, reproduced in Maartje 
Rutten, op. cit., p. 40. 
159 Ibid. 
160 Elizabeth Pond, `Kosovo: Catalyst for Europe', op. cit, p. 83. 
161 European Council. Cologne 3-4 June 1999, reproduced in Maartje Rutten op cit, p. 41. 
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an EU military committee should make recommendations to the PSC as should an EU 
military staff. 162 The meeting also concluded that WEU assets should be transferred to 
the EU and that Javier Solana should be designated as High Representative for CFSP 
in line with the decisions taken at the Amsterdam IGC. 163 The Cologne Council gave 
the EU a military capability, but did not define the political or military doctrine that 
underpinned the policy. This failure to agree was caused by divergent agendas 
between the UK and French governments who wanted the EU to be given more 
autonomy to act when NATO was not involved and the Italian and German 
governments who were concerned about the consequences of greater EU powers. 164 
This demonstrates the need for governments to ensure that collaborative policies are 
more beneficial to national interests than autonomous policies. German Foreign 
Minister Joschka Fischer attributed a lack of progress in the ongoing action in Kosovo 
to the different views between member governments; the UK government was in 
favour of action, the German government was against and the Italian government had 
requested a pause in military actions. 165 
162 The PSC is based in Brussels and is composed of national representatives at Senior Official / 
Ambassador level. The PSC deals with all issues concerning CFSP and ESDP in according with treaty 
provisions and without prejudice to the Commission. In cases of military crisis management operations 
the PSC ensures under the authority of the Council, political control and strategic direction of all 
operations, by evaluating options for response. The PSC also provides guidance to the military 
committee. The Military Committee is composed of member governments Chiefs of Defence staffs as 
represented by their military delegates and only at the most senior level when it is absolutely necessary. 
It provides a military consultancy function and makes recommendations for the PSC as well as 
ensuring the military direction of all EU related military activities. The Military Staff are situated 
within the Council and provides advice and support for the ESDP in the military sector including EU- 
led crisis management operations. The Military Staff provide assessments of military situations and 
also strategic planning services within the framework of the Petersburg Tasks including the 
identification of appropriate forces. 
163 European Council. Cologne, 3-4 June 1999, Reprinted in Maartje Rutten, op. cit., pp. 40.45. '64 Graeme Wilson, `Cook under fire on EU army deal' The Daily Mail, (London), 2 June 1999, p. 4; 
Rosemary Bennett, 'Blair vows to put UK at the heart of Europe: PM stresses need for EU reforms but 
wants Britain to be a leading player', Financial Times, (London), 14 May 1999, p. 1. 165 Martin Walker, `Summit and Nothing: Today's Cologne summit looks set to continue the European 
Council of Minister's tendency to make plans rather than take action', The Guardian, (London and 
Manchester), 3 June 1999, p. 21. 
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This evidence reinforces LI's analysis that common EU policies often result in lowest 
common denominator outputs although it might equally be said that the ongoing 
action in Kosovo made it impossible for governments to agree on institutional and 
operational military issues. From this perspective, and one held by the German 
Foreign Minister, Joschka Fischer, the most important output from Cologne was to 
secure agreements in principle rather than agreements of minutiae -a distinction that 
helps to qualify the extent to which this evidence validates LI. 166 
The Saint Malo Accords were adopted at the European Council at Helsinki on 11-12 
December 1999. The Helsinki Council added details to the Saint Malo Accords by 
establishing the PSC from 1 March, 2000 the Military Committee and Military Staff, 
establishing `headline goals' by 2003 that would commit the governments to commit 
60,000 troops capable of executing the full range of Petersburg tasks. 167 These forces 
would be capable of being deployed in 60 days and sustainable for up to a year. The 
post `neutral' EU Member States, most notably Sweden insisted on improving the 
non-military crisis management of the European Union, a position that affected what 
is the lowest common denominator position. 168 The main outcome of the Helsinki 
Council, the progression from a general commitment to a defined process with a 
specific set of objectives aimed at providing capabilities and institutional 
underpinnings to the policy. These outcomes did not cover the precise details of how 
European capabilities would be improved nor signalled the objectives of the military 
and political committees that had been established. As a result EU external relations 
166 Interview E, op. cit, Interview F, op. cit. 
167 European Council Helsinki 10-11 December 1999 reproduced in Maartj e Rutten, op. cit, p. 82-3. 168 The reason why the Swedish Government were so keen to push the softer, policing aspects of the 
ESDP was due to the domestic political situation which gave the views of the Communist and Green 
Parties great credence and produced a scepticism about the wisdom of potentially undermining 
Sweden's independence and neutrality in the defence sphere. Interview with Pal Jonson, op. cit. 
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negotiators, NATO delegates and the fifteen national Chiefs of Defence Staff still had 
to negotiate these details after the conclusion of the Cologne Council. 1 69 
Many of the gaps in operational and institutional details left over from Cologne were 
bridged at a meeting of the EU defence ministers on 28 February 2000 in Sintra. The 
shape of ESDP doctrine was tackled by the `Toolbox paper' drafted by the UK 
FCO. 170 The `Toolbox paper' gave weight to the UK Prime Minister's desire for the 
ESDP to be a capabilities driven policy to make collaboration more attractive than 
unilateral policies. 171 The `Toolbox paper' argued that the Helsinki Headline Goals 
should be adopted as a part of ESDP. It omitted military planning issues, geographical 
operational scope and the constitution of ESDP forces. 172 To counteract deficiencies 
emanating from the Helsinki goals the `Toolbox Paper' proposed some key planning 
assumptions e. g. `(EU governments) will carry out tasks in and around Europe but 
have to be able to respond to crisis world-wide.... (the EU should also be involved in 
executing) complex peace enforcement tasks in a joint environment in or around 
Europe' with a timetable leading to a Capabilities Conference that should meet by the 
end of 2000.173 The British involvement in drafting the `toolbox paper' points 
strongly towards a log-rolling strategy though the UK government tried to ensure the 
169 Interview H and Interview F argued that the development of ESDP was a phased process, detail 
being added with each successive conference or summit. This was a deliberate process to help manage 
the development of the policy and to prevent too many decisions having to be taken at any one time, 
which they viewed as increasing the chances of there being a failure to agree. Interview with H, op. cit; 
Interview F, op. cit. 
170 Interview D, op. cit; and Interview E, op. cit. 
1" Interview D, op. cit; and Interview E, op. cit. 
172 `The Toolbox Paper' Meeting of European Union Defence Ministers, Sintra 28`x' February 2000, 
Reproduced in Maartje Rutten, op. cit, pp. 94-111. 
173 Ibid 
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success of the ESDP negotiations by creating a significant momentum towards the 
policy. 174 
The significance of the `toolbox paper' was that it allowed UK MoD officials to agree 
the political framework for the defence initiative and planning elements of ESDP. 
However, by December 2000 the relationship between NATO and the EU's ESDP 
had not been resolved by member government negotiators. The UK government 
argued that NATO should remain the mainstay of European security with ESDP a 
means by which the EU could share the burden of European security. After intense 
lobbying of the Pentagon and State Department this position was supported by the 
American administration. 175 
The French government rejected the need to formally link ESDP with NATO until 
such time as the capabilities and institutional shape of the ESDP were finalised. '76 
The French government's position was that ESDP should be free from American 
involvement to avoid the ESDP pursuing American foreign policy aims. '77 The US 
State Department rejected the French government's characterisation of America's 
influence in Europe and viewed this as further evidence of the French government's 
174 The term log-rolling was not used by interviewees. However both Interview E and Interview M 
argued that the 'toolbox paper' provided additional momentum to the development of ESDP. Interview 
E, op. cit; Interview M, op. cit. 
'75 Johnston, Hatfield and Jones-Parry were all involved in the negotiations and meetings with the US 
State Department whilst Liddle advised the PM on how the Saint Malo initiative should be advanced in 
the light of US views. Interview I, op. cit; Interview E, op. cit; Interview D, op. cit; Interview G. op. cit. 
176 The Toolbox Paper' Meeting of European Union Defence Ministers, Sintra 28t' February 2000, 
Reproduced in Maartje Rutten, op. cit, pp. 94-111. Alexandre Vulic did, however, say that the French 
government's acceptance of NATO as the central security institution was a large concession and one 
that demonstrated their commitment to ESDP. Interview with Alexandre Vulic, 10 May 2004. 
"' Anton La Guardia & Michael Smith, `France snubs America over EU army', The Telegraph, 
London, 7 December 2000; Emilie Acquantine, `France pushes for EU defence industry', Pravda, 
Moscow, 3 October 2002. 
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desire to `de-couple' from NATO. 178 These concerns echoed those of Madeline 
Albright in 1998 when she raised three concerns about closer EU cooperation on 
defence which were the need to avoid de-coupling, duplication and discrimination 
against non-EU members of NATO within a potential autonomous EU defence 
capability. 179 
Albright's concerns particularly focussed on the prospect of the EU duplicating 
NATO tasks, structures and capabilities and which might lead the EU to discriminate 
against non-EU NATO members like Turkey. 180 The potential reaction of the US 
administration was an important factor in the ESDP negotiations. Whilst it was not an 
official negotiator at the Nice IGC, the UK negotiators placed great credence in the 
policy preferences of the US. 181 The presence of US administration preferences in the 
negotiations, albeit tacitly, made the ESDP more likely to conform to a lowest 
common denominator policy. 
The `Toolbox Paper' suggested that NATO's Deputy Supreme Commander Europe 
(DSACEUR) should participate when appropriate in the EU Military Committee 
although not as a full member which met US State Department concerns. 182 Similarly, 
17$ CNN Online News Service, `NATO battles EU over defence', 14 December 2000 (0945GMT); John 
Maples MP, Debate in the House of Commons, Hansard Column 381,22 November 1999; Simon 
Tisdall, `Embryonic European Defence Force Inches Forward', The Guardian, London, 16 November 
2000. 
19 Madeline Albright, `The Right Balance will secure NATO's future' Financial Times, 7 December 
1998 
180 Stanley Sloan, `Congress and NATO enlargement', US Information Agency Electronic Journal, 
Vol. 2, No. 4, October 1997. 
181 This is because of the United States role as the senior military actor in the EU and also because of 
the day-to-day close contact with US State Department and Pentagon dealing with European security 
issues. Interview E, op. cit; Interview with Malcolm Rifkind, op. cit; Interview with Lord Robertson, 
o 
2 The Food For Thought Paper [Toolbox paper], 28 February 2000, Reproduced in Maartje Rutten, 
op. cit., pp. 102-106. The US State Department was keen to ensure that it tacitly retained an influence 
over ESDP operationally. Interview C, op. cit; Interview with Sir Timothy Garden, op. cit. 
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the paper suggested that the EU Military Staff would not act as a military 
headquarters but would 
... 
[C]o-ordinate and stimulate the development of European military capabilities, developing an 
appropriate relationship with NATO's force planning process... organise and co-ordinate operating 
procedures with national, multinational and NATO HQs available to the EU; liase with national HQs, 
European multinational force HQs and NATO. 183 
These measures moulded the ESDP to fit within the NATO paradigm. 184 However, 
the UK government's negotiators although having written the `toolbox' paper did 
make a number of concessions, notably by not specifying too closely the levels of 
capabilities expected by each contributing member government and avoiding 
formalising the relationship between ESDP and NATO. 185 The intense negotiations 
between national defence officials led to the establishment of four ad-hoc working 
groups that were established to examine capabilities and the permanent arrangements 
between the EU and NATO. 186 The ad-hoc working groups covered security issues, 
capability goals, modalities for EU access to NATO assets, and the definition of 
permanent consultation arrangements. 187 At this Council progress was made were key 
concessions to gain support of the Irish and Swedish governments for the 
agreement. '88 
To resolve the issues surrounding the capabilities dimension of the ESDP defence 
ministers met informally on 22 September 2000 at Ecouen where the `Capabilities 
la' The Food For Thought Paper, 28 February 2000, Reproduced in Maartje Rutten, op. cit., pp. 102.106. 
184 `Eurocorps to command peacekeepers in Kosovo', International Herald and Tribune, op. cit; This is 
also the view of one of the authors of the paper, Interview E and the leading FCO negotiator at Saint 
Malo and during the Saint Malo process. Interview E, op. cit; Interview G, op. cit. 
185 UK officials Interview E from the FCO and Interview F from COREPER would have liked to have 
made this link clear but could not do so within the confines of the negotiations and French government 
preferences. Interview E, op. cit; Interview F, op. cit. 
s6 European Council, Santa de Feira. 19th and 20`h June 2000, Reprinted in Maartje Rutten, pp. 120- 
139. 
'87 Ibid 
188 Section III, European Council. Santa de Feira. 19th and 20th June 2000, Reprinted in Maartje Rutten, 
pp. 120-139. Presidency Report on the ESDP. Appendix Four, Reprinted in Rutten, op. cit, Interview E, 
op. cit, who attended these negotiations as a UK government official. 
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Catalogue' was discussed. Prior to this meeting the defence ministers and chiefs of 
defence staff drafted a more complete version of the catalogue but excluded `... tasks 
of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking'. 189 The catalogue 
included four types of Petersburg operations that the EU might engage in. These were: 
1) separation by force of the belligerent parties; 2) prevention of conflicts; 3) delivery 
of humanitarian aid; and 4) evacuation of nationals. 190 The development of the 
Petersburg tasks into the four operational hypotheses provides clear evidence of 
negotiators manoeuvring to meet win-sets across the fifteen governments. This 
reappraisal of the ESDP tasks allowed the UK government to stay within its 
negotiating `red-lines' which excluded ESDP being engaged in `hard-security' 
issues. 191 The purpose of these negotiations were, therefore, to find the lowest 
common denominator positions between negotiating parties and to draft an acceptable 
agreement that took this into account. 
The defence ministers agreed that a Conference on Capability Commitment would 
take place on 20 November, 2000. At the Capabilities Conference governments 
voluntarily committed themselves to making national contributions that corresponded 
to the capabilities required for the Helsinki Headline Goals. The member governments 
confirmed that they would be able to meet the Headline Goals and went further to 
pledge a pool of 100,000 persons and approximately 400 combat aircraft and 100 
vessels. 192 The UK's contribution to the Headline Goal figures were 12,500 land 
lag Informal meeting of EU defence ministers. Ecouen. 22°d September 2000, reprinted in Maartje 
Rutten, op. cit, p. 143-146. 
190 Ibid. 
191 The UK government perceived the need to more tightly define the range of capabilities that could be 
performed by the EU under ESDP, this meant gradually writing out roles that breached UK 
preferences. Interview M, op. cit; Interview G, op. cit; Interview D, op. cit. 
9Z Capabilities Commitment Conference. Brussels 20-21 November 2000, Reprinted Rutten, op. cit., 
p. 158-163. 
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component personnel, 18 warships and 72 combat aircraft. 193 The voluntary aspect of 
the commitment was a direct consequence of an unwillingness amongst EU 
governments to advance the process and policy beyond the lowest common 
outcome. 194 Indeed, the Capabilities Conference provided an important context to the 
Nice IGC negotiations adding important details to the ESDP. Evidence from the UK 
government negotiators is that ESDP negotiations were finalised before the last few 
days of the IGC at Nice and thus avoided the somewhat frenetic negotiating reported 
from the final days negotiating at Nice. 195 
The culmination of the IGC was the European Council meeting, held at Nice 7-11 
December 2000. This dealt with institutional reforms, preparations for the 
enlargement of the EU and ESDP provisions. 196 The negotiations concerning 
institutional reform had, in the context of the pre-IGC negotiations, deliberately been 
under-discussed. 197 In contrast to ESDP which had been fully negotiated by December 
2000, institutional reform had been ignored although a considerable number of 
193 Ministry of Defence Press Release, Inter-Allied Confederation of Reserve Officers Annual Seminar, 
European Defence - The Facts and the Myths, 13 February 2001. 194 Centre for Defence Studies, `Making sense of the Helsinki Goal', King's College London, 20 
November 2001; Appendix 5, Fifteenth report from the House of Lords Select Committee on the 
European Union, Session 1999-2000, op. cit; Interview E and Interview H argued that there would 
have been significant difficulties in trying to gain agreement for compulsory commitments of military 
assets because these were viewed as impinging on core national sovereignty. Interview E, op. cit; 
Interview H, op. cit. 
195 Peter Norman, `Prodi warns of chance that Nice meeting might fail'. Financial Times, (London) 1 
December 2000, p. 11; Quentin Peel, `Britain and Spain `biggest Nice winners', Financial Times, 
London, 14 December 2000, p. 10; Robert Graham and Brian Groom, `A New Dynamic at Nice: The 
Franco-German axis at the centre of Europe's post war development is giving way to more fluid 
alliances based on industrial issues', Financial Times, (London), 12 December 2000, p. 27. 
196 Presented in Parliament by the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs by 
Command of Her Majesty, February 2000, IGC: Reform for Enlargement. The British Approach to the 
European Union Intergovernmental Conference 2000, CM4595, The Stationary Office (London), p. 4. 
197 There was however a great deal of conjecture about how the French and the Germans, in particular, 
were going to negotiate around this subject. Bulletin uotidien Europe Number 7854, 'Chirac's 
Rounds', 2 December 2000; Bulletin Ouotidien Europe. Number 7855, `Last Ministerial Conclave did 
not broach issue of weighting of votes in Council - hardening of positions over ceiling for 
Commission', Monday / Tuesday 5&6 December 2000. Bulletin Ouotidien Europe Number 7856, `Mr 
Fischer is optimistic but realistic over result of Nice Summit', 6 December 2000. 
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governmental positions were made public before the negotiations began. '98 Despite 
this many governmental negotiators came to the international negotiations without 
sufficient knowledge about the preferences of the other negotiators or where win-sets 
could be achieved. 199 The main pressure to reach agreement was the threat of the 
treaty failing through an inability to agree, providing negotiators with a choice of 
accepting an imperfect treaty or getting no agreement at all. 200 UK government 
negotiators argue that the timing of the French government's Presidency was 
fortunate in this respect, since the prospect of a treaty not being signed at Nice was 
the largest political motivation for the French government's negotiators to ensure that 
institutional reform was secured. 201 
The negotiations concerning ESDP were markedly different to those concerning 
institutional reform because ESDP clauses had been negotiated in successive forums 
from December 1998, whereas the negotiations concerning institutional reform were 
largely conducted in the last four days of the IGC. 202 As this chapter shows, much of 
the ESDP negotiations were conducted in bilateral meetings before Nice leading to 
agreement well in advance of the final reading of the `Presidency Report on ESDP' 
that was ratified at Nice. 203 The protracted negotiations and paragraph by paragraph 
intergovernmental agreement ensured the ESDP articles could find support in all 15 
198 Quentin Peel, 'Britain and Spain `biggest Nice winners', op. cit, p. 10; Leader Section, `Necessary 
deals in Nice', Financial Times, (London), 12 December 2000, p. 26; Brian Groom and Peter Norman, 
`EU Leaders draw up outline deal on treaty revisions'. Financial Times, (London), 11 December 2000, 
1. 199 
Interview H, op. cit; Interview F, op. cit. 
200 Bulletin Ouotidien Europe Number 7854, `Tight Schedule for Ministers', 2 December 2000. 
201 Interview E, op. cit; and Interview H op. cit; Alexandre Vulic argued that this was the case for the 
French government because they felt that such significant advances had been made a Saint Malo. 
Interview with Alexandre Vulic, op. cit. 
202 Interview H, Interview E, Interview F and Interview M all argued that the UK government had such 
strong defence related preferences that to avoid policy entrepreneurship principally from the French 
government but also from other governments like the Irish and Swedish governments. Interview H, 
op. cit; Interview F, op. cit; Interview E, op. cit; Interview M, op. cit Z3 As Footnote 201. 
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member states. As a result the Presidency report was agreed on the first day of the 
Nice IGC (7 December 2000) without any further negotiations. 204 
One of the main areas of contention in ESDP negotiations was the relationship 
between the EUMC and NATO. Three issues dominated this debate: first, whether 
NATO has the right of first refusal on crises; second, how far the EU could act 
autonomously with NATO assets; and third, the extent to which the EU should build 
its own military planning institutions or use NATO facilities. None of these issues 
were conclusively resolved during negotiations. 05 The operational provisions 
negotiated at Nice established a close working relationship between the EU and 
NATO. 206 For example, one provision establishes extensive meetings at the PSC / 
NAC level and between NATO and EUMC biannually whilst another states that in a 
time of possible deployment liaisons between the EU and NATO would be 
increased. 207 
The negotiations clarified the autonomous capability of the EU and access for EU 
governments to pre-identified NATO assets. 208 Whilst the creation of an autonomous 
EU capability seems radical, the lack of military planning facilities or assets means 
that the EU is unable to act without NATO's assistance. UK officials would have 
preferred to have formalised NATO as the institution of first choice for all EU 
204 Both Interview H and Interview F noted that ESDP provisions were the first to be signed and that 
this reflected the advanced state of completion resulting from the number of bilateral meetings between 
UK officials and other EU government officials. Interview H, op. cit; Interview F, op. cit; 
205 Interview H, op. cit; Interview F, op. cit; 
206 Nice Treaty. `Presidency Conclusions on the ESDP'. Reproduced in Maartje Rutten, op. cit. p. 168. 
207 Presidency Report on the ESDP. Annex VII. Part II, Reproduced in Maartje Rutten, op. cit, p. 174. 
Closer working provisions also included creating ad hoc EU / NATO working groups on capabilities 
issues and less regular groups focussing on particular areas of expertise. NATO representatives are also 
invited to meetings of Defence Ministers. Regularised contacts between the secretaries-general, 
Secretariats and Military Staffs of the EU and NATO and exchanges of information are also planned. 
208 Nice Treaty. `Presidency Conclusions on the ESDP', Reproduced in Maartje Rutten, op. cit. p. 168. 
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security issues. 209 Richard Hatfield said, in evidence to the House of Commons Select 
Committee on Defence, 
The key thing that is autonomous is the ability to take political decisions. The only independent input 
that the EU will have in terms of machinery is a small-ish military staff, about the same size the WEU 
had which has been abolished, which can frame the questions that will be sent off to the NATO 
planning staffs for preparing options for them to consider. Beyond that, it will depend on drawing on 
capabilities either from NATO or from the EU nations, so there will not be anything else independent 
being created for the EU as such. 210 
The British emphasis on the EU developing closer relations with NATO is indicated 
by the amount of detail devoted to the subject in the Annexes of the Presidency 
Report on ESDP. 211 The Annexes outline the procedure to be followed when the PSC 
consults the EUMS with a view to determining whether military options should be 
produced and how the EU then consults with NATO's planning capabilities. 12 
Leading on from this the automatic right of access to NATO capabilities was fiercely 
negotiated outside of the confines of the IGC. 213 The Turkish government, as a non- 
EU NATO member, raised considerable objections to the provision of an automatic 
right of access to NATO assets. Turkish officials argued that non-EU NATO 
members would be excluded from the decision making process on the range and 
209 See Footnote 185. 
210 Quoted in Mark Oakes, European Security and Defence Policy: Nice and Beyond, House of 
Commons Research Paper 01/50, The Stationery Office, (London), 2 May 2001 
211 Presidency Report on the ESDP. reproduced in Maartje Rutten, op. cit., pp. 168-209. 
212 In this instance the following procedures would be followed: On the recommendations of the 
EUMC assisted by the EUMS, the PSC will send the designated operation commander, via the EUMC, 
strategic directives enabling him to draw up the necessary planning documents for the operation, 
making use of the guaranteed access to NATO planning capabilities. These plans will then be 
submitted to the PSC for approval. Experts from the two organisations, in liaison with DSACEUR as 
strategic co-ordinator will meet to specify the predetermined NATO assets and capabilities concerned 
with this option. Once the assets and capabilities to be used in the operation are specified, the EU will 
forward a request to NATO. The hand-over of predetermined assets and capabilities used in the EU 
operation together with the arrangements for making them available and any recall conditions will be 
identified at a PSC / NAC meeting. Throughout the operation the Alliance will be kept informed of the 
use of NATO assets and capabilities, if necessary by convening a meeting of the PSC and NAC. The 
commander of the operation will be invited to the EUMC meetings to report on the progress of the 
operation The Presidency may invite him to attend meetings of the PSC and GAC. Having first 
informed the NAC, the PSC will propose to the Council that operation be terminated. The EU will 
terminate the use of NATO assets and capabilities. Mark Oakes. European Security and Defence 
Policy, op. cit. 
213 Robert Hunter, The European Security and Defense Policy: NATO's companion or competitor 
RAND, New York, 2002, p. 73. 
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scope of any operations involving NATO assets. 214 They were also concerned that the 
EU might use NATO assets to act in the Eastern Mediterranean area. 215 British and 
American negotiators concluded an agreement with Turkey on 16 December 2001 
that provided guarantees over the geographical scope of EU operations and also gave 
Turkey the right to be consulted, but not to veto operations. 216 George Robertson 
invested a great deal of his own time, as NATO's General Secretary, on this issue in 
bilateral meetings with the Turkish Prime Minister persuading the PM and his 
officials that this would not compromise Turkish national security. 217 
The Nice Treaty modified the CFSP sections in the Amsterdam Treaty and added 
annexes relating to the ESDP. The Presidency Conclusions stated that the result of the 
Saint Malo initiative was: 
To give the European Union the means of playing its role fully on the international stage and of 
assuming its responsibilities in the face of crises by adding to the range of instruments already at its 
disposal an autonomous capacity to take decisions and action in the security and defence field. 218 
The practical implications of the Nice Treaty were to subsume the WEU and its 
defence competencies into the EU . 
219 The amalgamation of WEU functions into the 
EU has created new institutions. These are the Political Security Committee (PSC)220, 
214 Ibid, p. 113. 
215 Nice European Council, Presidency Conclusions. December 7-9,2000, Annex VI, On the European 
Security and Defence Policy, I. Establishment of Permanent Political and Military Structures, 
'EU/NATO Relations in Times of Crisis (A) (B), reproduced in Maartje Rutten, op. cit, p. 164. 
216 Douglas Hamilton, 'US to Turkey, Don't Let EU-NATO deal collapse', op. cit; Jitandra Joshi, 
`NATO, EU ink peacekeeping pact', Agence France Presse, Paris, 17 December 2002. 217 Interview with Lord Robertson, op. cit. 218 Annex VI of the Nice Treaty. Presidency Report on the European Security and Defence Policy, 
reproduced in Maartje Rutten, op. cit, p. 168. 
Z' Title V, Provision of a Common Foreign and Security Policy in Article 17 of the Nice Treaty 
replacing Article 17 of The Amsterdam Treaty. 22 The PSC is the lead institution in decision making on CFSP and ESDP. The PSC also acts as a crisis 
monitoring and crisis management organisation. In practice this means that the PSC will keep track of 
the General Affairs Council, provide guidelines to departments and committees with interests that 
spread into the CFSP and ESDP sphere and also deals with crisis situations. In crisis situations the PSC 
is able to take soundings and exercise 'political control and strategic direction of the EU's military 
response to the crisis' meaning that the PSC has overall political authority. The PSC will also evaluate 
the opinions and recommendations of the Military Committee specifically the strategic military 
options, chain of command, operational concepts and plans that will be submitted to the Council. If a 
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the EUMC and the EUMS221 In addition to new institutions the negotiations codified 
the pledge at the Helsinki Council to develop an EU military force of up to 60,000 
troops able to be deployed within 60 days and for up to a year conducting a large 
number of tasks ranging from peace-keeping to peace-making. 222 
Enhanced co-operation was included into Article 27(a-e) of the Nice Treaty. These 
provisions describe how enhanced co-operation can be used in relation to ESDP223 
Enhanced co-operation allows groups of states the right to carry out a policy without 
the consensus of all EU governments. A majority of governments had to be in favour 
of an initiative under the Treaty of Amsterdam Whilst Article 24 modifications at Nice 
means that only eight member governments have to be in favour of an initiative. 224 
Before the enlargement of the EU to 25 governments, a majority of nations will still 
need to be in favour of an initiative for it to become an EU policy. After enlargement 
less than a simple majority of governments need to support the initiative, thus only a 
third of EU governments will be required to support a proposal under enhanced co- 
crisis were to occur the Secretary General or High Representative would chair the PSC. The Nice 
Treaty lays out that to maintain full control over a military-crisis situation, a procedure is followed: the 
PSC would send a recommendation to Council based on the opinion of the Military Committee. The 
Council might then decide to launch a military operation within the framework of a joint action. The 
joint action would contain a clause defining the role of the High Representative / Secretary-General. 
Once the operation had begun the Council would be kept informed through PSC reports presented by 
the High Representative or Secretary-General in their capacity as Chairman of the PSC. 
221 EUMC is the highest military institution within the EU. It is staffed by the Chiefs of Defence 
(CHODs) and represented daily by their military representatives. (MILREPS). The EUMC exercises 
military direction of all military activities within the EU framework. The EUMC provides military 
advice and recommended courses of action to the PSC on military matters within the EU when 
requested. The EUMC also works on military doctrine and costings for all military operations within 
the EU's remit. "Upon the PSCs request it issues an Initiating Directive to the Director General of the 
EUMS to draw up and present strategic military options. It evaluates the strategic military options 
developed by EUMS and forwards them to the PSC together with its evaluation and military advice. On 
the basis of the military option selected by the Council it authorises an Initial Planning Directive for the 
Operation Commander. Based on the EUMS evaluation, it provides advice and recommendations to the 
PSC: - on the Concept of Operations (CONOPS) developed by the Operation Commander on the draft 
Operation Plan (OPLAN) drawn up by the Operation Commander. It gives advice to the PSC on the 
termination option for an operation. " Presidency Report on the ESDP, Annex IV. Presidency Report on 
the ESDP, Part II. 
222 Presidency Report on the ESDP. Part I, Reproduced in Maartje Rutten, op. cit, p. 176 
223 Article 27a, Title V, Provision on a Common Foreign and Security of the Nice Treaty, Annex C. 
224 Article 24, Treaty of Amsterdam 1997 & Article 24, Treaty of Nice, 2001, Annex C. 
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operation. This will have potential impacts on the ESDP and could allow ad-hoc 
coalitions of governments to advance integration against UK government preferences. 
The French Foreign Minister attributed the success of ESDP negotiations to `... the 
EU's political will and the will to gather all the military and civilian capabilities 
necessary to ensure the credibility of the defence policy. i225 This only partly addresses 
the question of whether ESDP negotiations produced lowest common denominator 
outputs. LI advances the argument that negotiations are guided by the principle of 
unanimity and thus to gain agreement across fifteen governments for an issue area 
there must necessarily be a convergence of core interests and agreement to exclude 
aspects of proposed policies that fall outside of some negotiating parties acceptable 
limits - hence negotiated outputs will always be lowest common denominator 
agreements. In the case of ESDP negotiations the evidence shows that there are four 
governments who had intense issue specific preferences namely, the UK, French, 
German, and Swedish governments. The remaining governments, whilst playing a full 
role in negotiations, did not possess the same range and depth of institutional red-lines 
on ESDP that provided greater latitude for the four governments with intense 
preferences to negotiate. As a result this section has argued that EU intergovernmental 
negotiations can be a positive sum-game, something that LI implicitly rejects with the 
prescription that outputs are lowest common denominator agreements. The ESDP 
case study provides considerable evidence that governments are more sophisticated in 
the way they select issues on which they feel core issues of sovereignty, autonomy 
and key policy interests are affected. In addition, by identifying governments with 
intense issue specific preferences lowest common denominator agreements can be 
struck with those governments, creating a positive sum output. 
22$ Bulletin Quotidien Europe Number 7855. `Council Approves Report on ESDP for Summit', op. cit. 
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The EU is an international regime for national policy co-ordination. 
LI advances the argument that the EU is an international regime for national policy 
co-ordination. 26 LI's analysis states that governments are the principal actors in 
international negotiations, as a result of the pre-eminence of intergovernmental 
bargaining, thus leading to the argument that the EU's institutions are merely co- 
ordinating and regulating institutions. 27 The ECJ and Commission's outputs in terms 
of legal judgments and regulations and directives are cited as counter-factual 
arguments to this view. The ECJ, in certain key judicial decisions, has extended the 
policy remit of the EU beyond the point where the EU co-ordinates domestic policies 
determined by member governments. The `Factortame' series of cases both in the 
House of Lords and the ECJ extended the judicial principle established in the so- 
called `Costa' (1967) case that the ECJ was the superior court to the UK's House of 
Lords. 228 The importance of these examples are central to the debate about what is the 
European Union. LI's view of the EU, is that it is a regime for coordinating and 
regulating the transfer of fifteen governments' sovereignty, reducing transaction costs 
and preserving governmental sovereignty on an issue specific area. 
The federalist view of the EU is that it provides a higher form of government than 
national governments and thus on policies in which it has competencies it behaves as 
a replacement for national governments. LI's view of the role of a government in the 
international system is to consider the institutional framework of the EU as a way of 
coordinating government policies, which LI views as sovereign. Security and defence 
226 Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe, op. cit., p. 20-1 
227 Ibid, p. 19-21 
228 Factortame vs Regina (ex parte Secretary of State for Agriculture, Fisheries and Food), All England 
Law Reviews (1990-2001) 
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are areas of core national sovereignty - the importance of the ESDP case study is 
partly in its symbolism as an area in which many commentators argued competency 
would remain outside of EU frameworks. 
The ESDP negotiations and treaty articles provide strong evidence of the EU as a co- 
ordinating forum for domestic policies. The tight constraints on the direction of ESDP 
through negotiations by the UK and three other governments partly explains why the 
EU is limited as an actor in the case of ESDP. To ensure parliamentary ratification 
would be forthcoming after the negotiations had concluded, UK government 
negotiators judged that they had to ensure that any operational element of ESDP 
remained under the control of governments rather than providing the EU with the 
ability to take decisions under delegated authority. 229 In the example of ESDP the EU 
has been used as a means by which to coordinate national policies without the need to 
recourse to individual bilateral agreements, which would bring considerable 
transaction costs. The ESDP negotiations provided UK officials with a forum and 
framework for advancing their preferences for enhanced co-operation on security and 
defence within the EU. The framework provided by the EU allowed UK officials to 
advance an agenda of security preferences that provided for the transfer of modest 
amounts of sovereignty to the EU on security and defence. This would be a transfer 
that did not undermine the EU's NATO maintained security provision. ESDP 
established an innovative way of using NATO capabilities when the Alliance as a 
whole is not involved in the proposed military action. The informal ESDP 
229 This was never really a danger in ESDP negotiations as the issues as had been thoroughly rehearsed 
through all the intervening summits between Saint Malo and the European Council at Nice. Interview 
H argued that the only danger of supranational control being suggested came from the French 
government trying to exert control over negotiations, however he argues that the UK government 
would have threatened the other negotiators that they would not sign the treaty articles if this had been 
seriously proposed. Interview H, op. cit; Interview D, op. cit; Interview E, op. cit; Interview F, op. cit; 
Interview G, op. cit. 
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negotiations before the Nice European Council therefore supports LI's analysis of the 
EU as a co-ordinating institution. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has advanced the argument that LI's explanation of the ESDP 
negotiations at the Nice IGC is very strong. The fundamental tenets of the theory are 
validated by this case study. UK government negotiators bargained rationally to try 
and maximise the benefits to the UK's national interest which was defined by the PM 
and the core executive. Negotiations concerning ESDP were not explicitly linked to 
other issues being negotiated at the Nice IGC. However, there was evidence of a very 
close co-ordination of UK negotiators across all the issue areas - COREPER and the 
European Secretariat of the Cabinet Office kept a close and evolving note of all the 
negotiations as they progressed. This gave these co-ordinating institutions a broad 
view of the negotiations which allowed them to suggest areas in which concessions 
could be demanded or given as necessary. Many of the interviewees for this thesis 
argued that this gave the UK government negotiators a slight advantage over their 
fellow negotiators, and that the UK government was exceptionally well co-ordinated. 
In essence, LI's core assumptions about issue linkage in negotiations has been 
validated by this case study: the system of co-ordinating issue specific negotiations 
did nothing to affect the validity of the assumptions. 
Within the analysis of the seven hypotheses derived from LI this thesis further argued 
that the assessment of which domestic win-sets could be achieved did not result in the 
different issues at the IGC (like voting rights in the Council and numbers of MEPs) 
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being linked to ESDP negotiations. The crucial issue for negotiators was how strongly 
committed the government was to the ESDP policy within the iterative parameters 
they perceived from domestic `win-set' providers like Parliament and interest groups 
and the armed forces. Moreover, post-agreement ratification in Parliament and 
securing domestic political support from interest groups are too simplistic to explain 
negotiating behaviour in IGCs. The assumptions made by negotiations about domestic 
political support for a measure provides the context in which negotiators can propose 
any changes to the proposals or make concessions to other negotiators. By this 
rationale the government's large House of Commons majority should have afforded it 
a great deal of negotiating latitude and win-set on ESDP because even with a large 
rebellion from Labour MPs the bill ratifying the Nice Treaty would have been won. 
The evidence from officials and negotiators involved in the development and 
negotiation of ESDP was, however, that the Prime Minister and his core officials took 
particular care to control and manage the development of ESDP from the Saint Malo 
Accords in December 1998. For example, they authored the `Toolbox Paper' 
presented at Sintra in February 2000 and demanded that the `Capabilities Catalogue' 
was given renewed prominence ten days before the Nice IGC. 
UK government negotiators argued that the government's strong preference on ESDP 
produced an identifiable pattern of behaviour. The UK government decided to use the 
considerable political leverage it possessed through military and economic strength to 
frame the ESDP debate and drive the policy towards the intergovernmental 
negotiations at Nice. This was particularly true in the example of the Sintra `Toolbox 
Paper' and the bilateral meetings between the Policy Directors of the FCO and MoD 
Emyr Jones-Parry, Richard Hatfield and their respective opposite numbers in fellow 
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EU governments. 230 This behaviour demonstrates that domestic win-sets are not 
solely determined by Parliamentary majority, which would have given the 
government considerable negotiating latitude. Domestic win-sets were therefore built 
from a complex picture of perceived agreements from the armed forces, the media, a 
notion of public opinion, and a similarly iterative sense of what is in the UK's 
national interest. 
An important element from these negotiations is that there was a point before the final 
agreement of the Treaty where the PM and his close advisors had to make a decision 
about whether the outcome would meet a domestic win-set. However, they did not 
just discuss this once, it was part of a continual iterative discourse in the negotiating 
team about whether proposals would achieve domestic or intergovernmental win-sets. 
This chapter has argued that the government's negotiators controlled the development 
of ESDP to ensure that the policy reflected core UK preferences and provided the 
largest win-set possible on a policy issue on which the Labour government was wary 
for historical reasons. UK negotiators were able to manage and strongly influence 
ESDP negotiations through authoring key positioning papers and in the number of 
bilateral negotiations they held with fellow EU government officials. Indeed, this 
chapter advances the argument that the vast majority of ESDP negotiations occurred 
outside of formal EU frameworks, including the Saint Malo Accords in December 
1998. The large number of bilateral negotiations between UK negotiations and other 
EU government negotiators developed ESDP to a largely completed stage by the 
European Council at Nice. 
230 Interview D, op. cit; Interview G, op. cit; Interview E, op. cit. 
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Positive externalities were the main motivation within the ESDP negotiations. LI 
makes the hypothesis that positive externalities and the fear of not reaching an 
agreement are the principle motivations within the bargaining. 23 1 This chapter found 
that the fear of not reaching an agreement was a dynamic of the negotiations rather 
than the primary motivation. Furthermore, this chapter has advanced the argument 
that enhanced co-operation between the French and UK governments in December 
1998 at Saint Malo and subsequent bilateral negotiations outside the formal IGC 
framework this brought the bargaining beyond a point where a fear of failure 
prevailed to a discussion about how the policy would operate and whether it would 
have full capabilities. 
In summary, this chapter has critically evaluated LI's explanation of international 
bargaining and particularly seven hypotheses derived from LI. This chapter 
conclusively found that governments are the principal actors in European 
negotiations. It found that the European Parliament and European Commission did not 
play an advanced role in ESDP negotiations. European Parliament observers were 
effectively excluded from the negotiations because the vast majority of the ESDP 
outcome had been resolved in bilateral negotiations outside of formal IGC 
frameworks. The European Commission voluntarily decided to withhold its influence 
from negotiations because of the role it perceives it plays in EU military affairs. 
This chapter has presented strong evidence that governments act as `gatekeepers' 
between domestic political actors and pressures and the other EU negotiators. 
Evidence of this came from the weak link between negotiators and domestic 
231 Andrew Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe, op. cit, p. 64. 
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parliamentarians and other interest groups and also by the effective exclusion of the 
European Parliament and European Commission from the negotiations. Furthermore, 
governments who had intense issue specific preferences and capabilities were the 
influential actors in the negotiations. In ESDP bargaining these included the UK, 
French and German governments and the effectiveness of international co-operation 
and these negotiations resulted from preference convergence. Less influential 
governments were able to add policies to ESDP through offering their conditional 
support for the policies. These governments including the Swedish and Danish 
government had less intense preferences and therefore could offer agreement more 
easily than UK, French and German governments. This meant that the negotiated 
outcome was not the product of preference convergence across the fifteen EU 
governments but convergence amongst governments with intense preferences and 
acquiescence from governments with less intense preferences. In ESDP negotiations 
the EU was a co-ordinating forum for national policies reducing transaction costs 
between governments rather than extending an EU political system. On balance this 
chapter has concluded that LI's explanation of international bargaining has been 
validated by ESDP negotiations and shows LI to be a very effective theoretical 
framework through which to explore European negotiations. 
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Chapter Five 
Why Governments Transfer Sovereignty 
187 
This chapter critically evaluates LI's explanation of why the UK government made the 
decision to transfer defence and security to the EU under ESDP. This final element of LI. 
is the motivational aspect concerning why governments seek collaborative policy 
solutions rather than persisting with unilateral policy solutions. 
LI and competing explanations of sovereignty transfer are explored in the first section of 
this chapter. It will then analyse institutional choices and the distribution of benefits 
amongst member governments transferring sovereignty. Furthermore, this chapter 
examines whether the EU constitutes a co-ordinating forum for governmental preferences 
and analyses the balances of power inherent in the EU, especially between the UK, 
French and German governments. 
This chapter advances the argument that LI effectively explains the motivations behind 
the UK government's decision to transfer elements of its defence and security sovereignty 
to the EU. Specifically, it argues that the decision to transfer sovereignty is conditional on 
the outcome being Pareto-efficient, namely that the collective policy holds greater 
benefits for the government than continuing to pursue a unilateral policy. ' In the ESDP 
case study, a key motivation was to improve the EU's defence capabilities through co- 
ordination and a streamlining of capabilities and command structures. Further, that 
transferring sovereignty to the EU helped the UK government to negate the `anarchy' 
problem of fellow EU governments' preferences taking EU security structures in a 
I See chapter four, page 126 for an explanation of Pareto efficiency. 
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direction that would not meet UK defence preferences. 2 The co-ordination of defence and 
security policy through the EU, in a policy that met core UK government redlines, 
effectively locked other EU governments into UK preferences. The transfer of 
governmental sovereignty to the EU adds credibility to the Saint Malo initiative and 
similarly reduces the future transaction costs of developing pan-European collaborative 
defence ventures. Transferring defence sovereignty is therefore an efficient way for UK 
preferences to be expressed and realised. Moreover, as LI argues, the decision to transfer 
sovereignty is a deliberate one. The transfer of defence sovereignty to the EU was not the 
product of institutional spillover but was a managed process by the government who had 
rationally concluded that the collaborative ESDP was in the UK's national interests. 
LI's Explanation of Sovereignty Transfer and Leading Contenders 
LI argues that European integration and the EU serve as policy tools to overcome 
constitutional bars to binding one legislature to an external legislature. Moreover, LI 
contends that these institutional arrangements enable controls to be placed to regulate a 
transfer of sovereignty and monitor governments' defections once the transfer of 
sovereignty has occurred. This analysis has been explored in great depth by Simon Hix 
and Alberta Sbragia who argue that the EU is a political system in its own right exerting a 
governmental role over and above that of national governments, a position that is 
radically different from LI's explanation of the integration project. 4 
2 See chapter four, page 147 for the UK government's fear of fellow EU governments proposing this policy 
first. 
3 Andrew Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe, op. cit, pp. 3-4. 
4 Simon Hix, `Explaining the EU political system' in Simon Hix, The Political System of the EU, 
Macmillan (Basingstoke), 1999, p. 1-17; Alberta Sbragia, `Thinking about the European Future, the uses of 
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Competing explanations of sovereignty transfer highlight the benefits governments can 
derive in terms of securing credible commitments from other governments towards 
collective policy areas .5 
Moreover, they suggest that intergovernmental bargains are 
merely one aspect of an issue and lead to closer co-operation across the full range of 
competencies within that specific issue area. Furthermore, they contend that integration 
on one issue leads to a wider culture of co-operation and collaboration across the full 
remit of EU policy competencies. 6 
There are other factors, identified in the literature, that inform the analysis of why 
governments decide to delegate sovereignty to the EU. The argument that issue specific 
vulnerability drives the degree to which governments are prepared to delegate sovereignty 
is a key concept employed within this chapter. The smaller governments of the EU are 
dependent on the financial strength and political credibility of the larger EU governments 
like the UK, France and Germany. These smaller governments seek to cement influence, 
and thus secure their domestic preferences, over these larger countries through 
collaborative policies managed within EU institutions. ' The disadvantages smaller 
comparison', in Alberta Sbragia (ed) Europolitics" Institutions and Policy Making in the New European 
Community, op. cit, p258 & 291. 
s David Allen, `Conclusions: The European Rescue of National Foreign Policy', in Christopher Hill (Ed. ), 
The Actors in Europe's Foreign Policy, Routledge, (London) 1996, pp. 288-304, p. 290; Philip Gordon, 
`Europe's Uncommon Foreign Policy', International Security Vol. 22, No. 3,1997, pp. 74-100; Reinhard 
Rummel, Wolfgang Wessels, `Federal Republic of Germany: New Responsibilities, Old Constraints', in 
Christopher Hill (Ed. ): National Foreign Policies and European Political Cooperation, Allen & Unwin, 
London), 1983, pp. 34-55, p. 34. 
Giandomernico Majone, `Democracy and Constitutionalism in the EU', European Consortium for 
Political Research (ECPR) Paper, European Union Studies Association, Vol. 13, No. 2, Spring 2000, pp. 2-7, 
p. 2. Andrew Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe, op. cit, p. 475; Martin Walker, `Join Europe - and shrink', 
United Press International, (Washington), 9 April 2004; The Economist Global Agenda, `The EU 
Constitution, Revived to Die Another Day? ', The Economist, (London), 26 March 2004; Heather Grabbe 
and Ulrike Guerot, `Could a hard core run the enlarged EU? ', Centre for European Reform Briefing Notes, 
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governments feel in terms of size, lack of influence and inability to effectively formulate 
political coalitions within the EU leads these governments to be more prepared to transfer 
elements of their sovereignty to EU institutions. 
In Ben Tonra's study of the conduct within the CFSP he argues that smaller states benefit 
considerably from working with larger states: `Minor states usually lack significant 
intelligence or espionage capabilities and, as a general rule, have smaller diplomatic staffs 
from which to gather and analyse data'. 8 Similarly, Moravcsik draws a comparison 
between the effectiveness of domestic foreign policy capacity and governmental 
preferences on foreign policy co-operation. 9 As a consequence LI argues that 
`.. geopolitical concerns would dominate [.... ] positions [... ] in those areas without clear 
and certain economic implications, such as [... ] foreign policy cooperation'. 10 The 
evidence of chapter three suggested that the UK government's decision to become a 
policy entrepreneur on ESDP was partly a consequence of geopolitical and strategic 
circumstances that aimed to maximise British influence at the `heart of Europe'. " 
LI argues that a government's capacity to act unilaterally is conditional on its position 
within the existing balances of power. 12 Institutionally and militarily capable 
governments have a larger capacity for an effective unilateral foreign policy than those 
governments without these capabilities. From a neo-realist perspective, a government's 
Centre for European Reform, (London), February 2004. 
8 Ben Tonra, 'The Impact of Political Cooperation', in Knud Jorgensen (Ed. ), Reflective Approaches to 
European Governance, Macmillan, (Basingstoke) 1997, pp. 181-198, p. 183. 
9 Andrew Moravcsik & Kalypso Nicolaidis, `The Treaty of Amsterdam', op. cit., p. 64. 
10 Andrew Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe, op. cit p. 402. 
II See Chapter Three, page 69-70. 
12 Andrew Morvacsik & Kalypso Nicolaidis, `The Treaty of Amsterdam', op. cit., p. 64. 
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power position within the EU is a product of two factors, first, the number of highly 
influential governments in the EU, termed polarity and secondly, the governments' share 
of key material resources. 13 These factors weigh heavily on the strategic direction of a 
government's foreign policy. Neo-realist scholar Stephen Krasner argues that, 
The behaviour of individual states, regardless of their domestic political characteristics, is constrained by 
their own capabilities and the distribution of power in the system as a whole (... ). The external environment 
will inevitably pressure states to move toward congruity between commitments and capabilities14 
The UK government was able to exert influence on the development and negotiations of 
ESDP because, relative to other EU governments, the UK has extensive military 
capabilities and a senior position within NATO and the UN. 15 The extent to which the 
UK government is an authorative voice on security affairs in the EU provides it with a 
freedom and flexibility in negotiating positions that other EU governments do not share. 
The added negotiating flexibility of the UK government was also the result of the 
additional human resources deployed by the government in co-ordinating the UK's 
negotiating approach towards ESDP across the Cabinet Office, MoD and FCO. 16 UK 
officials also tried to co-ordinate the bargaining positions of the other respective 
governments during the negotiations, through holding many bi-lateral liaison meetings. '7 
The deployment of additional diplomatic resources to policy co-ordination allowed UK 
officials to strongly influence the path and progress of the ESDP negotiations. 18 
13 Stephen Krasner, `Power, Polarity, and the Challenge of Disintegration', in Helga Haftendom, Christian 
Tuschoff (Eds. ), America and Europe in an Era of Change, Boulder, (Westview), 1993, pp. 21-42. 
14 Stephen Krasner, 'Power, Polarity, and the Challenge of Disintegration', op. cit, p. 21. 
15 Nicola Butler, 'UK White Papers on Defence and Foreign Policy', Disarmament Diplomach, Issue 
Number 75, January 2004. 
16 Interview E highlighted the additional diplomatic resources, particularly Officials time, that went into 
ESDP negotiations. Interview M argued that this was standard practice where issues might become part of 
the bargaining at a European Council. Interview E, op. cit; Interview M, op. cit. 
17 Ibid. 
18 It might be expected that UK officials involved in the Nice European Council, like Interview H and 
Interview F, would argue that they had considerable influence on the direction of ESDP negotiations. 
However, there is strong textual evidence from examining the Saint Malo Accords and Presidency 
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Neo-realism, for example, regards a government's share of certain capabilities as decisive 
for its position within the balance of power in the EU. These capabilities are seen as 
transferable, and are able to be used in policy areas unrelated to their nature, and that 
whether a particular capability contributes to a government's power depends on its 
utility. 19 Economic strength (size of economy and GDP) is an important governmental 
capability in the EU. Countries with strong economies can be expected to possess a high 
level of technology that may be used, transferably, for military purposes as well as private 
industry. In the case of ESDP, the salient capabilities were military assets, financial 
capabilities, institutional affiliation and roles within these institutions and influence over 
the foreign and security policy of other member governments. In ESDP bargaining the 
UK government's military strength was a compelling reason why the UK was seen to be a 
leading government in this process 2° In the military and security spheres the UK 
government had considerable scope within existing preferences to innovate, because of its 
position with the EU and European security structures. 21 
Britain's membership of, and position within, relevant institutions like the UN, NATO 
and G7 adds to the UK's position within the international system. To be excluded from 
Conclusions from Nice that the initial proposal was largely unchanged throughout the entire negotiating 
period which strongly indicates that the UK government's position was strong. 
19 Kenneth Waltz, 'Reflections on Theory of International Politics. A Response to My Critics', in Robert 
Keohane (Ed. ), Neorealism and Its Critics, Columbia University Press, (New York), 1986, pp. 322-345, 
333 
All the UK based interviewees for this thesis argued that Britain's military strength was a compelling reason 
why it was able to lead on ESDP. Notably though Charles Grant argued that Blair's strongly pro-European views 
assisted in making this case in Europe and Timothy Garden and William Hopkinson added that the UK's 
prominent roles in NATO and the UN further assisted this position. Interview with Charles Grant, op. cit; 
Interview with William Hopkinson, op. cit; Interview with Sir Timothy Garden, op. cit. 
21 The principle ESDP negotiating team argue that they had considerable room to manoeuvre in comparison 
to some of their fellow negotiators because of the UK's prominent position as a leading defence actor in 
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these international institutions diminishes a government's opportunity to influence 
international responses to events. 2 The UK government is particularly privileged in 
holding a veto power in the UN Security Council, a large number of European Parliament 
seats and EU Council votes as well as enjoying an enhanced and privileged access to 
American officials in the Whitehouse, State Department, Pentagon and in the CIA23. This 
privileged access to US policy makers and policy shapers allowed the UK to be the 
conduit between the US and the EU and helped to place the UK as the pre-eminent 
authority within the development of the ESDP, although Michael Noonan argued that the 
US State Department and Pentagon's support for this initiative was conditional on ESDP 
not using NATO funds for replicated functions. 24 
Realist scholars have referred to the influence of `national morale', `quality of diplomacy' 
as well as `prestige' in international relations. 25 Joseph Nye refers to these factors as the 
Europe but were confined by self-imposed red-line constraints. Interview H, op. cit; Interview F, op. cit; 
Interview G, op. cit. 
22 Exclusion from leading international institutions like the UN may indicate or lead to a severe 
marginalisation of a government in the international system. 
23 Former Secretaries of State for Defence Robertson and Rifkind argued strongly that the close day-to-day 
relationship between British and American officials in the State Department and Pentagon gave the British 
government a key advantage over fellow European governments in dealing with defence and security issues. 
Riflcind gave an example of how this contact helped secure British purchases of American cruise missiles. 
From an officials perspective William Hopkinson said that the American view was always considered very 
favourably by British officials whilst Paul Johnston noted that his interaction with US officials revolved 
around explaining UK positions and reassuring American officials about intended actions. John Allen 
Williams, Chair of the Academic Advisory Council of the National Strategy Forum and senior academic 
commentator, argued that the `privileged relationship' is very real and serves to advance an Anglo-Saxon 
security perspective. Interview with Lord Robertson, op. cit; Interview with Sir Malcolm Rifkind, op. cit; 
Interview with William Hopkinson, op. cit; Interview E, op. cit.; Correspondence from Professor John Allen 
Williams, `Note for Rob Dover', 19 April 2004. 
24 This view was very firmly held by Lord Robertson, Malcolm Rifkind and Bruce George. A softened 
version of this view was held by FCO and Cabinet Office officials who have a more EU based brief. 
Interview with Lord Robertson, op. cit; Interview with Sir Malcolm Rifkind, op. cit; Interview with Bruce 
George, op. cit; Interview M, op. cit; Interview A, op. cit. Correspondence from John Allen Williams, op. cit. 
Correspondence with Michael Noonan, 'ESDP', 19 April 2004. Michael Noonan is the Deputy Director of 
the Foreign Policy Research Institute, Philadelphia and has previously worked in the Pentagon. 
25 Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics, Cambridge University Press, (Cambridge)1981, p. 13 
& 30. 
194 
`second face of power' 26 According to Nye a government's indirect influence is based on 
the `... attraction of (their) ideas or on the ability to set the political agenda in a way that 
shapes the preferences that others express'. 27 Indirect influence is more difficult to 
measure than direct influence but evidence suggests that Britain's unique experience and 
capabilities in defence and security policy, as well as economic power, links with key 
American government departments and prestigious military history meant that Britain 
was able to shape the pre Saint Malo debate and then the formulation of the ESDP 
provisions. 28 
LI conceptualises the EU as a policy framework for the pursuit of national governments' 
policy preferences. 29 Locating defence and security policy preferences within the EU 
brings about `costs', namely constraints on government's autonomy. By inference, the EU 
will continue to retain and expand its competencies only where it provides more 
`benefits' than 'costs' to rational treaty-negotiating member governments seeking, in 
Moravcsik's term, `Pareto-efficient bargains'. 0 The nature of these benefits range across 
26 Joseph Nye, Bound to Lead, Basic Books (New York), 1990, p. 29. 
27 Joseph Nye, Bound to Lead, op. cit., p. 31. 
28 Nye is unable to relate directly to the Saint Malo initiative due to `Bound to Lead' having been published 
eight years before the Saint Malo Accords were signed. However, his point about indirect influence is 
relevant. Interview C, Lord Robertson and Malcolm Riflcind all argued that Britain's' military history, 
economic power and international influence assisted UK officials in shaping the Saint Malo debate with no 
significant dissent amongst any of the other interviewees. Joseph Nye, Bound to Lead, op. cit, p. 32. 
Interview C, op. cit; Interview with Lord Robertson, op. cit; Interview with Sir Malcolm Rifkind, op. cit. 
29 Andrew Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe, op. cit, p. 8 
30 Andrew Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe, op. cit, p. 482; Roy Ginsberg, Forei ng Policy Actions of the 
European Community: The Politics of Scale, Lynne Rienner, (Colorado), 1989, p. 2; A large amount of 
research on EU external relations have been conducted through rationalist paradigms. Only recently have 
there been a handful of constructivist studies on CFSP(cf., among others Knud Jorgensen, `PoCo: The 
Diplomatic Republic ofEurope', in Knud Jorgensen (Ed. ), Reflective Approaches to European Governance, 
Macmillan, (Basingstoke) 1997, pp. 167-180; Knud Jorgensen, ' Modem European Diplomacy: A Research 
Agenda', Journal of International Relations and Development, 1999, Vol. 2, Nol, pp. 78-96; Michael Smith, 
`Rules, Transgovernmentalism, and the Expansion of European Political Cooperation', in Wayne 
Sandholtz, Alec Stone Sweet, (Eds. ) European Integration and Supranational Governance, Oxford 
University Press, (Oxford) 1998, pp. 304-333 and Kenneth Glarbo, `Wide-awake Diplomacy: 
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the financial, social, political and practical outcomes and are contested by integration 
scholars, notably `functionalist regime theory' critiques. 1 Within this latter view 
international institutions help governments to overcome problems in formulating 
collective actions. 2 The EU reduces transaction costs and, by being a conduit of 
information between governments, uncertainty. 33 Thus, where as international treaties, 
like the Kyoto environmental treaty have to be negotiated at an international forum 
outside of the remit and scope of a regularised institutional framework, the EU provides a 
stable institutional framework through which agreements can be reached, managed and 
enforced. 4 The EU also acts as a manager adding operational detail and interpretation to 
policies within the issue area to negate the need to create separate agreements on smaller 
operational issues within the headline agreement. However, the neorealist critique 
suggests that there is a missing balance of power structure that underpins international 
institutions. 5 Neorealists accept a limited independent role for the EU and consequently 
argue that the EU can be an instrument of government policy. 6 This contrasts markedly 
to functionalist regime theory, that holds that the EU may serve as instruments of 
Reconstructing the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union', Journal of European 
Public Policy Vol. 6, No. 4,1999,634-651. 
31 Kenneth Waltz, Theories of International Politics, Random House (New York), 1979, p. 96 
31 Andreas Hasenclever, Peter Mayer, Volker Rittberger, Theories of International Regimes, Cambridge 
University Press, (Cambridge), 1997. p. 616 
33 Robert Axelrod & Robert Keohane, `Achieving Cooperation under Anarchy. Strategies and Institutions, 
in Kenneth Oye (Ed. ), Cooperation under Anarchy, Princeton, Princeton University Press, (New Jersey), 
1996, pp. 226-254, p. 250. 
34 Elfriede Regelsberger et at (eds. ), Foreign Policy of the European Union: From EPC to CFSP and 
b eyond, Reinner, Colorado, 1997, p. 183; Cases in point include France's use of EPC as regards her Middle 
East policy and Great Britain's endeavour to elicit 'European' support for its policy in Zimbabwe as well as 
during the war in the Falklands. Simon Bulmer, Geoffrey Edwards, `Foreign and Security Policy', in Simon 
Bulmer, Stephen George, Andrew Scott, (Eds. ), The United Kingdom and EC Membership Evaluated, 
Pinter Press, (London), 1992 145-160, p. 150. 
35 John Mearsheimer, 'The False Promise of International Institutions', International Security, 1994, 
Vol. 19, No. 3 pp. 5-49 
36 Ibid. 
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governments to exert power and influence. 37 The question of what the EU is and how it 
serves to advance or hinder the work and role of national governments is crucial to the 
hypothesis of LI, which firmly asserts that the EU merely acts to co-ordinate government 
policies 38 
All governments seek to create coalitions of supportive governments to shape the policy 
agenda and negotiations of EU policy. However, as chapter four argued the evidence 
suggests that governments with strong issue specific preferences and capabilities are 
particularly active in ensuring their preferences prevail and in doing so seek to achieve a 
convergence of preferences with other bargaining governments 
39 This provides part of 
the explanation why UK officials were so active in conducting a large number of bilateral 
meetings with the other EU member government officials, in seeking agreement for UK 
government preferences. 
The influence and ability of governments to create persuasive coalitions in European 
Council negotiations is dependent on the issue area, the strength of the respective 
governments policy preferences, and the influence of positive and negative externalities 
on the bargaining. Members of these influential coalitions gain what Joseph Grieco calls 
`voice-opportunities' . 
40 Voice-opportunities are `institutional characteristics whereby the 
views of partners (including relatively weaker partners) are not just expressed but reliably 
37 Stephen Krasner, `Regimes and the Limits of Realism: Regimes as Autonomous Variables', International 
Organization, Vol 36, No. 2,1982, pp. 497-510, p. 506; Stephen Krasner, `Global Communications and 
National Power: Life on the Pareto Frontier', World Politics, Vol. 43, No. 3,1991, pp. 336-366. 
38 Andrew Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe, op. cit, p. 485-6' 
39 See chapter four, page 138-40. 
40 Joseph Grieco, `State Interests and Institutional Rule Trajectories: a Neorealist Interpretation of the 
Maastricht Treaty and European Economic and Monetary Union', in Benjamin Frankel (Ed. ), Realism: 
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have a material impact on the operations of the collaborative arrangement'. 1 Becoming a 
constructive member of a negotiating coalition affords a government the opportunity to 
shape elements of the policy to suit their own preferences, whilst also allowing the major 
governments in the coalition, in this case the UK and French governments, to advance the 
policy agenda in a way that suits their core preferences. The rationale for this is that the 
junior coalition partners gain a greater measure of influence over the precise detail of the 
policies remaining within the coalition than they would if they were outside of the 
coalition altogether. This was a point notably grasped by the Swedish government who 
sought to use their role as a'critical friend' to ESDP to add further `soft security' roles to 
the negotiated outcome. 42 
Finally, liberal scholars have noted that a commitment to the EU can offer an opportunity 
for governments to enhance their autonomy from domestic pressure. 43 Similarly, by 
transferring issues from domestic debates to European intergovernmental negotiations 
governments increases their leverage over domestic actors (such as Parliament and 
interest groups) in various ways. 4 Through the `gate-keeper' role governments gain a 
privileged access to information from other negotiating governments and thus can shape 
the domestic debate through managing the dissemination of this information. 45 
Restatements and Renewal, Frank Cass Publishers, (London), 1996, pp. 261-306. 
41 Ibid 
42 Both Pal Jonson and Interview E raised the example of the Swedish governments desire to add `soft' 
security roles to the final outcome as an example of this practice. Interview with Pal Jonson, op. cit; 
Interview E, op. cit. 
43 Andrew Moravcsik, 'Why the European Community Strengthens the State: Domestic Politics and 
International Cooperation' (Working Paper Series 52), Harvard University, Center for European Studies, 
1994, p. 1; Klauss Wolf, `The New Raison d'etat as a Problem for Democracy in World Society', European 
Journal of International Relations, Vol. 5, No. 3,1999, pp. 333-363. 
as Andrew Moravcsik, Why the European Community Strengthens the State, op. cit, p. 7. 
45 Stephen Flaggard and Andrew Moravcsik, `The Political Economy of Financial Assistance to Eastern 
Europe, 1989-1991', in Robert Keohane, Joseph Nye and Stanley Hoffmann (eds), After The Cold War: 
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The government's monopoly over the flow of information is coupled with the role of the 
UK parliament in the ratification of the negotiated output, limited as it is to a 
retrospective ratification; UK parliamentarians are able to vote for or against the entire 
treaty package without being afforded the opportunity to amend any of the negotiated 
outputs. Parliamentary scrutiny of the IGC output and negotiations comes from the ability 
of parliamentarians, as a whole, to vote to ratify the governmental legislation that 
enshrines the Treaty outputs and through the Standing Committees on the 
Intergovernmental Conference. 46 
The Standing Committee has the opportunity to study the issues of the IGC in close detail 
and is able to suggest and lobby the relevant government ministers and Prime Minister 
about how they think negotiations should proceed. This scrutiny reduces, however, to a 
simple vote to accept or reject the negotiated package, this being particularly true in the 
case of the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty in July 1993 where the issue became a 
matter of confidence in the Major government. 47 The Labour government, enjoying a 
majority of 179 in the House of Commons, allowed a great deal more room for the UK 
government to manoeuvre to achieve Parliamentary ratification of the output from the 
Nice European Council 48 However, the Prime Minister and his core executive introduced 
self-imposed tight restrictions on their negotiating leverage to ensure that the 
International Institutions and State Strategies in Europe. 1989-91, Harvard University Press, (Cambridge), 
1993, p. 282-285. 
46 This is primarily the work of the European Scrutiny Committee which also then forms an IGC 
standing committee before treaty approving European Councils. 
http: //www. parliament. uk/parliamentary_committees/european_scrutiny. cfxn 
47 Philip Stephens, Politics and the Pound, Macmillan, (London), 1997, p. 332. 
48 Indeed Nick Palmer, and Nicholas Clegg, commented that it would have been exceptional for Parliament 
to have blocked the treaty legislation given the realities of British Parliamentary politics at the time. 
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government's core defence and security preferences were not breached. 
Alan Milward argues that governments seek to transfer sovereignty to the EU to 
effectively lock other EU governments into their preferences, thus having the effect of 
increasing the influence of the proposing government. 49 Certainly for the UK government 
the case for stronger EU capabilities as a key motivator in the ESDP negotiations and 
process was strong. 50 For the UK political executive ESDP was seen as a means by which 
governments can `add-value' to their security and defence policies by providing an 
enhanced international intervention capability when NATO as a whole does not wish to 
51 be engaged. 
The ability of the EU to effectively co-ordinate defence and security issues is, however, 
contested. Foreign policy issues that lead to the deployment of military assets are the 
source of a great deal of negotiation and particular sensitivities surrounding national 
sovereignty. Further sensitivities surround which organisation should be given 
institutional responsibility for the deployment and questions of political legitimacy and 
funding - funding being a particularly troublesome area within the EU's role in defence 
and security sphere. 52 The Netherlands are currently the only EU Member to have a 
Interview with Nicholas Palmer MP, op. cit; Interview with Nicholas Clegg MEP, op. cit. 
49 Alan Milward, The European Rescue of the Nation State, Oxford University Press, (Oxford), 2001, 
pp. 16-17; Neil MacCormick, Questioning sovereignty: law, state and nation in the European 
commonwealth, Oxford University Press, (Oxford) 1999, pp. 123-126. 
50 Liddle argued that the Prime Minister was very robust in asserting this as his principle aim. Lord Wallace 
similarly believed that the experience of the Balkans and the perceived need to be able to act positively in 
Europe's near abroad were significant drivers in this process. Interview with Roger Liddle, op. cit; Interview 
with Lord Wallace, op. cit. 
s' This position was supported by all of the interviewees but most notably Lord Guthrie and Bruce George 
who had differing views about whether such moves would enhance or damage NATO. George was firmly of 
the view that ESDP damaged NATO. Interview with Bruce George MP, op. cit; Interview C, op. cit. 
52 Timothy Garden, Whither ESDP: Trends and Challenges, RAND Corporation, (New York), 13 October 
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dedicated budget for ESDP activities and even this budget is restricted so that it covers 
only Dutch activities within ESDP. 53 
Further sensitivities on military issues are advanced by Christopher Hill and Martin 
Holland who argue, through analysing the EU's response to the Balkans crisis and 
political upheaval in South Africa, that the EU and its external relations apparatus is 
punching below its weight in international affairs. 4 In the context of the EU's 
involvement in international affairs through the EPC mechanisms, and latterly the CFSP, 
which attempts to co-ordinate EU foreign and security policies, have only registered 
marginal success in gaining closer EU voting patterns in the UN and in coordinating 
lowest common denominator responses to elements of the Yugoslavian civil war. 55 
Indeed, the EU's ability to operate in the foreign and security policy sector have been 
hindered by the need to gain agreements based on unanimity. To be sure, general policy 
principles have been easily and quickly established but the policy instruments to reinforce 
these first principles agreements have been slow to follow. Similar stumbling blocks 
include the preference for EU security and European military interventions to be 
conducted under either the NATO or UN banner and that an EU defence presence has 
been viewed as a direct threat to the NATO alliance and one that should therefore not be 
2003, p. 2; Assembly of the WEU, Document A/1817, 'Parliamentary scrutiny of the ESDP in national 
Parliaments -debates and replies to Parliamentary questions tabled in WEU countries', 3 June 2003. 53 Charles Grant, Timothy Garden and Bill Newton Dunn all mentioned this budget as a potentially positive 
step forward for the EU that they believed ought to be copied by all EU member governments. Interview 
with Bill Newton-Dunn MEP, op. cit; Interview with Charles Grant, op. cit; Interview with Sir Timothy 
Garden, op. cit. 
54 Christopher Hill, `The Capabilities-Expectations Gap or Conceptualizing Europe's International Role, 
Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 31, No. 3, pp. 305-328; Martin Holland, `Bridging the Capabilities- 
Expectations Gap: A case study of the CFSP Joint Action on South Africa', Journal of Common Market 
Studies, Vol. 33, No. 4,1995, pp. 555-572. 
55 Peter Bruckner, `The European Community and the United Nations', European Journal of International 
Law, Vol.!, No. 1/2,1990, pp. 174-195, p. 187. 
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pursued. 56 
Though the basis of the NATO Alliance has been the overwhelming presence of the 
United States, eleven of the fifteen EU governments are members of NATO. 57 As a result 
eleven EU governments have considerable experience of collaborative defence initiatives 
in which national sovereignty is both pooled and preserved. The EU has not organised its 
security and defence in isolation and indeed several leading EU security commentators, 
such as Timothy Garden and William Wallace, have argued that the EU Members of 
NATO have used the American security guarantee to effectively under-finance European 
security. 58 The defence budgets of many Members of the EU are well below that of 
America and indeed Britain and France 59 The EU members have the collective 
experience of collaborative defence ventures, joint operations and training experience and 
the experience of this j oint working should serve to reduce the initial costs of running the 
ESDP. This should add strength to the argument that ESDP serves to provide additional 
value to national defence budgets and capabilities. In turn, this leads to the conclusion 
that ESDP negotiations were a means to co-ordinate national policies and that in so doing 
56 This was a position held by the Major Government and one publicly expounded by the Blair government 
in the first year of its term in office, which led to UK officials shaping the debate to ensure that ESDP could 
not be viewed as being a threat to NATO. The position of the Benelux countries and Germany, Italy and 
Spain was that ESDP should not remove the NATO security guarantee over Europe. The progress of the 
negotiations made it plain that the ESDP was complimentary to NATO rather than a threat. Kevin Ruane, 
Chapter Four, `The Death of the EDC, July to August 1954' in Ruane, The Rise and Fall of the European 
Defence Community. Anglo-American Relations and the Crises of European Defence, 1950-55, Palgrave, 
(Basingstoke), 2000. 
57 EU member governments who are also members of NATO are Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, 
Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and the United Kingdom. Lord George Robertson, 
`This ain't your Daddy's NATO', final speech as Secretary General of NATO, 11 December 2003; Office 
of International Security Affairs, Department of Defense, United States Security Strategy for Europe and 
NATO, Department of Defense, (Washington) 2000, Chapter Two. 
58 Interview with Sir Timothy Garden, op. cit; Interview with Lord William Wallace, op. cit. 
59 Miliary Balance 2003-2004, IISS, (London), p. 335. All 2001 in US S. US - 299,917m, France - 
32,438m, Germany - 26,279m, Italy - 21,528m, Netherlands - 6,083m, Luxembourg -156m, Portugal - 2,277m, Spain - 7,007m, UK - 33,967m. EU members of NATO contribute 164,564m. 
202 
reduce the transaction costs of further agreements and institutionalise UK and French 
government preferences. 
The strength of the liberal rationalist literature is in locating the UK government's aims in 
defence policy and European affairs more generally 6° UK governments motivations set 
out in chapters three and four were to improve the autonomous defence and security 
capabilities of the EU so that the EU could intervene militarily in situations where it felt 
appropriate to do so and where NATO, as a whole, did not wish to be involved. 
61 This 
initiative would also serve to improve military capabilities within the EU, to ensure the 
medium term future of NATO through European governments sharing the burden of 
European security with the US, and only activating a military response through the EU 
when NATO chooses not to act. 
Institutional Choice - Delegation and Pooling 
When the UK government made the decision to transfer elements of its defence and 
security sovereignty to the EU it did so in the context of the type of institution and range 
of functions within the host institution. This was important as the main potential cost of 
transferring sovereignty is that the host institution gains further policy competencies 
without the agreement of the Member governments. Further, that if the institution created 
did not have the institutional competencies to effectively manage ESDP the agreement 
60 Moravcsik notes that in his words `exceptional circumstances' geopolitical circumstances have played a 
role in governments aims for collaborative policies. This is certainly the case for ESDP where part of the 
motivation for the policy was in the side-benefits for improving European military capabilities. Andrew 
Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe, op. cit, p. 476. 
61 See pages 90 and 149 in chapters three and four. 
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would therefore be Pareto sub-optimal. 62 In this scenario there would be greater 
advantage in retaining a unilateral policy rather than transferring sovereignty to the EU. 
The rationalist theory of institutional choice places an emphasis on functionality. For 
example rationalists 
.. explain 
institutional choices in terms of the functions a given institution is expected to perform and the 
effects on policy outcomes it is expected to produce, subject to the uncertainty in any institutional design 6'' 
Institutional choice theory emphasises its applicability to the development of the EU and 
the range of institutions created. 64 Compared to other international institutions, like 
NATO and the UN, European integration has produced a large number of different types 
of institution - from co-ordinating institutions in external relations to supranational 
governing institutions like the European Court of Justice. EU institutions can limit 
member governments' autonomy in two ways: through either pooling or delegating 
authoritative decision-making. 
Sovereignty is pooled when governments agree to decide future matters by voting procedures other than 
unanimity. j... ] Sovereignty is delegated when supranational actors are permitted to take certain 
autonomous decisions, without intervening interstate vote or unilateral veto 65 
Pooling sovereignty provides a solution to the problem of incomplete IGC contracts; 
namely those which require additional intergovernmental agreement to bring them to 
62 The rationalist perspective on institutional choice can be found in work produced by analytical groups 
working on this subject; see Gilles Andreani, Christoph Bertram, and Charles Grant, Europe's Military 
Revolution, op. cit; Anthony Forster, `Prospects for an Independent Security Policy: Institutions and 
Capabilities', in Helene Sjursen (Ed), Redefining Security? The Role of the European Union in European 
Security Structures, ARENA, (Oslo), 2001, pp. 15-33 
63 Mark Pollack, `Delegation, Agency, and Agenda Setting in the European Community', International 
Organization, Vol. 51, No. 1,1997,99-134, p. 102. 64 Ibid. 
65 Andrew Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe, op. cit, p. 67 
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fruition. 66 Qualified majority voting provides a simpler route to gaining 
intergovernmental agreement because fewer governments are required to endorse a 
proposal. Under QMV less votes are taken in the Council because intransigent 
governments can be quickly isolated and the threat of a vote often leads to compromise. 7 
QMV also ensures that the national permanent representations have to seek negotiated 
settlements rather than exercise the right to veto, thus encouraging a collegiate rather than 
confrontational approach to negotiations. 8 
Mark Pollack lists four functions that delegated sovereignty might achieve. 69 Delegation 
increases the credibility of commitments, which is crucial in policy areas where core 
national sovereignty is seen to be at issue, like the single currency and the ESDP. 70 
Furthermore, there are governmental incentives to delegate the right to initiate proposals 
to European institutions. One reason being that, from a negotiating standpoint, initiating a 
policy weakens a government's ability to manoeuvre and bargain at the 
intergovernmental level because it has already outlined to its fellow negotiators the 
collective policy that best reflects its core preferences. Research in chapter four indicated 
that the UK government had significantly benefited from its position as the initiating 
government. 71 In gaining a negotiated bilateral agreement with the French government at 
Saint Malo UK officials created a highly influential coalition to advance this initiative 
66 Bernhard Winkler, `Is Maastricht a good contract? ', Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 37, No. 1, 
1999, pp. 39-58, p. 39-40. 
67 Interview M, suggested that QMV was a very useful tool for officials but was seen as being potentially 
damaging to UK security interests which is why the government would resist the extension of QMV into 
defence and security policy. Interview M, op. cit. 
68 Andrew Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe, op. cit., p. 73. Interview H, op. cit; Interview F, op. cit. 
69 Mark Pollack, `Agenda Setting in the European Community', op. cit., p. 103. 
70 Wayne Sandholtz, `Choosing Union: Monetary Politics and Maastricht', op. cit, pp. 1-39. Issues of high 
politics attract a commensurately high level of electoral risk 
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into the European Council at Nice. The evidence suggested that, in doing so the UK 
government effectively protected core UK defence preferences during the ESDP 
negotiations. 72 
In summary, this section has argued that pooling rather than delegation of sovereignty 
was the only realistic option for the UK government when negotiating ESDP provisions. 
This is because the UK government did not wish to transfer significant amounts of its 
defence and security autonomy to the EU. Furthermore, this section argued that the shape 
and roles of proposed institutions is a large consideration for negotiators during European 
Councils and that governments formulate their negotiating positions partly as a response 
to institutional proposals. 
Balances of power within the EU 
Governments face potential `costs' from transferring security and defence sovereignty to 
the EU, not least in disrupting existing balances of power. The fact that the EU accepts 
transferred security and defence sovereignty inevitably results in some disruption, 
however minor, to relationships between governments and international organisations 
like NATO and the UN. 73 Between 1997 and 2000 several factors shaped EU 
governments position within the EU balance of power. The end of the Cold War left the 
71 For example, chapter four, page 139. 
72 As Footnote 48. 
73 This is partly because of the emergence of another competent organisation in this field and also because 
of potential conflicts of interest in membership and capabilities but also a question mark over how the new 
institution might impact on international affairs, whether it will hold a contrary strategic vision to existing 
institutions. Pol de Witte argues that these potential shocks are limited by the transparency between EU and 
NATO governments and the central institutions. Interview with Pol de Witte, op. cit. 
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United States as the only credible superpower. Moreover, German unification signified an 
increase in German government capabilities and drastically changed the distribution of 
capabilities within the EU. More importantly the collapse of the Soviet Union ended 
European bipolarity leaving in its wake a post-cold war international system that could be 
described as being unipolar without hegemonic influences or as an emerging multi-polar 
system. 74 The latitude for EU governments in this system to innovate on policy issues, 
like ESDP, has consequently increased because the confines of cold war strategic 
thinking have lifted. However, the importance placed on retaining, and not creating 
`shocks' to the existing balances of power remained a priority of FCO official, according 
to Paul Johnston and Emyr Jones"Parry. 75 
To avoid the potential pitfalls of altering EU balances of power the UK government, 
through its officials at the FCO, MoD and Cabinet Office, dedicated the time between 
Pörtschach, 25 October 1998, and Saint Malo, 4 December 1998 to managing the 
development of the Saint Malo initiatives. The balances of power, on this issue in 
particular, lay between the UK and French governments, UK and EU governments and 
between the UK government and US Administration. Similarly, between the Saint Malo 
summit and the European Council at Nice UK officials conducted a large number of 
meetings with officials from other European governments and the US State Department. 6 
This was to ensure that ESDP did not disrupt good working relations between UK 
74 Kenneth Waltz. `The Emerging Structure of International Politics', International Security Vol. 18,1993, 
pp. 44-79; John Mearsheimer, 'Back to the Future. Instability in Europe After the Cold War'. International 
Security. 1990, Vol. 15, No. 4, pp. 5-56; Christopher Layne, 'Death knell for NATO? The Bush 
Administration Confronts the European Security and Defense Policy', CATO Pol icy Analysis, No. 394, The 
CATO Institute, (Washington DC), 4 April 2001; David Wilkinson, `Unipolarity without Hegemony', 
International Studies Review, Vol. 1, No. 1,1999, pp. 141-172. 
75 Interview E, op. cit; Interview G, op. cit. 
76 Interview E, op. cit; Interview H, op. cit. 
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government and its EU and American allies. 77 
So called `shocks' to the international system can overcome problems with disruptions to 
the balance of power, like the end of the Cold War, and are also a key supply side factor 
in the creation of new EU institutions. 78 The collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the 
problems associated with the Kosovo crisis (1999) are two of the many contributing 
factors between the Cold War and the eventual decision in 2000 of the EU to codify a 
common defence and security policy. 79 `Shocks' provide a supply side solution to the 
problem of delegating sovereignty to the EU in three ways: first, `shocks' help to shift 
existing balances of power and institutions, like NATO, that exist to retain the pre- 
`shock' status quo; second, `shocks' discredit old ideologies and working practices that 
leads to a political climate where new ideas and working practices are acceptable 80 Third, 
`shocks' create a general sense of shared opportunity for institutional reform. 81 
For British policy makers, particularly those in Downing Street, the Cabinet Office, and 
the Policy Director's staff in the FCO, key concerns centred around how the development 
77 Interview E alluded to this process also being to find win-sets amongst an US State Department audience, 
although he did not use the term win-set. Interview E, op. cit; Interview D, op. cit; Interview F, op. cit. 
78 The UK Ministry of Defence's definition of 'shocks', in the strategic context, are high impact, low 
probability events that have an immediate primary impact but then produce consequential impacts. These 
high impact events are also capable of triggering an escalation of circumstances to produce a sustained shift 
of international circumstances. The example the MoD use is the fall ofthe Berlin Wall in 1989. `Paragraph 
12 - Methodology, Key Findings and Shocks', Strategic Trends, Joint Doctrines and Concepts Centre, 
Ministry of Defence, March 2003. 
79 Interview with Sir Timothy Garden, op. cit; Interview with Lord Wallace, op. cit. Also see chapter three, 
page 114-5. 
$0 Interview D and Brittan argued that upheavals in the international system often created permissive 
environments in which officials and politicians could advance policies that would have been impossible to 
advance previously. Interview C thought that `shocks' like the Cold War produced new scenarios that the 
military had to react to rather than this being a pure opportunity for entrepreneurship. Interview D, op. cit; 
Interview C, op. cit; Interview with Lord Brittan, op. cit. 
81 Lord Brittan and Lord Robertson felt that the end of the cold war and the subsequent gradual reforms 
during the 1990s had provided a sprit of willingness amongst member governments to create new 
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of a UK European defence policy would affect the relationship between the UK and EU, 
the UK and France / Germany and most pertinently the relationship between the UK and 
United States. 82 
The German government's influential role within the EU and the possible `shocks' to the 
EU that could result from German disagreement made consultations across Foreign and 
Defence offices very important 83 During the 1970s and 80s the German government's 
influence within the EU increased due to its continued economic success and 
involvement with the UN and Eastern Europe, although it failed to exercise similar levels 
of foreign policy entrepreneurship. 4 
In particular, Germany's position on the frontline of any East-West conflict meant that 
unilateral German government foreign policies might lead to shifts in the EU balance of 
power and would'... lead to negative reactions, thereby reducing the Federal Republic's 
influence and room for manoeuvre' 85 The end of the Cold War provided a permissive 
environment in which prohibitions on the German government to formulate unilateral 
foreign policy were lifted and they could take a more active role in international relations. 
Post-unification Germany has placed a greater emphasis on its ability to develop 
institutions within the EU. Interview with Lord Brittan, op. cit, Interview with Lord Robertson, op. cit. 
82 Interview E, op. cit; Interview D, op. cit; Interview with Lord Wallace, op. cit; Interview I, op. cit. 
83 This was the very strong opinion of Interview E and Interview F who spent a great of their time managing 
the expectations and responses of fellow EU governments including the German government to avoid 
causing these very disruptions. Interview E, op. cit; Interview F, op. cit. 
84 Reinhard Rummel & Wolfgang Wessels, `Federal Republic of Germany', op. cit, p. 39. 
85 Reinhard Rummel &Wolfgang Wessels, `Federal Republic of Germany', op. cit., p. 40. 
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unilateral policies 86 The political-cultural hindrances on the German government to 
formulate effective unilateral foreign and defence policies meant that there was added 
motivation for them to take a full role in CFSP and ESDP, as a key means to engage in 
external relations. For example, Anne-Marie Le Gloannec notes that post-unification 
German preferences changed `from a champion of federalism into an advocate of 
intergovernmentalism, from a Musterknabe of Europe into a convert to British policies'. 87 
This is partly demonstrated by the German government's engagement with, and 
enthusiasm for, ESDP as a continuation of the policy of seeking European security 
efficiencies through collaborative defence ventures. 88 
Evidence from UK government negotiators suggested that German government officials 
did not have preferences that were as intense as those of the UK and French 
governments. 89 The German government was however engaged in shaping the ESDP to 
reflect its transatlantic security preferences and in having recognised the need for the EU 
to be able to act in its near abroad. 90 
The post-World War II preference in Downing Street, the FCO and MoD is that the so 
called `special-relationship' between the UK and the US supersedes all other foreign 
86 Simon Bulmer, Charlie Jeffery, William Paterson, `United Germany in an Integrating Europe', in Peter 
Katzenstein, (Ed. ) Tamed Power. Germany in Europe, Ithaca, (New York), 1997, pp. 1-48 
87 Anne-Marie Le Gloannec, `Germany and Europe's Foreign and Security Policy: Embracing the British 
vision', in Carl Lankowski, Break out, break down or break in?. Germany and the EU after Amsterdam, 
CGS Research Report, No. 8,1999, pp. 21-30, p. 21 
88 Interview C, op. cit; Interview with Sir Timothy Garden, op. cit; Interview with William Hopkinson, 
. cit. . 8 Interview M, op. cit; Interview G, op. cit; Interview D, op. cit. 
90 Evidence from the UK's ESDP negotiating team was that the German government negotiators had fully 
accepted the need to improve EU capabilities whilst retaining US involvement. Which was not to say that 
they accepted the need for Germany to improve its military capabilities. Interview H, op. cit; Interview E, 
op. cit; Interview F, op. cit. 
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policy considerations. 91 Contemporary explanations of the pre-eminence of the `Special 
Relationship' have centred around the notion of the `Anglo-sphere', an inherent trust of 
English speaking countries with Anglicised traditions. 92 However, the balance of power 
issue concerning ESDP is in whether the perception of French government preferences 
for EU security to be managed separately from NATO is merely rhetoric or is the official 
French MoD or Ministry of Foreign Affairs position. 93 A media based interpretation of 
the Saint Malo Accords was that it would undermine NATO - America's preferred 
institutional structure for managing European security and to establish a separate locus of 
power away from the US. 94 However, interview evidence strongly suggested that UK 
government's red-lines made it clear that NATO was the continued security institution of 
choice and that the UK negotiators were prepared not to come to an agreement on ESDP 
rather than undermine this fundamental aspect of their preferences. 
The British government was careful to avoid causing a shift in the balance of power 
between the US and the EU. 95 As part of this approach the strategy adopted by the key 
officials within the UK MoD and FCO was to keep US officials fully informed of the 
91 Clare Short and Malcolm Riflcind, 'Too close for comfort? Is our special relationship with the US a 
happy fact or a dangerous fantasy? ' The Guardian, (Manchester), 15 November 2003, p. 24; Alan Massie, 
'US power and a willingness to employ it rankled most', The Sundes Times, (London) 23 March 2003, 
p. 21; Hugh Massingberd, `A very special relationship as Britain again stands shoulder to shoulder with its 
transatlantic ally', The Daily Telegraph, (London), 17 September 2002, p. 1. 
92 Andrew Sullivan, 'Come on In: The Anglosphere is Freedom's New Home', The Sunday Times 
London February 2,2003; James Bennett, An Anglosphere Primer, Foreign Policy Research Institute, 
2002; James Bennett, `Anglosphere: Melting Pots and Harmonies', Washington Times, (Washington DC), 
24 August 2003. 
93 See chapter four, page 137-9 for a lengthier exposition of this point. In short, the balance of interview 
evidence is that the French government hold a preference for security structures outside of NATO but do 
not wish to make these preferences a reality before the EU is committed to realistic defence spending plans 
and has the political motivation for an effective defence structure. Francois Heisbourg argues that the 
French MFA saw ESDP as a distinct process separate from NATO whilst UK officials argued that the two 
were inevitably linked. Correspondence with Francois Heisbourg, `ESDP Research', 4 May 2004. 
94 Christopher Layne, 'Death knell for NATO? ', op. cit; Kori Schake, `EU Should Duplicate NATO Assets', 
op. cit. 
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working parties and moves towards greater levels of activity concerning the ESDP. 96 
According to George Robertson and Malcolm Rifkind, both former Secretaries of State 
for Defence, this was a standard strategy for ensuring that the US State Department 
remained supportive of UK policy and also ensured that Britain remained a beneficiary of 
`solid' diplomatic relations with the US. 97 With a privileged link to the US, British 
negotiators were therefore able to openly discuss their intentions, red-lines and analysis of 
progress in the ESDP negotiations with confidence that this discourse would remain 
private 98 Through extensive daily consultation, UK officials attempted to allay White 
House, State Department and Pentagon fears about an EU split from NATO, French 
motivations and the UK government's ability to manage change in EU security within the 
transatlantic preference. 99 
With good levels of access and transparency, British officials were able to keep the 
developments in the ESDP from disrupting relations between the UK and US. Indeed 
George Robertson, Richard Hatfield and Emyr Jones-Parry were able to confirm in the 
minds of the security advisors in the Pentagon and Whitehouse, Samuel Berger and 
Anthony Lake, that an ESDP of Britain's making would promote the idea that European 
governments should take greater steps to underwrite European security. '00 
The relationship between France, Germany and the UK was a key consideration in the 
95 As Footnote 84. 
96 Interview D, op. cit; Interview G, op. cit; Interview E, op. cit; Interview F, op. cit. 
97 Interview with Lord Robertson, op. cit; Interview with Malcolm Rifkind, op. cit. 
98 This was a particularly important reciprocal element to the relationship with the US. UK officials felt 
confident that there analysis would not be passed to the other EU governments by America thus preserving 
an important control of the flow of information. Interview M, op. cit; Interview E, op. cit. 99 Interview G, op. cit, Interview D, op. cit, Interview E, op. cit, Interview F, op. cit, Interview M, op. cit. 
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debate about balances of power for policy makers within the FCO, Downing Street and 
MoD. '°' The negotiation and development of the ESDP did not significantly alter the 
balance of power between the British and French foreign and defence ministries. This is 
because of a long recent history of joint operations and policy development throughout 
the Bosnian civil war and the peacekeeping operations that followed. ' 02 Despite a strong 
recent history of collaborative efforts in military interventions key British defence and 
military personnel were reluctant to state a preference for dealing with the French military 
and government above working with the US military, Pentagon and State Department 
even these operations had become a matter of routine and success. 103 As chapter four 
indicated the key hurdle UK foreign policy officials faced was in persuading officials 
from the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs that UK entrepreneurship on ESDP was a 
genuine effort in this field as opposed to short-term rhetoric. 104 The balance of power 
between the UK and France was not adversely affected by the moves towards the ESDP, 
but a new spirit of co-operation between the French and British foreign and defence 
ministries continued throughout the negotiations. los The relatively limited nature of EU 
foreign and defence policy co-operation imposes few costs on the UK and thus is 
attractive to the government as it has allowed the UK to develop, support and influence 
policy in areas of the world relatively free from British influence. '06 
100 Interview G, op. cit; Interview D, op. cit; Interview with Lord Robertson, op. cit. 
101 See Footnote 84. 
102 Interview C and Lord Wallace were particular advocates of this view. Interview with Lord Wallace, 
op. cit; Interview C, op. cit. 
103 This was particularly true of the following interviewees. Interview C, op. cit; Interview with Lord 
Wallace, op. cit; Interview with Charles Grant, op. cit; Interview 1, op. cit. 
104 Please see chapter four page 139. 
105 Interview D and Interview E from their respective positions within the UK MoD and FCC commented 
that the Saint Malo initiative greatly assisted in maintaining very good working relations between UK and 
French foreign and defence ministries. Interview D, op. cit; Interview E, op. cit. 
106 Simon Bulmer, Geoffrey Edwards, `Foreign and Security Policy', op. cit, p. 150; Louise Richardson, 
`British State Strategies after the Cold War', in Robert Keohane, Stanley Hoffmann, Joseph Nye (Eds. ) 
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Making Agreements Credible 
The transfer of sovereignty may serve to prevent defection from agreements and to 
provide a political tool preventing the need for governments to blame each other for 
defecting from agreements. 107 The `costs' of negotiators blaming each other for 
defections are considerable and can be measured in terms of a reduction in the flow of 
information and exchange of bargaining information during negotiations making it harder 
to reach agreement. 108 Part of the initial diplomatic exchange in early and mid-1998 
between the UK and French Ministries of Defence was to gauge the commitment of each 
government to the ESDP proposals. This was crucial to the construction of trust between 
British and French officials to develop these proposals and bring them into a European 
fora. 109 Once the Saint Malo Accords had been signed, it would be politically untenable 
for either government to defect or accuse the other of defecting as this would make 
further co-operation on ESDP more problematic! 10 The problems such breaches of trust 
cause in international relations are shown by the anecdotal evidence of a breakdown in 
trust in 2003 between the UK and French governments regarding the Iraq conflict and 
negotiations concerning the Common Agricultural Policy. The disagreement between the 
two governments on both these issues had a direct result on the continued development of 
After the Cold War, Harvard University Press, 1993, pp. 148-169, p. 150; Trevor Taylor, `Great Britain', in 
Mathias Jopp, Reinhardt Rummel, Peter Schmidt (Eds. ), Integration and Security in Western Europe. Inside 
the European Pillar, Boulder, (Westview), 1991, pp. 136-145, p. 145. 
107 Robert Putnam, `Two-Level Games', op. cit, p. 445-5. 
108 Robert Putnam, `Two-Level Games', op. cit, pp445-455. 
109 Interview G, op. cit; Interview E, op. cit., Interview G and Interview E both performed this role 
during this period. 
110 The interviewees that provided this information all came to this view from having considering 
experience of these issues at a European level. Interview M noted, however, that such events are very 
carefully managed so that their significance is down played to the public and parliamentarians. Interview E, 
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ESDP with French President Chirac initiating informal ESDP summits without inviting 
UK officials and similarly issuing instructions to French government officials not to 
engage in discussions with UK government officials concerning ESDP. "1 
The transfer of sovereignty to the EU through pooling or delegation, provides solutions to 
the problems of incomplete contracting, but it also impacts differently on member 
governments' autonomy and influence. Delegation of sovereignty does not enhance one 
government's control over the other governments because sovereignty is transferred to an 
independent body. The independence of a supranational actor to which sovereignty has 
been transferred is variable, but the potential cost for governments trying to control these 
institutions is large. 112 
When sovereignty is pooled, however, it `is not transferred to a supranational body 
because the crucial decision-making role is taken by an interstate body'. 113 Thus, when 
sovereignty is pooled, governments can exert pressure on the other governments and as a 
result may be able to extract further policy concessions of agreements! 14 Thus, in some 
circumstances the pooling of sovereignty can actually increase a member government's 
influence. This is the key advantage of ESDP for the British government. Britain's pre- 
eminent place in the European security sphere as it means that the ESDP provisions and 
pooled sovereignty serves to make the UK a disproportionately effective actor in the 
op. cit; Interview F, op. cit; Interview D, op. cit; Interview M, op. cit. 
111 This command from President Chirac went unreported but was brought up independently by both 
Charles Grant and Ian Black. Interview with Charles Grant, op. cit; Interview with Ian Black, op. cit. 
112 Andrew Moravcsik, `Introduction: Integrating International and Domestic Theories of International 
Bargaining', op. cit, p. 15. 
113 Robert Keohane, Stanley Hoffmann, 1991, `Institutional Change in Europe in the 1980s', in Robert 
Keohane, Stanley Hoffmann (Eds), The New European Community. Decision making and Institutional 
Change Westview Press, (Boulder) 1991, pp. 1-40, p. 8. 
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international sphere, and within the EU particularly. 
To explain member governments' preferences LI focuses on the cost / benefit analysis of 
each policy sector for individual governments. The interdependence fostered by the EU 
brings positive and negative externalities that prevent governments from achieving 
unilateral policy goals. These negative externalities impact on governments differently: 
`.. some are able to sustain effective policies autonomously, others remain vulnerable to 
negative externalities from policies abroad'. lls The UK government's approach towards 
the strengthening the ESDP strongly focussed on the ability of the government and 
military to retain a strong independent presence in the world and that ESDP would 
provide ready established coalitions of the willing. Indeed the positive effect of ESDP for 
the UK government comes from the potential to improve EU interaction with the US and 
in being able to fulfil member government's expectations of being capable of acting in 
international crises particularly in the near abroad, such as in the Balkans. The potential 
negative externalities, including the continued ability of member governments to 
formulate their own defence and security policies, were importantly negotiated out of the 
Presidency Conclusions of the European Council at Nice. 116 
Governments with effective unilateral policies, benefit from the current pattern of 
externalities and have little to gain from international co-operation. This poses an 
interesting set of challenges to the UK government at Saint Malo and at the subsequent 
114 Robert Putnam, `Two-level game', op. cit, p. 452. 
115 Andrew Moravcsik, `Preferences and Power in the European Community', op. cit, p. 486; Moravcsik 
draws on the work of Robert Keohane, Joseph Nye, Power and Interdependence. World Politics in 
Transition, Little, Brown and Company (Boston), 1977, p. 12. 
116 See Annex C, pp. 273-313. 
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intergovernmental negotiations. Prima facie, Britain has maintained an effective 
unilateral defence and security policy and has no pressing need to delegate this 
sovereignty to EU structures! 17 Yet, as chapter three analysed the main benefits to the 
UK from delegating sovereignty on defence and security were to improve EU defence 
capabilities, to strengthen the transatlantic Alliance, and to eventually produce budgetary 
efficiencies through collaborative research and development, procurement and training 
budgets. 118 The benefits of this delegation are supplementary to LI's explanation that 
negotiators bargain for specific and calculable benefits. 
However, it can be strongly argued that the side benefits of UK government 
entrepreneurship in the security and defence policy sector met short-term political 
objectives. These were, for example, demonstrating the UK government's pro-European 
credentials and securing US involvement in EU security, that aimed to overcome related 
negative externalities and overcoming the potential costs associated with provided 
`shocks' to the international system. In contrast, smaller EU governments and less 
effective military actors sought to co-operate on ESDP where they saw that they could 
have a practical effect on the policy. 119 A case in point is the negotiating position of the 
Nordic countries who universally emphasised the need to improve EU crisis management 
capabilities. They argued that NATO is primarily focussed on territorial defence and thus 
EU crisis management ought to be conducted outside of NATO frameworks. 120 The 
1 17 Hopkinson and Interview C were keen to highlight that whilst Saint Malo and ESDP had made progress 
towards improving EU capabilities security and defence remained policy areas for autonomous 
governments. Interview with William Hopkinson, op. cit; Interview C, op. cit. 
118 See chapter three, page 120. 
119 Andrew Moravcsik, Kalypso Nicolaidis, 'Explaining the Treaty of Amsterdam', op. cit, p. 61. 120 Nina Graegar, Henrik Larsen and Hanna Ojanen, Conclusions: Fourfold `nuisance power' or four 
contributors to the ESDP?, in Nina Graegar, Henrik Larsen, and Hanna Ojanen, The ESDP and the Nordic 
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development of ESDP allowed smaller EU governments, in co-operating with the 
development of the policy to add further elements that did not undermine the fundamental 
tenets of the policy. 
Conclusion 
In summary, this chapter has argued that LI provides a strong theoretical foundation 
through which to explain the UK decision to transfer defence and security sovereignty to 
the EU. Moreover, this chapter has analysed the case study of UK defence policy (1997- 
2000) and the negotiation of ESDP to conclude that the UK government transferred small 
amounts of defence and security sovereignty to the EU in the belief that this would 
produce greater benefits than pursuing a unilateral policy. From the UK government 
perspective the ESDP outcome was Pareto-efficient and therefore rational. 
The analysis made by officials advising the PM and core executive was that the possible 
costs of transferring security and defence sovereignty to the EU did not out-weight the 
benefits the policy could bring. The costs the UK government faced were potential future 
losses of autonomy, risks to existing balances of power within the EU and the risk of 
institutional spillover within ESDP taking the policy remit beyond the Nice European 
Council output. The risk of these costs occurring were however low, according to UK 
officials, not least because of the extent to which negotiations had been effectively 
managed by UK negotiators and because of the agreed text in the European Council 
conclusions that ensured that further extension of ESDP would need unanimous 
Countries: Four Variations on a Theme The Finnish Institute of International Affairs, (Helsinki), 2002, 
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government agreement. 
Similarly, UK officials concluded that the potential costs from ESDP were remote 
considering the precise detail of the agreement. The agreed ESDP text at the Nice 
European Council clearly marked the policy as being intergovernmental in nature and in 
operation. For example, governments are not compelled to take part in military operations 
initiated under the ESDP banner and similarly the `Headline Goals' established at the 
Helsinki Council in December 1999 are entirely voluntaristic. The intergovernmental and 
voluntary nature of ESDP therefore allowed the UK government to pursue a pro- 
European defence policy that met short term political aims of demonstrating its pro- 
European credentials and its longer term military and strategic aims of improving the 
EU's autonomous military capabilities and retaining US involvement in European 
security, without being seen to have conceded core UK defence and security sovereignty. 
ESDP entailed a transfer of small elements of defence and security sovereignty in areas 
which issues of common agreement already existed but remained un-codified. For 
example, the ESDP reflects a policy that deals with crisis management and peacekeeping 
functions that were already areas in which the UK and France had particular experience in 
the Balkans. Moreover in research, development and procurement policy, which are 
predominantly economic issues, the existing EU trade and industry agreements provide 
the EU with considerable experience and history of effective collaboration. A notable 
example of this is the Eurofighter Typhoon, which is a joint strike-fighter aircraft 
collaboration between the UK, German, Italian and Spanish governments that was 
pp. 218-236, p. 219-220. 
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reaffirmed in 1994, and which should be in active operation in the Royal Air Force by 
July 2006.121 
Specifically, this chapter has argued that LI can be located within a significant body of 
literature that has analysed EU external relations from a rationalist perspective. 122 In LI's 
explanation of integration the exact level of co-operation between governments remains 
unspecified although its rationalist approach is effective in identifying the costs and 
benefits of this cooperation. 123 Moreover, from LI's perspective it is clear why QMV in 
external relations has been controversial. Security, defence and the deployment of 
military assets are elements of the security policy sector where autonomy is a key 
indicator of a government's sovereignty, which is why governments have cautiously 
negotiated the transfer of elements of their security and defence sovereignty. Whilst the 
EU's external relations policy regime remains non-binding, unanimous and 
intergovernmental German, French and UK government's support for the development of 
this area can be explained by the few costs and in terms of the impact on national 
autonomy. 
LI concludes that governments transfer elements of their sovereignty to the EU to achieve 
credibility for government commitments. '24 Establishing multilateral credibility for 
governmental preferences binds the signatory governments into a framework whereby 
121 'Eurofighter', Background Information, Press Release from Eurofighter GmBh, 2 August 2003 
122 Roy Ginsberg, `European Security and Defense Policy; The State of Play', European Union Studies 
Association Review, Vol. 16, No. 1,2003, pp. 1-2; Michael E. Smith, `Institutional Moments, Policy 
Performance and the future of the EU Security / Defense Policy', European Studies Association Review, 
Vol. 16, No. 1,2003, p3-5. 
123 Andrew Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe, op. cit, p. 479-80. 
124 Ibid, p. 4-8 
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they cannot change their preferences. 125 For negotiating governments, therefore, a key 
element of the cost-benefit analysis they conduct is the extent to which a collaborative 
policy is in the government's perception of long term national interests and similarly the 
likelihood of their being circumstances where the government's view of ESDP might 
fundamentally change. In the specific example of ESDP the framing of the policy 
enshrines the autonomy of governments to decide whether to engage or commit assets to 
ESDP. The ESDP outcome therefore removed a core element of the `costs' of agreement 
that LI focuses on, namely locking in government preferences into collaborative EU 
policies. 
One of the key problems associated with the UK government transferring defence and 
security sovereignty is characterised as the problem of `anarchy'. This draws on a realist 
perspective that governments are keen to avoid exposing themselves to the associated 
risks of transferring 'sovereignty vulnerability' to external actors. In this instance this 
vulnerability is partly overcome by the presence of the EU to regulate the behaviour of 
governments and its ability to make further delegation less costly. Moreover, there are 
four key supply side factors that militate against the problem of `anarchy' and make 
governments more willing to transfer sovereignty: first, the government's prior 
experience of dealing with the EU builds trust among governments to continue this 
practice. Second, the EU has supportive constituencies, the Commission, European 
Parliament and judicial service that pressure governments to strengthen and expand the 
institutions and their competencies. Third, the presence of existing institutions, like the 
EU, reduces uncertainty and thus makes governments more willing to transfer 
125 Ibid, p. 4-8 and p. 64. 
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sovereignty. Fourth, existing institutions reduce transaction costs making it easier for 
governments to agree the nature of new institutions. As a pre-existing institution in which 
a great deal of positive experience has been accrued and in which the creation of new 
agreements, institutions and processes entails low transaction costs, the EU was a low- 
risk institution in which the UK government decided to transfer elements of its defence 
and security sovereignty. 
LI advances the argument that the transfer of sovereignty is a deliberate and active 
process of government delegation. The evidence from the ESDP case study strongly 
supports this view. LI rejects the notion that sovereignty transfer can also be a passive 
process, caused by government inaction that allows the EU institutions to grow 
unchecked or by the EU acting in a purposive manner to enhance its own powers. 126 The 
amount of autonomous power the EU has over any particular policy area is reflected by 
its ability to make decisions that do not reflect the preferences and policies of leading 
governments. ESDP is an intergovernmental area in which member governments can 
volunteer capabilities and support to actions without committing themselves to permanent 
operational arrangements. In this respect, the institutions of the EU retain little control 
over policies that might affect the autonomy of member governments. '27 
LI argues that the UK government transferred sovereignty when it judged that it could not 
achieve its policy preferences without co-operating. This hypothesis is strongly supported 
126 The leading example cited is the European Court of Justice. Terence Shaw, `Euro laws in danger, says 
judge', Daily Telegraph, (London), 6 September 1995, p. 11; Stephen Ward and Andrew Marshall, `Two 
other international courts in Luxembourg and the Hague have the right to challenge Britain's sovereignty, 
The Independent, (London), 28 September 1995, p. 19. 
127 Roy Ginsberg, `European Security and Defense Policy: The State of Play', op. cit, p. 1-2. 
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by the evidence from UK officials. The interviewees argued that to achieve stronger EU 
defence capabilities, to keep the US actively involved in EU security and to eventually 
generate budgetary efficiencies through eliminating overlap and replicated command 
structures, necessarily involved co-operating with EU partners at the European Council 
level. 
A potential theoretical corrective to LI is the historical institutionalist account proposed 
most notably by Paul Pierson. 128 This approach to European integration argues that 
governments might be motivated to delegate their sovereignty but are constrained in their 
ability to do so by given historical paths. 12' Historical institutionalism (HI) argues that the 
constraints on governments grow with time. As the history of the Union develops the 
greater the historically determined path each government faces. 130 Once governments 
transfer some authority to international institutions they focus their attention on 
coordination problems which gives the host institution the opportunity to gain more 
authority. HI focuses on how sovereignty `is lost' to international institutions and also 
posits that once authority is transferred it cannot be recovered. 13 1 The factors highlighted 
by HI are not present within ESDP where the restrictive collective responsibility placed 
on member governments is very slight and unlikely to expand without unanimous 
member government approval. Moreover, the institutions of the EU are effectively 
excluded from operation of ESDP, even in planning and operational command the 
128 Paul Pierson and Theda Skocpol, Historical Institutionalism in Contemporary Political Science, op. cit. 
129 Dietrich Rueschemeyer and John Stephens, `Comparing Historical Sequences: A Powerful tool for 
Causal Analysis', Comparative Social Research, Vol. 17, No. 1,1997 pp. 55-72; James Maloney, `Path 
Dependence in Historical Sociology'. Theory and Society, Vol. 29, No. 4,2000, pp. 507-548. 
130 Paul Pierson, 'Increasing returns, path dependence and the study ofpolitics, American Political Science 
Review, Vol. 94, No. 2,2000, pp. 251-67, p. 252. 
131 Paul Pierson, `Increasing returns, path dependence', op. cit, p. 251. 
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institutions were designed to be NATO `owned', thus the policy instruments that could 
advance informal European integration are absent making the institutional creep analysis 
of HI redundant. 
LI argues that agreements between governments as particularly difficult to achieve and 
voluntary defection from agreement are particularly likely because of the permanent 
nature of these agreements. 132 The case of ESDP challenges these core assumptions; the 
UK government did believe that there foreign and security goals could be further 
advanced through ESDP and indeed that the policy would allow the UK to engage in 
humanitarian and peace support operations with the assistance of EU partners and with 
pre-identified capabilities and an institutional mechanism for raising these. 
The British case study also challenges LI's view that agreements between governments 
are difficult to achieve. The key hurdle to agreement on ESDP occurred at the Saint Malo 
summit between the UK and French governments. This obstacle was the perception that 
the two governments held diametrically opposing views on European security and the UK 
government's red-line preference that European security should be underwritten by 
NATO whilst the French MFA were more ambivalent about a continued role for NATO. 
Once the two governments published the Saint Malo Accords, which provided a clear 
blueprint for the development of ESDP, it was clearly demonstrated that these two 
diametric views had been accommodated with in these agreements. Following Saint 
Mato, agreement amongst the other member governments of the EU was not as difficult 
132 Andrew Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe, op. cit, p. 4-8. 
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to achieve, as LI would assert. 133 In summary, LI provided a strong theoretical 
foundation through which to analyse the UK government's motivations for transferring 
sovereignty to the EU. The potential costs of this transfer that LI highlights were 
considered and acted upon by UK officials in ESDP negotiations. 
133 For example, Moravcsik argues that withdrawing defence and security coverage has been historically 
used in European Council negotiations as a threat by British and French negotiators to secure concessions 
from other negotiators. Andrew Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe, op. cit, p. 485. 
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Chapter Six: Conclusion 
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The methodological premise underpinning this thesis is one that recognises `the insecure 
epistemological bases of social science (and) recognising that theory and data are 
inescapably entwined' - an approach Michael Mann describes as `as-if positivism. " In 
essence the approach is positivist in so far as there is it accepts the ultimate existence of 
discoverable facts. However, this research goes beyond a strictly positivist perspective 
but stops short of post-positivism in that it regards the facts relevant to the ESDP case 
study as socially constructed. These `facts' are a product of a paper trail of official 
documents, official and contemporary written accounts and of verbal accounts provided 
by officials who were present at the relevant meetings and negotiations. Thus, in this 
thesis, the basis of the `facts' are founded in the strength of the triangulated evidence - 
the relevance of the officials interviewed and the relative merits and bias contained 
within these accounts and the contemporaneous accounts used. 
This thesis has critically evaluated LI through a case study of British defence policy 
(1997-2000) and the UK government's approach to the negotiation of ESDP. LI is a 
tripartite theory: domestic policy formulation; intergovernmental bargaining at IGCs 
and the transfer of national sovereignty to the EU. The version of LI evaluated in this 
thesis was derived from Moravcsik's `The Choice for Europe .2 This represents the 
most extensive research using LI and the most robust exposition of the theory. 
Moravcsik's subsequent analysis written with Nicolaidis of the Treaty of Amsterdam 
negotiations - at the time of writing the only revision to `The Choice for Europe' did not 
fundamentally change the assumptions of LI, other than to allow the authors to weaken 
' Michael Mann, 'Authoritarian and Liberal Militarism', op. cit, pp. 221-223. 
2 Andrew Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe, op. cit. 
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the ambition for what the theory can explain. The version of LI applied in this thesis is 
one that Moravcsik could stand behind. The three elements of LI are used here to 
analyse the UK government's approach to EU security and defence policy. 
This thesis opened with a critical evaluation of LI, analysing its micro-foundations and 
fundamental tenets. In addition to this theoretical critique the empirical focus of this 
thesis has rested on an analysis of the domestic policy formulation process, the co- 
ordination of negotiating positions for international bargaining and the process of 
international bargaining at the Nice European Council. The research presented in this 
thesis suggests that LI is effective in explaining the development of the UK 
government's European defence policy although with some very important caveats. 
These correctives reveal and evaluate the areas in which LI is unable to effectively 
explain the development of ESDP. For example, the formulation of UK defence policy 
is under-specified with respect to the interaction between departments and officials - 
something overlooked by LI. 
This conclusion brings together insights from both theoretical and empirical analysis. 
The empirical conclusions cover historical content, in particular, the domestic policy 
formulation process, and the influence of individual actors. The theoretical 
reconsideration focus on LI's core elements and thus address domestic policy 
formulation, international bargaining and why governments transfer sovereignty to 
supranational institutions. The final section of the conclusion examines how this thesis 
fits in with the existing literatures and concludes by exploring the implications of this 
thesis in terms of possible avenues of further research. 
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Empirical Claims 
This thesis placed the Saint Malo process within the context of long-term British defence 
policy and European integration history. Factors that have motivated British defence 
reviews since the Second World War include an emphasis on economic considerations, 
the need to achieve greater levels of military effectiveness and efficiency for less defence 
expenditure, and strategic factors - the need to react to changing world situations and also 
to reflect changes in UK government's international political ambitions. This thesis has 
argued that the Saint Malo Declaration and ESDP negotiations did not shift UK defence 
preferences and therefore did not represent a significant departure for UK defence policy 
or history. It can be strongly argued the Saint Malo policy initiative represents an 
innovative approach to strengthening the long-standing UK government preference of 
European security being underwritten by the transatlantic Alliance. 
Furthermore, this thesis argues that strategic considerations were the primary motivation 
for the development of a pro-European British defence policy. This was based on three 
elements: first, the desire to improve European capabilities to strengthen NATO, second, 
the ambition to facilitate greater use of the existing 15 EU member government's military 
capabilities and through practical steps set out in the Nice European Council Presidency 
Conclusions to enhance these capabilities and third, as a political measure designed to 
show a positive approach to European integration. Importantly, the UK government's 
unwillingness to engage in the European single currency project provided indirect but not 
direct linkages to the development of the Saint Malo initiatives. In particular, the 
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initiative provided a response to the PM's Whitehall-wide memorandum, requesting EU 
policy areas in which UK government could become more involved and new EU policy 
areas in which the government could propose and lead. 
The debate whether the Saint Malo initiatives and ESDP negotiations changed core UK 
government defence preferences can be located in LI's explanation of domestic policy 
formulation; that governmental preferences remain stable and only policies that emanate 
from these preferences change. This thesis argues that the Saint Malo Accords were an 
innovative policy response to the problem of the EU needing NATO capabilities to act in 
the EU's near abroad for example, the Balkans. The preference for European security to 
be underwritten by the transatlantic Alliance could have been eroded by UK 
government's promotion of ESDP, indeed the Conservative party and elements of the 
PLP argued precisely this. 4 However, evidence from this thesis suggests that UK officials 
were keen to secure approval for the initiative from key US departments both when it 
launched and during the negotiations that culminated at the Nice European Council. The 
constructs of `preferences' and `policies' were effective in helping to explain the 
development of British defence policy. Indeed, they are ideally suited to this case study 
where there was a stable preference for the transatlantic alliance and innovation to meet 
the fixed endpoint of improving European defence capabilities. 
Evidence supporting the claim that the UK government changed policy rather than core 
preferences can be found in the analysis of the policy formulation processes. The speed of 
the policy development is the first factor that suggests the Saint Malo initiative was a 
3 Andrew Moravcsik, The Choice for Eurore, op. cit, p. 493. 
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shift in policy. The initiative was effectively created in October 1997 in the Policy 
Directorate of the MoD with a team led by Richard Hatfield brainstorming ideas for 
shaping British defence policy. Twelve months later the pro-European defence initiative 
was announced at Pörtschach and two months after this the foundation stone ofthe ESDP 
was laid with the publication of the Saint Malo Accords. 5 
In the context of minor changes in British defence policy that have often taken years to 
finalise, the Saint Malo accords were completed with unusual haste. This speed was the 
product of the PM's desire to publicly announce a pro-European policy initiative that 
would be seen as credible to Britain's European partners. Moreover, the direct 
intervention of the PM and the levels of political credibility he invested in this process, 
lend further weight to the argument that the Saint Malo process was a cornerstone issue 
for the Labour government's first term in office. The PM effectively dictated the broad 
direction of the policy within the accepted transatlantic preference and as a result 
overruled an internal Whitehall debate between the MoD and the FCO. 6 Indeed, Prime 
Ministerial involvement in the policy ensured that officials were especially motivated to 
secure key UK government interests throughout the negotiations and were key factors in 
securing a satisfactory outcome. 
This thesis argues that Labour government's defence preferences were guided by the 
desire to be a `force for good' in the world, which involves pursuing policies that do not 
just directly advance British interests. The core aim of the ESDP - to improve EU defence 
4 See chapter three, page 72. 
5 See Annex A. 
6 See Chapter Three page 117-8. 
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capabilities and therefore be able to intervene in humanitarian crises in the EU's near 
abroad - conforms to this first preference. Similarly, the preference for collaborative 
rather than unilateral defence ventures to build credible coalitions of the willing, 
constitutes another facet of ESDP. There was also a preference that European security 
structures should be fashioned to meet the demands of the post-cold war world. In the 
view of British officials this meant involved a substantial and continuing role for the 
United States and NATO. 
LI argues that domestic policy is created through the aggregation of preferences from 
domestic interest groups. This thesis advances the argument that the influence of interest 
groups on domestic policy formulation varied greatly, but that the positioning of key 
policy officials was a crucial determinate in the progression of the policy. For example, 
Richard Hatfield, as the Policy Director of the MoD, was the originating author of the 
Saint Malo initiative. The positioning of other officials involved in interdepartmental 
relations and advising the PM about policy, such as Emyr Jones-Parry as Policy Director 
of the FCO and Stephen Wall as the head of the European Secretariat of the Cabinet 
Office, were also important but less crucial. Although driven initially by the MoD the 
agreement of the Cabinet Office and FCO gave the initiative credibility and momentum 
within Whitehall, which facilitated its development for negotiation at the European 
Council at Nice. 
Tony Blair was keen to demonstrate, early in his first term of office, that his government 
wished to engage positively in European policy and to suggest, where appropriate, areas 
in which the EU could expand its remit. Blair's strong lead on EU issues became the 
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received operating tenet of the government despite reservations from some quarters of the 
Cabinet, notably the Foreign Secretary Robin Cook and the Chancellor of the Exchequer, 
Gordon Brown. Key political allies of Tony Blair, such as Peter Mandelson, Minister 
without Portfolio and George Robertson, Secretary of State for Defence (1997-1999) 
were able to convince the PM because of alliances they had formed with him and because 
of their proximity, in terms of their ministerial poistions and interest in this policy.? 
Tony Blair's personally appointed staff including Roger Liddle, his personal political 
advisor, were in favour of European based defence solutions and keenly in favour of 
extending and expanding the EU's policy competencies. The positioning of highly 
knowledgeable and experienced key officials made a significant impact on the direction 
of the UK approach to ESDP. For example, Stephen Wall was able to advise the PM, 
having been the UK's ambassador to COREPER, how the policy might be negotiated and 
played out with other EU governments. 
Sectional interest groups like the armed forces only had a limited role in the decision to 
adopt a pro-European defence policy. The evidence presented in this thesis suggests that 
the government's consultation with the armed forces centred around meetings between 
the PM, the Secretary of State for Defence and the Chief of the Defence Staff, Lord 
Guthrie. Furthermore, evidence from leading defence analysts claimed that if the CDS 
had opposed the Saint Malo initiative it would have been politically difficult for the 
government to proceed with confidence. 8 Lord Guthrie showed strong support for the 
It should be noted that Peter Mandelson did not want to be interviewed for this thesis. 
8Interview with Lord Wallace, Interview with William Hopkinson, Interview with Sir Timothy Garden. Sir 
Timothy Garden argued that in practice this position would never occur, the Chief of Defence staffs would 
233 
Saint Malo initiatives providing that the negotiated agreement did not undermine the 
established preference for the transatlantic alliance. In an interview for this thesis Lord 
Guthrie stated his motivation for supporting the initiative was to demonstrate the armed 
forces' constructive engagement with the government, one which might provide the 
armed forces with greater negotiating leverage in the annual budget settlement. 
Furthermore, Guthrie claimed that he was intellectually supported ESDP because he 
believed Britain shouldered an unduly large proportion of the European security burden 
and that ESDP might encourage fellow European governments to improve their 
capabilities. 9 
The preferences of commercial and manufacturing interest groups played a less 
significant role in the ESDP process than LI suggests that they would. 10 It is particularly 
surprising that the defence industries did not feature more strongly in the Saint Malo 
initiative as commercial pressures feature very strongly in trade and industry policies. It is 
indicative of the speed of the Saint Malo initiatives and the voluntaristic nature of ESDP, 
which did not produce an immediate change in procurement practices, that defence 
industries did not need to conduct additional lobbying on these issues. Sectional interest 
groups and analysts, like the Centre for Defence Studies, King's College London, 
Bradford University's Department of Peace Studies, the Heritage Foundation in the 
United States, the International Security Information Service and the Centre for European 
ensure that the position was managed effectively enough that this position would neither become public in 
the strict public disclosure sense nor in the sense that such disagreements would become common currency 
within the MoD. William Hopkinson's view differed slightly as he believed that a decisive view from the 
Chief of Defence Staff could effectively rail-road a policy, especially in this case where the Prime Minister 
had no established experience in defence policy. See also, Chapter Three, page 102. 
9 Interview C. Interview C made this point in rather strong tones arguing that Germany in particular had 
shirked their responsibility to European security by deliberately under funding defence. 
10 Andrew Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe, op. cit, p. 475-6 
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Reform, continued to exert pressure and influence on UK government policy through 
publications, policy forums and informal meetings with politicians and officials engaged 
in UK defence policy formulation. There is, however, very little evidence that this 
pressure affected the UK government's approach to ESDP. Indeed in the meetings 
between Charles Grant and Cabinet Office Officials in which some argue that Grant 
promoted and to a limited extent steered the policy, evidence suggests that Grant's role 
was to provide supportive arguments for the policy. 
The PM's central role in the development of the Saint Malo initiative is indicative of its 
importance to the government's European programme. The PM's intellectual agenda to 
advance European integration whilst promoting Britain's national interests was grasped 
by his officials in negotiations with the French government at Saint Malo and then 
formally and informally with the other EU member governments in negotiations up to and 
including the European Council at Nice. Tony Blair took considerable personal political 
risks in advancing a policy that could have undermined the NATO alliance - this risk was 
further heightened by his lack of personal experience in defence policy and with the speed 
of the decision at Saint Malo to adopt the agreement negotiated overnight by MoD and 
FCO officials. 
This thesis has, through the use of interview evidence with key (and in the case of the 
Saint Malo summit the only) UK government officials present at the meetings, provided 
an account of the events surrounding both the Pörtschach and Saint Malo summits. It 
suggests the role of contingency in the Saint Malo initiative and the role of political 
expediency in the policy formulation process. Interviews with officials brought out 
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clearly that the Saint Malo Accords were signed after an evening of negotiations between 
UK and French government officials, rather than being exclusively the product of the two 
months of informal negotiations between Pörtschach and Saint Malo (25 October -4 
December 1998). This suggests that there was a great deal of expediency in the UK 
government in allowing the Saint Malo initiative to progress. 
Theoretical Claims 
The first element of LI's explanation of European integration is the formulation of 
domestic policy. This can be summarised as domestic interest groups asserting their 
preferences to the government which then aggregates these preferences in the context of a 
government constructed `national interest', as well as in the context of their policy 
preferences and exogenous pressures. Furthermore, LI holds that governments are rational 
actors who bargain in recognition of their core national interests and similarly negotiate 
with other European governments in the context of the relative influence of domestic 
producer group preferences. 
LI argues that government policy is driven by electoral and political-economic realities 
and that domestic interest groups retain significant influence over government policy. In 
the case of trade and industry issues interest groups can be simply identified through 
business organisations, trade unions, and consumer organisations. Within British security 
and defence policy there are a distinct set of active interest groups with varying levels of 
influence over governmental policy. These groups are the defence manufacturers, the 
Armed Forces, pressure groups and think-tanks, Parliament and the two relevant 
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government departments - the Ministry of Defence and the Foreign and Commonwealth 
Office. 
According to LI, these groups lobby relevant government departments and key actors 
within these departments. In the case of Saint Malo the Prime Minister, the Secretary of 
State for Defence and Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, the 
Policy Directors of the FCO and MoD and the European Secretariat of the Cabinet Office 
aggregated these preferences into a policy that met the government's political aims as 
well as domestic win-sets. Evidence from those at the heart of the decision making 
process in the Cabinet Office, Downing Street and the FCO and MoD produces an more 
nuanced account to that suggested by LI. There is strong evidence that the MoD exerted 
considerable influence on the ESDP process principally through formulating a draft ofthe 
Saint Malo initiative. A more accurate explanation of this process might be one where 
Downing Street decides the general direction of British European policy, the MoD 
provides a potential policy initiative and then the Cabinet Office, MoD and FCO work to 
implement this policy. The difference between LI's explanation and the one put forward 
by this thesis is that the core executive directed the policy and officials then sought to 
find win-sets amongst domestic pressure groups. This conclusion, which does not see 
domestic groups influencing policy from the bottom, casts doubt on the relationship and 
the direction of pressure and responses to it of pressure groups and the government. l l 
This thesis' analysis of domestic policy formulation touches upon a growing body of 
literature on epistemic communities - `... agents working on a commonly acknowledged 
11 For example, chapter three page 120. 
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subset of knowledge issues and who at the very least accept a commonly understood 
procedural authority as essential to the success of their knowledge activities. ' 12 Indeed, 
the outcome from the Saint Malo initiatives were driven by a small group of influential 
actors within the MoD, FCO, Downing Street and European Secretariat of the Cabinet 
Office support the notion that the core executive was an epistemic community. 
Epistemic communities have also been defined, however, `... as a framework providing 
sufficient incentives for members of the community to make, knowledge accessible to the 
group, through their contribution to the process of codification'. 13 Research on epistemic 
communities can be located within a broader literature concerning public administration 
that has focused on theories of networking, governance, institution building and 
cooperation. The work of James March and Johan Olsen has explored the impact of the 
infrastructure of political institutions and how this impacts on policy formulation. '4 
Institutional explanations of policy making argue that officials mould institutional policy 
preferences and that the importance of leadership provided by politicians and officials 
cannot be underplayed. Moreover, Peter Haas has expanded the notion of community 
within these groups defining them as "... [A] network of professionals with recognized 
expertise and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy 
relevant knowledge within that domain or issue-area' 15 The research presented in chapter 
12 David Cowan & Dominique Foray, `The explicit economics of knowledge codification and tacitness', 
Industrial and Corporate Change, Vol. 9, No. 2,2000, pp. 212-253 
13 Patrick Cohendet & Frieder Meyer-Krahmer, `The theoretical policy implications of knowledge 
codification', Research Policy, Vol. 30, No. 9,2001, pp. 1563-1591 
14 "Political democracy depends not only on economic and social contributions but also on the design of 
political institutions " James March and Johan Olsen, The New Institutionalism: Organizational Factors in 
Political Life', American Political Science Review Vol. 78,1984, pp. 734-49, p. 738. See also Kent Weaver 
and Bert Rockman (Eds), Do Institutions Matter? Government Capabilities in the United States and 
Abroad, The Brookings Institute (Washington), 1993. 
15 Peter Haas, `Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination', International 
Organization, Vol. 46, No. 1, pp. 1-35, p. 3 
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three on domestic defence policy formulation can be broadly located within the epistemic 
communities explanation and literature. 
The key domestic win-set providing groups in British defence policy agreed with the 
government's policy through rational self-interest. The armed forces provided a win-set 
for the government's European defence policy on the lead of Lord Guthrie who, as the 
Chief of Defence Staff, was in a position to offer the armed forces' support for the policy 
motivated by the rational explanation that positive explanation that positive engagement 
with government policy would give the armed forces greater leverage in budget and 
human resource negotiations. Similarly, the government received support for the Saint 
Malo initiative from pressure groups, analysts and think-tanks. These groups like the 
Centre for European Reform, ISS Paris and Centre for Defence Studies, King's College 
London gave their support to a policy they saw as reshaping British security perspectives 
to provide tangible benefits but within the transatlantic guarantee. 16 
Parliament also provided a win-set for the government's change in strategic direction. 
The PLP were briefed in December 1998 about the Saint Malo initiative and the direction 
the government would be taking British European defence policy. Evidence from the 
meeting suggests that there was a strong exchange of views in which the PLP were given 
assurances concerning the protection of British national sovereignty and that any 
developments would not result in the UK and non-neutral EU governments decoupling 
from NATO. Once those assurances were given the majority of the PLP were happy to 
16 Charles Grant, European defence post-Kosovo, Working Paper Series, Centre for European Reform, 
(London), May 2000; Charles Grant, Gilles Andreani and Christoph Bertram, Europe's Military 
Revolution, op. cit; Jolyon Howorth, European Integration and Defence: the ultimate challengee9 op. cit; 
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broadly support the government's position. The House of Commons Select Committee on 
Defence adopted a more critical approach to ESDP and the Saint Malo initiative. The 
reports of the Committee and transcripts of oral evidence demonstrate a desire to question 
the efficacy of the ESDP. " Similarly, the Conservative party opposed ESDP, partly 
through a successful media campaign in `The Sun', `The Daily Mail', `The Daily Express' 
and 'The Daily Telegraph', and also exerting political pressure on the government 
through holding publicised meetings with Pentagon and Whitehouse officials to deliver 
messages of concern regarding ESDP and the transatlantic security guarantee. However, 
the high political capital of the Labour government in their first term of office (1997- 
2001) meant the opposition to the government's programme in Parliament was muted. 
Moreover, the Conservative party was in a period of recovery following their heavy 
electoral defeat, in 1997, which meant that their opposition to the Labour government 
was slight. This allowed government officials considerable theoretical room to 
manoeuvre on ESDP, although this was, in reality, within self-imposed `red-lines' of not 
transferring significant defence and security sovereignty or undermining NATO. 
Win-sets were found for ESDP within domestic interest groups for a policy initiative that 
had been opposed by the Conservative government in the 1990s, the Labour government 
as official party policy up to and including the European Council at Amsterdam (1997). 
Francois Heisborg (ed), European Defence: making it work, op. cit. 
17 House of Commons Select Committee on Defence, European Security and Defence, Eighth Report, 
op. cit; House of Commons Select Committee on Defence, Uncorrected Evidence presented by Mr Simon 
Webb CBE. Policy Director of the Ministry of Defence, Dr Sarah Beaver. Director for the EU and UN. 
Ministry of Defence, and Mr Paul Johnston. Head of the Security Policy DeDartment, Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office, 15 October 2003, The Stationary Office, (London). 
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The trigger points for the Saint Malo initiative were the government's desire to improve 
EU military and security capabilities, to keep the US engaged in European security and 
also to demonstrate pro-EU policy preferences. The political dimension - to show pro-EU 
preferences - raised the opportunity for Richard Hatfield to produce an astute policy 
initiative that met the PM's preference for trying to engage in EU-based solutions. The 
Saint Malo intiative can therefore convincingly be seen as the product of historical and 
entrepreneurial contingency, and as a form of opportunism. Whilst to some extent a 
policy development will always include elements of political expediency and personal 
opportunism, this element is striking within the formulation of ESDP. Furthermore, the 
key actors within the domestic policy formulation process from the policy directorate of 
the MoD, the Secretary of State for Defence, the Cabinet, the Prime Minister, the Armed 
Forces, pressure groups, defence manufacturers all acted with rational motivations. 
This thesis argued that preferences provided an effective way to examine the formulation 
of domestic defence policy. The transatlantic security preference drove UK government's 
resistance to pressure from other EU governments to give the EU a credible security 
dimension before 1998. The balance of evidence presented in this thesis suggests that the 
Saint Malo initiatives were a tactical shift in UK defence and security policy to meet a 
multi-faceted motivation for improved EU defence capabilities. The Cabinet Office, MoD 
and FCO officials invested a great deal of time in meetings with other EU government 
and US State Department officials to secure the continued pre-eminence of NATO to 
European security. 18 If the Saint Mato initiative was a fundamental shift of preferences it 
1s It should be noted, however, that all three government departments involved in the formulation and 
development of the Saint Malo initiatives did make great efforts to ensure that US State Department, 
Pentagon and Whitehouse officials were fully informed about all the potential outcomes from this process - 
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is unlikely that UK officials would have invested so much time ensuring that the 
transatlantic security guarantee was a prefix to every public announcement on this policy. 
A key element of LI is the hypothesis that the preferences of domestic interest groups are 
aggregated by the `goverment', within an ideological framework and manifesto 
commitment, into government policies that are taken forward to intergovernmental 
negotiations, if appropriate. Yet, the formulation of the Saint Malo initiatives did not 
conform to LI's hypothesis of domestic policy formulation. Instead this research suggests 
that the PM and core executive, inspired by the work of the MoD's Policy Unit, created a 
pre-determined end-point. Having established a desired outcome the MoD and FCO had 
to reach agreement on this endpoint. The debate between the two departments was forced 
by the Pörtschach announcements, and then second order issues resolved at a later date. 
19 
The series of informal negotiations between the UK and French governments, particularly 
the respective British and French Ministries of Defence, were based on a series of lowest 
common denominator agreements. 20 However, this is not the case for the multiple bi- 
lateral negotiations between UK officials bargaining with officials from other EU 
indeed Sir Malcolm Riflcind argued that the MoD and FCO were sensitive to the controversy the policy 
would cause and to avoid incurring an effective US veto on the policy underplayed the range and scope of 
the policy. Paul Johnston, as an official who liaised with US officials gives the account a far more positive 
angle arguing that FCO officials kept US desk officers fully informed about developments and that a failure 
of this policy to reach senior officials was a failure of US bureaucracy rather than a British attempt to 
conceal policy details. 
19 This process is very similar to that outlined by Charles Lindblom in his article concerning the `science of 
muddling through', a description of decision making within bureaucratic organizations. 
20 This conclusion feeds into an emerging niche political literature in German political science known as 
`Durchwelsten' which argues that policy formulation is an iterative product of successive lowest common 
denominator agreements. For example, Franz Walter, `Durchwelsten until 2006? ', Die Welt (Berlin), 28`h 
June 2003. 
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governments. 21 These negotiations developed along higher than lower common 
denominator lines, because vetoes were likely in to be used in security and defence policy 
if the proposed agreement went beyond a perceived domestic win-set. Similarly, issue 
linkage, log-rolling and side-payment negotiating tools were not present in ESDP 
negotiations, although the negotiated outcome was greater than lowest common 
denominator because less influential governments were able to incorporate these in the 
final policy without disrupting the core tenets of the agreement. 22 
Intergovernmental Bargaining 
Intergovernmental bargaining is the second core element of LI's explanation of European 
integration. LI argues that governments are rational actors who negotiate to maximise 
their national interests. The rationalism of governments is not just a feature of their 
interaction with other governments. LI holds as an intellectual reference point the work of 
Robert Putnam who describes a two-level game in international negotiations 23 The two 
levels of this game are international negotiations and domestic politics. The essence of 
this work is that governments negotiate to maximise their national interests in an issue 
specific area or across a broad range of issues but that any agreement struck between 
governments must also fulfil win-sets within domestic constituencies. In short, no 
national government can negotiate and agree to measures that jeopardise the electoral 
survival of the government. 
21 For example, chapter four, page 180. 
22 For example, chapter four, page 168. 
23 Robert Putnam, `Two-Level Games', op. cit, p. 436. 
243 
Following this, LI argues that a government's policy is determined by ideological 
preferences, pressures from external stimuli, and the aggregated preferences of domestic 
interest groups. Furthermore, if a government can negotiate a collaborative policy close to 
the preferences of the domestic win-set providers ratification will be easily achieved. 
Domestic pressure creates demand for international solutions and the negotiated results 
from IGCs provides supply side solutions. This thesis argues that only one identifiable 
producer group, the MoD, exerted pressure on the government's defence policy. Within 
the MoD only the Policy Unit and the Secretary of State, George Robertson exerted 
pressure through the formulation of the Saint Malo initiatives, between November 1997 
and May 1998, and then latterly Lord Guthrie provided important support for the Prime 
Minister's chosen policy outcome. 
LI argues that the threat of exclusion or failure of the negotiations, of there being no 
agreement is the largest motivator for bargaining governments at the European Council. 
The rational trade-off for governments is whether the absence of a domestic win-set 
overrides the consequences of failing to reach an international agreement. This 
motivation is certainly true of the French government who suggested numerous last- 
minute amendments to the agreed ESDP texts, at the Nice European Council after the 
policy had been agreed, which UK negotiators said they would reject. In the face of the 
UK government's threat French negotiators withdrew their amendments in order to 
prevent failure at the Nice European Council. Evidence from Foreign Office and 
European Secretariat officials suggested that the government would have allowed the 
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Nice Treaty to fail rather than accepting a significant breach of their negotiating red- 
lines 24 
LI argues that governments are the principal units in the international system and the EU. 
The EU does, however, retain an element of supranational policy entrepreneurship, 
through the European Council, European Parliament and European Court of Justice. 
However, in the case of the ESDP the European Commission and Parliament had 
particular views which they asserted in the General Affairs Council at Nice but which 
were excluded by the member governments from the informal bi- and multi-lateral 
negotiations between the government on ESDP. Consequently, this thesis has strongly 
argues that within ESDP negotiations national governments were the principal actors, and 
more precisely the only actors of significance. However, as chapter four argues not all 
governments had the same influence over the direction of the negotiations. The level of 
influence was determined by the respective government's interest in security and defence 
policy, their ability to project their preferences and create coalitions of governments 
around a policy area. 
LI also argues that international bargaining is dominated by major governments. LI's 
definition of a major government is determined by the policy area but is largely based 
24 To a certain extent this is part and parcel of an official line that would necessarily have to be given by 
negotiating officials. They could not say that the government would agree to any measure before them. In 
the particular case of ESDP the statement about redlines is largely superfluous because of the very close 
management of the process by Foreign and Cabinet Office officials so whilst Interview E argued that the 
government would have allowed the Treaty to fail Interview M acknowledged that the opportunity for 
failure was limited by the good management of relations between the Cabinet and Foreign Office 
negotiators and the other negotiating governments. 
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around the notion that the UK, French and German governments constituting the major 
governments of the EU, especially in respect of security and defence policy. 25 
The original Saint Malo proposal was formulated in the British MoD and brought into the 
international forum by Tony Blair and officials from the European Secretariat of the 
Cabinet Office, in October and then December 1998 at Pörtschach and Saint Malo 
respectively. They then worked in close collaboration with the French government to 
ensure that win-sets were achieved in both countries for this initiative. Germany pursued 
a policy of constructive engagement without taking a prominent role in the policy's 
development. This reflected a reluctance to engage too closely in debates about additional 
German contributions to European security, not least because of problems being 
experienced by the German economy. The leading role played by the core executives of 
the UK and French governments demonstrated the pre-eminent position of the major 
governments within the Saint Malo process. This argument is further strengthened by a 
study of the agreed texts at Saint Mato and the Presidency Conclusions of the European 
Council at Nice that outline the ESDP - the final negotiated output remained very faithful 
to the spirit of the original text -a point that was highlighted by key members of the 
British negotiating team. 26 
25 `F, D and UK direction is a short hand. These three states are distributed across the spectrum of state 
preferences on many issues and thus representative, and because others are dependent on them, what they 
do unilaterally tends to have a big impact. If I were doing fisheries, obviously Ireland is a superpower. In 
defense, the rest of the countries are irrelevant anyway. ' Moravcsik highlights the issue specific nature of 
what is a major government by highlighting that in fishing issues, for example, Ireland and Spain are major 
overnments. Letter from Andrew Moravcsik, `Question LI', op. cit; 
6 This was particularly stressed by Interview D, one of the two key negotiators at Saint Malo and also by 
commentators Lord Wallace and Sir Timothy Garden, who commented on how surprised they were that the 
Nice outcome matched the Saint Malo Accords so closely. 
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LI's analysis that international agreements are only struck where national interests 
converge is part of the theory's rational foundations. The importance of defence and 
security policy to governments meant that the responsibility for policy formulation and 
deploying military assets would be retained by governments rather than being transferred 
to the EU. Importantly, the convergence of UK and French governments' defence and 
security preferences at Saint Malo - that formed the basis of ESDP - led to preference 
convergence across the fifteen governments. Where fundamental interests could not be 
reconciled through negotiation they were not included in the Accords or the Presidency's 
Conclusions. 
The perception of defence as an area of core sovereignty meant that the negotiating 
parameters established by the British and French MoD and Foreign Office negotiating 
teams were extremely difficult to break. The absence of persuasive interest groups 
opposing the policy and a very large Parliamentary majority gave UK negotiators 
considerable theoretical leeway. The red-lines that were established by the UK core 
executive were difficult to breach because of a self-imposed discipline enhanced by the 
public expression of these red-lines by the FCO. The outcome of Saint Malo, which may 
be exceptional within post-second world war and EU history, was a lowest common 
denominator agreement between France and the UK. The common interests between the 
French and UK governments were, for some interviewees, surprisingly considerable and 
enough to create a substantive policy initiative. To achieve convergence between the 
other EU governments at the Nice European Council, the original Saint Malo outcome 
was extended through allowing policy tools to be added to the final agreement by post 
247 
neutral countries like Ireland and Sweden such as humanitarian and peace support roles. 27 
A number commentators interviewed for thesis argued that only the UK and French 
governments have intensive defence preferences and the remaining thirteen governments, 
within varying degrees were content to allow the UK, French and US governments to 
shoulder a disproportionate burden of the financial and military weight of European 
security. 28 
The negotiated ESDP therefore provides a lowest common denominator agreement 
between all the European governments, as the Presidency Conclusions did not breach any 
of their fundamental preferences and with little constraint from any other groups. As a 
result it can be argued that the Saint Malo negotiations were the crucial negotiations in 
the development of the ESDP. 
The ESDP case study partly validates LI's hypothesis that IGC negotiations are the result 
of governmental interest convergence. This thesis argues that UK officials managed to 
find policy formulae that ensured that the UK's defence and security preferences 
converged with the other EU governments who had very modest issue-specific interests. 
Whilst this acquiescence could be interpreted as interest convergence, the phrasing of 
convergence implies a positive choice to reach agreement. The evidence suggests, 
however, that other EU governments who were willing to accept ESDP with additional 
humanitarian and peace support extensions were not significantly engaged in the 
negotiations. 
27 See chapter four, page 168. 
28 See chapter five, page 202-3. 
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LI also argues that international structural factors, or externalities, can in `exceptional 
cases' shape national policies but that predominantly it is domestic interest group 
pressure that informs government choices. The evidence from the ESDP process again 
does not support this hypothesis in its entirety. This research suggests that international 
structural factors associated with European security helped produce circumstances 
conducive to the formulation of ESDP. The end of the Cold War, the dissolution of the 
Warsaw Pact and the international failure to adequately deal with the crisis in the Balkans 
provided the stimuli, certainly within the British MoD and Downing Street, to think about 
whether the EU's military capabilities could be improved to deal with a range of 
humanitarian and peacekeeping operations. To this limited extent the ESDP example is 
an `exceptional case' as defined by Moravcsik as international structural factors drove the 
domestic policy formulation process to the exclusion of domestic interest groups. 29 
However, defence and security policy is necessarily guided by international structural 
factors because of the network of interdependencies and balances of power throughout 
the international system. No foreign, defence or security policy decision can realistically 
be taken without reference to the international context. Moreover, these 
interdependencies and balances create policy demands that can only be met by domestic 
supply side solutions like, for example, the change in UK defence policy and the Saint 
Malo initiative. 
29 The argument that has been advanced throughout this thesis has been that the motivation for the ESDP 
from the UK perspective was partly ideological, an inherent pro-EU ideology within the controlling group 
of the Labour party, partly a trade-off for the Prime Minister's unwillingness to engage in the single 
currency project and partly a response to the lessons of the Balkans where American intransigence led to 
closer working with European governments, particularly the French government, and a realization that to 
keep the US involved in EU security the EU would have to shoulder a greater amount of the burden. All 
three elements were necessary in leading the UK government to its position. 
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LI argues that governments act as a gatekeeper between the domestic and international 
bargaining tables. The evidence from the ESDP case study strong supports this view. This 
gatekeeper role serves to keep domestic political actors from the international bargaining 
table. The negotiations at the Nice European Council were conducted by a small cadre of 
negotiators from the Cabinet Office, COREPER, FCO and MoD. These negotiators were 
few in number and acted on behalf of their departments with delegated authority around 
the red-lines established by the PM and core executive. These negotiators would only 
refer back to their department when they felt an issue was close to the agreed red-lines or 
covered an area that has not got an established departmental position. Aside from these 
narrow circumstances the officials and ministers acting as negotiators operated in a 
vacuum with control over the flow of information back to their home departments. 
Neither parliamentarians, nor Labour party officials were kept informed of how the 
negotiations were proceeding. ESDP was negotiated separately from the institutional and 
procedural reforms that were a significant part of the business at the Nice European 
Council and there was therefore, very little issue linkage. Evidence from the British 
negotiating team at Nice suggested that the negotiations concerning ESDP were all but 
concluded before the final four days of the IGC at Nice (7-11 December 2000). ESDP 
articles were concluded early in the Council to avoid the ESDP being linked to 
negotiations regarding institutional reforms, something the French Presidency had an 
attempt at doing after agreement on ESDP had been effectively reached. 
The co-ordination between the UK MoD, FCO, Downing Street, European Secretariat of 
the Cabinet Office and UKREP before the Nice negotiations (February-December 2000) 
clearly established British negotiating positions. The UK negotiating team placed great 
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emphasis on the coordination of the negotiating strands, through COREPER, and in 
briefing the political negotiators about the issue area and how British interests might be 
maximised. This research strongly suggested that the UK negotiating team acted in a 
closely coordinated way facilitating their role as a gatekeeper between the domestic and 
international bargaining table. 
LI advances the argument that international bargains are agreed where the benefits to 
individual governments outweigh the costs that might be incurred by a collaborative 
policy area. Moreover, the threat of non-agreement (the entire package being vetoed on 
the failure of one element of policy) meant that each agreed policy must be the lowest 
common denominator policy between the fifteen governments. After the agreement at 
Saint Malo the UK and French governments took this agreement forward to the agenda of 
the Nice IGC to see whether these proposals would find support from their fellow EU 
governments. The Swedish, Danish and Irish government put forward policy additions 
with particular emphasis on humanitarian and soft-security roles. These proposals did not 
adversely affect the core ESDP agreement but did widen the range of additional items 
that allowed those governments to find win-sets within their domestic political system. 
Thus, this research supports LI's arguments that EU agreements are founded on the basis 
of lowest common denominator positions 30 
30 However, it should be noted that whilst the evidence of this thesis is that this is true for the UK and the 
formulation of the ESDP it may well not be true for other EU governments. Further research would need to 
be done to ascertain whether this conclusion is applicable across a majority of member states. 
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LI's assumption that governments are the principal actors in the international system and 
the EU necessarily leads to the conclusion that the EU is merely a forum through which 
the co-ordination of multiple governments policies can be regulated with low transaction 
costs. The case study of the ESDP reinforced this view of the EU, principally because 
there was no control over the policy by the EU's supranational institutions - 
implementation of the policy was purely intergovernmental and voluntary. One of the 
important functions of ESDP is that it serves as a way of avoiding having to create new 
agreements between governments for each new military operation. 
As LI suggests ESDP is a policy designed to co-ordinate, regulate and manage national 
policies, reducing transaction and operational costs. This conclusion may be somewhat 
limited to ESDP because of its voluntaristic and intergovernmental foundations. Other 
EU policy areas, notably trade and social policy, vest a greater degree of control over the 
policies, particularly the enforcement of decisions, within the supranational institutions of 
the EU. The exceptionalism of ESDP as it was conceptualised is that the member 
governments retain control over whether assets are contributed, with the EU merely 
providing the forum through which these policies can be co-ordinated, supporting LI's 
contention. 
Sovereignty Transfer 
The final element of LI subject to critical evaluation in this thesis is the explanation of 
why governments seek to make limited transfers of sovereignty. LI argues that the EU is, 
at its core, a tool by which governments can express and secure their national interests. 
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As rational actors, governments seek to make limited transfers of sovereignty if the 
outcome will be Pareto-efficient. LI further argues that governments only seek to make 
limited transfers of sovereignty when this secures credible collective actions thus the 
mutual transfer of sovereignty effectively acts to lock in governments preventing 
defection from agreement thus binding one legislature to another. 
The concept of sovereignty has played an important role in the European integration 
literature and in popular discourse about the UK's role in the EU. In broad terms, 
sovereignty can be defined as what ties the international to the domestic through linking 
independence from outside interference (autonomy) with the government's authority over 
its internal jurisdiction. 31 This is also known as the `Westphalian System' and as Francis 
Hinsley argues, `... these two assertions are complementary. They are the inward and 
outward expressions, the obverse and reverse sides of the same idea. '32 James Caporaso 
argues that the importance of Westphalian concepts of sovereignty are to demonstrate that 
domestic and international political systems are distinct and to also show how the 
domestic and international political systems interact with each other. 33 This system is 
premised on the role of national boundaries and third party governments respecting the 
internal authority of their partner governments. This approach is limited when applied to 
the EU because of the multiple levels of governance in the Union as a product of the 
transfer of national sovereignty to supranational institutions. 
The creation and operation of the EU is premised on the delegation and pooling of 
31 Francis Hinsley, Sovereignty (2' Edition). Cambridge Unversity Press, (Cambridge), 1986, p. 158. 32 Ibid. 
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sovereignty. Indeed, many analysts like Tanja Börzel, James Caporaso, and Liesbet 
Hooghe have argued that an important consequence of European integration is that the 
autonomy and authority of EU governments is weakened. 34 Approaches to sovereignty 
within the EU have focused on the multi-leveled nature of actors and authority within the 
Union. The constructivist approach to sovereignty has provided a challenge to the 
Westphalian account. Constructivists have argued that sovereignty and statehood are 
inter-subjective entities rather than a description of a factual situation. 5 Liesbet Hooghe 
and Gary Marks argue, in analyzing the EU from a constructivist perspective, `.. one does 
not have to argue that states are on the verge of political extinction to believe that their 
control of those living in their territories has significantly weakened. 'M Hooghe and 
Marks argue that `authority' rather than the competencies a government holds, is the 
crucial determinant of sovereignty. 37 Moreover, they argue that economic and political 
control by the EU affects the ability of member governments to act and that governments 
cannot be said to be sovereign if the only competency they retain is the defence of their 
territory. 38 Other multilevel governance theories, like that advanced by Ben Rosamond, 
33 James Caporaso, `The European Union and forms of state: Westphalian, regulatory, or post- 
modern? ', Journal of Common Market Studies. Vol. 34, No. 1, pp. 29-52. 34 Tanja Börzel, & Thomas Risse, `Who is Afraid of a European Federation? How to Constitutionalize a 
Multi-Level Governance System? ' In Christian Joerges, Yves Meny, J. H. H. Weiler (eds), What Kind of 
Constitution for What Kind of Polity? Responses to Joschka Fischer, Florence: European University 
Institute, (Florence), 2000, pp. 45-59; James Caporaso, `The European Union and Forms of State: 
Westphalian, Regulatory or Post-Modem? ' op. cit, pp. 29-52; Liesbet Hooghe, and Gary Marks, Multi-Level 
Governance and European integration, Rowman & Littlefield, (Boulder), 2001; Gary Marks, Liesbet 
Hooghe, and Kermit Blank, `European integration since the 1980s, op. cit, pp. 341-78; Thomas Risse- 
Kappen, `Exploring the Nature of the Beast: International Relations Theory and Comparative Policy 
Analysis Meet the European Union. ', Journal of Common Market Studies Vol. 34, No. 1,1996, pp. 53-80; 
Philippe Schmitter, `Imagining the Future of the Euro-Polity with the Help of New Concepts' in Gary 
Marks, Fritz Scharpf, Philippe Schmitter, and Wolfgang Streeck (Eds), Governance in the European Union, 
Sage, (London), 1996, pp. 1-14; Alec Stone Sweet, & Wayne Sandholtz, `European integration and 
Supranational Governance', Journal of European Public Policy, Vol. 4, No. 3,1997, pp. 297-317. 35 Markus Jachtenfuchs, `Conceptualizing European Governance', in Knud Jorgensen (Ed), Reflective 
Approaches to European Governance, MacMillan, (London), 1997, pp. 39-50, p. 43. 36 Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Marks, Multi-level Governance and European Integration, op. cit, p. 27. 37 Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Marks, Multi-level Governance and European Integration, op. cit, p. 5-6. 3e Gary Marks, Liesbet Hooghe, and Kermit Blank, `European integration from the 1980s', pp. 341-378. 
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describe the EU in broad terms encapsulating power relationships at different moments 
during policy formulation and negotiation. Analysis of these interchanges leads to 
Rosamond's description of the EU as a `polycentric polity' 39 
Alexander Wendt's approach to the question of sovereignty is informed by practical 
considerations. He advances the argument that if governments deal with each other in a 
way that indicates they believe they are sovereign, they are. 40 Furthermore, Wouter 
Werner and Jaap de Wilde argue that'... the reality of sovereignty consists in its use and 
acceptance. '41 There is, therefore, no settled position concerning the EU and national 
sovereignty but there is a growing and diverse literature on the subject. This research fits 
within the literature on Westphalian sovereignty because it argued that the transfer of 
sovereignty was a critical element of the UK government's `red-lines' on ESDP but it 
also considered the role of exogenous influences on governments placing it within a soft 
constructivist critique consistent with the use of `as-if positivism used in this thesis. 
The evidence from the ESDP case study suggests that the UK government can be 
conceptualised as a rational actor. The cost-benefit analysis of the Saint Malo process for 
the British government produced a far greater benefit than the potential costs of the loss 
of domestic control over defence and security policy and risks to the existing balances of 
power in the international system. In particular, these costs were limited by the efforts of 
the British MoD and FCO through close liaison with the US Pentagon, State Department 
39 Ben Rosamond, `Globalization and multi-level governance in Europe', paper for conference on 
Globalization and its implications for Europe and the United States, Atlanta, March 1999. 
40 Alexander Wendt, `Anarchy is what states make of it: The social construction of power politics', 
International Organization, Vol. 46, No. 2,1992, pp. 391-425, p. 410. a' Wouter Werner & Jaap de Wilde, `The Endurance of Sovereignty', European Journal of International 
Relations, Vol. 7, No. 3,2001, pp. 283-313, p. 304 
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and Whitehouse to assure them about the UK's intentions for the ESDP and that 
initiatives were consistent with the US government's stated policies. Extensive 
consultation with the various departments of the US and the Turkish governments is an 
important dynamic of ESDP formulation that is under-explored by LI's explanation of 
European integration. The meeting between UK and French MoD and FCO officials 
(May-December 1998) were important because they secured French agreement for a 
British plan to change elements of the European security structures which the French 
government was known to hold intense preferences on. UK officials perceived a need to 
achieve an agreement with the French government that met British preferences, before 
broadening negotiations to the European Union member governments. Once this period 
of highest risk to UK defence preferences was over and the Saint Malo Accords were 
signed, subject to some important steps, the potential `costs' that could be incurred by the 
UK government through transferring sovereignty were minor, indeed limited merely to 
the policy additions granted to 'post-neutral' governments. 
The analysis presented in this thesis fits into a body of literature that focuses on rational 
explanations of EU integration. Analysts using a rationalist approach seek to explain EU 
institutions and integration view preferences as exogenous to institutions they study. The 
clearest exposition of this view comes from LI. Other analysts like Geoffrey Garrett have 
extended LI's basic approach with formalised rational approaches to strategic interaction 
between governments. 42 Further formal extensions have occurred through the evaluation 
of transaction problems in integration, examining how these problems have manifested 
42 Geoffrey Garrett, `International Co-operation and Institutional Choice', op. cit, pp. 533-60; Geoffrey 
Garrett and Barry Weingast, 'Ideas, interests and institutions: constructing the European Community's 
internal market', in Judy Goldstein and Robert Keohane, Ideas and Foreign Policy. Cornell University 
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themselves across different policy areas. 43 The explanatory goals of these approaches, to 
explain institutions and integration, have remained stable and the premise on which this is 
done (the role of exogenous preferences) have remained broadly similar. This research 
supplements this literature having critically evaluated the fundamental tenets on which 
these theories are based. 
The transfer of sovereignty from the UK government to the EU in ESDP is very limited. 44 
Indeed the key areas in which the transfer of defence and security sovereignty has 
occurred supported LI's argument that EU negotiated outcomes reflected and codified 
informal arrangements between member governments. ESDP focussed on issues within 
which common interests lay. For example, agreements have already been reached on 
research, development and procurement projects through the single market provisions, the 
most obvious being the Eurofighter Typhoon project. The significance of the ESDP 
negotiations lies in the potential they established to take European defence and security 
policy into areas where eventually larger transfers of sovereignty might occur. 
5 In 
summary, the rationalist foundations of LI's explanation of sovereignty transfer was 
validated by ESDP negotiations. 
Press, (Ithaca), 1993, pp. 173-206. 
43 Katja Weber, `Institutional choice in international politics: a glimpse at EU member's industrial policies', 
Presented at the 38th Annual Convention of the International Studies Association, Toronto, 1997; Mark 
Pollack, `Creeping competencies: the expanding agenda of the European Community', Journal of Public 
Policy. Vol. 14, No. 2,1995, pp. 98-145. 
44 See Chapter five, pages 202-205. 
45 Richard Hatfield, `The Consequences of Saint Malo', op. cit. 
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LI has been subject to a number of theoretical critiques. 46 Some of the criticisms these 
studies produced on LI have argued that international negotiations are not a process of 
governments trying to maximise national interests in each issue area. Moreover, they 
argue that negotiators are willing to accept disadvantageous negotiations on some issues 
providing that the entire negotiated package has more potential benefits than costs. 47 
Similarly, some studies have argued that LI fails to take full account of the role of the 
EU's supranational institutions and does not adequately explain the process by which 
governments formulate policy. 48 This thesis builds on these critiques by arguing that, at 
least in the example of ESDP, domestic policy formulation is a not a process by which 
governments aggregate the preferences of domestic interest groups. Instead policy 
formulation is a process in which the core executive, in the context of positive 
externalities and an ideological platform, creates a distinctive policy goal and then seeks 
support from domestic producer groups. The evidence of this thesis is that the sequencing 
within domestic policy formulation is contrary to that suggested by LI. 
46 Philip Budden, The Single European Act, op. cit; Oran Young, `Comment on Andrew Moravcsik `A New 
Statecraft? Supranational Entrepreneurs and International Cooperation', International Organization, Vol. 53, 
No. 4, pp. 805-810.; Thomas Diez, `Riding the AM Track', op. cit,; Daniel Wincott, `Towards and Everyday 
Account', op. cit; Anthony Forster, `The Maastricht Treaty', op. cit; James Caporasa, Helen Wallace, Fritz 
Sharpf, `Symposium on The Choice for Europe', op. cit. 
47 Jeremy Richardson, Governing Under Pressure, op. cit;, John Peterson, `Decision making in the European 
Union', op. cit. 
48 Helen Wallace, `Institutions in a decentralised community', op. cit; Anthony Forster, Britain and the 
Maastricht Negotiations, St. Antony's/Macmillan Press, (Basingstoke), 1999; Philip Budden, The Single 
European Act, op. cit. 
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ESDP did not demand a significant transfer of sovereignty, and thus remained an 
intergovernmental policy of the EU. This thesis has highlighted that the formulation of 
British defence policy was not motivated by the preferences of domestic producer groups 
but was driven by a core executive of officials and politicians in Downing Street, the 
MoD and FCO. This conclusion adds to the analysis of Budden and Forster who all argue 
that LI's account of domestic policy formulation is inadequate and requires theoretical 
correctives. This thesis also adds to the literature concerning international bargaining. It 
argues, contrary to this literature, that ESDP bargaining was a process of rational 
negotiations, in which agreement centred on lowest common denominator positions. 
In summary, this thesis casts doubt on LI's explanation of domestic policy formulation 
and offers a corrective to this element of the theory. Moreover, LI's explanation of 
negotiated outcomes as the product of national interest convergence is similarly found to 
be narrow in its scope and understanding. The balance of the evidence from ESDP 
negotiations is that outcomes are not the product of a convergence of 15 governments but 
rather the product of a convergence of originating government's interests and the 
agreement, with additions from the remaining governments. 
Governments with high-level capabilities, intense preferences and the ability to formulate 
coalitions around an issue, like the UK and France, are a conditional part of reaching 
issue convergence. Governments who do not possess intense issue specific capabilities 
and preferences can, from the research of this thesis, request reasonable extensions to 
policies. However, it can be argued that even with the more nuanced explanation 
advanced by this thesis a convergence of interests does occur between governments. LI 
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presents a persuasive account of negotiating behaviour. The rational actor model 
espoused by LI is supported by the case study of the UK government's approach to ESDP 
and in the negotiations at the Nice European Council. Moreover, there was also 
considerable evidence that on an iterative basis government negotiators make rational 
choices about whether any given negotiation meets their interests, the interests of the 
other negotiators, and a win-set amongst domestic interest groups and Parliament. 
The Saint Malo process provides a window into the processes, relationships and actors 
within Tony Blair's government. The popular conception of the Blair government as one 
that is controlled by a cadre of politicians and officials within the Cabinet Office and 
Downing Street and this is supported by the interview evidence presented by this thesis 49 
Moreover, that a pattern of Prime Ministerial behaviour, one that mixes an ideological 
preference for Europe and a willingness to engage in policy innovation, provided the 
setting for policy entrepreneurship in the MoD to launch the Saint Malo initiatives. 
Analysis of the Saint Malo process is riddled with paradoxes and surprises. For example, 
whilst the Policy Directorate of the MoD carefully scrutinised the `Saint Malo' policy 
proposal, mapping out numerous possible outcomes, the PM and core executive did not. 
The PM's concerns focussed on the broader impacts of the initiative, for example, 
whether this marked out the Labour government as being pro-European, and whether the 
initiative would lead to the EU being militarily strengthened and thus lead to the US 
retaining their role in European security. Without personal expertise in defence and with 
49 Dan Balz, 'Britain's Prime Minister assumes Presidential air, Blair uses strong personality to consolidate 
power', The Washington Post, (Washington DC), 2 October 1997, p. A20; Andrew Grice and Colin Brown, 
`Blair faces backlash over `control freakery', The Independent, (London), 22 March 1999, p. 1; Jonathan 
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reassurances, from his key advisers, on the scope and likely outcomes of this initiative the 
PM was happy to proceed with the Saint Malo initiative without consulting more widely 
initiating a full debate in Parliament or undertaking a formalised defence review. 
Similarly, in the context of British defence history this alteration of policy, was 
completed in a very short space of time. The Prime Minister expended some of the 
considerable political capital he had from being newly elected to advance this policy 
without facing a credible or concerted opposition. Furthermore, the speed and 
inexperience of the PM in these issues points towards a fundamental trust in officials like 
Richard Hatfield, Emyr Jones-Parry and Sir Stephen Wall to warn of the potential pitfalls 
of, for example, transferring core national sovereignty. 
In terms of process, government policy is necessarily formulated by a small number of 
officials in the first instance and then considered by a small number of political actors 
within the Cabinet and core executive. The Saint Malo initiative is exceptional in that the 
acquisition of win-sets for this policy were so easily achieved considering the policy 
potentially impinged on core national sovereignty. This is an element of domestic policy 
formulation that is under-specified by LI as it focuses on the outcome rather than the 
process itself. In the ESDP case study, the process provides important context and details 
about why the policy was formulated. 
The juxtaposition of the PM's light-touch approach to the detail of the Saint Malo 
initiative with the interventionist approach taken in determining the pace of the policy led 
to political risks being taken at Pörtschach and Saint Malo. The first of these occurred on 
Freedland, `The latest control freakery may have damaged the New Labour brand, but the Blair brand 
remains pristine', The Guardian, (Manchester), 24 October 2001, p. 21. 
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the PM's aircraft to Pörtschach where he took the decision to curtail the departmental 
debate between the MoD and FCO and signalled Britain's intentions to be positive on the 
European defence policy. Similarly, at Saint Malo, the initial failure to agree policy 
between the French and British governments created risks in allowing Richard Hatfield 
and Emyr Jones-Parry to negotiate from fresh with the French Defence Ministry 
negotiator on an important government initiative. Moreover, additional risks were taken 
in accepting, within a fifteen-minute timeframe, the agreed text from the negotiations. 
Both of these events suggest risks, which cast some doubt on LI's argument that the 
delegation of national sovereignty is conducted in a careful and considered manner. It 
should be noted that neither summit resulted in a direct transfer of sovereignty but 
established the framework in which this occurred. 
The most striking conclusion, which has implications for the general study of British 
politics, is the behaviour of the Prime Minister when he decides to intervene in a policy 
area. When the PM decides to intervene in a policy its direction is determined by him and 
the core executive whilst the detail is managed by the relevant department. The example 
of Saint Malo adds weight to the analysis by Anthony Seldon and Peter Hennessy of the 
Prime Minister as chief executive figure within a `Napoleonic' bureaucratic system. so 
Research across other issue areas like asylum and immigration, street crime and education 
where the Prime Minister has enjoyed a high profile role would add critical mass to this 
analysis. 
As a critique of integration theory this thesis has argued that, with two correctives 
concerning domestic policy formulation and issue convergence aside, that LI is effective 
50 See chapter three, page 108. 
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in explaining the development and negotiation of ESDP. Notwithstanding the under- 
specification of domestic policy formulation processes, there was little evidence that 
falsified LI's explanation of EU policy integration. However, several crucial factors 
should be noted. First, that ESDP, from specification to codification, was a solely 
intergovernmental policy and so logically would be the sole preserve of the member 
governments. Moravcsik's explanation of IGC negotiations is arguably reductive in 
nature. On Moravcsik's own terms LI provides an adequate and accurate explanation of 
European integration, in which the results of informal or `every-day' policy making is 
codified into treaty amendments. This thesis has raised an important question mark over 
this element of LI suggesting that there is great utility in looking outside of the formal 
IGC negotiating framework where important agreements, like the Saint Malo Accords, 
are secured. Second, the negotiations concerning ESDP were confined to this policy 
rather than being linked to a wider package of negotiations. The Nice Council 
negotiations concentrated on institutional reforms, re-weighting of votes in the council, 
reform of the European Parliament and ESDP. 
The negotiations on institutional reform occurred in the final four days of the IGC, with 
little agreement having been found between February and December 2000. The defence 
negotiations were settled, however, before the final four days of the IGC. Thus, as the 
defence negotiations were solely concerned with `defence issues', bargaining on other 
issues did not have an impact on defence. Indeed, there is evidence to suggest the fifteen 
governments could have launched ESDP without the formal ratification of a new treaty. 
This means that the rational equation of costs and benefits for government agreement 
were limited to defence issues, thus LI's argument that governments negotiate on issue- 
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specific criteria is supported. Third, that the ESDP demands only a small transfer of 
national defence and security sovereignty and therefore is naturally conducive to 
intergovernmentalist explanation. This transfer occurs in the nomenclature of military 
action and in the prospects for future development of the policy into permanent 
autonomous standing forces or procurement policy. Only further research into emerging 
areas of EU policy and the negotiations at subsequent European Councils will 
demonstrate whether LI has the ability to explain all intergovernmental negotiations. 
Where LI is at its most useful is in providing a description of a pattern of governmental 
behaviour before and during IGC negotiations rather than a parsimonious theory of 
European integration. Having said this the analysis and conclusions drawn from the 
British case study awaits broader endorsement or rebuttal on the basis of multiple issue or 
multiple government case studies of the Nice IGC. 
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Annex A- Saint Maio Accords 
JOINT DECLARATION ON EUROPEAN DEFENCE (04/12/98) 
JOINT DECLARATION ISSUED AT THE BRITISH-FRENCH SUMMIT, SAINT-MALO, 
FRANCE, 3-4 DECEMBER 1998 
The Heads of State and Government of France and the United Kingdom are agreed that: 
1. The European Union needs to be in a position to play its full role on the international stage. This 
means making a reality of the Treaty of Amsterdam, which will provide the essential basis for action 
by the Union. It will be important to achieve full and rapid implementation of the Amsterdam 
provisions on CFSP. This includes the responsibility of the European Council to decide on the 
progressive framing of a common defence policy in the framework of CFSP. The Council must be able 
to take decisions on an intergovernmental basis, covering the whole range of activity set out in Title V 
of the Treaty of European Union. 
2. To this end, the Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military 
forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international 
crises. 
In pursuing our objective, the collective defence commitments to which member states subscribe (set 
out in Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, Article V of the Brussels Treaty) must be maintained. In 
strengthening the solidarity between the member states of the European Union, in order that Europe 
can make its voice heard in world affairs, while acting in conformity with our respective obligations in 
NATO, we are contributing to the vitality of a modernised Atlantic Alliance which is the foundation of 
the collective defence of its members. 
Europeans will operate within the institutional framework of the European Union (European Council, 
General Affairs Council, and meetings of Defence Ministers). 
The reinforcement of European solidarity must take into account the various positions of European 
states. 
The different situations of countries in relation to NATO must be respected. 
3. In order for the European Union to take decisions and approve military action where the Alliance as 
a whole is not engaged, the Union must be given appropriate structures and a capacity for analysis of 
situations, sources of intelligence, and a capability for relevant strategic planning, without unnecessary 
duplication, taking account of the existing assets of the WEU and the evolution of its relations with the 
EU. In this regard, the European Union will also need to have recourse to suitable military means 
(European capabilities pre-designated within NATO's European pillar or national or multinational 
European means outside the NATO framework). 
4. Europe needs strengthened armed forces that can react rapidly to the new risks, and which are 
supported by a strong and competitive European defence industry and technology. 
5. We are determined to unite in our efforts to enable the European Union to give concrete expression 
to these objectives. 
BRITISH-FRENCH SUMMIT: PRESS CONFERENCE (04/12/98) 
EDITED TRANSCRIPT OF PRESS CONFERENCE BY PRESIDENT JACQUES CHIRAC, 
PRIME MINISTER LIONEL JOSPIN AND PRIME MINISTER TONY BLAIR, BRITISH- 
FRENCH SUMMIT, SAINT-MALO, FRANCE, FRIDAY 4 DECEMBER 1998 
PRESIDENT CHIRAC: 
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The atmosphere which marked our discussions yesterday and today, at every level, was particularly 
warm and particularly full of trust and confidence. I see positive signs looking at the future, not only 
the Anglo-French future, but in more general terms looking at the European future. We are going to be 
facing tests from next year onwards, but I think that we are going to be solving the difficulties it in an 
atmosphere which has rarely been so warm. 
I would like to pay tribute and express my total support for the activities conducted by Tony Blair in 
Northern Ireland, with courage, tenacity and talent. Tony Blair wants to entrench peace in the minds 
and the hearts of all people of Northern Ireland by scrupulously applying, in a very dynamic way, the 
agreements which have been signed, and all of Europe -I can bear witness to this - is behind him as he 
does this. 
As for the main subjects that we discussed in our meetings, we raised the problem of foreign policy, 
security and defence policy. As for foreign policy and this new step which will lead Europe to new 
initiatives in foreign policy and security policy, we are all aware that this presupposes strong 
understanding between the United Kingdom and France, two countries which are amongst those with a 
strong tradition, both diplomatically and militarily. Therefore without true understanding and entente 
between the two countries, foreign and security policy of a joint nature could be conducted but 
wouldn't really be effective. So we intend to strengthen cooperation between France and the United 
Kingdom in this area. We have asked the competent Ministers, the Foreign Affairs Ministers and 
Defence Ministers, to work on developing our relations in these policy areas. 
We also raised the main problems facing the world today, in particular Africa and more specifically the 
crisis in the Great Lakes region. We noted that we must, more than in the past perhaps, work together 
to try and convince all the protagonists that an agreement, cease-fire and a peace conference is 
necessary and indeed inevitable. 
We then moved on to discuss defence issues. Europe is a long path marked by major milestones: the 
Common Market, the Single Market, the Euro in less than a month, and today employment. The next 
major challenge as we implement the Treaty of Amsterdam will be the European Union's confirmation 
on the international stage by means of a true foreign policy and a defence which Europeans will be able 
to implement when they need to naturally in the framework of their own commitments. This is the 
situation that I described to the Ambassador to France at the end of August and was picked up by the 
Prime Minister later on, hence our satisfaction when the British Prime Minister in Poertschach raised in 
a very positive way the role that the United Kingdom could play in defining a European defence policy. 
It is on the basis of that declaration in Poertschach that today, in St Malo, we together wanted to make 
a new, important step and the declaration that we have adopted bears witness to that. It confirms some 
basic fundamental principles, quite naturally the respect of Alliance commitments, that goes without 
saying, but also the role of the European Council, the purely intergovernmental nature of CFSP, the 
need to have autonomous capacity to act, resortion to European military resources within or outside 
NATO if necessary, a necessary adaptation of our military assets. And we sketched some plans about 
the paths that could be taken regarding organisation, ie the organisations which need to be created, and 
now we are going to work with all our partners, first and foremost with Germany, but also, of course, 
with our European partners and our American partners on this issue. 
Then we went on to raise the problems of Europe, quite naturally. We are all in favour of the proposal 
made by Chancellor Schroeder to deal in Cologne with the problems regarding Agenda 2000. We 
agreed that we need to stabilise expenditure at the level of 15, maintain the ceiling of 1.27 per cent and 
that, as far as methodology is concerned, we need to put everything on the table and consider that each 
should make a contribution to an overall agreement. We once again reminded the British Prime 
Minister of the importance that we attach to the European pact for employment and the European social 
model. 
As for the international monetary system, we believe that our positions are very close, regarding 
adapting and renovating the Bretton-Woods institutions, particularly the responsibility of the 
International Monetary Fund which will become more political in nature. I also said to the British 
Prime Minister that, with Chancellor Schroeder, we felt that in this area, during the G7 which will be 
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held in Cologne as well, we would, or should, look at problems raised by the necessary humanisation 
of globalisation. 
PRIME MINISTER BLAIR: 
Can I say to you, Mr President, that I have welcomed not just the fact of this summit, but also the 
immensely warm and generous spirit which you have shown towards us and with which the whole of 
this summit has been conducted. Can I thank you also very much for your words on Northern Ireland 
which are deeply appreciated. I think it is sometimes not fully appreciated how much people in 
Northern Ireland, and indeed in the whole of the United Kingdom, welcome the interest shown by our 
European partners in making sure that this process of building a lasting peace is sustained. 
On the topics that we discussed at our summit, I would like first of all to underline the importance of 
the statement that we have issued together on defence and common foreign and security policy. The 
relationship between the UK and France in this area is obviously central and when I began this debate 
at Poertschach in, as it were, opening up the British position, I recognised immediately that it would be 
extremely important for Britain and France to engage closely with each other upon it. I think that we 
have taken a very significant step forward in the statement that we issued today and I think it is vital for 
Europe to have a stronger and more coherent force and voice in international affairs. As we point out, 
this is fully in conformity with our existing alliances, in particular the Atlantic Alliance and NATO. 
But I think it is important that we lay out certain clear principles and we have done that today. I am 
quite sure that this is part of a relationship that will develop further in the future and I welcome that 
very much indeed. 
I also welcome the intervention that you have made in respect of Africa and resolving the conflict in 
the Great Lakes there and agree very much with the sentiments that we have expressed. The fact that 
we cooperate more closely in areas like Africa is extremely important. 
I welcome too the very strong bilateral initiatives on a range of different issues, including the 
implications of the millennium bug and the cultural exchanges also which are of importance to our two 
countries, developing the electronic village as part of a Dialogue 2000 between schools and colleges in 
France and Britain that we launched at the 1997 London Summit, and I particularly welcome too the 
work that is done on the small and medium size enterprises by Monsieur Pierret and Lord Simon. 
If I may also draw attention to the series of agreements that we have made in relation to transport 
because I think that is an important area of cooperation between our two countries. I also agree with 
you in respect of Agenda 2000, it is important that we manage to push that agenda forward 
constructively. 
On international finance, there are a series of initiatives, we have spoken very closely between our two 
countries on the need for stabilisation and reform in international finance. We have gotten over the 
most recent difficulties in the international markets, but I think we both recognise the importance of co- 
operating closely in this area. 
We have also again made the respective positions of our countries very clear on the subject of duty-free 
and the strong need to recognise the difficulties that this successor regime will give all our countries 
within the European Union. 
Finally if I may say once again how much we have enjoyed this summit, how much we have enjoyed 
the strong partnership and cooperation that it evidences between our two countries. Britain is indeed 
forging a new relationship in Europe, that is good for Britain, I hope it is good for Europe too, and I 
have no doubt at all that it is where the future interests of my country lie. 
PRIME MINISTER JOSPIN: 
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When I look back at the issues we have discussed I am more convinced than ever the Franco-British 
relationship is essential and vital to us. 
I won't repeat what the President of the Republic has said regarding the joint statement on security and 
defence which has been adopted, we are all aware that this is an important landmark, not only at this 
summit but in a wider context. I want to commend the excellent and very precise work that has been 
done by the officials, by the four Ministers, that has enabled us to achieve this result. The United 
Kingdom has moved on this matter, we moved too and I think that we need to do that in looking to the 
future defence and security policy for Europe, it is necessary that that policy goes forward through 
actions like this. 
We naturally talked quite a bit, and particularly in my talks with the Prime Minister, of Agenda 2000. 
France has said to its Spanish partners and to its German partners at the two recent summits we have 
had with them that we think that we cannot remain fixed, or we can't tussle about the issue. We have 
taken the German Chancellor at his word when he said that he wants to resolve these matters during the 
German Presidency and we have proposed that everything be put on the table, all our fears, all our 
hopes, in order to reach a compromise and that is the spirit that we are already working on. I think that 
our European partners will understand that. 
Naturally we dealt with several bilateral issues but which also have European implications. Duty-frees 
is a problem for hundreds of thousands of people, ordinary people, and I endorse what the Prime 
Minister and the President have said, we will hope to raise this at the political level at the Vienna 
Summit. We have also, of course, talked about tax. Now I know that talking about tax gives rise to hot 
debate in certain media. Neither the French nor the British have any thought about unifying taxes. 
Harmonisation does not mean uniform tax, nobody wants somebody else to choose for his country 
corporation tax or income tax. No. What we are talking about is first and foremost to reduce the 
number of tax havens which give rise to other problems with them as well. We want to avoid tax 
dumping, distortions in competition where tax practices discriminate in one way or another or represent 
unfair competition. It is in that spirit then, and being aware that, of course, this is the responsibility of 
individual governments, we want to work to try and do away with abuses in an area that is not only 
commercially unified but will soon be monetarily unified. But there is no question of any uniform tax. 
We talked about employment and jobs, looking forward to the Vienna Summit. We both said that we 
want to intensify the efforts begun at Luxembourg on this matter and other topics. We also talked about 
the aeronautic industry. We are told that there is to be a merger of companies. If that merger takes place 
then instead of having two interlocutors to deal with, we will have one. What we need is a balance 
between the nations and their industrial potential which was recalled by the President, the Prime 
Minister and Chancellor Kohl and by myself in a statement made on 9 November which talked about 
the building of a European aeronautical industry and also European space industry. We think that we 
have experience in aeronautics and that is a fact. We will go into the next phase in the same spirit, 
trying to build a balanced European aeronautics industry and we are very confident that we can do it. 
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Annex B- PSrtschach Press Conference 
1 Informal European summit Pörtschach, 24-25 October 1998 
PRIME MINISTER: 
First of all, let me congratulate the Austrian Presidency for a very well-organised and good informal 
summit. There are really three main issues that we discussed and debated together : 
The first was obviously the economic situation in the world and in Europe where we agree very 
strongly that both the European Union, G7 and others should take a concerted role and do whatever we 
can in order to promote greater confidence both in the financial markets and to boost the prospects of 
growth and employment in the world. 
Secondly, in respect of common foreign and security policy, there was a strong willingness, which the 
UK obviously shares, for Europe to take a stronger foreign policy and security role. This will arise 
particularly because we are going to be appointing two people to common foreign and security 
positions in the European Union in the next few months so it is something that is very much on our 
minds but we all agreed it was important that Europe should be able to play a better, more unified part 
in foreign and security policy decisions and certainly obviously we discussed specifically Europe closer 
to the people, ideas for that and subsidiarity where there was a very strong sense that we have to push 
on the process that was begun at Amsterdam on subsidiarity and get that implemented. 
QUESTION: 
Rumours were spread that your European colleagues gave you a standing ovation yesterday after your 
introduction to foreign policy and security affairs. What exactly made your colleagues applaud and 
could you elaborate on some important points in your speech? 
PRIME MINISTER: 
I am always willing to take credit for standing ovations even when they haven't happened and they are 
probably like most European rumours. I think there was a warm response certainly to what I said 
because people want to see Britain engaged with key arguments in Europe and as Kosovo has brought 
home to us, it is right that Britain and other European countries, as part of Europe, play a key and 
leading role and that we enhance our capability to make a difference in those situations. 
We are at the very beginning of that debate, we need to get the institutional mechanism right, we need 
to make sure that that institutional mechanism in no way undermines NATO but rather is 
complementary to it, we need to recognise that that will mean changes in our own defence capability 
and we also need the political will to back up whatever we do. 
A common and foreign security policy for the European Union is necessary, it is overdue, it is needed 
and it is high time we got on with trying to engage with formulating it and I think that people were 
pleased that Britain came to this with an open mind and was willing to participate in the debate and I 
think it is important that we do that. 
QUESTION: 
This weekend, you seem to be saying not a European army but you are clearly talking about the 
possible deployment of forces from European countries together in some way in a peacekeeping role 
maybe, is that a possibility? 
269 
PRIME MINISTER: 
Europe has that capability to do that now, and I am certainly not - repeat not - talking about a European 
army or anything like that at all, but the very purpose of having the European Security and Defence 
identity within NATO, which as I say was agreed in Berlin in 1996, was the recognition that there 
needed to be some form of European identity within NATO. Now that is where it is at the moment. All 
I am saying, and I am not saying more than this, is that we need to allow fresh thinking in this and it is 
important for Britain to be part of that thinking and not for us simply to stand there and say we are not. 
QUESTION: 
So, it would be an important pillar? 
PRIME MINISTER: 
There are all sorts of ideas that have been put forward on this and I think most people recognise the 
WEU is less than ideal, that was recognised clearly at Amsterdam. But we are not committed or 
wedded to fourth pillar ideas at all, I am not saying that, I simply want to start the debate. 
QUESTION: 
And what is the role of countries which are not members of NATO, like Sweden or Finland? 
PRIME MINISTER: 
Again, this is what we need to discuss because obviously there are countries that are members of the 
European Union that are neutrals and will guard that jealously, that is one of the things that you can 
debate. 
QUESTION: 
Because there was a rapid response on Kosovo in the sense that you were critical in China the other day 
of the fact that Milosevic hadn't really got the message? 
PRIME MINISTER: 
Sure, I think it is important, and it is still important in relation to Kosovo, that the only thing that was 
ever going to work in Kosovo was diplomacy backed up by the credible threat of force, and that is all 
that has brought Milosevic to the position he is in, and we need to keep him in that position now. But I 
think Kosovo simply underlines the need for Europe to take a very hard-headed review of this and to 
make sure that it can fulfil its obligations and responsibilities properly. 
QUESTION: 
You said that Europe should speak more forcefully on the international stage, but how could you 
appear more forceful when only NATO has the military capability to back up diplomacy? 
PRIME MINISTER: 
That is why I think we need to discuss how we take this debate forward. The very existence of the 
security and defence identity within NATO for Europe is an acceptance that there will be 
circumstances in which it is right to have that identity for Europe, but the European security and 
defence identity is very much within NATO. Now as I say, let us discuss the best way forward, though 
I repeat to you, nothing must happen which in any way impinges on the effectiveness of NATO, 
anything that suggests it should be complementary to that, because NATO for us is the absolute correct forum. 
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Annex C- Presidency Conclusions, European Council, Nice. 
NICE EUROPEAN COUNCIL PRESIDENCY CONCLUSIONS 
Press Release: Brussels (8/12/2000) Nr: 400/1/00 
IV. COMMON EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY 
13. The European Council approves the Presidency report, plus annexes, on the 
European security and defence policy (see Annex). 
14. The European Council calls on the next Presidency, together with the Secretary- 
GeneraUHigh Representative, to take forward work within the General Affairs 
Council, in accordance with the tasks assigned in the Presidency report. The 
objective is that the European Union should quickly be made operational in this area. 
A decision to that end will be taken by the European Council as soon as possible in 
2001 and no later than at its meeting in Laeken. The incoming Swedish Presidency is 
requested to report to the European Council in Göteborg on all of these matters. 
ANNEXES TO THE 
PRESIDENCY CONCLUSIONS 
NICE EUROPEAN COUNCIL MEETING 




ON THE EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY 
Introduction 
The aim of the efforts made since the Cologne, Helsinki and Feira European Councils is to give the 
European Union the means of playing its role fully on the international stage and of assuming its 
responsibilities in the face of crises by adding to the range of instruments already at its disposal an 
autonomous capacity to take decisions and action in the security and defence field. In response to 
crises, the Union's particular characteristic is its capacity to mobilise a vast range of both civilian and 
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military means and instruments, thus giving it an overall crisis-management and conflict-prevention 
capability in support of the objectives of the Common and Foreign Security Policy. 
In developing this autonomous capacity to take decisions and, where NATO as a whole is not engaged, 
to launch and conduct EU-led military operations in response to international crises, the European 
Union will be able to carry out the full range of Petersberg tasks as defined in the Treaty on European 
Union: humanitarian and rescue tasks, peace-keeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis 
management, including peacemaking. This does not involve the establishment of a European army. The 
commitment of national resources by Member States to such operations will be based on their 
sovereign decisions. As regards the Member States concerned, NATO remains the basis of the 
collective defence of its members and will continue to play an important role in crisis management. 
The development of the ESDP will contribute to the vitality of a renewed Transatlantic link. This 
development will also lead to a genuine strategic partnership between the EU and NATO in the 
management of crises with due regard for the two organisations' decision-making autonomy. 
The development of the European Security and Defence Policy strengthens the Union's contribution to 
international peace and security in accordance with the principles of the UN Charter. The European 
Union recognises the primary responsibility of the United Nations Security Council for maintaining 
peace and international security. 
The value of cooperation between the Union and the United Nations, as well as with the OSCE and the 
Council of Europe, as the Union develops its crisis-management and conflict-prevention capabilities 
has been emphasised in the context of the work carried out during the Presidency. In this context, the 
Secretary-General of the United Nations has also submitted a proposal for closer cooperation between 
the EU and the UN. In this respect the European Union welcomes the recent contacts between the 
Secretary-General of the United Nations, the Secretary-General/High Representative, the Presidency 
and the EU Troika. 
The development of European crisis-management capabilities increases the range of instruments for 
responding to crises available to the international community. The efforts made will enable Europeans 
in particular to respond more effectively and more coherently to requests from leading organisations 
such as the UN or the OSCE. This development is an integral part of strengthening the Common 
Foreign and Security Policy. 
In connection with the submission of this report, the Presidency noted that Denmark drew attention to 
Protocol No 5 annexed to the Treaty of Amsterdam on the position of Denmark. 
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF MILITARY CAPABILITIES AND THE 
STRENGTHENING OF CIVIL CRISIS MANAGEMENT CAPABILITIES 
(1) Elaboration of the headline goal and of the military capability goals 
established in Helsinki 
The main challenge for Member States is to develop military capabilities which can 
be put at the disposal of the EU for crisis management purposes. The aim is to 
mobilise Member States' efforts in this sphere. 
The Commitment Conference, which was held in Brussels on 20 November, 
demonstrated the Europeans' capability to satisfy fully, by their contributions in 
numerical terms, the needs identified to carry out the different types of crisis- 
management missions within the headline goal agreed in Helsinki. 
At this Conference the Member States also signalled their determination to make the 
necessary efforts to improve their operational capabilities further in order to carry out 
in full the most demanding of the Petersberg tasks, in particular as regards 
availability, deployability, sustainability and interoperability. As for their collective 
goals, the Member States agreed to pursue their efforts in the area of command and 
control, intelligence and strategic air and naval transport capabilities. 
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The Council approved the military capabilities commitment declaration published at 
the close of its meeting on 20 November and the definition of a "mechanism for 
evaluating military capabilities". 
Its aim is to enable the EU to ensure follow up and to facilitate progress towards the 
realisation of the commitments made with a view to achieving the headline goal, to 
review its aims in the light of changed circumstances and to contribute as well to 
ensuring compatibility of the commitments undertaken in the EU framework and, for 
the countries concerned, the goals accepted in the framework of NATO planning or 
the Planning and Review Process of the Partnership for Peace. These documents are 
annexed hereto. 
The ministerial meetings with the non-EU European NATO members and other 
countries which are candidates for accession in the follow-up to the Capabilities 
Commitment Conference made it possible to draw together pledges of additional 
contributions from these States with a view to their participation in EU-led 
operations. The Member States welcome these contributions, which increase and 
bolster the capabilities available for EU-led crisis-management operations. 
(2) Definition and implementation of EU capabilities in the civilian aspects of 
crisis management 
The European Union has continued developing civilian capabilities in the four 
priority areas established by the Feira European Council: police, strengthening of the 
rule of law, strengthening civilian administration and civil protection. Discussions 
have focused on the implementation of the specific goal regarding police capabilities, 
whereby Member States should be able to provide 5 000 officers by 2003 for 
international missions, 1000 of whom could be deployed within less than 30 days, 
and on the definition of specific goals in connection with strengthening the rule of 
law. The proceedings of the Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management 
enabled considerable progress to be made in elaborating the police objective. 
Methods were devised and ideas for deployment were developed. It is now necessary 
to flesh out Member States' commitments by calling for voluntary contributions. 
Moreover, the need to equip the General Secretariat of the Council with expertise in 
police matters on a permanent basis has been identified. 
Discussions on strengthening the rule of law, the second priority identified in Feira, 
will make it possible to establish specific objectives in this area compatible with the 
development of European Union police capabilities. At the seminar organised in 
Brussels on 25 October it was possible to determine initial views and guidelines for 
further work within the Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management. In 
connection with these discussions, a database to record Member States' capabilities 
regarding the re-establishment of a judicial and penal system was set up within the 
General Secretariat of the Council. 
Discussions have been initiated on cooperation with the UN, the OSCE and the 
Council of Europe. They will need to be followed up. 
The contribution of non-EU Member States to the EU's civilian crisis management 
operations, in particular in EU police missions, will be studied in a positive spirit, in 
accordance with procedures to be determined. 
A document setting out the main aspects of the work on the civilian aspects of crisis 
management is annexed hereto. 
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II. ESTABLISHMENT OF PERMANENT POLITICAL AND MILITARY 
STRUCTURES 
The process initiated since the Cologne European Council is intended to enable the 
European Union to assume its responsibilities for crisis management as a whole. If it 
is to play fully its role on the international stage, the EU must be in a position to have 
at its disposal the whole range of instruments required for a global approach to crisis 
management, and in particular: 
- develop a coherent European approach to crisis management and conflict 
prevention; 
- ensure synergy between the civilian and military aspects of crisis management; 
- cover the full range of Petersberg tasks. 
To enable the European Union fully to assume its responsibilities, the European 
Council has decided to establish the following permanent political and military 
bodies, which should be made ready to start their work: 
- the Political and Security Committee; 
- the Military Committee of the European Union; 
- the Military Staff of the European Union. 
The documents detailing the composition, competences and operation of these bodies 
are annexed hereto. 
The build-up of the resources needed for the operation of such bodies, in particular 
the Military Staff, will have to take place without delay. 
The development of a mechanism to ensure synergy between civilian and military 
instruments is essential if the civilian and military aspects of crisis management are 
to be efficient and consistent. 
To this end, a document (13957/1/00 REV I+ COR 1) constituting a reference 
framework has been submitted by the Secretary-General/High Representative and has 
been noted with interest. Another document, concerning crisis management 
procedures, including an Annex on the European Union Situation Centre, has also 
been circulated by the General Secretariat of the Council. This document will be the 
subject of a detailed study, followed by tests and exercises so that it can be adapted in 
the light of experience, and subsequently approved. 
In this crisis management mechanism the PSC has a central role to play in the 
definition of and follow-up to the EU response to a crisis. The Secretary 
General/High Representative, who may chair the PSC, plays an important role in 
providing impetus. He also contributes to the effectiveness and visibility of the 
Union's action and policy. 
III. ARRANGEMENTS WHICH WILL PERMIT IN THE EU'S MILITARY 
CRISIS MANAGEMENT THE CONSULTATION AND PARTICIPATION OF 
NON-EU EUROPEAN NATO MEMBERS AND OTHER COUNTRIES 
WHICH ARE CANDIDATES FOR ACCESSION TO THE EU 
The EU project is open. If there is to be efficient crisis management, the European 
Union wishes to receive contributions from the non-EU European NATO members 
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and other countries which are candidates for accession to the EU, in particular those 
which have the determination and capability to commit considerable resources to 
participate in the Petersberg tasks. This openness must, of course, respect the 
principle of the European Union's decision-making autonomy. 
In implementing the arrangements agreed in Feira, the Presidency has initiated and 
developed a regular and substantive dialogue on the ESDP with the countries 
concerned. Ministerial meetings were thus held on 21 November as a follow-up to 
the Capacities Commitment Conference. This dialogue has also been developed at 
the level of the IPSC, which held meetings in the inclusive structure on 27 July, 
2 October and 17 November, and through meetings comprising military experts to 
prepare non-member states' contributions to the capability goals. These consultations 
were in addition to the meetings held in connection with the Union's political 
dialogue with its partners. 
The document on "arrangements for non-EU European NATO members and other 
countries which are candidates for accession to the EU" is annexed hereto. In 
accordance with the undertakings given, these arrangements will make it possible to 
consult such countries on a regular basis when there is no crisis and to associate them 
to the greatest possible extent in EU-led military operations in times of crisis. 
IV. PERMANENT ARRANGEMENTS FOR EU-NATO CONSULTATION 
AND COOPERATION 
On the basis of the decisions taken by the Feira European Council and in close 
consultation with NATO, the European Union has, during the French Presidency, 
continued preparations for establishing a permanent and effective relationship 
between the two organisations. The attached documents on the principles for 
consultation, cooperation and transparency with NATO and the modalities for EU 
access to NATO assets and capabilities (Berlin plus) constitute the EU's contribution 
to work on future arrangements between the two organisations. The EU hopes for a 
favourable reaction from NATO so that these arrangements can be implemented on a 
mutually satisfactory basis. 
Consultations and cooperation between the two organisations will be developed in 
matters of security, defence and crisis management of common interest in order to 
make possible the most appropriate military response to a given crisis and ensure 
effective crisis management, while fully respecting the decision-making autonomy of 
NATO and the EU. 
The EU reiterates the importance which it attaches to being able, when necessary, to 
make use of the assured access to NATO's planning capabilities and to the 
presumption of availability of NATO's assets and capabilities as envisaged in the 
Communique of the Washington Summit. The European Union will call on NATO 
for operational planning of any operation using NATO assets and capabilities. When 
the Union examines options with a view to an operation, the establishing of its 
strategic military options can involve a contribution by NATO's planning 
capabilities. 
The EU would stress the importance of appropriate provisions giving those who so 
wish access to Alliance structures in order, when necessary, to facilitate effective 
participation by all Member States in EU-led operations which make use of NATO 
assets and capabilities. 
The meetings between the Interim Political and Security Committee and the North 
Atlantic Council on 19 September and 9 November marked a decisive stage in the 
development of a relationship of confidence between the EU and NATO. The 
discussions by the ad hoc working parties set up at Feira and the working party of 
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experts on military capabilities (HTF plus) have led to progress in transparency and 
cooperation between the two organisations. The Interim Security Agreement 
concluded by the two Secretaries-General has encouraged the development of these 
relations by authorising initial exchanges of documents and opened the way to a 
definitive arrangement between the European Union and NATO. 
V. INCLUSION IN THE EU OF THE APPROPRIATE FUNCTIONS OF THE WEU 
The European Union has confirmed its intention of itself assuming the crisis- 
management function of the WEU. It took note in this context of the measures 
adopted by the WEU Council of Ministers in Marseilles to enable the latter to take 
account of developments which have occurred in the EU. 
The Council adopted the following decisions of principle on the inclusion of the 
appropriate functions of the WEU in the field of the Petersberg tasks: 
- the setting up in the form of agencies of a Satellite Centre and an Institute 
for Security Studies which would incorporate the relevant features of the 
existing parallel WEU structures; 
- the direct management by the EU of a police technical cooperation 
mission in Albania to take over from the Multinational Advisory Police 
Element in Albania, implementation of which had been entrusted to the 
WEU by the Council on the basis of Article 17 of the TEU. The Council 
took note of the assessment that the mine-clearance operation in Croatia will 
have achieved its objectives, in its current form in the WEU, upon expiry of 
its mandate. 
The Council also agreed to enrich the Transatlantic dialogue by asking the ISS to 
undertake activities similar to those currently being conducted by the Transatlantic 
Forum, in accordance with modalities to be agreed which would enable all the States 
concerned to participate in these activities. 
VI. ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE CONSULTATION AND PARTICIPATION 
OF OTHER POTENTIAL PARTNERS 
In Feira, it was recalled that Russia, Ukraine, other European States with which the 
Union maintains political dialogue and other interested States such as Canada could 
be invited to participate in EU-led operations. 
To that end, the Union proposes stepping up dialogue, cooperation and consultation 
on security and defence issues with the countries concerned within the framework of 
existing agreements on the basis of the following principles: 
In the routine phase, the Union will conduct exchanges of information on questions 
relating to the ESDP and military crisis-management through meetings on this topic, 
which will normally be held once every six months by the PSC Troika. Additional 
meetings will be organised if the Council deems it necessary. In a crisis situation, 
when the possibility of a military crisis-management operation is being considered, 
such consultations conducted in Troika format or by the Secretary-General/High 
Representative will constitute the framework making it possible for exchanges of 
views and discussions on possible participation by potential partners to be held. 
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The European Union has already welcomed the interest shown by Canada. 
Consultations with Canada will be stepped up in times of crisis. Participation by 
Canada will be of particular importance in the case of EU operations drawing on 
NATO assets and capabilities. In this context, when the Union embarks on detailed 
examination of an option making use of NATO assets and capabilities, particular 
attention will be paid to consultation with Canada. 
The countries participating in an operation may appoint liaison officers to Planning 
Staff and, together with all the EU members, attend the Committee of Contributors 
with the same rights and obligations as the other participating States as far as day-to- 
day management of the operation is concerned. 
These initial principles are without prejudice to any specific consultation and/or 
participation mechanisms which may be concluded with some of the countries 
concerned. The EU has, for example, adopted with Russia a joint declaration on 
strengthening dialogue on political and security questions in Europe, providing in 
particular for specific consultations on security and defence issues. 
VII. CONFLICT PREVENTION 
The European Councils in Cologne, Helsinki and Feira decided that the Union should 
fully assume its responsibilities in the sphere of conflict prevention. To that end, the 
Feira European Council invited the Secretary-General/High Representative and the 
Commission to submit to the Nice European Council concrete recommendations for 
improving the cohesion and effectiveness of action by the European Union in the 
field of conflict prevention. 
The report was submitted to the European Council, which welcomed the concrete 
recommendations made by the Secretary-GeneraUHigh Representative and the 
Commission and highlighted the need to continue these discussions. 
VIII. MANDATE FOR THE NEXT PRESIDENCY 
1. On the basis of the present report, the Swedish Presidency is invited, in association 
with the Secretary-General/High Representative, to continue work within the General 
Affairs Council on developing the Common Security and Defence Policy and to 
implement the measures necessary for the following: 
(a) to achieve the objective of making the EU quickly operational. A 
decision to that end will be taken by the European Council as soon as 
possible in 2001 and no later than the European Council in Laeken. 
To that end, the Swedish Presidency is invited to: 
- take the measures necessary for implementation and 
validation of the crisis-management mechanisms, 
including structures and procedures; 
- continue discussions with NATO with a view to 
establishing arrangements between the EU and NATO; 
- report back to the European Council in Gothenburg. 
(b) the follow-up of the military capabilities objectives and the 
commitments in the Declaration of Military Capabilities Commitment, in 
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particular by defining the details of the follow-up and evaluation 
mechanism, which have been outlined in the document annexed to Annex I 
hereto; 
(c) the continuation of the work begun on civilian aspects of crisis 
management, including the development of a capability for planning and 
conducting police operations and the request for voluntary contributions 
with respect to police, as well as the definition of specific objectives; 
(d) the implementation of the decisions taken at the present European 
Council on permanent arrangements with non-EU European NATO 
members and other countries which are candidates for accession to the EU 
and the submission of proposals for the modalities of participation by third 
countries in the civilian aspects of crisis management; 
(e) the implementation of the arrangements for the consultation and 
participation of other potential partners, the principles of which are laid 
down by this European Council; 
(f) the setting up in the form of agencies within the EU of a "Satellite 
Centre" (responsible for producing satellite and aerial images) and an 
"Institute for Security Studies" which would incorporate the relevant 
features of the similar existing WEU structures; 
(g) the identification of possible areas as well as modalities of cooperation 
between the European Union and the United Nations in crisis management; 
(h) the definition of proposals for improving the cohesion and effectiveness 
of Union action in the sphere of conflict prevention. 
2. The Swedish Presidency is invited to submit a report on these matters to the 
European Council in Gothenburg. 
ANNEX I to ANNEX VI 
MILITARY CAPABILITIES COMMITMENT DECLARATION 
1. Since the Cologne European Council in June 1999, and in particular thanks to the 
work carried out by the Finnish and Portuguese Presidencies, it has been a priority of 
the Union to develop and introduce the civil and military resources and capabilities 
required to enable the Union to take and implement decisions on the full range of 
conflict-prevention and crisis-management missions defined in the Treaty on 
European Union ("Petersberg tasks" ( 2)). The Union has in this respect highlighted 
its determination to develop an autonomous capacity to take decisions and, where 
NATO as a whole is not engaged, to launch and conduct EU-led military operations 
in response to international crises. For that purpose, Member States have decided to 
develop more effective military capabilities. This process, without unnecessary 
duplication, does not involve the establishment of a European army. These 
developments are an integral part of strengthening the Common Foreign and Security 
Policy. The Union will thus be able to make a greater contribution to international 
security in keeping with the principles of the United Nations Charter, the 
OSCE Charter and the Helsinki Final Act. The Union recognises the primary 
responsibility of the United Nations Security Council for the maintenance of 
international peace and security. 
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2. In the field of military capabilities, which will complement the other instruments 
available to the Union, at the Helsinki European Council in December 1999 the 
Member States set themselves the headline goal of being able, by 2003, to deploy 
within 60 days and sustain for at least one year forces up to corps level (60,000 
persons). These forces should be militarily self-sustaining with the necessary 
command, control and intelligence capabilities, logistics, other combat support 
services and additionally, as appropriate, air and naval elements. 
In Helsinki the Member States also decided rapidly to develop collective capability 
goals, particularly in the field of command and control, intelligence and strategic 
transport. At the Feira European Council in June 2000 the Union also encouraged the 
countries which have applied for membership of the EU and the non-EU European 
members of NATO to contribute to improving Europe's capabilities. The work 
conducted since the Feira European Council has enabled the Union to define the 
variety of measures needed successfully to carry out the full range of Petersberg 
tasks, including the most demanding among these. It has made it possible to specify 
the Union's needs in terms of the military capability and forces required to attain the 
headline goal. The needs identified are outlined in a capability catalogue. As agreed 
at the Feira European Council, NATO's military expertise has helped in drawing up 
this catalogue. 
3. On 20 November 2000 in Brussels the Member States took part in a Capabilities 
Commitment Conference, making it possible to draw together the specific national 
commitments corresponding to the military capability goals set by the Helsinki 
European Council (3). The conference also made it possible to identify a number of 
areas in which efforts will be made in upgrading existing assets, investment, 
development and coordination so as gradually to acquire or enhance the capabilities 
required for autonomous EU action. The Member States announced their initial 
commitments in this respect. 
This conference constitutes the first stage of a demanding process of reinforcing 
military capabilities for crisis management by the Union with the purpose being to 
achieve the headline goal set by 2003 but continuing beyond that date in order to 
achieve the collective capability goals. At the Helsinki European Council the 
Member States had also decided rapidly to identify the collective capability goals in 
the field of command and control, intelligence and strategic transport, and had 
welcomed decisions of that nature already announced by certain Member States: - to 
develop and coordinate monitoring and 
early warning military means; - to open existing joint national headquarters to 
officers coming from other Member States; - to reinforce the rapid reaction 
capabilities of existing European multinational forces; - to prepare the establishment 
of a European air transport command; - to increase the number of readily deployable 
troops; - and to enhance strategic sea 
lift capacity. This effort will continue. It 
remains essential to the credibility and effectiveness of the European security and 
defence policy that the Union's military capabilities for crisis management be 
reinforced so that the Union is in a position to intervene with or without recourse to 
NATO assets. 
4. At the Capabilities Commitment Conference, in accordance with the decisions 
taken at the Helsinki and Feira European Councils, the Member States committed 
themselves, on a voluntary basis, to making national contributions corresponding to 
the rapid reaction capabilities identified to attain the headline goal. These 
commitments have been set out in a catalogue known as the "Force Catalogue". 
Analysis of this catalogue confirms that by 2003, in keeping with the headline goal 
established in Helsinki, the Union will be able to carry out the full range of 
Petersberg tasks, but that certain capabilities need to be improved both in quantitative 
and qualitative terms in order to maximise the capabilities available to the Union. In 
this respect, Ministers reaffirmed their commitment fully to achieve the goals 
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identified at the Helsinki European Council. To that end, they will aim to identify as 
soon as possible the complementary initiatives which they may implement, either on 
a national basis or in cooperation with partners, to respond to the needs identified. 
These efforts will be in addition to the contributions already identified. For the 
countries concerned, their efforts here and those they devote to the NATO Defence 
Capabilities Initiative will be mutually reinforcing. 
A) Concernin fgorces 
In quantitative terms, the voluntary contributions announced by Member 
States make it possible to achieve in full the headline goal established in 
Helsinki (60 000 persons available for deployment within 60 days for a 
mission of at least a year). These contributions, set out in the "Force 
Catalogue", constitute a pool of more than 100 000 persons and 
approximately 400 combat aircraft and 100 vessels, making it possible fully 
to satisfy the needs identified to carry out the different types of crisis 
management missions within the headline goal. 
By 2003, once the appropriate European Union political and military bodies 
are in a position to exercise political control and strategic management of 
EU-led operations, under the authority of the Council, the Union will 
gradually be able to undertake Petersberg tasks in line with its increasing 
military capabilities. The need to further improve the availability, 
deployability, sustainability and interoperability of forces has, however, 
been identified if the requirements of the most demanding Petersberg tasks 
are to be fully satisfied. Efforts also need to be made in specific areas such 
as military equipment, including weapons and munitions, support services, 
including medical services, prevention of operational risks and protection of 
forces. 
B) Concerning strategic capabilities 
As regards command, control and communications, the Member States 
offered a satisfactory number of national or multinational headquarters at 
strategic, operational, force and component levels. These offers will have to 
be evaluated further in qualitative terms so that the Union can, in addition to 
possible recourse to NATO capabilities, have the best possible command 
and control resources at its disposal. The Union pointed out the importance 
it attaches to the speedy conclusion of ongoing talks on access to NATO 
capabilities and assets. The European Union Military Staff, which will 
acquire an initial operating capability in the course of 2001, will bolster the 
European Union's collective early warning capability and will provide it 
with a predecisional situation assessment and strategic planning capability. 
In regard to intelligence, apart from the image interpretation capabilities of 
the Torrejon Satellite Centre, Member States offered a number of resources 
which can contribute to the analysis and situation monitoring capability of 
the Union. Nevertheless, they noted that serious efforts would be necessary 
in this area in order for the Union to have more strategic intelligence at its 
disposal in the future. 
As regards the strategic air and naval transport capabilities at the Union's 
disposal, improvements are necessary to guarantee that the Union is able to 
respond, in any scenario, to the requirements of a demanding operation at 
the top of the Petersberg range, as defined in Helsinki. 
5. In accordance with the decisions of the Helsinki and Feira European Councils on 
collective capability goals, the Member States also committed themselves to medium 
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and long-term efforts in order to improve both their operational and their strategic 
capabilities still further. The Member States committed themselves, particularly in 
the framework of the reforms being implemented in their armed forces, to continue 
taking steps to strengthen their own capabilities and carrying out existing or planned 
projects implementing multinational solutions, including in the field of pooling 
resources. 
These projects as a whole relate to: 
- improving the performance of European forces in respect of the 
availability, deployability, sustainability and interoperability of those forces; 
- developing "strategic" capabilities: strategic mobility to deliver the forces 
rapidly to the field of operations; headquarters to command and control the 
forces and the associated information and communication system; means of 
providing the forces with intelligence information; 
- strengthening essential operational capabilities in the framework of a 
crisis-management operation; areas which were identified in this context 
were: resources for search and rescue in operational conditions, means of 
defence against ground-to-ground missiles, precision weapons, logistic 
support, simulation tools. 
The restructuring of the European defence industries taking place in certain Member 
States was a positive factor in this. It encouraged the development of European 
capabilities. By way of example, the Member States concerned cited the work they 
are engaged in on a number of vital projects which would contribute to bolstering the 
capabilities at the Union's disposal: Future Large Aircraft (Airbus A 400M), 
maritime transport vessels, Troop Transport Helicopters (NH 90). Some Member 
States also announced their intention to continue their efforts to acquire equipment to 
improve the safety and efficiency of military action. Some undertook to improve the 
Union's guaranteed access to satellite imaging, thanks in particular to the 
development of new optical and radar satellite equipment (Helios II, SAR Lupe and 
Cosmos Skymed). 
6. In order to ensure continuing European action to strengthen capabilities, the 
Member States agreed on the importance of defining an evaluation mechanism 
enabling follow-up and progress towards the realisation of the commitments made 
with a view to achieving the headline goal, in both quantitative and qualitative terms. 
The mechanism, the broad outline of which will be approved at the Nice European 
Council, will provide the Union with an assessment and follow-up mechanism for its 
goals (based on the HTF - Headline Goal Task Force) on the basis of a consultation 
method between the Member States. In order to avoid unnecessary duplication, it 
will, for the Member States concerned, rely on technical data emanating from 
existing NATO mechanisms such as the Defence Planning Process and the Planning 
and Review Process (PARP). Recourse to these sources would be had, with the 
support of the EU Military Staff (EUMS), via consultations between experts in a 
working group set up on the same model as that which operated for the drawing up of 
the capabilities catalogue (HTF Plus). In addition, exchange of information and 
transparency would be appropriately ensured between the Union and NATO by the 
Working Group on Capabilities set up between the two organisations, which would 
take steps to ensure the coherent development of EU and NATO capabilities where 
they overlap (in particular those arising from the goals set out at the Helsinki 
European Council and from the NATO Defence Capabilities Initiative). 
This mechanism would be based on the following principles: 
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(a) preservation of the Union's autonomy in decision making, in particular in 
the definition, evaluation, monitoring and follow-up of capability goals; 
(b) recognition of the political and voluntary nature of the commitments 
made, which implies that the Member States are responsible for any 
adjustment of the commitments in the light of the evaluation made; 
(c) transparency, simplicity and clarity, in order among other things to 
enable comparisons to be made between the commitments of the various 
Member States; 
(d) a continuous and regular evaluation of progress made, on the basis of 
reports enabling ministers to take the appropriate decisions; 
(e) the flexibility necessary to adapt the commitments to newly identified needs. 
Regarding relations with NATO: 
The arrangements concerning transparency, cooperation and dialogue between the 
Union and NATO should be set out in the document on permanent arrangements 
between the Union and NATO. The evaluation mechanism will take account of the 
following additional principles: 
(f) the need, for the countries concerned, to ensure the compatibility of the 
commitments taken on in the EU framework with the force goals accepted 
in the framework of the NATO Defence Planning Process or the PARP; 
(g) the need for mutual reinforcement of the Union's capability goals and 
those arising, for the countries concerned, from the Defence Capabilities 
Initiative; 
(h) the need to avoid unnecessary duplication of procedures and of information 
requested. 
Concerning relations with third countries: 
(i) the mechanism will ensure that the contributions of European States 
which are members of NATO but not part of the EU, and of the applicant 
countries, are taken into account, in order to enable an evaluation to be 
made of their complementary commitments which contribute to the 
improvement of European capabilities, and to facilitate their possible 
participation in EU-led operations in accordance with the Helsinki and Feira 
decisions. 
The examination of the work carried out within the Union will benefit from the 
support of EUMS, in the framework of its mandate, and will be the subject of reports 
to the Council. 
**« 
The Member States welcomed the intentions expressed with a view to the ministerial meetings on 
21 November 2000 by the countries applying for membership of the EU and the non-EU European 
NATO Members in reply to the invitation made to them at the Feira European Council to make their 
contribution, in the form of complementary commitments, to improving European capabilities. 
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Contributions received at the ministerial meetings on 21 November 2000 will extend the range of 
capabilities available for EU-led operations, thus enabling the Union's intervention capability to be 
strengthened in the manner most appropriate to the circumstances. They would be welcomed as 
significant additional contributions to those capabilities offered by the Member States. In this context, 
the Member States signalled their agreement for those contributions to be evaluated, in liaison with the 
States concerned, according to the same criteria as those applied to the Member States. 
Appendix to ANNEX Ito ANNEX VI 
ACHIEVEMENT OF THE HEADLINE GOAL 
REVIEW MECHANISM FOR MILITARY CAPABILITIES 
INTRODUCTION 
1. The Helsinki European Council on 10 and 11 December 1999 decided to press 
ahead with the achievement of capability goals (a headline goal and collective 
capability goals in the fields of command and control, intelligence and strategic 
transport) in order to be able to carry out the full range of Petersberg tasks defined in 
the Amsterdam Treaty, including the most demanding among them. 
2. The European Council also instructed the General Affairs Council (GAC) to 
elaborate the headline and capability goals, together with "a method of consultation 
through which these goals can be met and maintained and through which national 
contributions reflecting Member States' political will and commitment towards these 
goals can be defined by each Member State, with a regular review of progress 
made. ". 
3. The Feira European Council noted the progress made and reaffirmed how 
important it would be to "create a review mechanism for measuring progress towards 
the achievement of those goals". 
PROGRESS MADE SINCE HELSINKI 
4. Since Helsinki 
(a) the headline goal has been elaborated by Member States' military experts 
who, assisted where necessary by NATO experts, have detailed in 
quantitative and qualitative terms a reservoir or "catalogue of forces" 
essential to the achievement of the full range of proposed Petersberg tasks. 
The Member States have announced their national contributions and have 
identified areas in which progress still needs to be made if the requirements 
of the most demanding of the Petersberg tasks are to be met in full; 
(b) at the capability-pledging Conference on 20 November 2000, the 
Member States pledged both existing means and measures aimed at making 
up the remaining requirements; 
(c) contributions in terms of capability and forces by European NATO 
Member States not part of the EU and by countries which are candidates for 
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accession to the EU have been taken into account and welcomed as a further 
valuable contribution towards improving the European military capability. 
EU REVIEW MECHANISM GOALS 
5. Following the elaboration of the headline goal set forth in a detailed catalogue of 
the necessary capability and the announcement of national pledges to make the latter 
available, the review mechanism proposed at Helsinki should now be defined in 
detail. The mechanism has three specific aims: 
(a) to enable the EU to monitor and facilitate progress towards the 
honouring of undertakings to achieve the overall goal, in both quantitative 
and qualitative terms; 
(b) to enable the EU to evaluate and, if necessary, to review its defined 
capability goals in order to meet the requirements of the full range of 
Petersberg tasks in the light of changing circumstances; 
(c) to help to achieve consistency between the pledges undertaken in the EU 
framework and, for the countries concerned, the headline goal force agreed 
to in the context of NATO planning or the Partnership for Peace (PARP). 
As agreed at Helsinki, the Member States concerned will also deploy existing 
defence planning procedures, including, if appropriate, those of NATO and of the 
planning and review process (PARP) of the Partnership for Peace. 
PRINCIPLES 
6. The method of consultation and the process of evaluation pursued at Helsinki must 
observe the following principles: 
(a) preservation of the EU's autonomy in decision making, in particular in 
the definition, evaluation, monitoring and follow-up of capability goals; 
(b) recognition of the political and voluntary nature of the commitments 
made, which implies that the Member States are responsible for any 
adjustment of the commitments in the light of the evaluation made; 
(c) transparency, simplicity and clarity, in order among other things to 
enable comparisons to be made between the commitments of the various 
Member States; 
(d) a continuous and regular of evaluation of progress made, on the basis of 
reports enabling ministers to take the appropriate decisions; 
(e) the flexibility necessary to adapt the commitments to newly identified needs. 
Regarding relations with NATO: 
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The arrangements concerning transparency, cooperation and dialogue between the 
EU and NATO should be set out in the document on permanent arrangements 
between the EU and NATO. The evaluation mechanism will take account of the 
following additional principles: 
(0 the need, for the countries concerned, to ensure the compatibility of the 
commitments taken on in the EU framework with the force goals accepted 
in the framework of NATO planning or the PARP; 
(g) the need for mutual reinforcement of the EU's capability goals and those 
arising, for the countries concerned, from the Defence Capabilities 
Initiative; 
(h) the need to avoid unnecessary duplication of procedures and of 
information requested 
Concerning relations with third countries: 
(i) the mechanism will ensure that the contributions of European States 
which are members of NATO but not part of the EU, and of the applicant 
countries, are taken into account, in order to enable an evaluation to be 
made of their complementary commitments which contribute to the 
improvement of European capabilities, and to facilitate their possible 
participation in EU-led operations in accordance with the Helsinki and Feira 
decisions. 
EU EVALUATION PROCESS: TASKS 
7. Progress since Helsinki constitutes the initial stages of a planning and evaluation 
exercise which will be maintained on a regular basis. 
The process will continue to be based on the method used with success initially in the 
elaboration of the headline goal, in particular the involvement of Member State and 
NATO experts through expert groups based on the Headline Task Force/Headline 
Task Force Plus (HTF/HTF Plus) formats, with the EUMS assisting in the process of 
elaborating, evaluating and reviewing capability goals in accordance with its remit. 
All work carried out will be the subject of reports to the EU's Military Committee, 
which will draft any necessary recommendations for the PSC. 
The EU mechanism encompasses the following main tasks: 
(a) identification of EU capability goals for military crisis management. The 
original goals set by the Helsinki European Council will be evaluated and, if 
necessary, revised. New capability goals and an appropriate timetable will 
be determined by the European Council when the latter considers it 
necessary for EU political decisions to be reflected in the development of 
the CEDSP. 
(b) monitoring, under the direction of the EU Military Committee, of a 
"catalogue" of the necessary forces and capabilities resulting from these 
goals. Monitoring will involve the preparation and analysis of possible 
planning scenarios by a group of national experts, assisted by the EU 
military staff (HTF) which will call on NATO expertise in the form of an 
experts group based on the HTF Plus format. 
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(c) identification and harmonisation of national contributions in the light of 
the required capability. This task was originally performed at the ministerial 
capacity-pledging Conference in November 2000, which was preceded by a 
feedback process under the direction of the EUMC which recorded Member 
States' original offers, their quantitative and qualitative scrutiny, the 
identification of requirements not entirely met and additional offers. 
National contributions will need to be re-evaluated and re-harmonised in the 
light of the revision of approved needs. For the countries concerned, this 
will need to be done in such a way as to ensure consistency with Defence 
Planning Process (DPP) and the Planning and Review Process (PARP). 
(d) the quantitative and qualitative review of progress towards honouring 
previously approved national pledges, including requirements in terms of 
the interoperability of forces (C3, exercises, training, equipment) (4) and 
forces availability standards. This evaluation will be made by the EU 
Military Committee on the basis of the detailed work of the experts group 
(HTF), assisted where necessary by NATO in the form of the experts group 
based on the HTF Plus format. The EU Military Committee will be required 
to spot any shortcomings and to make recommendations to the PSC 
regarding measures guaranteeing that Member States' undertakings are 
consistent with requirements. 
(e) the modification of national pledges, if necessary. 
ANNEX II to ANNEX VI 
STRENGTHENING OF EUROPEAN UNION CAPABILITIES 
FOR CIVILIAN ASPECTS OF CRISIS MANAGEMENT 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In order to be able to give an effective response to the challenges of crisis 
management under the European security and defence policy the European Union has 
committed itself to increasing and improving its capabilities, including those for 
civilian aspects of crisis management. In Santa Maria da Feira, the European Council 
accordingly identified policing, strengthening the rule of law, strengthening civilian 
administration and civil protection as the four priority areas of work in which the 
Union intends to establish specific capabilities for use in operations conducted by 
lead agencies, such as the United Nations or the OSCE, or in EU-led autonomous 
missions. 
Action by the Union in these areas will enable it to make a greater contribution to 
conflict prevention and crisis management in accordance with the principles of the 
United Nations Charter. 
On the basis of the recommendations made by the European Council in 
Santa Maria da Feira, the Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management set 
up by Council Decision of 22 May 2000 has given priority in its work to 
implementing the specific target for policing. It has dealt with strengthening the rule 
of law, with a view to setting specific targets in that area. A meeting has been 
organised with representatives of the United Nations, the OSCE and the Council of 
Europe with a view to identifying areas and principles for cooperation with those 
organisations. 
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This paper presents the essential elements of the work carried out by the Committee 
for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management. 
11. POLICING CAPABILITIES 
In Feira, Member States committed themselves to providing by 2003, by way of 
voluntary cooperation, up to 5 000 police officers, 1 000 of them to be deployable 
within 30 days, for international missions across the full range of conflict-prevention 
and crisis-management operations. 
In order to achieve that specific target, the Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis 
Management has established a "method through which phased targets can be met and 
maintained through voluntary contributions". It has been agreed that this will be a 
basis for work under successive Presidencies. 
The method singles out four steps: 
. -preparation of generic 
planning scenarios and identification of the resultant 
missions; 
-definition of the capabilities needed for the performance of the missions 
identified; 
-call for contributions from Member States and identification of the 
capabilities on offer; 
-possible measures to ensure follow-up for concrete targets. 
Based on a pragmatic approach, the Committee's work has thus made it possible to 
establish more clearly the underlying principles of the Union's approach to the 
policing aspects of crisis management, consider ways of using European police 
forces and make substantial progress towards identifying the kinds of capabilities 
required. 
1. Guiding principles 
The following guiding principles have been identified. 
1) A full range of assignments: the European Union must 
be capable of carrying out police missions ranging from 
advice, assistance or training assignments to substituting 
for local police. Member States have available all of the 
various policing capabilities required for the purpose, 
which should be deployable so as to complement one 
another, while not losing sight of their specific features. 
Particular arrangements of Member States for national 
policing and the type of police expertise they can provide 
will be taken into account. This variety of police forces in 
the Member States is a valuable asset since it enables the 
Union to carry out a wide range of police missions. 
2) A clear remit and appropriate mandate: The 
deployment of EU police forces requires clearly defined 
guidelines regarding their tasks and powers as well as an 
appropriate mandate. 
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3) An integrated approach: European Union action on 
Petersberg-type assignments requires a strong synergy 
between the military component and the civilian 
component (police, rule of law, civilian administration, 
civil protection). The military and police components 
must therefore, where necessary, be part of an integrated 
planning process and should be used on the ground in a 
closely coordinated manner, making allowance for the 
constraints on deployment of Member States' police 
forces. 
4) Close coordination with international 
organisations: The European Union should ensure that its 
own efforts and those of the United Nations, the OSCE 
and the Council of Europe are consistent and mutually 
reinforcing, without any unnecessary duplication. The 
European Union should notably take into account the 
recommendations set forth in the Report of the Panel on 
United Nations Peace Operations ("Brahimi report"). 
2. Concepts of police forces 
In order to identify the capabilities required, two generic concepts, based on 
recent experience in Guatemala, Croatia, Albania, Mostar and El Salvador, 
as well as in Bosnia and Herzegovina, East Timor and Kosovo, have been 
identified: strengthening of local police forces and substituting for local 
police forces. 
Strengthening of local policing capabilities is a key function in conflict 
prevention, crisis management, and post-conflict rehabilitation. In this case 
European Union police forces are deployed essentially to educate, train, 
assist, monitor and advise local police, with the aim of bringing their 
capabilities and conduct up to international standards, in particular in the 
field of human rights, and making them more effective. Use of highly 
skilled police officers will enable the results of such missions to be 
sustained; the training given should be able to cover the full range of police 
work and be directed at all levels. 
In the second function, the European Union police force is to substitute for 
local police notably where local structures are failing. A Kosovo-style 
complex crisis situation may thus involve three stages: 
an initial stage of an essentially military operation to 
establish overall control on the ground; 
a transition stage, focusing on restoring public security as 
a prime condition for a return to normality; 
a post-crisis stage of civil reconstruction and a gradual 
return to proper operation of local institutions. 
In this context, the military and police components of a crisis management 
operation must be part of an integrated planning process for carrying out 
such operations to contribute to ensure a coherent and effective overall EU 
response. The main task of the police forces, which should be deployed as 
early as possible, is to contribute to restoring public security (keep order, 
protect people and property). This means tackling violence, reducing tension 
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and defusing disputes of all kinds, particularly by facilitating the 
reactivation of judicial and penal facilities. 
In substitution missions international police forces perform executive 
functions. Such functions can be carried out by all types of EU police 
forces. In some instances it may be necessary to rapidly deploy integrated, 
flexible and interoperable police units on the basis of cooperation among a 
number of Member States. Subject to their national rules and legislation, 
such police forces may be placed temporarily under the responsibility of the 
military authority entrusted with the protection of the population. 
With a view to reestablishing a functioning local police force as quickly as 
possible, the European Union will in parallel, wherever necessary, also 
provide support for police instruction, advice, assistance and training. 
3. Capabilities required 
The two functions (strengthening of and substituting for local police forces) 
draw on all specialist policing techniques available in the Member States 
(NB: "police forces" here covers both police forces with civilian status and 
police forces with military status of the gendarmerie type). It has been found 
that European police forces have developed within their ranks a variety of 
skills, based on similar professional criteria, available for use at various 
stages of crisis management. 
More specifically, in assignments to strengthen local police, the spectrum of 
required capabilities covers, inter alia: 
monitoring of and advice for local police in their day-to- 
day work, including criminal investigation work. This 
may include recommendations for police reorganisation; 
training of police officers as regard international 
standards, both for senior officers and for ordinary law 
enforcement officers. Special emphasis should, where 
necessary, be placed on training in police professional 
ethics and human rights; 
training of instructors, particularly through cooperation 
programmes. 
In substitution assignments, the spectrum of required capabilities covers, 
inter alia: 
public surveillance, traffic regulations, border policing 
and general intelligence; 
criminal investigation work, covering detection of 
offences, tracing of offenders and transfer to the 
appropriate judicial authorities; 
protection of people and property and keeping order in the 
event of public disturbances. The risk of situations getting 
out of control with a resulting need for supporting military 
forces should be borne in mind here. 
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In order to develop capabilities required to carry out both kinds of missions, 
the following needs have been identified as priorities: 
maintaining and developing the policing capabilities 
database produced by the coordinating mechanism 
established by the European Council in Helsinki; 
information-sharing between Member States by way of a 
network of contact points; 
quantitative and qualitative identification of policing 
capabilities to be used in accordance with the scenarios 
envisaged; 
preparation of generic documents, drawing on United 
Nations work, as a frame of reference for police missions 
(rules of engagement, standard operating procedures, legal 
framework, etc. ); 
planning of logistical requirements for rapid 
implementation of international policing operations, their 
incorporation into the general planning process and 
logistical support throughout a mission (equipment, 
staffing, etc. ); 
furthering cooperation between Member States in the field 
of training for police missions; 
identification of precursor elements (advance teams, 
stand-by leadership and logistic capabilities) for EU police 
operations; 
interaction with military structures. 
The Union's policing activities should be integrated, as from the planning 
stage, into a coherent overall crisis management operation. This requirement 
means that the General Secretariat of the Council should be provided with a 
permanent police expertise as soon as possible. Preliminary work has been 
carried out on the development of a policing operations planning and 
conduct capability as part of a "detailed study on the feasibility and 
implications of EU autonomous police missions". 
The following lines of approach emerged from proceedings: 
The need to rely, in certain crisis situations, when facing an institutional and 
normative vacuum, on a legal framework, which could be applicable straight 
away on a provisional basis to all components of an international police 
mission and to local actors. On this point, the European Union should 
notably take into account the recommendations of the Report of the Panel on 
United Nations Peace Operations ("Brahimi report"). 
- With that in mind, on the basis of specific objectives identified by the 
European Union, a strong synergy needs to be developed between the 
actions undertaken in support of the rule of law and those of the police 
mission. This means that a suitable criminal justice infrastructure must be 
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available as soon as possible in dealing with a crisis so as to avoid any legal 
vacuum liable to leave further difficulties to be resolved. 
- While some unstable situations require immediate substitution measures, 
focusing primarily on law and order and on criminal justice, it is necessary 
to ensure a lasting settlement by restoring as early as possible the local 
judicial and penal system. Experience in a number of recent crisis situations 
has shown the need for continuity between short-term emergency 
interventions and more long-term initiatives. 
- The reconstruction, restoring and improvement of judiciary and 
penitentiary systems could take the form, among others, of training local 
magistrates and personnel, of advising and providing expertise to local 
authorities and governmental institutions to drafting of laws and regulation 
in compliance with international standards. Account should be taken of 
social, ethnic, cultural, economic and political complexities which may 
require coordinated action on several fronts (police, judiciary, local 
administration). 
International personnel should be selected according to common standards. 
The European Union's work should here take full account of the body of 
experience built up by the United Nations, the OSCE and the Council of 
Europe. 
IV. FOLLOW-UP 
Work undertaken on strengthening civilian aspects of crisis management should be 
resolutely continued, so that the European Union can make more effective use of its 
civilian instruments for the objectives of conflict prevention and crisis management. 
The progress of work on policing capabilities now makes it possible to consider the 
third stage of the method decided on for achieving the specific target. This involves 
going on to put Member States' commitment into practice with a call for voluntary 
contributions, to be issued in the near future in accordance with procedures to be 
determined. Work should therefore continue identifying the capabilities required, 
particularly in qualitative terms, and specify requirements for the planning and 
conduct of European policing operations. The next Presidency, in liaison with the 
Secretary-GeneraVHigh Representative, is called upon to put forward proposals for 
the purpose. 
For the rule of law, it has been agreed that it is now possible for the European Union 
to set specific targets in conjunction with the development of policing capabilities. 
Scenarios based on recent experience could therefore be considered in order to spell 
out the capabilities required, both in terms of Member States' resources and expertise 
within the European Union. Future work of the Committee for civilian aspects of 
crisis management should be informed by, inter alia, themes raised at the Seminar 
held on 25 October 2000. 
In both areas, the Commission and the coordinating mechanism established within 
the General Secretariat of the Council will continue to provide their input to work in 
hand. 
In the upcoming work of the Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management, 
coherence and coordination with ongoing work in other bodies on related areas have 
to be ensured. 
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For strengthening civilian administration and civil protection, the European Union 
will have to continue its discussions, on the basis of the recommendations made by 
the European Council in Feira, with the aim of defining concrete targets and 
equipping the EU with suitable resources for it to cope effectively with complex 
political crises. 
Contributions of non-EU States to EU civilian crisis management operations, 
especially EU police missions, will be given favourable consideration, in accordance 
with modalities to be determined. 
Lastly, the European Union will further develop its cooperation with the 
United Nations, the OSCE and the Council of Europe, particularly in the light of the 
meeting arranged with those organisations within the Committee for Civilian Aspects 
of Crisis Management and the seminar on strengthening the rule of law. 
ANNEX III to ANNEX VI 
POLITICAL AND SECURITY COMMITTEE 
The approach adopted at Helsinki makes the PSC the linchpin of the European security and defence 
policy (ESDP) and of the common foreign and security policy (CFSP): "The PSC will deal with all 
aspects of the CFSP, including the CESDP ... ". Without prejudice to Article 
207 of the Treaty 
establishing the European Community, the PSC has a central role to play in the definition of and 
follow-up to the EU's response to a crisis. 
The PSC will deal with all the tasks defined in Article 25 of the TEU. It may convene in Political 
Director formation. 
After consulting the Presidency and without prejudice to Article 18 of the TEU, the Secretary- 
General/High Representative for the CFSP may chair the PSC, especially in the event of a crisis. 
I. In particular the PSC will: 
- keep track of the international situation in the areas falling within the 
common foreign and security policy, help define policies by drawing up 
'opinions" for the Council, either at the request of the Council or on its own 
initiative, and monitor implementation of agreed policies, all of this without 
prejudice to Article 207 of the Treaty establishing the European Community 
and to the powers of the Presidency and of the Commission; 
- examine the areas of GAC draft conclusions in which it is involved; 
- provide guidelines for other Committees on matters falling within the 
CFSP; 
- maintain a privileged link with the Secretary-General/High Representative 
(SG/HR) and the special representatives; 
- send guidelines to the Military Committee; receive the opinions and 
recommendations of the Military Committee. The Chairman of the Military 
Committee (EUMC), who liaises with the European Union Military Staff 
(EUMS), takes part, where necessary, in PSC meetings; 
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- receive information, recommendations and opinions from the Committee 
for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management and send it guidelines on matters 
falling within the CFSP; 
- coordinate, supervise and monitor discussions on CFSP issues in various 
Working Parties, to which it may send guidelines and whose reports it must 
examine; 
- lead the political dialogue in its own capacity and in the forms laid down 
in the Treaty; 
- provide a privileged forum for dialogue on the ESDP with the fifteen and 
the six as well as with NATO in accordance with arrangements set out in the 
relevant documents; 
- under the auspices of the Council, take responsibility for the political 
direction of the development of military capabilities, taking into account the 
type of crisis to which the Union wishes to respond. As part of the 
development of military capabilities, the PSC will receive the opinion of the 
Military Committee assisted by the European Military Staff. 
2. Furthermore, in the event of a crisis the PSC is the Council body which deals with 
crisis situations and examines all the options that might be considered as the Union's 
response within the single institutional framework and without prejudice to the 
decision-making and implementation procedures of each pillar. Thus the Council, 
whose preparatory work is carried out by Coreper, and the Commission alone have 
powers, each within their own areas of competence and in accordance with 
procedures laid down by the Treaties, to take legally-binding decisions. The 
Commission exercises its responsibility, including its power of initiative under the 
Treaties. Coreper exercises the role conferred on it by Article 207 of the Treaty 
establishing the European Community and by Article 19 of the Council's Rules of 
Procedure. To that end, it will be informed in good time by the PSC. 
In a crisis situation, close coordination between these bodies is especially necessary 
and will be ensured in particular by: 
- the participation, where necessary, of the Chairman of the PSC 
in Coreper 
meetings; 
- the role of the Foreign Relations 
Counsellors whose task it is to maintain 
effective permanent coordination between CFSP discussions and those 
conducted in other pillars (Annex to the Council conclusions of 
11 May 1992). 
To prepare the EU's response to a crisis, it is for the PSC to propose to the Council 
the political objectives to be pursued by the Union and to recommend a cohesive set 
of options aimed at contributing to the settlement of the crisis. In particular it may 
draw up an opinion recommending to the Council that it adopt a joint action. Without 
prejudice to the role of the Commission, it supervises the implementation of the 
measures adopted and assesses their effects. The Commission informs the PSC of the 
measures it has adopted or is envisaging. The Member States inform the PSC of the 
measures they have adopted or are envisaging at the national level. 
The PSC exercises "political control and strategic direction" of the EU's military 
response to the crisis. To that end, on the basis of the opinions and recommendations 
of the Military Committee, it evaluates in particular the essential elements (strategic 
military options including the chain of command, operation concept, operation plan) 
to be submitted to the Council. 
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The PSC plays a major role in enhancing consultations, in particular with NATO and 
the third States involved. 
On the basis of the proceedings of the PSC, the Secretary-General/High 
Representative directs the activities of the Situation Centre. The latter supports the 
PSC and provides it with 
intelligence in conditions appropriate to crisis management. 
The following arrangements will be put in place to enable the PSC to ensure full 
"political control and strategic direction" of a military crisis-management operation: 
- With a view to launching an operation the PSC sends the Council a 
recommendation based on the opinions of the Military Committee in 
accordance with the usual Council preparation procedures. On that basis the 
Council decides to launch the operation within the framework of a joint 
action. 
- In accordance with Articles 18 and 26 of the TEU, the joint action will 
determine, in particular, the role of the Secretary-General/High 
Representative in the implementation of the measures falling within the 
"political control and strategic direction" exercised by the PSC. For such 
measures the Secretary-General/High Representative acts with the PSC's 
assent. Should a new Council decision be deemed appropriate, the 
simplified written procedure could be used (Article 12(4) of the Council's 
Rules of Procedure). 
- During the operation, the Council will be kept informed through PSC 
reports presented by the Secretary-General/High Representative in his 
capacity as Chairman of the PSC. 
ANNEX IV to ANNEX VI 
EUROPEAN UNION MILITARY COMMITTEE 
(EUMC) 
1. Introduction 
At Helsinki, the European Council decided to establish within the Council, new 
permanent political and military bodies enabling the EU to assume its responsibilities 
for the full range of conflict prevention and crisis management tasks defined in the 
EU Treaty, the Petersberg tasks. 
As provided in the Helsinki report, the European Union Military Committee 
(EUMC), established within the Council, is composed of the Chiefs of Defence 
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(CHODs) represented by their military representatives (MILREPs). The EUMC 
meets at the level of CHODs as and when necessary. This Committee gives military 
advice and makes recommendations to the Political and Security Committee (PSC), 
as well as provides military direction to the European Union Military Staff (EUMS). 
The Chairman of the EUMC (CEUMC) attends meetings of the Council when 
decisions with defence implications are to be taken. 
The EUMC is the highest military body established within the Council. 
For this purpose, the Terms of Reference of the EUMC are outlined as follows: 
2. Mission 
The EUMC is responsible for providing the PSC with military advice and 
recommendations on all military matters within the EU. It exercises military direction 
of all military activities within the EU framework. 
3. Functions 
It is the source of military advice based on consensus. 
It is the forum for military consultation and co-operation between the EU Member 
States in the field of conflict prevention and crisis management. 
It provides military advice and makes recommendations to the PSC, at the latter's 
request or on its own initiative, acting within guidelines forwarded by the PSC, 
particularly with regard to: 
- the development of the overall concept of crisis management in its military aspects; 
- the military aspects relating to the political control and strategic direction 
of crisis management operations and situations; 
- the risk assessment of potential crises; 
- the military dimension of a crisis situation and its implications, in 
particular during its subsequent management; for this purpose, it receives 
the output from the Situation Centre; 
- the elaboration, the assessment and the review of capability objectives 
according to agreed procedures; 
- the EU's military relationship with non-EU European NATO Members, 
the other candidates for accession to the EU, other states and other 
organisations, including NATO; 
- the financial estimation for operations and exercises. 
(a) In crisis management situations 
Upon the PSC's request, it issues an Initiating Directive to the Director 
General of the EUMS (DGEUMS) to draw up and present strategic military 
options. 
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It evaluates the strategic military options developed by the EUMS and 
forwards them to the PSC together with its evaluation and military advice. 
On the basis of the military option selected by the Council, it authorises an 
Initial Planning Directive for the Operation Commander. 
Based upon the EUMS evaluation, it provides advice and recommendation to the 
PSC: 
on the Concept of Operations (CONOPS) developed by 
the Operation Commander 
- on the draft Operation Plan (OPLAN) drawn up by the Operation 
Commander. 
It gives advice to the PSC on the termination option for an operation. 
(b) During an operation 
The EUMC monitors the proper execution of military operations conducted 
under the responsibility of the Operation Commander. 
The EUMC members sit or are represented in the Committee of 
Contributors. 
4. Chairman of the EUMC (CEUMC) 
The EUMC has a permanent Chairman whose responsibilities are described hereafter. 
The CEUMC is a 4-star flag officer on appointment, preferably a former Chief of 
Defence of an EU Member State. 
He is selected by the CHODs of the Member States according to approved 
procedures and is appointed by the Council on the recommendation of the EUMC 
meeting at CHODs level. 
His term of office is in principle three years, except in exceptional circumstances. 
His authority is derived from the EUMC to which he is responsible. Acting in an 
international capacity, the CEUMC represents the EUMC at the PSC and the 
Council, as appropriate. 
As the Chairman of the EUMC, he: 
- chairs the EUMC meetings at MILREPs and CHODs levels, 
- is the spokesman of the EUMC and, as such: 
-participates as appropriate in the PSC with the right to contribute to 
discussions and attends the Council meetings when decisions with defence implications are to be taken and 
296 
-performs the function of military adviser to the SG/UR on all military 
matters, in particular, to ensure consistency within the EU Crisis 
Management Structure; 
- conducts the works of the EUMC impartially and in order to reflect consensus; 
- acts on behalf of the EUMC in issuing directives and guidance to the DGEUMS; 
- acts as the primary Point of Contact (POC) with the Operation 
Commander during the EU's military operations; 
- liaises with the Presidency in the development and implementation of its 
work programme. 
The CEUMC is supported by his personal staff and assisted by the EUMS, especially 
regarding the administrative support within the General Secretariat of the Council. 
When absent the CEUMC is replaced by one of the following: 
- the permanent DCEUMC, if it is so decided to create and fill the post, 
- the Presidency representative or 
- the Dean. 
5. Miscellaneous 
The relations to be established between the EUMC and NATO military authorities 
are defined in the document on the EU/NATO permanent arrangements. The 
relations between the EUMC and the non-EU European NATO members and other 
countries, which are candidates for accession to the EU are defined in the document 
on the relations of the EU with third countries. 
The EUMC is supported by a military working group (EUMCWG), by the EUMS 
and by other departments and services, as appropriate. 
ANNEX V to ANNEX VI 
EUROPEAN UNION MILITARY STAFF ORGANISATION 
(EUMS) 
1. Introduction 
At Helsinki, the EU Member States decided to establish within the Council, new 
permanent political and military bodies enabling the EU to assume its responsibilities 
for the full range of conflict prevention and crisis management tasks defined in the 
EU Treaty, the Petersberg tasks. As provided in the Helsinki report, the EUMS, 
"within the Council structures provides military expertise and support to the CESDP, 
including the conduct of EU-led military crisis management operations". 
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For this purpose, the Terms of Reference of the European Union Military Staff 
(EUMS) are defined as follows: 
2. Mission 
The Military Staff is to perform "early warning, situation assessment and strategic 
planning for Petersberg tasks including identification of European national and 
multinational forces" and to implement policies and decisions as directed by the 
European Union Military Committee (EUMC). 
3. Role and Tasks 
- It is the source of the EU's military expertise; 
- It assures the link between the EUMC on the one hand and the military 
resources available to the EU on the other, and it provides military expertise 
to EU bodies as directed by the EUMC; 
It provides an early warning capability. It plans, assesses and makes 
recommendations regarding the concept of crisis management and the 
general military strategy and implements the decisions and guidance of the 
EUMC; 
It supports the EUMC regarding situation assessment and military aspects of 
strategic planning ( 6), over the full range of Petersberg tasks, for all cases 
of EU-led operations, whether or not the EU draws on NATO assets and 
capabilities; 
It contributes to the process of elaboration, assessment and review of the 
capability goals taking into account the need, for those Member States 
concerned, to ensure coherence with NATO's Defence Planning Process 
(DPP) and the Planning and Review Process (PARP) of the Partnership for 
Peace (PfP) in accordance with agreed procedures; 
- It has the responsibility to monitor, assess and make recommendations 
regarding the forces and capabilities made available to the EU by the 
Member States, on training, exercises and interoperability; 
4. Functions 
It performs three main operational functions : early warning, situation 
assessment and strategic planning; 
Under the direction of the EUMC it provides military expertise to EU bodies 
and, in particular, to the Secretary-General/High Representative; 
It monitors potential crises by relying on appropriate national and 
multinational intelligence capabilities; 
It supplies the Situation Centre with military information and receives its 
output; 
It carries out the military aspects of strategic advance planning for 
Petersberg missions; 
It identifies and lists European national and multinational forces for EU-led 
operations co-ordinating with NATO; 
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It contributes to the development and preparation (including training and 
exercises) of national and multinational forces made available by the 
Member States to the EU. The modalities of the relation with NATO are 
defined in the relevant documents; 
It organises and co-ordinates the procedures with national and multinational 
HQs including those NATO HQs available to the EU, ensuring, as far as 
possible, compatibility with NATO procedures; 
It programmes, plans, conducts and evaluates the military aspect of the EU's 
crisis management procedures, including the exercising of EU/NATO 
procedures; 
It participates in the financial estimation of operations and exercises; 
It liaises with the national HQs and the multinational HQs of the 
multinational forces; 
It establishes permanent relations with NATO according to "EU/NATO 
Permanent arrangements" and appropriate relations with identified 
correspondents within the UN and OSCE, subject to an agreement from 
these organisations. 
(a) Additional functions in crisis management situations 
It requests and processes specific information from the intelligence 
organisations and other relevant information from all available sources; 
It supports the EUMC in its contributions to Initial Planning Guidance and 
Planning Directives of the Political and Security Committee (PSC); 
It develops and prioritises military strategic options as the basis for the 
military advice of the EUMC to the PSC by: 
. defining initial broad options; 
-drawing as appropriate on planning support from external 
sources which will analyse and further develop these 
options in more detail; 
-evaluating the results of this more detailed work and 
commissioning any further work that might be necessary; 
, -presenting an overall assessment, with an 
indication of 
priorities and recommendations as appropriate, to the 
EUMC; 
- It can also contribute to the non-military aspects of the military options; 
- It identifies in co-ordination with national planning staffs and, as 
appropriate, NATO, the forces that might participate in possible EU-led 
operations; 
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It assists the operation commander in technical exchanges with third 
countries offering military contributions to an EU-led operation, and in the 
preparation of the force generation conference; 
It continues to monitor crisis situations. 
(b) Additional functions during operations 
The EUMS, acting under the direction of the EUMC, continuously monitors 
all the military aspects of operations. It conducts strategic analysis in liaison 
with the designated operation commander to support the EUMC in its 
advisory role to the PSC in charge of the strategic direction; 
In the light of political and operational developments, it provides new 
options to the EUMC as a basis for EUMC's military advice to the PSC. 
5. Organisation 
It works under the military direction of the EUMC to which it reports; 
The EUMS is a Council Secretariat department directly attached to the 
SG/HR; it is composed of personnel seconded from the Member States 
acting in an international capacity under the statute to be established by the 
Council; 
EUMS is headed by the DGEUMS, a 3-star flag officer, and works under 
the direction of the EUMC; 
In order to cope with the full spectrum of Petersberg tasks, whether or not 
the EU has recourse to NATO resources, the EUMS is organised as in 
Annex "A"; 
In crisis management situations or exercises, the EUMS could set up Crisis 
Action Teams (CAT), drawing upon its own expertise, manpower and 
infrastructure. In addition, it could, if necessary, draw upon outside 
manpower for temporary augmentation to be requested from the EU 
Member States by the EUMC. 
6. Relations with third countries 
The relations between the EUMS and the non-EU European NATO 
members and other countries, which are candidates for accession to the EU 
will be defined in the document on the relations of the EU with third 
countries. 
II. Permanent consultation arrangements during non-crisis periods 
On the basis of what was agreed at Helsinki and Feira, consultation procedures will, 
during normal periods, be based on the following elements: 
The frequency of and procedures for consultation will depend on requirements and 
should be guided by considerations of pragmatism and efficiency, with a minimum of 
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two meetings in EU+15 format being held during each Presidency on ESDP matters 
and their possible implications for the countries concerned. Within this context, a 
minimum of two meetings will be held during each Presidency with the six non-EU 
European NATO members (EU+6 format). 
One ministerial meeting bringing together the 15 and the 6 countries will be held 
during each Presidency. 
The PSC will play a leading role in the implementation of these arrangements, which 
will also include a minimum of two meetings at Military Committee representative 
level, as well as exchanges at military experts level (in particular those concerning 
the establishment of capability objectives) which will continue in order to enable the 
non-EU European NATO members and other candidate countries to contribute to the 
process of enhancing European military capabilities; meetings of experts may be 
called on matters other than capabilities, such as, for example, in times of crisis, for 
information on the strategic options envisaged. 
These meetings will supplement those held as part of the CFSP enhanced political 
dialogue. 
This meeting schedule is indicative. Extra meetings may be organised if 
circumstances require. Each Presidency will submit the planned timetable of 
meetings for its term and the agendas. The States concerned may also submit 
proposals. 
Each third country may, if it so wishes, appoint a representative from its mission to 
the EU to follow the ESDP and act as an interlocutor with regard to the PSC. 
To facilitate the association of third countries wishing to be involved in EU military 
activities, they may appoint an officer accredited to the EU Military Staff who will 
serve as a contact. A minimum of two information meetings will be held during each 
Presidency for these officers from the 15 and the 6 countries, which could for 
example address the question of how the follow-up of crisis situations should be 
handled. In addition, specific liaison arrangements may be organised, particularly for 
the duration of NATO/EU exercises. These arrangements will be particularly 
important for the involvement of the 15 and the 6 in the development of the military 
capabilities available to the EU for EU-led operations. 
111. Arrangements during crisis periods: 
(A) Pre-operational phase 
As agreed at Helsinki and Feira, in the event of a crisis, dialogue and 
consultation will be intensified at all levels, including ministerial level, in 
the period leading up to the Council decision. When a crisis develops, these 
intensified consultations will provide an opportunity for exchanges of views 
on situation assessment and discussion of the concerns raised by the 
countries affected, particularly when they consider their security interests to 
be involved. 
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When the possibility of an EU-led military crisis management operation is 
under consideration, the aim of these consultations, which could be held at 
politico-military experts level, will be to ensure that the countries potentially 
contributing to such an operation are informed of the EU's intentions, 
particularly with regard to the military options being envisaged. In this 
respect, once the EU begins to examine in depth an option requiring the use 
of NATO assets and capabilities, particular attention will be paid to 
consultation of the six non-EU European NATO members. 
(B) Operational phase 
Once the Council has chosen the strategic military option(s), the operational 
planning work will be presented to the non-EU European NATO members 
and the other candidate countries which have expressed their intention in 
principle of taking part in the operation, to enable them to determine the 
nature and volume of the contribution they could make to an EU-led 
operation. 
Once the Council has approved the operation concept, having taken into 
consideration the outcome of the consultation with third countries likely to 
take part in the operation, these countries will be formally invited to take 
part in the operation according to the arrangements agreed in Helsinki, i. e.: 
- the non-EU European NATO members will participate 
if they so wish, in the event of an operation requiring 
recourse to NATO assets and capabilities. They will, on a 
decision by the Council, be invited to take part in 
operations where the EU does not use NATO assets. 
- other countries which are candidates for accession to the 
EU may also be invited by the Council to take part in EU- 
led operations once the Council has decided to launch 
such an operation. 
For operations requiring recourse to NATO assets and capabilities, 
operational planning will be carried out by the Alliance's planning bodies, 
and for an autonomous EU operation it will be carried out within one of the 
European strategic level headquarters. For operations requiring recourse to 
NATO assets, the non-EU European allies will be involved in planning 
according to the procedures laid down within NATO. For autonomous 
operations in which they are invited to take part, the candidate countries and 
non-EU European allies may send liaison officers to the European Military 
Staff bodies at strategic level for exchanges of information on operational 
planning and the contributions envisaged. The States concerned will provide 
the EU with an initial indication of their contribution, which will then be 
further specified during exchanges with the Operation Commander assisted 
by the EUMS. 
These exchanges will make it possible to establish the significant nature of 
the national contributions proposed and their suitability as regards the 
requirements of the EU-led operation. The countries concerned will confirm 
the level and quality of their national contribution at the Force Generation 
Conference, following which the operation will be formally launched and 
the Committee of Contributors established. 
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(C) Committee of Contributors 
The Committee of Contributors will play a key role in the day-to-day 
management of the operation. It will be the main forum for discussing all 
problems relating to day-to-day management having regard to the measures 
taken by the PSC in this field. The deliberations of the Committee of 
Contributors will constitute a positive contribution to those of the PSC. 
In this connection: 
- it will be supplied with detailed information regarding 
the operation on the ground via the EU bodies responsible 
for follow-up. It will receive regular information from the 
Operation Commander who may be heard by the 
Committee. 
- it will deal with the various problems concerning the 
implementation of the military operation, the use of 
forces, and all day-to-day management matters which are 
not exclusively, under the instructions he will have 
received, the responsibility of the Operation Commander. 
- it will provide opinions and recommendations on 
possible adjustments to operational planning, including 
possible adjustments to objectives which may affect the 
situation of forces. It will adopt a position on planning the 
end of the operation and the withdrawal of forces. 
In these areas, the Political and Security Committee, which exercises the 
political control and strategic direction of the operation, will take account of 
the views expressed by the Committee of Contributors. 
All EU Member States are entitled to be present at the Committee's 
discussions irrespective of whether or not they are taking part in the 
operation, but only contributing States will take part in the day-to-day 
management of the operation. Non-EU European allies and candidate 
countries deploying significant military forces under an EU-led operation 
will have the same rights and obligations in terms of day-to-day 
management of the operation as EU Member States taking part in the 
operation. 
The work of the Committee of Contributors will be conducted without 
prejudice to consultations in the framework of the single structure including 
non-EU European NATO members and EU candidate countries. 
Depending on the nature of its tasks, the Committee may meet in the 
appropriate format. For Member States, it may be comprised of 
representatives on the PSC and on the Military Committee. It will usually be 
chaired by a representative of the Secretary-General/I-iigh Representative or 
the Presidency, assisted by the Chairman of the Military Committee or his 
Deputy. The Director of the Military Staff and the Operation Commander 
may also attend or be represented in the Committee. 
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The Chairman will be responsible for conveying the outcome of the 
Committee's discussions to the PSC and to the Military Committee. 
The Committee will be consulted by the Military Committee and the PSC on 
matters relating to planning the end of the operation and the withdrawal of 
forces. Once the operation is ended, the Committee of Contributors may be 
requested to provide its assessment of the lessons drawn from the operation. 
ANNEX VII to ANNEX VI 
STANDING ARRANGEMENTS FOR CONSULTATION AND COOPERATION BETWEEN 
THE EU AND NATO 
I. Guiding principles: 
As stated in the conclusions of the Helsinki European Council, the aim in relations 
between the EU and NATO is to ensure effective consultation, cooperation and 
transparency in determining the appropriate military response to crises, and to 
guarantee effective crisis management. At the Feira European Council it was decided 
to base consultations with NATO on the following principles: 
- Development of consultation and cooperation between the EU and 
NATO 
must take place in full respect of the autonomy of EU decision-making. 
- The EU and NATO have undertaken 
further to strengthen and develop 
their cooperation in military crisis-management on the basis of shared 
values, equality and in a spirit of partnership. The aim is to achieve full and 
effective consultation, cooperation and transparency in order to identify and 
take rapid decisions on the most appropriate military response to a crisis and 
to ensure efficient crisis-management. In this context, EU-objectives in the 
field of military capabilities and those arising, for those countries concerned, 
from NATO's Defence Capabilities Initiative, will be mutually reinforcing. 
- While being mutually reinforcing 
in crisis management, the EU and 
NATO are organisations of a different nature. This will be taken into 
account in the arrangements concerning their relations and in the assessment 
to be made by the EU of existing procedures governing WEU-NATO 
relations with a view to their possible adaptation to an EU-NATO 
framework. 
- Arrangements and modalities for relations between the EU and NATO 
will reflect the fact that each Organisation will be dealing with the other on 
an equal footing. 
- In the relations between the EU and NATO as institutions, there will be no 
discrimination against any of the Member States. 
In that spirit, and to place this consultation and cooperation within a true strategic 
partnership on crisis management, the autonomy of NATO and EU decision-making 
will be fully respected. 
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Consultations and cooperation will be developed between the two organisations on 
questions of common interest relating to security, defence and crisis management, so 
that crises can be met with the most appropriate military response and effective crisis 
management ensured. 
II. Arrangements for consultation outside times of crisis 
1. Regular dialogue will be established between the two organisations to 
ensure consultation, cooperation and transparency, in particular by holding 
meetings between the PSC and the North Atlantic Council (NAC) and 
ministerial meetings, at least once during each Presidency; either 
organisation may request additional meetings, for which it will propose a 
draft agenda. 
Meetings between the NATO and EU Military Committees may be held as 
required, at the request of either organisation, with at least one such meeting 
during each Presidency. These meetings will be held on the basis of specific 
agendas. 
There may also be meetings between subsidiary groups (such as the PCG 
7) and the PMG ( 8), or Military Committee working parties), in the form of 
ad hoc EU/NATO groups (for example on capabilities) or expert groups 
along HTF Plus lines, when there is a need for NATO expertise on specific 
subjects. 
The organisational arrangements for these meetings will have to be agreed 
between the two organisations. 
2. When necessary, and in particular where the capabilities and expertise of 
the Alliance are concerned, the dialogue will be supplemented by inviting 
NATO representatives to meetings, in accordance with the provisions of the 
TEU and on a basis of reciprocity. This will apply to the Secretary-General 
of NATO for ministerial meetings, in particular those attended by Defence 
Ministers; the Chairman of the NATO Military Committee for meetings of 
the Military Committee, and, in view of his responsibilities for the European 
pillar of NATO and his potential role in EU-led operations, DSACEUR ( 9) 
for meetings of the Military Committee. 
3. Regular contacts between the Secretaries-General, Secretariats and 
Military Staffs of the EU and NATO will also be a useful contribution to 
transparency and exchanges of information and documents. 
Under this heading there will be: 
- contacts between the Secretaries-General or between the 
Assistant Secretary-General for Political Affairs and the 
European Union's official responsible for ESDP; 
- contacts between NATO's International Staff and the 
Council Secretariat departments dealing with the ESDP 
(PPEWU (10), DGE (11), Situation Centre, etc), in 
particular for preparing for meetings and forwarding 
documents for such meetings. 
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- contacts, based on directives from the Military 
Committee, between experts from the EU Military Staff 
(EUMS) and their opposite numbers on NATO's Military 
Staff, in particular for preparing for meetings and 
forwarding documents for meetings (including planning 
documents). 
All these contacts and exchanges will be the subject of regular reports to the 
PSC and the EUMC. 
III. NATO/EU relations in times of crisis 
(A) In the emergency phase of a crisis contacts and meetings will be stepped 
up, including those at ministerial level if appropriate, so that, in the interests 
of transparency, consultation and cooperation, the two organisations can 
discuss their assessments of the crisis and how it may develop, together with 
any related security problems. 
At the request of the PSC, the EUMC will instruct the European Military 
Staff to determine and prioritise the strategic military options. Having 
determined the initial general options, the Staff may call on external 
planning sources, in particular the guaranteed access to NATO planning 
capabilities, to analyse and refine these options. This contribution will be 
evaluated by the EUMS, which may commission any additional work that 
may be necessary. 
Should the Union intend to look more closely at an option calling for 
predetermined NATO assets and capabilities, the PSC will so inform the 
NAC. 
(B) In the event of an operation calling on NATO assets and capabilities 
(see Appendix to this Annex) 
- on the basis of opinions and recommendations from the 
Military Committee assisted by the EUMS, the PSC will 
send the designated operation commander, via the 
Military Committee, strategic directives enabling him to 
draw up the necessary planning documents for the 
operation (CONOPS, OPLAN), making use of the 
guaranteed access to NATO planning capabilities; these 
planning documents will be submitted to the PSC for 
approval; 
- experts from the two organisations, in liaison with 
DSACEUR as strategic coordinator, will meet to specify 
the predetermined NATO assets and capabilities 
concerned by this option; 
- once the predetermined assets and capabilities to be used 
in the operation have been specified, the EU will forward 
a request to NATO; 
- the hand-over of the predetermined assets and 
capabilities used in the EU operation, together with the 
arrangements for making them available and any recall 
conditions, will be identified at a PSC/NAC meeting; 
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- throughout the operation the Alliance will be kept 
informed of the use of NATO assets and capabilities, if 
necessary by convening a meeting of the PSC and the 
NAC; 
- the commander of the operation will be invited to 
EUMC meetings to report on the progress of the 
operation. The Presidency may invite him to attend 
meetings of the PSC and the GAC; 
- having first informed the NAC, the PSC will propose to 
the Council that the operation be terminated. The EU will 
terminate the use of NATO assets and capabilities. 
(C) In the event of a European Union operation conducted without NATO assets 
Throughout the period in which the European Union conducts an operation 
without NATO assets, or if NATO conducts a crisis management operation, 
each organisation will keep the other informed of the general progress of the 
operation. 
Appendix to ANNEX VII to ANNEX VI 
ANNEX TO THE PERMANENT ARRANGEMENTS ON EU/NATO 
CONSULTATION AND COOPERATION ON THE IMPLEMENTATION 
OF PARAGRAPH 10 OF THE WASHINGTON COMMUNIQUE 
On the basis of decisions adopted by the Alliance at the Washington Summit on 24 April 1999, the 
European Union suggests that the arrangements between the two organisations for the implementation 
of Berlin Plus should be as follows: 
(1) Guaranteed access to NATO's planning capabilities 
The European Union will have guaranteed permanent access ( 12) to NATO's 
planning capabilities: 
- when the EU examines options with a view to an operation, drawing up its 
strategic military options can involve a contribution from NATO's planning 
capabilities; 
- in order to provide operational planning for an operation which has 
recourse to NATO assets and capabilities. 
That access will be guaranteed under the following arrangements: 
- under the control of the EUMC, the Director-General of the EUMS will 
send DSACEUR, as part of his responsibilities within NATO's European 
pillar, technical planning requests to contribute to the drafting of strategic 
options; 
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- in the field of operational planning, the Military Staff of the Alliance with 
responsibility for handling EU requests will be accessible to experts from 
the Member States who so wish without discrimination; 
- in the event of DSACEUR's informing the EU that he cannot at the same 
time satisfy both the EU request and NATO work on a non-Article V 
operation, close consultation will take place between the organisations at the 
appropriate level in order that an acceptable solution for the two 
organisations in terms of managing priorities and allocating assets may be 
reached, the final decision lying with NATO; 
- should NATO undertake an Article V operation and should it have had to 
refuse or recall planning capabilities in that context, the EU will have access 
to those NATO planning capabilities which remain available. 
(2) Presumption of availability of pre-identified assets and capabilities 
Regarding the pre-identification of assets, work on pre-identifying the collective 
assets and capabilities of the Alliance which may be used for EU-led operations will 
be carried out by EU and Alliance experts and will be validated by a meeting of the 
Military Committees of the two organisations with a view to their approval under 
each organisation's specific procedures, 
If the EU should consider an in-depth study of a strategic option which calls for 
NATO assets and capabilities, the PSC will inform the NAC. 
In the event of an EU operation calling for NATO assets and capabilities, the 
following procedure for placing those pre-identified assets and capabilities at the 
disposal of the European Union will be established: 
- once the EU has chosen a strategic option, experts from both organisations 
will meet to determine the pre-identified assets and capabilities which are 
likely to be used within that operation; 
- on a proposal from the EUMC based on a report from the EUMS which 
takes account of talks with experts, the PSC will forward a request for pre- 
identified assets and capabilities to the NAC; 
- the NAC will reply to the PSC request. A meeting of experts from the two 
organisations will examine from the technical viewpoint the extent to which 
the assets and capabilities proposed by the Alliance match the EU request; 
- availability will be formally confirmed at a PSC/NAC meeting in the form 
of an overall package defining the practical arrangements, including the 
administrative, legal and financial aspects, for making them available 
throughout the operation; 
- the assets and capabilities will be available to the EU throughout the 
operation, except in cases where the Alliance has to carry out an Article V 
operation or a non-Article V operation which has been given priority after 
consultation between the two organisations; 
- new requests which might be made during the operation will go through 
the same procedure as described for the initial package; 
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- throughout the operation the EU will inform NATO of the use of the 
assets and capabilities placed at the EU's disposal, in particular at meetings 
between the PSC and the NAC and through the intermediary of the 
Chairman of the EU Military Committee, come to address the Military 
Committee of the Alliance. 
(3) Identification of a series of command options made available to the EU 
Discussions will take place between experts from the EU and the Alliance with a view 
to identifying a series of possible options for the choice of all or part of a chain of 
command (operation commanders, force commanders, unit commanders and 
associated Military Staff elements). These discussions will include developing the 
role of the DSACEUR to enable him to meet his European responsibilities fully and 
effectively. These discussions will be validated by a meeting of the Military 
Committees of the two organisations with a view to their approval under each 
organisation's specific procedures. 
- should the EU consider an in-depth study of a strategic option which calls 
for NATO command options, in particular for the command of the 
operation, the PSC will inform the NAC; 
- after the EU Council has adopted a strategic option and chosen to call 
upon an operations commander, the PSC will forward to the NAC a request 
for the command options relating to the operation; 
- after the NAC has replied, the Council will appoint the operation 
commander and, through the intermediary of the PSC, instruct him to 
activate the chain of command; 
- the entire chain of command must remain under the political control and 
strategic direction of the EU throughout the operation, after consultation 
between the two organisations. In that framework the operation commander 
will report on the conduct of the operation to EU bodies only. NATO will be 
informed of developments in the situation by the appropriate bodies, in 
particular the PSC and the Chairman of the Military Committee. 
Footnotes: 
( 1) Council Resolution of 17 December 1999 on "Into the new millenium": 
developing new working procedures for European cooperation in the field of 
education and training (OJ C 8,12.1.2000, p. 6). 
( 2) The Petersberg tasks include humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks 
and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking. 
(Article 17(2) TEU). 
(3) Denmark recalled Protocol No 5 annexed to the Treaty of Amsterdam. 
( 4) C3 = command, control and communications. 
( 5) Defence Capabilities Initiative. 
( 6) Preliminary definitions: 
309 
Strategic planning: planning activities that start as soon as a crisis emerges and end 
when the EU political authorities approve a military strategic option or a set of 
military strategic options. The strategic process encompasses military situation 
assessment, definition of a POIJMIL framework and development of military 
strategic options. 
Military strategic option: a possible military action designed to achieve the 
POUMIL objectives outlined in the POUMIL framework. A military strategic option 
will describe the outline military solution, the required resource and constraints and 
recommendations on the choice of the operations commander and OHQ. 
(7) NATO Policy Coordination Group. 
( 8) Politico-Military Group. 
(9) Deputy Supreme Allied Commander, Europe. 
(10) Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit. 
(11) Directorate-General for External Relations. 
(12) without case-by-case NATO authorisation 
Annex D 
ESDP Chronology 
4 October 1997 - PM Blair announces that he wants the UK to be at the heart of Europe. 
November 1997 - Memorandum from Downing Street goes out to Whitehall Departments requesting 
policy areas in which the UK can become more engaged in Europe. 
May - July 1998 - Hatfield committee develops the Saint Malo initiative. 
July-October 1998 - Cross departmental debate concerning the MoD's proposal. 
4 October 1998 - Informal European Council at Pörtschach, at which the UK dropped its objection to 
EU defence. 
October - December 1998 - UK and French officials work towards common agreement on the Saint 
Maio initiative. 
4 November 1998 - Meeting of EU defence ministers at Vienna in which participants discussed defence in an EU context for the first time. 
3-4 December 1998 - Anglo-French summit at Saint Malo. Accords and Letter of Intent signed. 
24-25 April 1999 - NATO summit, Washington - Strategic concept discussed. 
3-4 June 1999 - Cologne European Council, limitation of defence discussions to the Petersburg tasks. 
Regular ad hoc meeting of the GAC (including, as appropriate, Defence Ministers), Creation of Interim 
Political and Security Committee (COPS), Interim Military Committee (MC), Military Staff (MS) 
including a Situation Centre (SitCen) 
20 July 1999 - Anglo-Italian summit, Rome - Launching of European Defence Capabilities Initiative (EDCI) 
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22-23 November 1999- WEU Ministerial Council, Luxembourg, audit of assets and capabilities for 
European led crisis management missions. 
25 November 1999 - Anglo-French summit, London - Joint declaration on European defence. 
10-11 December 1999 - Helsinki European Council, Headline Goals (by 2003,60.000 troops 
deployable within 60 days) and sustainable for one year; Develop modalities for full co-operation 
between the EU and NATO; Develop modalities for consultation with accession candidates and non- 
EU European NATO and WEU partners 
23-24 March 2000 - Informal European Council, Lisbon - Civilian Crisis Management committee 
established. 
15-16 May 2000 - WEU Ministerial meeting, Porto - Audit conducted of European military 
capabilities. 
19-20 June 2000 - Santa Maria da Feira European Council - Establishment of four ad-hoc EU/NATO 
committees on security, capability goals, modalities of the use of NATO assets, definition of permanent 
consultation mechanisms. Headline goal of up to 5000 police officers for international missions across 
the range of conflict prevention. Proposing establishment of committee for civilian aspects of crisis 
management. 
20 November 2000 - Brussels Capabilities Commitment Conference. 
6-12 December 2000 - Nice European Council, established formal definition of the headline goals, 
permanent political and military structures, consultation arrangements and definition and 
implementation of EU capabilities. 
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